Journalism practice, media and democracy in Venezuela (2000-2010) by Bracho-Polanco, E. & Bracho-Polanco, E.
  
 
 
WestminsterResearch 
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/research/westminsterresearch 
 
 
Journalism practice, media and democracy in Venezuela 
(2000-2010) 
 
Edmundo E. Bracho-Polanco 
 
Faculty of Media, Arts and Design 
 
 
 
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 2014. 
 
This is an exact reproduction of the paper copy held by the University of 
Westminster library. 
 
 
 
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journalism practice, media and democracy  
in Venezuela (2000-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edmundo E. Bracho-Polanco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
Westminster for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
London 
September 2014 
 
 
 
i 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Since first winning elections in 1998, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez became one 
of the most vocal leaders in the international arena to oppose the U.S. and western 
neo-liberal policies. His administration arguably represents the most radical socio-
political shift in the western hemisphere during the twenty-first century. Its political 
model has led to a political polarisation previously unknown in Venezuela and Latin 
America.  
 
In such a highly-polarised environment and ongoing clashes between pro-Chávez 
forces and the opposition, the news media have played a central role as active political 
entities. Venezuelan journalists have become agents of specific ideological advocacy 
and political militancy. Such a scenario in the media collides with most normative 
liberal notions of balanced, accurate, transparent, and ethical journalistic practice, as 
well as with certain ideals of the media’s democratic role.   
  
Based on a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with Venezuelan journalists, 
media-related professionals and commentators – designed to represent adequately 
both sides of the ideological divide – this thesis critically explores how journalistic 
practices have been carried out in Venezuela under the Chávez administration. As its 
central and original contribution to knowledge it analyses how news media 
professionals in Venezuela evaluate the ways they have reflected an acute political 
and social confrontation in news outlets, and their varying roles as agents that shape a 
highly-polarised social sphere. Very importantly, it offers answers to the question of 
politicisation among journalists, and the ways they understand the boundaries of 
professional and normative practice.  
 
The research draws conclusions in relation to the ways reporters, editors, scholars and 
commentators perceive journalistic practice as a means to promote democratic values, 
and whether or not Venezuelan news media have enhanced democratic debate during 
the 2000s.   
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Introduction 
 
This study examines how journalistic practices have been carried out in Venezuela, 
between 2000 and 2010, under the leadership of President Hugo Chávez and in a 
most polarised social and political environment. In doing so, it investigates how news 
media professionals evaluate the ways they have reflected an acute political and social 
confrontation in news outlets, their journalistic values and tenets, and their roles as 
agents that potentially shape a highly-polarised public sphere. The research draws 
conclusions related to the re-shaping of Venezuelan journalistic culture during the 
2000s, the ways reporters and editors perceive themselves – or not – as promoters of 
democratic values in their work, and whether or not Venezuelan news media have 
enhanced the democratic debate.   
 
Since the early 2000s, Venezuela has arguably epitomised the radical political shift that 
a significant part of Latin American nations have been experiencing. Profound social, 
economic and political changes have been introduced by a wave of anti-neo-liberal 
governments. These have broadly been characterised as socialist or leftist by most 
analysts. Also, an important group of scholars have defined most of them as populist.  
 
This set of leftist Latin American leaders claim to aspire to the construction of more 
inclusive societies and stronger democracies, and have indeed introduced an array of 
social and communitarian policies as part of such objectives (Ellner and Tinker-Salas 
2007, Borón 2008, Lander 2008). However, many of the governments they lead have 
been accused of pursuing authoritarian and non-democratic forms (Petkoff 2005 and 
2010, Schamis 2006, Castañeda and Morales 2008).  
 
In recent years and according to various authors, arguably the most influential case of 
this strand of authoritarianism has been represented by Hugo Chávez (Ibid, Caballero 
2010), democratically-elected President in 1998, and re-elected in 2000 and 2006. A 
self-declared socialist, his government increasingly employed the media as one of the 
most important tools to promote its ideology and political agenda, and also identified 
the privately-owned media as a principle obstacle in its efforts to transform the country 
– and the region – by way of a revolutionary process (Bisbal 2008a and 2009, Petkoff 
2005, Cañizalez 2009b and 2011).  
 
Venezuela’s political opposition, and both local and international organisations that 
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monitor issues such as freedom of expression and human rights, have accused 
Chávez’s government of attempting to silence his critics in the media and to close 
down the paths of democratic practice – allegations the President and his followers 
deny (Hawkins 2003, Amnesty International 2010, Provea 2010, Cañizalez 2011). 
Sympathisers of the government, in what further reflects the country’s high political 
polarisation, claim that the opposition media represent an elitist, bourgeois, anti-
revolutionary, and pro-U.S. group that attempts to sabotage a radical political project of 
social emancipation and egalitarianism (McCoy and Myers 2004, Ellner 2004, Borón 
2008, Lander 2008).  
 
Although Chávez attained a firm grip on the local media that antagonised him and 
managed to impose his policies by the mid-2000s, some private outlets – mainly the 
opposition press, and possibly due to a strategic allowance by the government – have 
been able to inform and comment with relative independence. Yet, news production 
has been predominantly biased and increasingly partisan, according to many 
observers (Bisbal 2008a and 2009, Quiñonez 2011).  
 
During the Chávez era, ideological bias and political advocacy in Venezuelan news 
media have increasingly gained terrain, mirroring like few other social phenomena the 
way the country has become politically divided and highly polarised (Corrales 2005, 
Bisbal 2009, Parra 2010, Lozada 2011, Kitzberger 2012, Waisbord 2012). This political 
environment has profoundly transformed that of the media, and journalists seem to 
have primarily become agents of specific ideological advocacy and rivalling political 
militancy (Hawkins 2003, Corrales 2005, Bisbal 2008a and 2009, Hidalgo 2009, 
Lozada 2011). Such a scenario in the media is argued to conflict with basic notions of 
balanced, accurate, transparent and ethical journalistic practice within Venezuela. As a 
consequence, the two colliding and opposed views – those that are pro-government 
and those of the opposition – by which the media represent reality have been affecting 
the very notion of democracy at the heart of the society (Bisbal 2008b and 2009, 
Cañizalez 2009b, Bisbal and Nicodemo 2010).  
 
Investigating the dynamics of journalistic practice and strategies within the media 
battleground in Venezuela seems a necessary precondition for understanding the ways 
in which politics, and the political, are altering traditional notions of journalism and of a 
media-saturated environment. Indeed, few countries in the world have witnessed in 
recent years a surge of its local media as a political battleground as intensely as 
Venezuela has under Chávez’s government (McCoy and Myers 2004, Petkoff 2005, 
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Botía 2007, Lozada 2011). Much has been written about his political project or about 
the categorisation of such a leftist or populist model. Yet, there are very few studies 
which explore the way media practices and strategies have been changing, since 
Chávez gained power, as a prominent characteristic of a highly-polarised political 
struggle.  
 
Research questions and methodology  
 
The principal outcome of this study will be charting and examining journalistic practices 
and strategies in the news media, during the Chávez era; to what degree these have 
become – or not – unbalanced, biased, and politicised; and the way these may 
intensify or undercut the development of democratic values in the country and 
elsewhere in the region. Journalistic practice in Venezuela, between 2000 and 2010, 
may be perceived as a means to exercise democratic agency by people working in the 
national media, or the contrary.  
 
The research, however, does not aim to elaborate a prognosis, but rather to focus on 
understanding and accessing recent trends in journalism practices and to what extent a 
specific national political environment has influenced these.  
 
In view of opinions and arguments formulated by scholars and commentators on recent 
political, social and media changes in Venezuela under Chávez, the research’s leading 
hypothesis is that the traits of the Chávez administration, the politicisation of both pro-
government and oppositional news media, and the highly-polarised political climate in 
Venezuela, have arguably been the key factors in undermining the practice of certain 
core concepts and notions of professional journalism, particularly in accordance with 
liberal models, prevalent in the Anglo-American media cultures. This assumption, 
however, might be false.  
 
Importantly, this study sets out to make an original contribution in the sense of critically 
explicating recent shifts in journalistic practices in the case of Venezuela, and in 
amplifying the debate of democracy and media in the country and, to some degree, in 
other nations’ contexts that have been undergoing similar conditions of colliding 
models of democracy, political projects, and media dynamics and practice.  
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This research is organised around the following main questions:  
 
 How do journalists in Venezuela evaluate their practice and the ways in which they 
represent the nation’s political and social reality?  
 How do media professionals interpret the implications of journalistic practices in 
Venezuela for democracy? 
 How do journalists and media-related workers characterise Venezuela’s socio-
political environment and democracy during the Chávez era?  
 How do politics, ideology and cultural/historical factors shape news production in 
Venezuela, and to what degree do journalists consider themselves agents of 
politicisation and of democratisation?  
 
In answering the main research questions this study relies on a theoretical framework, 
historical accounts, and an empirical investigation that is based on finding original, first-
hand qualitative data though the use of an in-depth interview technique. This was 
found to be the most suitable methodology for gathering and describing opinions, 
perceptions and attitudes of journalists, editors, media workers, media owners, public 
functionaries, media-related scholars, political commentators, and media-related 
NGOs’ spokespersons that were assessed critically. The interviewing process with 42 
persons followed a set of technical, ethical, interpretative, and analytical criteria, as 
formulated by various authors, in order to attain validity, effectiveness and explanatory 
rigour (Kvale 1996, Berger 1998 and 2000, Wengraf 2002, Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009).  
 
A set of interviewees was identified and chosen so as to obtain a heterogeneous and 
representative sample (Weiss 1995, Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Interviewees were 
chosen primarily on the basis of their own political-ideological alignment and that of the 
news media outlet they work or have worked for during the 2000s, while also 
considering the levels of public influence and opinion-making power these outlets are 
argued to entail, according to existing studies (Bisbal 2008b, Cañizalez 2009a). 
Another aspect of the selection criteria was that, whenever possible, journalists had 
some degree of “editorial responsibility” (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986) and that they 
covered news related to politics, community, legislation and the economy. The sample 
purposely combined professionals of varying hierarchical levels working within news 
organisations. 
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Ten thematic areas were developed – informed by concepts and theories which were 
reviewed and by opinion-patterns found through the interviewing process – in order to 
provide an analytical framework for describing and discussing the diverse data 
obtained by means of in-depth semi-structured interviewing. These were then 
evaluated critically within four analytical strands, through which the interviews’ findings 
were linked to the diverse theories and historical perspectives explored in the first 
chapters of this study.  
 
Structure of the research’s chapters 
 
This research is broadly concerned with the relation between media and democracy, 
and they are inextricably linked (Keane 1991 and 2009, McChesney 2000, Curran 
2002, McQuail 2003 and 2005, Dahlgren 2009, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010, Street 2011, 
Waisbord 2012 and 2013). The first chapter of this study provides a selective review of 
the debate about the nature of democracy, and of the diversity of democratic models 
and theories, primarily within the radical and liberal traditions. Democracy is hardly a 
consensual concept, and its normative proposals are varied (Caballero 1983, Callinicos 
1991, Held 2006, Sartori 1991 and 2007b, Keane 2009). Hence, in order to understand 
the role of the media and of journalists within a democracy, it seemed necessary to 
examine the varying – and often colliding – views and interpretations presented in 
theories of democracy.  
 
The second chapter offers a review of the literature focused on the relationship 
between democracy and the media. It charts and explains relevant western theories 
that underpin the manner in which news production and journalism should contribute to 
enhancing rational debate in the public sphere and democratic practice. Importantly, it 
presents competing perspectives apropos the relationship between media, journalistic 
practice and democratic models, as to provide a conceptual framework by which to 
help comprehend the tensions that have been emerging in the journalistic occupation 
in Venezuela during the Chávez era vis-à-vis its potential democratic role.  
 
The discussion of media and democracy is further explored in chapter three, but with 
an exclusive emphasis on formulations centred on the context of Latin America and 
Venezuela. In fact, the majority of authors reviewed in this section of the study are 
Latin American and, although their theoretical formulations do entail relevant 
connections to the dominant western discourses on journalism, media and culture, and 
democracy, their conceptual elaborations are essentially based on assessing the 
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specificities of Latin American societies, cultures, politics and economics, within their 
‘peripheral’, ‘hybrid’ and ambivalently ‘modern’ character.  
 
In chapter four, a historical framework is provided – with some sociological explanation, 
analytical insights, and practical perspectives elaborated mainly by Venezuelan and 
Latin American scholars – to explicate the trajectory of the media and journalism in 
Venezuela, while offering a historical context for understanding basic contemporary 
social, political and economic changes in the country. Linkages between political and 
socio-economic aspects, successive projects of ‘democracy’ and ‘modernity’, and the 
way the national news media have been an active part of such developments are 
highlightened in this part of the study.  
 
The research’s techniques and methodology are explained in chapter five. Crucially, it 
delineates the main research questions and addresses the methodological approaches 
by which to assess and help answer them. Scholarly explanation is provided in order to 
justify the utilisation of in-depth semi-structured interviewing as the core technique for 
obtaining reliable qualitative data and examining the findings. Advantages and 
limitations of the interviewing method are addressed, as well as the sample used – 
Venezuelan journalists, editors, media owners, communications scholars, public 
functionaries, media-related NGOs’ spokespersons, and political commentators –,  and 
a description of the fieldwork experience as carried out in Venezuela.  
 
Chapter six represents the most extensive and detailed part of this study. It is devoted 
to a predominantly descriptive presentation of the empirical findings, attained through 
an intense in-depth interviewing process. In order to interpret the broad and substantial 
content gathered from the interviewing process, ten different qualitative themes of 
discussion were developed. These thematic threads were elaborated in part, resorting 
to central ideas and concepts addressed in theoretical chapters, and encompassing 
patterns in opinions that emerged during the interview process. Rather than artificially 
splitting down the ten themes throughout different chapters, because of the nature of 
the findings and the intricate linkage they hold between themselves, presenting them in 
one chapter seemed adequate and more appropriate for analysis. 
 
These empirical findings are analysed critically in the seventh chapter, linking them 
with the theoretical, historical, and practical formulations discussed in the previous 
chapters. In order to achieve this in a succinct, systematic and rigorous manner, four 
different analytical strands were elaborated for this section of the study.   
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Conclusions are presented in the eighth chapter. It offers a condensed summary of the 
central aspects emerging from the critical connection of theoretical, historical, and 
methodological aspects reviewed and the qualitative data obtained and analysed. 
Importantly, it raises pressing questions for further analytical exploration on the topics 
of Venezuelan media, its shifting journalistic culture, polarisation in news media, 
challenges for western and normative models of journalism and for the media as an 
agent for strengthening democracy, and the implications these might have in post- 
Chávez Venezuela.    
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Chapter 1 
 
The democratic debate: models and perspectives  
 
 
This study seeks to explore the relationship between media and democracy in order to 
contextualise how political specificities can shape media practice. To do so in a 
comprehensive way, it must first provide various viewpoints on the definition and 
models of democracy.  
 
There has existed wide debate about the nature of democracy and different theories 
have been drawn in an attempt to define and explain it (Schumpeter 1976, Bobbio 
1987, Dahl 1991 and 1999, Sartori 1991 and 2007b, Schmitter and Karl 1991, Laclau 
and Mouffe 2001, Diamond 2002, Held 2006). In western societies, democracy has 
become since the early nineteenth century a valuable political form, yet “vulnerable in 
theory and practice and always incomplete in certain respects” (Duncan 1983: 3).  
 
It could be argued that the theory of democracy is vulnerable in the sense that it has 
been subject, throughout a long history, to changes in the discourses that have aimed 
to define it. But despite its vulnerabilities, democratic practice proposes ‘the consent of 
the people’, the most convincing principle of legitimacy, as the fundamental base of a 
political order (Held 2006). It is by no means an infallible political solution for all the ills 
a society might have, but it is the political system that has proven historically to have 
the best capacity to “modify its norms and institutions in a consensual manner and 
according to the demands of the people” (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 81). 
 
After the fall of the Soviet regime, with the surge of democratic movements in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and the significant democratic shift in most nations of the 
Americas, democracy seems to have become the prevailing standard of political 
legitimacy (Bobbio 1997, Diamond 2002, Sartori 2007b). This has meant an 
intensification of democratic practice since the early 1990s, as David Held has argued: 
 
In more and more countries citizen-voters are, in principle, able to hold 
public decision-makers into account, while the decision-makers 
themselves represent the interests of their constituents – ‘the people’ in 
a delimited territory (2006: x). 
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However, the advance of democracy has also meant the expansion of its meaning and 
the divergence of views about its character.  
 
Held (op. cit) has mapped and explained various models of democracy, seeking to 
maintain a balance in both the descriptive and normative basis on which some of these 
models are founded. These outlines are by no means definitive. After all, as David 
Miller explains, a model is “an ideal representation derived from certain axioms 
concerning human behaviour, not a depiction of any political system” (1983: 136). 
 
Considering how rich and broad the debate about democracy is and the sheer bulk of 
existing literature related to it, for this study to be feasible it is necessary to be selective 
in choosing those models of democracy that seem most relevant for this study. In doing 
so, some of Held’s formulations of models of democracy (2006) will be used partially 
and selectively, as well as contesting views from different authors belonging to diverse 
trends of political thought. This mixture of theoretical perspectives and historical 
outlines represent an apt framework for understanding the various notions of 
democracy. Due to the nature of this study, and because of its particular focus, not all 
of Held’s models will be described and utilised.  
 
Held (Ibid) has elaborated ten different models, drawing from different theories and 
ranging from ancient Greece to twenty-first century paradigms. However, Paul E. 
Corcoran (1983) proposes, in what he evaluates as a simplistic yet guiding formulation, 
that both democratic theories and models during the twentieth century seem to have 
moved into two main directions of political thought. One is the radical tradition that 
follows from Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The other derives from the Individualistic 
English liberal current. 
 
Although Corcoran considers this binary view limited and somewhat reductionist when 
dealing with a concept as complex as democracy, it can offer a starting point to assess 
modern variants of democratic thought. 
 
1.1. Foundations for radicalism and liberalism 
 
Rousseau’s Social Contract offers a view of democracy as a means for the people’s 
will to be transformed into public policy (Miller 1983). It is through direct participation 
and open debate, argues Rousseau, that the people should reach decisions that 
determine what is to be done politically, and thus attain popular sovereignty. In a 
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radical stance of this strand of political thought, it is the people that enact legislation 
directly (Ibid).    
 
By contrast, a conception of democracy as a political device in which the people 
exercise their sovereignty by electing those that represent them politically, follows the 
tradition of English liberalism, and is well exemplified by James Mill’s ideas in his 
Essay on Government (Ibid, Held 2006). Under this political paradigm, democracy 
becomes a protective device, through which the people can be protected from their 
political representatives in case these commit excesses, and also from each other. 
This type of ‘protective’ democracy is argued to entail the means by which to hold 
accountable those who exercise as governors for their policies and results 
(Macpherson 1972). 
 
Such a liberal line of thought was further developed, not without some criticisms, by 
political thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, among other 
classical authors. According to Norberto Bobbio, it is J.S. Mill’s essay On Liberty that 
has over the years come to represent the “ABC of liberalism” (Bobbio 1987: 101). In a 
different vein of thought, Miller (1983) argues that the writings of J.S. Mill can serve as 
a notable example of how aspects of both Rousseau and James Mill’s views of 
democratic theory are used and blended together. Furthermore, he suggests that a 
significant amount of political authors have mixed both James Mill’s and Rousseau’s 
trains of thought during the past two centuries (Ibid).  
 
This, affirms Bobbio (1987), is evident in the way J.S. Mill professed the need for 
democracy to guarantee individual freedom and as a means to attain moral self-
development. He argues that participation in political life was vital for developing an 
active and informed citizenry within society (Held 2006). His arguments for democracy, 
Bobbio claims, were very influential in both the political and extra-political 
establishments: 
 
[Mill’s ideas] concerning the need for there to be limits to power, even 
when this power is the power of the majority, concerning the fruitfulness 
of conflict, the praise of diversity, the condemnation of conformism, the 
absolute priority accorded by a well-governed society to the freedom of 
opinion – became common places in the 19th century political journalism 
of civilised countries (Bobbio 1987: 100-101). 
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J.S. Mill argues that, through a representative government (regular elections, limits to 
power, elected rulers, secret ballot, etc.), the citizenry can be protected from all social 
and political forces, while also being able to hold accountable the leadership for their 
policies and actions (Held 2006).  
 
Although J.S. Mill’s conception for democracy has been regarded as elitist by non-
liberal critics, in the sense that it tends to prescribe political leadership to an ‘educated’ 
class, its core liberal ideas of elected representatives, as Bobbio (1987) and Held 
(2006) explain, signified a shift in democratic thought. They argue that since J.S. Mill’s 
time, the liberal legacy has brought forth legitimate political participation for the people. 
However, J.S. Mill’s brand of ‘developmental’ democracy, according to various critics, 
does not formulate solutions for a more equal political participation and empowerment 
for the disenfranchised, nor for the suffrage of women and certain minority groups 
(Held 2006). 
 
1.2. The Marxist paradigm and direct democracy 
 
In the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels it is argued that, contrary to J.S. Mill’s 
convictions, the liberal conception of democracy could not in practice achieve social 
equality nor freedom among individuals (Callinicos 1991). Marx and Engels consider 
that 
  
the reality of liberal democracy appeared systematically to curtail its 
pretensions; the class state for the neutral arbiter; paper freedom for real 
political freedoms; and restricted political freedom for general human 
emancipation (Levin 1983: 83).  
 
Both thinkers value the liberal notion of free choice for the people, but regard the idea 
of liberal rule as a political platform by which free-market economy is systematically 
sustained and promoted. In this economic dynamic, they argue, a surplus would 
always be generated, and with it a consequential emergence of different social classes 
(Levin 1983). In modern times, these social classes are to be configured as the 
bourgeoisie and as the proletariat, in permanent clash against each other, with the 
former exploiting the latter (Marx and Engels 1998).  
 
Marx argues that liberal democracy privileges the exploitation of the proletariat and 
stimulates the systematic accumulation of private capital (Bottomore 1991, Held 2006). 
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These aspects tend to perpetuate policies that are only beneficial to the dominant 
economic class, the bourgeoisie (Levin 1983). Under this framework, as expressed by 
Held, such economic class “can exert determinate political influence without even 
having representatives in government” (2006: 108).   
 
Classical Marxists have debated that liberal doctrines promote the rule by the dominant 
economic class even when it is not formally governing (Bobbio 1987, Bottomore 1991, 
Callinicos 1991). Furthermore, in Marxist views, liberal democracies tend to sustain 
freedom only for the capital, rather than for the majority of citizens; and in such a social 
and economic context those who do not belong to the dominant socio-economic class 
lack political and social equality (Ibid). Such inequality undermines the liberty of most 
citizens as political beings, which ultimately is argued to belong to the minority – the 
elite – of the economically powerful. For there to exist democracy, Marx insists, 
equality for all citizens must be the core of the idea of general freedom (Levin 1983).  
 
This, however, would require the implementation of political and social mechanisms by 
which class exploitation and social classes can be abolished altogether (Callinicos 
1991). The Marxist doctrine formulates that the state form, as conceived by liberal 
democratic thought, must be destroyed and replaced, through a revolutionary process, 
by a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Levin 1983). This type of rule is to be regulated 
through self-government, in which ‘the people govern themselves by themselves’ 
(Callinicos 1991, Sartori 2007b). This was viewed by Marx as a process that would 
lead to a classless or communist society. And, as Callinicos explains, such an 
emancipatory process of social and political transformation is to be understood through 
its various stages:   
 
During the lower phases (the dictatorship of the proletariat), the social 
product will be distributed according to the principle ‘from each 
according to his capacity, to each according to his works’; the 
inequalities to which this gives rise… would be remedied in a ‘higher 
phase of communist society’, where both the greater development of the 
productive forces and the transformation of personal motivations would 
make possible the application of a new distributive principle: ‘From each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs’ (1991: 119). 
 
The Marxist ideals of self-government, communal ownership, and classless society are 
a partial legacy of Rousseau’s radical defence of self-government and human 
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emancipation (Ryan 1983, Macridis 1986). Graeme Duncan argues that Marxist critics 
have been specifically concerned with the “relationship between representative 
institutions and capitalist society” and the “structural impediments it poses to human 
emancipation” (1983:19). In this sense, the process of class negotiation and 
contradictions is well expressed in Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’, and has 
been of great relevance in Marxist thought (Artz et al 2006). Although Gramsci’s 
theoretical construct has been interpreted in various ways, Lee Artz and Bren Ortega 
Murphy have defined hegemony as follows:  
 
The process of moral, philosophical, and political leadership that a 
social group attains only with the active consent of other important 
social groups… Hegemony addresses how social practices, 
relationships, and structures are negotiated among diverse social forces 
(2000: 1-3). 
 
As in the case of Gramsci, the ideals of classical Marxism have been reformulated and 
amplified significantly since Marx and Engels published the Communist Manifesto in 
1848 (Bottomore 1991, Callinicos 1991). The rejection of capitalism by critical 
advocates of direct democracy, and the opposition to the various strands of the liberal 
tradition, has consistently deepened the nature of the democratic debate. The 
ramification of Marxist critique has drawn a critical project of political thought and 
practice that has been significantly vivid (Duncan 1983, Callinicos 1991, Bobbio 1997, 
Laclau and Mouffe 2001, Artz et al 2006).  
 
1.3. Schumpeter’s competitive elitism and Dahl’s idea of pluralism 
 
After Marxist ideals were put into practice by the Bolshevik ideologues, a new current 
of democratic thought emerged which was critical of both Rousseau’s and Marx’s 
arguments for a direct and highly-participatory democracy (Held 2006). Arguably, the 
author who most popularised this critique was Joseph Schumpeter. During the first half 
of the twentieth century, he debated that there exists limited space in political life for 
collective or individual growth and for democratic participation (Ibid).  
 
According to Giovanni Sartori (2007b), democracy as conceived by Schumpeter is a 
limited and restrictive political system, in which the people may only reach the 
possibility to elect its decision-makers and, through democratic institutions, may aspire 
to restrict excesses from their governors. Schumpeter argues that, in ‘classical’ 
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democratic theory, the selection of representatives of the citizens is of secondary 
importance to a broader democratic arrangement of electoral vestment in the people 
(Schumpeter 1976). In reversing the role of these elements he formulates a preliminary 
definition of his ‘other’ theory of democracy, which places special emphasis on the 
aspect of competitive leadership: 
 
The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Schumpeter 1976: 
269).  
 
Although Schumpeter defines a political ‘method’ of democracy that is essentially 
procedural, he also outlines a principle that explains that, within a competitive context, 
elected leaders would always be conditioned by the expectation of how their electorate 
will respond to the decisions they make as leaders (Sartori 2007b). Therefore, the 
competitive struggle between rival parties and leaders should produce specific forms of 
responses which, in turn, make the political apparatus function according to the 
decisions and preferences of the people (Ibid).  
 
In order for the democratic competitive system to function successfully, Schumpeter 
outlines various conditions. These are the basis of a model that, according to Sartori 
(2007b), illustrates the effective dynamics of representative democracy. Such 
conditions are (Schumpeter 1976, Miller 1983), firstly, that the calibre of political 
leadership is high in quality and morals. Secondly, competition between political parties 
and representatives must take place within a range of issues that is delimited and not 
too extended, as well as bounded by consensus on the general parameters. Thirdly, a 
professional bureaucracy must exist, directed by a ‘decent’ government, in order to 
effectively carry out policy-making and administration. Fourthly, all political agents must 
act within ‘democratic self-control’, that is, the political opposition must refrain from 
excessive attacks towards the government, and the electorate must respect the 
separation between themselves and the leadership. Lastly, there must exist a 
significant measure of tolerance and respect for differences of opinion from the 
government and within the electorate.  
 
Schumpeter (1976) maintains that his model explains the relation that must subsist 
between democracy and freedom. He claims that, in principle, there exists individual 
freedom for everyone to compete in elections for political leadership (Held 2006). This 
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relation can only be successfully achieved within a culture of respect for a plurality of 
opinion and freedom of discussion ‘for all’, including both freedom of speech and of the 
press (Schumpeter 1976, Held 2006).  
 
However, the extent to which everyone has genuine freedom to compete for leadership 
has been questioned, as Crawford B. Macpherson (1972) argues, by various authors. If 
Schumpeter’s model implies that competitive democracy is a system based on 
leadership that ‘guides’ while also being ‘guided’ by the people, socialists and 
advocates of direct democracy claim that it offers no meaningful political participation 
for everyone but only for those that belong to the political and economic elite. It offers 
an excessive centrality to political parties and to a liberal scheme of electoral 
leadership, disregarding some of the benefits of more direct political participation 
(Macpherson 1972, Miller 1983).   
 
Political thinkers referred to as pluralists claim that Schumpeter’s ‘prescription’ of 
democracy does not pay the required attention to ‘intermediary’ groups or ‘factions’ that 
are argued to play a highly significant role in democracy, even more than that 
represented by competing parties and leaders (Sartori 1991 and 2007b, Held 2006). 
 
A ‘pluralist’ such as Robert A. Dahl places special emphasis on the importance of the 
political mechanisms and consequences of interest groups and factions of different 
kinds that compete for power (Ibid)1. His definition of faction is a group of citizens, 
which may or may not belong to a majority of the total electorate, who act together 
driven by a common impulse of interest “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (Dahl 1956: 25).  
 
Dahl considers that advocates of liberal democracy, contrary to the belief of J.S. Mill, 
should not fear about the dangers supposedly posed to freedom by majority rule acting 
against the interests of minorities (Held 2006). Such idea of a ‘tyrannical’ majority tends 
to be undermined by the ‘polyarchical’ character of society2.  Partially drawing from 
Schumpeter’s ideas of electoral competitiveness and institutional arrangement, Dahl 
                                                          
1 Dahl’s idea of “pluralism” relies on James Madison’s ideas of federalism and democracy, in which 
power is divided between a central government and federal entities, representing specific 
constitutions and their people’s interests (Crick 2002). 
2 Dahl defines ‘polyarchy’ as a system in which political competition and electoral processes 
function in a way that obliges the leaders “to take preferences of a plurality of minorities into 
account in making policy choices,” while also allowing them “a substantial degree of autonomy” 
(Cammack 2000: 153).  
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proposes a model “in opposition to ‘populistic’ democracy of unconstrained majority 
rule” (Cammack 2000: 153).  
 
In a ‘polyarchy’, argues Dahl (1956, Bobbio 1987), the networks of minorities and 
factions can exercise a stronger political influence than the ‘sovereignty’ of the majority. 
It is essentially against the threat of tyrannical and autocratic power, and within a liberal 
vein, that Dahl and pluralist theorists elaborate their democratic models. According to 
Bobbio, pluralism has “the advantage of making us aware of the basic trait that modern 
democracy entails: the freedom, even the licence, we enjoy to express dissent” (1987: 
60).  
 
Various theorists have emphasised the relevance of the pluralist model in its 
consideration of democracy as a system that underpins freedom of thought, freedom of 
expression, and ‘policentrism’ (Bobbio 1987, Sartori 2007b). Yet, critics affirm that 
pluralists have not adequately weighed the distribution of power within liberal 
democracies, and that there are inevitable asymmetries in power that ultimately 
condition the degrees of both participation and freedom (Krouse 1983). For instance, 
the existence of multiple power centres – as promoted by the pluralists – does not 
necessarily guarantee that the elite leadership will communicate with them all in an 
equal way (Held 2006). However, most critics are willing to admit that “the rule by plural 
elites and multiple social forces… is preferable to the autocratic rule of a single, closed 
elite” (Krouse 1983: 77).  
 
1.4. Polarised views: the New Right and the New Left 
 
While Dahl and advocates of ‘pluralism’ have argued that political power is shared and 
exchanged among different interest groups or factions, Herbert Marcuse (1991) claims 
that these groups, and the public in general, have become disconnected from active 
political participation and that a rationale of productivity, imposed by the dominant 
class, has eroded their sense of empowerment. This effect of ‘depoliticisation’ is the 
result of western societies’ fixation with production, distribution and efficiency (Ibid). It 
is the consequence, Marcuse argues, of a social system that venerates the technical 
apparatus and is characterised by its ‘totalitarian’ tendencies to determine “not only the 
socially needed occupations… and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations” 
(1991: xli).  
 
The permeability of technology and the obsession with it, as highlighted by Marcuse, 
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has been a trait of the liberal societies that emerged in the post-war period. The 
relative political and social stability experienced after World War II, and an 
accompanying critique of the nationalistic and statist regimes that had appeared in 
Europe, prompted the formulation of a strand of democratic thought which called for a 
‘minimal state’ as the most plausible frame in which to achieve individual freedom 
(Held 2006).  
 
Friedrich August Hayek (1976) has argued that a ‘large government’ entails the danger 
of restricting freedom and constraining democracy in the name of the majority, as he 
maintains was the case with both the experiences of fascism and of Soviet 
communism.  
 
In a fundamentally liberal view, Hayek elaborates a distinction between ‘democracy’ 
and ‘liberalism’. The latter is principally concerned “with limiting the coercive powers of 
all government” (1976: 103), whereas ‘dogmatic’ democracy recognises only one limit 
to government, which is “current majority opinion” (Ibid). Hayek understands 
democracy as a doctrine by which society’s laws are determined, and he defends 
liberalism as a doctrine about what “the law ought to be” (Ibid). Furthermore, he is 
critical of the dogmatic notion of the demos ruling, arguing that the majority does not 
necessarily know what is a good law, nor is there necessarily a connection between 
“democracy and any one view about how the powers of the majority ought to be used” 
(Ibid: 104).  
 
Along with other neo-liberal thinkers, Hayek argues in favour of the elaboration of 
broad rules which would restrict the choices and actions of both the majority and its 
representatives in government – “the majority rule ought to be circumscribed by the 
rule of law” (Held 2006: 207). Only if those rules were exerted, could there exist the 
possibility for individual freedom and for democracy to be effectively a warrantor of 
liberty (Hayek 1976). The enemies of freedom, he maintains, tend to base their 
arguments on the view that social and political activity require “that some should give 
orders and others obey” (Ibid: 159). 
 
In order to provide the framework for individuals to achieve political and economic 
activities in ‘freedom’, Hayek and neo-liberal theorists argue in favour of the market 
and its dynamics. Thus, the state should be minimal in its social and political 
intervention and act within the limitations of rule of law in order to protect a free and 
democratic system (Hayek 1976, Sartori 2007b). Although he is never explicit about a 
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necessity for a laissez-faire market society, he sets various outlines for this neo-liberal 
type of rationale, further developed by the so-called New Right. This neo-liberal trend, 
Bobbio affirms, set out to target “less the collectivism of countries where communist 
parties have taken over, than the Welfare state” (1987: 107), and gained a significant 
international presence, particularly during the 1980s in the United States and Great 
Britain.    
 
Macpherson (1972 and 1977) questions the formulation by the New Right that a liberal 
and free-market society can provide genuine political freedom and participation for all 
its citizens. He refutes the notion that the ultimate human values of “freedom and 
equality could be achieved only by the free party system and the capitalist market 
system” (Macpherson 1972: 184). Along with political thinkers that became known as 
the New Left, Macpherson argues that it had not been demonstrated that political 
freedom required capitalism nor did “freedom of the capitalist market equate with 
individual economic freedom” (1972: 156), as expressed by advocates of neo-
liberalism.  
 
The New Left affirms that representative democracy and the capitalist market alone 
cannot achieve the ultimate democratic values of freedom and equality (Bobbio 1987). 
Furthermore, they have detected problems within free-market systems: the social costs 
of economic growth, the limitations of corporate capitalism to reduce inequality while 
meeting consumer expectations, and the citizens’ political apathy (Macpherson 1977). 
Such conditions, adds Macpherson (Ibid), present the ideal conditions for implementing 
participatory democracy.   
 
By combining various ideas from both the liberal and the Marxist traditions, 
Macpherson elaborates a model of participatory democracy, which seeks to achieve 
freedom and equality for individuals. To accomplish a successful functioning of such a 
model, a ‘participatory’ society needs to promote political efficiency and advance “the 
formation of knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a sustained interest in 
government process” (Held 2006: 215).  
 
Participatory democracy is, in Macpherson’s (1977) view, an alternative form of liberal 
democracy. Elements of traditional liberalism (i.e. representative leadership, 
competitive parties, regular elections, institutional separation of power) are desirable, 
and must merge dynamically with aspects of both pluralist and direct democracies. 
Macpherson affirms that for participatory democracy to be efficient “the combination of 
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a pyramidal direct/indirect democratic machinery with a continuing party system seems 
essential” (1977: 112).   
 
Along with Macpherson, thinkers of the New Left argue that, for democracy to be 
participatory, it must nurture various aspects (Macpherson 1977, Held 2006). Firstly, 
political discussion and deliberation at both local and broad social levels must be 
nurtured. Secondly, the elected leaders must democratically form a parliament. Thirdly, 
an elected body or representatives must be accountable to the electorate. Fourthly, the 
various forms of social struggle groups must strive, as must the state, to actively 
function within a political frame that ensures accountability (Ibid).  
 
Theorists of participatory democracy have contributed to reinsert the question of 
whether meaningful liberty – beyond liberty of possessive individualists – can be 
achieved with greater measure of equality (Macpherson 1972). Their critique of both 
free-market capitalism and orthodox Marxism, which selectively combines features of 
both liberal and socialist theories, inserts aspects of participation in the democratic 
debate.  
 
1.5. Democracy after Soviet communism 
 
It has been argued by a significant number of political scientists that the most notable 
symbol of the dismantling of the revolutionary state in the twentieth century was the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Soon after, in 1991, the final steps materialised 
for regime change in the Central and Eastern European countries that had operated 
under the influence of the Soviet Union. Many theorists and commentators agree that 
such events represented a success story for liberal democracy, in detriment of 
communism. Hence, Sartori argues that during the early 1990s “the democracy that 
triumphed is the only ‘real’ democracy ever to have been materialized, that is, liberal 
democracy” (2007b: 303-304)3. 
 
Others went further, proclaiming that the breakdown of these former communist 
regimes was not only a triumph for the capitalist economic system and the free-market 
criteria, but the ‘end of history’, as formulated by Francis Fukuyama:  
 
 
                                                          
3 In this chapter, I have translated direct quotes from authors Ansaldi, Petkoff, and Sartori (2007b) –
all belonging to works not published or not available in English– from Spanish.  
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For a large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions 
to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy… Even 
non-democrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to 
justify their deviation from a single universal standard” (1992: 45). 
 
This expressed an idea, latent among some advocates of western liberalism, through 
which they assumed that the collapse of the Soviet communist model, and the end of 
the Cold War, supposed the demise of ideological conflict between liberalism and 
communism. However, the alleged end of one ideology, as Sartori (2007b) argues, 
should not imply the end of all ideologies or the end of ideology itself, even if Marxism 
had been regarded as the ‘super-ideology’ of the twentieth century.   
 
Fukuyama, reinterpreting the Hegelian idea that history moves through the clashes of 
ideas, believes that ideological conflict was practically over after the ‘victory’ of 
liberalism in the early 1990s. Furthermore, he considers (1992) that liberal democracy 
and free-market principles remained the only system of ideas that is to further expand 
internationally, and therefore dismisses the possible impact of other ideological forces, 
such as religious and nationalistic. Even the Marxist notion of addressing equality as its 
core preoccupation (Bobbio 1997) much more so than in liberal thought, is challenged 
by Fukuyama:  
 
All truly liberal societies are in principle dedicated to the elimination of 
conventional sources of inequality…The dynamism of capitalist 
economies tends to break down many conventional and cultural barriers 
to equality… A century of Marxist thought has accustomed us to think of 
capitalist societies as highly inegalitarian, but… they are far more 
egalitarian in their social effects than the [ones] they replaced (1992: 
290).  
 
These arguments aim to consolidate the idea, promoted by the New Right, that minimal 
state and laissez-faire market economics offer the most desirable future. Such an idea, 
as Sartori (2007b) indicates, represents only one model of liberalism – called by some 
neo-liberalism – and it would be misleading to assume and utilise this strand of 
liberalism as the overarching one. For example, J.S. Mill’s is a constitutional and 
developmental liberalism with no mention of laissez-faire economics; neither did the 
liberal ideas formulated by authors such as Dahl or Macpherson.  
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The utopian thought and the ideals for revolution brought forth by various brands of 
Marxism are, according to Fukuyama (1992) and followers, vanished for good. Yet, 
there abound vigorous critiques to the views formulated by Fukuyama, as expressed 
predominantly by neo-Marxist theorists and thinkers related to radical traditions.  
 
According to Callinicos (1991) the collapse of the Soviet Union, and of those 
neighbouring regimes that were under its political influence, cannot be interpreted as a 
failure of Marxism. Such a claim, he argues, can only be persuasive if one equates 
Marxism to Stalinism4. The latter he defines as a system characterised “by the 
hierarchically organised control of all aspects of social life, political, economic, and 
cultural, by a narrow oligarchy” (1991: 15), which ultimately represented an autocratic 
perversion of the central ideas of Marxism. Contrary to the formulation of Leszek 
Kolakowski (1978), by which he argues that the ‘logical’ consequence of Marxist praxis 
was Stalinism, Callinicos defends Marxism as a broad social project of human 
emancipation through direct democracy, in which total transformation cannot be 
achieved 
 
on behalf of the working class by some group acting in its name, whether 
it be a Stalinist ‘vanguard’ or social-democratic parliamentarians. ‘The 
proletarian movement,’ Marx says, ‘is the self-conscious independent 
movement of the immense majority.’ His is a conception… of ‘socialism 
from below’, springing from the self-activity of the masses themselves 
(1991: 17-18).  
 
Callinicos (1991) claims that just like Stalinism betrayed the spirit of self-emancipation 
of the working class and of revolutionary democracy, liberalism, as it has existed, has 
also been betraying the principles on which it is allegedly built upon. He argues (Ibid) 
that liberalism has not been able to provide those citizens that do not belong to the 
dominant classes with a broad participatory political role and with freedoms to dissent 
and reform.  
 
If, as Held argues, the apparent “‘crisis of socialism’, in theory and practice, goes much 
further than the ‘crisis of Stalinism’” (2006: 229), so does the consolidation of liberalism 
in the post-Soviet era, following Fukuyama’s claims, seem to fall short of its claims of 
                                                          
4 Stalinism is broadly defined as a form of communism developed by Soviet leader Josef Stalin 
(1878-1953), and characterised by hyper-statisation, collectivisation, authoritarianism, state terror 
and personal leadership (Bottomore 1991). 
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global dominance and delivering qualitative principles – those of liberty, equality, and 
justice (Callinicos 1991). Even after the collapse of communism in Europe, it seems 
presumptuous to point out that ideologies have expired and that history has come to an 
end. The Marxist model of the economy did suffer an immense setback at the hands of 
the market economy, but the legacy of Marxist thought in its promotion of struggle for 
equality and emancipation – its utopian project – seems an active force (Callinicos 
1991, Bobbio 1997, Held 2006).   
 
1.6. The Left-Right debate and the Latin American case 
 
Sartori, evaluating Bobbio’s views on post-Soviet political debate, affirms that even a 
supposed end of ideologies does not mean the end of a clear distinction and struggle 
of ideals between the political Left and the Right: “To navigate in the seas of politics 
one needs a compass in which north and south become, in politics, the Left and the 
Right” (2007b: 354).  
 
Bobbio (1997) observes that the Left-Right axis has been significantly influential in 
political debate, even in the ‘post-ideological’ West. Thus, the world has not moved 
beyond the terms ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ as it might have been expected by thinkers such as 
Fukuyama. Instead, some interpretations suggest that these terms offer the means to 
interpret the political reality of any society in a range of dichotomous ways that people 
still find useful (Ellner 2004). 
 
Although Bobbio (1997) indicates that each concept – the Left and the Right – may 
vary over time, there are key distinctions in terms of the values that each entail. For 
instance, the Left has always tended to characterise itself by offering more importance 
to the value of equality than does the Right; it tends to favour change and not 
conservationism; its political policies tend to be interventionist (Ibid).  
 
This view is amplified, in a more radical vein, by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
(2001). They argue that the Right, with its liberal-conservative discourse, has promoted 
a hegemonic project to defend the market economy and sustain an anti-egalitarian 
agenda. Contrary to the leftist potential to articulate equality liberalism, the Right strives 
to  
 
restrict the terrain of democratic struggle, and to preserve the 
inequalities existing in a number of social relations, demands for the 
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defence of a hierarchical and anti-egalitarian principle which has been 
endangered by liberalism itself (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 175). 
  
Various political scientists and commentators have been critical of Bobbio’s Left-Right 
basic characterisation. For instance, Sartori (2007b) maintains that ‘Marxist praxis’ has 
misunderstood the concept of equality and that its supposed preference for equality, in 
detriment of liberty, has led to the curbing or even suppression of freedom in 
communist and socialist regimes. Teodoro Petkoff (2005) alleges that, to a significant 
extent, the Left’s idealisation of equality, and its unsuccessful conception of egalitarian 
and direct participation, has not been able to correspond with the political reality of 
socialist and communist regimes. Corcoran argues that within Marxist thought, most 
social values exist as a product of ideological control “to cover the class division and 
moral degradation characteristic of societies that claim to enjoy freedom and equality” 
(1983: 18). 
 
During the early 1990s the political and economic discourse of the New Right became 
very influential internationally. However, by the end of that decade, a certain leftist 
‘reinvigoration’ seemed to have taken place with the emergence of various non-liberal 
democratic and pseudo-democratic regimes and social movements in some parts of 
the world (Schamis 2006, Castañeda and Morales 2008).  
 
Such re-emergence of left-wing and non-liberal projects was not a global trend. But 
there is evidence that during the mid and late 1990s some nation states, after going 
through traumatic economic and political experiences, reacted against neo-liberal 
orthodoxy. In this context, they began searching for alternatives to canonical capitalism 
and neo-liberal models. Also, the leaders of these leftist or non-liberal political parties 
and movements claimed to be seeking a way to achieve egalitarian democratisation, 
without having to equate it to orthodox capitalism and its formulas (Barret et al 2008, 
Castañeda and Morales 2008). 
 
Arguably the most notable case of the surge of left-wing politics was Latin America 
(Schamis 2006, Castañeda and Morales 2008). In 1991 only two countries in the 
Americas could be said to be ruled by leftist governments: Cuba and Nicaragua. 
Moreover, neither government achieved power through democratic elections, but by 
way of armed struggle (Ibid). During the 2000s, Colombia has been the only country in 
Latin America that has been under a clearly right-wing government. The rest of the 
Latin American nations have elected leftist or left-of-centre leaders, of various 
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ideological shades, since 1998.  
 
A variety of studies about the relatively recent ‘left shift’ in Latin America have been 
carried out (Barret et al 2008). Most contend Fukuyama’s notion of an ‘end of ideology’ 
and the New Right’s asseveration of neo-liberal ‘superiority’. However, it has been 
argued that most studies lack a comparative and regional perspective (Ibid), and fail to 
analyse systematically the democratic peculiarities of political and social participation, 
the relationship between the leaders and the people, and the way elements of both 
Right and Left thought have been negotiated. In relation to this last aspect, and 
following Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of Right/Left political mechanisms, Patrick Barret et al 
argue that 
 
the legacy of neo-liberalism in the [Latin American] region is felt… in the 
tension between a ‘right hand’ of the state, charged with maintaining 
economic orthodoxy, and a ‘left hand’, generally represented by the 
ministries of education, health, labour and social welfare, seeking to 
push policy in a post-neo-liberal direction (2008: 21).  
 
Motives for such resurgence of the Left are argued to be popular disaffection with the 
neo-liberal canon and the setting of a political agenda aimed at deepening and 
expanding democracy, by way of projects that “combine representative democracy with 
the radicalisation of participatory democracy” (Barret et al 2008: 17). However, the 
characterisation of such projects and regimes is varied and on occasions very critical. 
 
Roberto Mangabeira-Unger (2006) affirms, with particular focus on Latin American 
politics, that there are three broad types of Left. He characterised as the ‘sell-out Left’ 
the tendency that accepts the primacy of the market and the globalisation process as 
imposed by a neo-liberal agenda. An altogether different strand is represented by a 
statist, authoritarian and retrograde Left, directly inspired in Marxist-Leninist ideals and 
ardently antagonistic to any form of corporativism and advance of globalisation (Ibid). 
He advocates for a ‘third’ Left that is socially-responsible, progressive, reformist, and 
promotes policies that seek to socially assist the disenfranchised, democratise the 
market economy and strengthen democratic institutions (Ibid).  
 
The assessment and characterisation of the Latin American Left by Jorge Castañeda 
(2006) and by Petkoff (2005 and 2007) follows a more binary reading. According to 
Castañeda (2006), there exists a Left that is nationalist, authoritarian, state-centred, 
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rhetorically anti-liberal, and springing from the tradition of Latin American populism. Its 
counterpart is allegedly non-dualistic, reformist, inclusive and internationalist (Ibid). 
Importantly, Castañenda stresses that the anti-liberal, retrograde, rupturist Left is 
exemplified by certain populist leaders, of marked authoritarian leanings, who are 
ultimately “much more interested in policy as an instrument for attaining and 
conserving power than in power as a tool for making policy” (2006: 34).  
 
The progressive Latin American Left, as argued by Petkoff (2005: 32-33), does not 
seek to impose a re-foundation of the national order nor restrain liberal initiatives, like 
its “fossilised and primitive” leftist counterpart. Instead, its political initiatives are 
allegedly anchored in creating “spaces for ample and deep processes by which to 
stimulate social equity and deepen democratic values – in brief, to create a society of 
justice and freedom” (Ibid).  
 
1.7. ‘Hybrid’ democracies and the populist dilemma 
 
Various studies suggest that, since the mid-1980s, democracy has shifted to the global 
forefront as the most expansive political force (Schmitter and Karl 1991, Held 2006, 
Sartori 2007b). Some authors and theorists – particularly those of western liberal 
tendencies – have referred to this historical process as ‘democratisation,’ others as 
‘transition’ towards democracy or a ‘third wave’ of democracy (Diamond 1999 and 
2002, Ansaldi 2007). Freedom House (2001) has reported that, in the twenty-year 
period before 2000, the proportion and number of what it considered democracies 
almost doubled in the world. 
 
There has been preoccupation, however, about the quality of participation in some of 
these democracies and about the procedures of some of its regimes (Diamond 2002). 
A diversity of western observers have evaluated these emerging types of democracies 
– occasionally called ‘democracies of transition’ – focusing on various questions (Ibid). 
These are, among others: to what extent are these democracies deepening the 
people’s demands of freedom and equality?; in what ways is the people-leadership 
relationship embedded in plural and participatory democracy?; and to what degree are 
the governments or representatives nurturing and deepening freedom of speech, 
freedom to dissent, and freedom of the press? (Ibid).  
 
Such observers claim that the ‘emergent’, ‘transitional’ and newer regimes of 
democracies need to be measured at least through the ‘minimalist’ standard outlined 
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by Schumpeter, that is a political system in which leadership and power are attained by 
way of a competitive struggle for the electorate’s vote (Ibid). Alternatively, some have 
insisted on drawing from Dahl’s idea of ‘polyarchy’ in order to appraise more 
procedurally the ‘democratic character’ of a society or a regime. In such a case, it has 
been argued, democracies new or old should not only hold elections that are fair, free, 
and competitive, but should also nurture freedom of expression and freedom to 
dissent, autonomous institutions, alternative ways to produce and obtain information, 
all of which should guarantee that government policies relate to and satisfy the choice 
of people (Ibid).  
 
Larry Diamond (2002) argues that, by the end of the twentieth century, there were 
more regimes than ever adopting a form of democracy; a significant portion of these 
fell short of meeting basic democratic standards formulated by either Schumpeter or 
Dahl. Cases such as Russia, Nigeria, Singapore and Venezuela – circa 2000 – are, 
according to Diamond, “very ambiguous” in their democratic traits and character, and 
should be understood as “competitive authoritarian systems, hegemonic-party 
systems, or hybrid regimes of some sort” (Ibid: 22)5. Such cases arguably illustrate 
Dahl’s logical route towards the consolidation of a ‘polyarchy’, in which political 
participation of many ‘minorities’ is to be preceded by a stage of competition among a 
small group of the population – gradually, this elite has allegedly incorporated the 
demands of other groups into electoral politics (Bobbio 1987, Diamond 2002, Held 
2006). 
 
These views and characterisation of hybrid democracies have been challenged by 
studies of non-liberal character. They have claimed that many of these new forms of 
hybrid democracies have been assessed only politically and not in sufficient 
sociological breath, focusing almost exclusively on analysing the type of political 
regime while ignoring the social conditions for democratic realisation (Ansaldi 2007). 
This ‘formulistic’ approach is argued to be the product of the hegemonic domination of 
neo-liberal political thought (Ansaldi 2007, Barret et al 2008). A trend of non-western 
thinkers have indicated that, in evaluating democratic ‘quality’ and ‘degrees’ of 
democracy, it is necessary to observe and assess social peculiarities and historical 
specificities of communities, nation-states, and geopolitical regions (Ibid).    
                                                          
5 Diamond (2002) affirms that ‘hybrid’ regimes (combining democratic and authoritarian elements) 
are not new, and that in the past there have been numerous cases in Europe and Latin America of 
limited elite party competition with a limited franchise. In 19th and early-20th century Latin 
America these ‘oligarchic’ democracies ‘contributed to the ultimate development of fuller 
democracies’ by establishing political institutions, its principles of limitation, and rotation of power.  
 
 
27 
 
 
Waldo Ansaldi (2007) illustrates – somewhat simplistically – the above-mentioned 
argument as it applies to the case of Latin America. Historically, the construction of 
democracy in the region has allegedly been more associated with the search for 
equality and social justice than of liberties (Ibid). Since attaining independence in the 
early nineteenth century, Latin American nations have experienced demands for liberty 
associated with the middle classes, and a demand for equality from the ‘proletariat’ 
(Ibid). Such emphasis on the social, rather than on the political, is argued to be a key 
factor in the configuration of populist tradition in the region: 
 
[The populist experiences in Latin America] are characterised more for 
extending the rights of the people… than for providing these with more 
density, even though one could argue that the vertical relation leader-
people tends to generate submission from the people towards the 
leader, with a disturbing result: turning citizens into an empty shell and 
distributive justice into an instrument of domination (Ansaldi 2007: 43). 
 
Margaret Canovan (1981) affirms that a study about the nature of populism is at the 
same time an investigation about democratic politics. Her broad study on the topic 
outlined seven forms of populism, from the rural radical – as would be the case of the 
Russian narodnischestvo – to the political personae of Argentina’s leader Juan Perón6. 
Arguably the only common theme across all seven categories is “a resort to appeals to 
the people and a distrust of elites” (Canovan 1981: 264). Yet, from her conclusions it 
can be inferred that, because populism incorporates such a wide range of elements 
which lack a common core, it becomes very complex if not impossible to define. 
Similarly, Laclau asserts that there exists no unique referent to populism, that it is 
essentially “a way of building the political” (2005: xi). He has stressed that populism 
does not mean a “type of movement identifiable with either a special social base or a 
particular ideological orientation” (Ibid: 117). 
 
The relation between populism and democracy has been amplified by Francisco 
Weffort in his study of Brazilian politics. He formulates that the populist system can be 
defined as an  
 
                                                          
6 Juan D. Perón (1895-1974), three-times President of Argentina, is considered by many scholars 
one of Latin America’s archetypical representatives of nationalist, reformist and authoritarian 
populism (Barrett et al 2008, Williamson 2009). 
 
 
28 
 
institutional structure of authoritative or semi-corporativist character; 
which has an anti-liberal, nationalist, anti-oligarchical political 
orientation; an economic orientation of industrialist and nationalist traits; 
a multi-class social composition with a broad support from the popular 
and working classes (Weffort cited by Ansaldi 2007: 80).  
 
Populism presents itself as a subversive form of challenging, politically and socially, the 
status quo and as “a starting point for a more or less radical reconstruction of a new 
order” (Laclau 2005: 177). This political phenomenon seems to entail a Manichean 
discourse which tends to be strongly anti-liberal – though not necessarily anti-capitalist 
– particularly in terms of political ideology, and rather anti-imperialist (Ansaldi 2007). 
Also, populist regimes tend to emerge from “outside the party system” (Merino 2007: 
88).  
 
Through its Manichean dynamics, populism manages to establish a clear-cut 
dichotomy whose “two poles are necessarily imprecise… such as the people versus 
the oligarchy, toiling masses versus exploiters, and so on” (Laclau 2005: 18). Its 
reservation towards liberal representative democracy, however, does not prevent it 
from employing its ‘formalities’, such as holding elections between competitive parties 
in order to legitimise itself in power (Ansaldi 2007). Moreover and contrary to the claim 
of some of its critics, leaders of populist bent tend to regard themselves as agents for 
deepening democracy and social justice, in the sense that they claim to embody the 
‘voice’ of the people (Ibid).  
 
Critics of populism have debated that it is characterised by a tendency to foster a 
highly affectionate and emotional bond between the leader and the people (Ibid, 
Seligson 2007). This may lead to a form of democratic practice – or pseudo-democratic 
practice – in which all political and moral legitimacy falls in the hands of a charismatic 
leader, a supreme ‘strong man’ – a caudillo, to use the expression in Latin America’s 
political tradition – who “relates directly to ‘the people’” (Merino 2007: 68). This type of 
leader, according to some authors, frequently presents authoritarian traits, which 
become evident in the way the leader tends to monopolise the political arena, to “do 
away with representative and judicial institutions” (Seligson 2007: 82), and restricts 
democratic freedoms, such as freedom to dissent and freedom of expression (Diamond 
2002, Ansaldi 2007).  
 
After evaluating the Latin American democratic experience and its history of populism, 
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John Keane elaborates a version of democracy that he has defined as caudillo 
democracy, which is 
 
a local variant of representative democracy that was quite unique to 
Spanish America, a twisted type of republican oligarchy rooted in the 
people, a hybrid method of governing based on rich and powerful 
caudillos, strongmen who liked looking at themselves in the mirror of 
the people they dominated (2009: 384). 
 
He indicates that this system is a “mutant” form of representative democracy and that, 
ultimately, it is “democratic only in appearance” (Ibid). It has had continuous historical 
presence in Latin America since the early nineteenth century, with the emergence of 
figures such as Argentina’s caudillo Juan Manuel de Rosas, and into the twenty-first 
century, as is arguably the case of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (Keane 2009). 
No other part of the world, argues Keane, has witnessed this phenomenon in intensity 
and extensiveness as has Latin America (Ibid). 
 
The manner in which both western Marxist and liberal studies have associated 
populism exclusively with despotic caudillos has been contended by authors such as 
Edgardo Lander (2008). He affirms that these views have failed to assume the 
transformative democratic role that populist regimes have played in many societies, 
particularly in Latin America (Ibid). In many cases, Lander argues, populist systems 
have been able to integrate broad sectors of society that had been “excluded both 
under oligarchic regimes and in the liberal-democratic experience” (2008: 77).  
 
Laclau also claims that populism has been “denigrated… and linked to a dangerous 
excess of the masses” (2005: 19), particularly by neo-liberal thinkers. These, as argued 
by Schamis (2006), have questioned whether such regimes have genuinely attained 
correcting social inequalities, and especially whether they have done so in a 
consensual manner and within a framework that promotes democratic freedom and 
strengthens democratic institutions. A significant conceptual contribution to such 
debate is that of Benjamín Arditi, when assessing populism as a grey area in 
democracy, in which “it becomes difficult to distinguish the mass populism from the 
government of the mob” (2004: 91).  
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1.8. Conclusion 
 
The various authors so far reviewed in this study and their diverse formulations about, 
and models of, democracy offer a conceptual basis by which one is able to begin to 
outline various critical views about the relation between media and democracy. The 
competing understandings of democracy – its concepts, aims and dynamics – 
reviewed in this chapter are of theoretical and narrative relevance in charting and 
understanding the relationship between journalism, media, culture and democracy in 
the next chapters of this study.  
 
Each type of democratic ideal argues for a different standpoint and critique in terms of 
the role of the media and of journalists in a democratic system (Street 2011). It could 
be argued that most affirm that media must be essentially free and enhance 
democratic debate. Yet, the perspectives on how this should be achieved seem highly 
diverse, nuanced, and non-consensual.  
 
Such diversity in debates and views about the role that media and journalism play in 
democracy, and the nexus between them, are outlined and evaluated as part of the 
next stage of this study.   
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Chapter 2 
  
Media and democracy: competing theories and tenets  
 
 
With some notable exceptions, theorists of democracy are argued not to have paid 
sufficient analysis to evaluating the relationship between democracy and the media, 
nor to the aspects and principles that should guide the media within a democratic 
system (Keane 1991, Street 2011).  
 
The media operate even where democracies do not, and they do not necessarily 
promote nor increase the variety or quality of freedom and public debate in a society 
(Dahlgren 2000, Schudson 2003, McQuail 2005). Yet, there are authors who justify in 
varying ways the relation between media and democracy. For instance, some insist 
that a democratic society benefits significantly from the existence and functioning of 
independent media, as it serves as an effective tool to both stimulate public debate and 
scrutinise those in power (Keane 1991, McQuail 2005). Others uphold the relevance of 
a ‘democratic media’ to empower citizenship and maximise liberty (Ibid). And, as 
Michael Schudson argues, even though the press “by itself is not democracy and does 
not (necessarily) create democracy” (2003: 198), journalists in all parts of the world, 
regardless of their ideological or political standings, seek to work in freedom.  
 
There seems to exist a prominent narrative by which journalists and media 
practitioners identify their vocation “as one of freedom and fit for democracy” (Ibid: 
200). These ideas, affirms Keane (1991), have been mainly led by modern theories 
that have interlinked freedom of the press with democratic practice. More recently there 
has been a broad debate that seeks to reassess the relationship between the media 
(and, more generally, news media) and democracy.  
 
2.1. The public sphere and the idea of normative journalism 
 
A starting point for discussing the relationship between democracy, media and 
journalistic practice in this part of the study is a brief examination of Jürgen 
Habermas’s (1986 and 1991) concept of the public sphere. Indeed, his elaboration of 
this category remains one of the most influential in communication and media analysis 
(Schudson 2003, Cañizalez 2010, Hartley 2011). Moreover, Habermas’s formulation of 
the evolution of a non-institutionalised and non-prescriptive space developed for plural 
communication and debate has, to a significant degree, defined basic notions by which 
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to evaluate democratic conditions for the media and society at large (Ibid, Habermas 
1986).    
 
Habermas argues that a public sphere of reasoned discourse emerged during the 
eighteenth century (1986 and 1991). During the following two centuries, he indicates, 
the social landscape underwent a structural transformation which altered the nature of 
the public sphere (Schudson 1995 and 2003, Dahlgren 2000, Curran 2002). Whereas 
citizens – namely those in western societies – had been stimulated to participate in a 
‘reasoned’ public debate with the rise of the early press during the eighteenth century, 
citizens living in societies with industrialised and commercialised media had by the 
late-nineteenth century become mere consumers with an apathetic leaning towards 
public debate (Ibid, Street 2011). As these societies intensified in their capitalist 
orientation the public sphere, what had been “a means of enlightenment, became a 
marketplace of sensation” (Schudson 2003: 66). 
 
The shift in the infrastructure of the new public sphere brought forth relevance to 
“advertising, the increasing fusion of entertainment and information, the centralization 
in all areas” (Habermas 1991: 436). By the late-nineteenth century, newspapers had 
been transformed into cultural objects of consumption (Habermas 1986 and 1991, 
Thussu 2000, Schudson 2003). The consequence of the media going through such 
structural transformation has signified on the one hand, according to Habermas, the 
elimination of critical argument and the end of rational debate within the public sphere. 
On the other, it has meant the increasing concentration of the media in the hands of a 
political and economic elite.  
 
Critics of Habermas seem to accept that his understanding of the media as a potential 
tool of power and domination by the elites is grounded in veracity. Yet, as Keane 
(1991) and James Curran (2002) point out, there are various weaknesses in his 
narrative of the history of media. First, his definition of ‘public sphere’ rests only on the 
historical study of the middle class of Western Europe, excluding other forms of 
societal reasoning (Keane 1991, García Canclini 1999). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that what occurred in western societies during the early-nineteenth century was 
not a clash between reason, non-reason, or sub-reason, “but a growing working-class 
refusal to be put down by the… premises of the bourgeois ‘rational’ debate” (Curran 
2002: 45). However, Schudson contends that although there is broad disagreement 
towards Habermas’s historical view, his concept of ‘public sphere’ should be regarded 
“as a normative model of exemplary civic life” (2003: 67). Craig Calhoun emphasises 
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the relevance of Habermas’s “inquiry into normative ideals and actual history” (1992: 1) 
as derived from his early work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. In 
it, Calhoun argues, Habermas formulates a key question for democratic practice:  
 
What are the social conditions [asks Habermas] for a rational-critical 
debate about public issues conducted by private persons to let 
arguments and not statuses determine decisions? … It focuses upon 
the bourgeois political life of the seventeenth through mid-twentieth 
century, yet it claims to reach beyond the flawed realities of this history 
to recover something of continuing normative importance. This 
something is an institutional location for practical reason in public affairs 
and for accompanying valid, if often deceptive, claims of formal 
democracy (Ibid).  
 
This aspect of Habermas’s work has offered some theorists a framework with which to 
underpin a set of principles and core values when assessing the media and their role in 
democracies (Davis 2010). It has helped various authors elaborate a normative 
character for varying models of media as democratic institutions of the public sphere 
(Siebert 1963, Keane 1991, Glasser 1999, Schudson 2003, Hallin and Mancini 2004, 
McQuail 2005, Davis 2010). Normative and professional ideals in the media include 
providing the public with a systematic means to check on state authorities, institutions, 
and power groups; a source of balanced, diverse and transparent information; a plural 
access to the media for all citizens; a platform for rational deliberation and discussion 
of political views; a set of discourses that are inclusive and representative of the 
social/interest groups (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990, Curran 2002, Davis 2010, 
Waisbord 2013).  
 
It is presumed that these normative ideals have been drawn mainly within the context 
of the United States and Great Britain. And arguably most of the existing literature 
referring to it in the West has been produced within the Anglo-American orbit (Thussu 
2000 and 2009, Waisbord 2013). Yet, within this current there seems to exist disparity 
and tension between the seemingly democratic principles that the media “are 
supposed to serve and the communications structures and practices that actually 
prevail” (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990: 270). Normative, professional ideals in media 
and journalism should be driven by a “public-oriented logic that is not subsumed under 
particular interests of the markets, politics, and bureaucracies (Waisbord 2013: 126). 
Under this view, only “journalism informed by higher values that transcend social 
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differences and personal interests, and probes the logic of markets and politics, 
deserves to be called professional” (Ibid: 127). 
 
Accordingly, Paolo Mancini (cited by McQuail 2005) argues that, under this liberal 
media framework, there exists a twofold ‘gap’ between the normative/professional 
theories and the practice in various countries. One, he observes, refers to the manner 
in which the advocacy and investigative role of journalism hardly receives any 
normative recognition. The other alludes to the journalistic principles of supposed 
balance, neutrality and independence, when in practice there is a tendency for most 
journalists to work “in close symbiosis” with powerful economic and political groups, 
government officials, political parties and other authorities (Ibid: 175). This formulation 
derives, not from Daniel C. Hallin’s and Mancini’s elaboration of their much-cited three 
models of media and politics, which has been criticised due to their seemingly 
reductionist characterisations of media systems (Humphreys 2011), but from a shared 
view with other authors that affirm that in many nations, of distinct journalistic cultures, 
there may be common ground regarding the norms of professional journalism, but yet 
very little attention seems to be paid to those normative standards in everyday practice.     
 
In a similar critical tone, and in reference to the context of the United States’ news 
media, Herbert J. Gans (2003) argues that journalistic practices weaken democracy 
rather than enhance it. The codes of practice might claim to strengthen the public 
sphere by actively providing balanced, accurate and transparent information; but as 
professionals of media organisations – which seek to make profit as their main goal – 
journalists ultimately fail to empower the citizens in delivering and exchanging 
information in a rational ‘bottom-up’ dynamic.  
 
Gans criticises the U.S. political system and its liberal model in that it does not or 
cannot “make room for an unorganised and unwieldy collectivity like the citizenry” 
(2003: 20); and that the press, he argues, for all their ostensive normative ideals, 
develop a kind of proxy system with political and economic power groups which tend to 
“endanger civic engagement” (Schudson 2003: 208).  
 
By contrast, and in an attempt to legitimise the professionalism of journalism and its 
civic purpose, Schudson claims that the press can effectively serve not only as a key 
instrument for disseminating information but, most importantly, as a platform through 
which the public can be engaged in constructive discussion and debate (Hallin 2000, 
Schudson 2003, McQuail 2005). He observes that although “journalistic deference to 
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democratic political institutions may be weakening,” the press – as exemplified in the 
context of the United States – offers an important space to ‘civic’ voices over ‘official’ or 
‘statist’ pronouncements, and journalistic or media practice tend to stand “in support of 
the importance of public life and the common good” (2003: 210-211).  
 
The premises of a press that aims at “promoting and improving, and not merely 
reporting or complaining about, the quality of public and civic life”, as formulated by 
Theodore L. Glasser and Stephanie Craft (1998: 204), responds to a model of ‘public 
journalism’. As Denis McQuail (2005) points out, Schudson’s understanding of the 
democratic role of the media can be conceptually aligned with the group of U.S. 
authors who promote the idea of a ‘public journalism’ and that argues in favour of a 
professional model of the media – news media specifically – within a normative 
framework. In this sense, they stress that the press and its professionals are arguably, 
by means of established standards and norms,  
 
the best guarantors of the interest of the public, since their primary 
concern is serving the public’s need for information and comment and 
providing the platforms for expressions of diverse views. The 
institutional and professional autonomy of journalism is also the best 
guarantee of an adequate watch being kept on those in power (Ibid: 
186).     
 
Schudson’s arguments relate directly to Habermas’s idea of how the press became 
“the public sphere’s preeminent institution” (1986: 183). Even though journalism had by 
the early-nineteenth century become professionalised almost everywhere in the West, 
and news were then professionally constructed and commercially distributed in most 
western nations, Habermas’s view that the press rose as a key player in underpinning 
the public sphere as a ‘space’ for free and civic discussion, and for nurturing 
democratic principles, seems very relevant when evaluating the role of media in 
democracy.   
 
There exists, however, an overarching pessimistic view in Habermas in relation to the 
possible emergence of diverse and newer forms of public life by which the state and 
the civil could coexist ‘rationally’ (Keane 1991). Moreover, Keane finds a “fundamental 
ambivalence” in the way the latter aspect coexisted with Habermas’s apparent 
nostalgia for the diminished bourgeois public sphere (Ibid: 36). Such a view about the 
public sphere and the press is further amplified by an absence of attention to “low 
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politics, clientelist power relations” (Curran 2002: 45), and the author’s idealisation of 
past forms of public reason.  
 
2.2. Freedom of the Press theory and liberal values 
 
It has been argued that the liberal narrative is the longest established tradition in media 
history and analysis, and is arguably the dominant and most accepted in the West 
(Keane 1991, Bolaño 1999, Sparks 2000, Curran 2002)7.  
 
Most of the principles that govern the liberal view of media and democracy are to be 
traced to seventeenth and eighteenth century Northern and Western Europe, and 
specifically to Britain, where the call for ‘freedom of the press’  is said to have been 
proclaimed first (Siebert 1963, Keane 1991 and 2009). It might seem ironic that the 
pleas for liberty of the press, a historic “cornerstone of modern power-sharing 
government and politics” (Keane 2009: 239) were expressed by religious men who had 
never felt comfortable with the word ‘democracy’.   
 
One of the key texts to spearhead the plea for freedom of expression and of the press 
was John Milton’s Areopagitica8, written in 1644 (Siebert 1963, Keane 1991 and 2009, 
McQuail 2005). Censorship, Milton claimed, debilitates the development of the 
conscience of each individual (Ibid). It is clear in his argumentation, that Milton believed 
that it is through the expression and sharing of contrasted opinions that one may 
become best prepared to promote tolerance and engage in civilian virtue (Ibid). 
 
Apart from Milton and his theological approach, in Keane’s (1991) account of the early 
history of the freedom of the press, he stresses the ‘libertarian’ role played by various 
intellectual figures between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in Britain, North-
Western Europe and the American colonies9.  
 
A second key component of this philosophy is that “the conduct of the press should be 
guided by the rights of individuals” (Ibid: 13), and should have a secular character. In 
this sense, rational individuals are entitled to utilise the press to freely express their 
opinions about the government and other institutions. A third defence of the freedom of 
                                                          
7 For a review of historical narratives of the media, according to Curran (2002), see Appendix A.  
8 In his tract Areopagitica, Milton argues vigorously for individuals to follow their “God-given 
faculty of reason” free from state censorship (Keane 1991: 11). 
9 Among the liberal thinkers who began to shape the philosophy of press freedom are John Locke, 
Mary Wollstonecraft, Thomas Paine, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill (Keane 1991 and 2009).   
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the press is to be found in the ideas developed by utilitarian thought. From observing 
these, it can be inferred that the press is to be regarded as an important tool for making 
governments accountable for their actions and policies, while also serving as a 
watchful platform by which to curb any form of despotism.  
 
A fourth aspect that Keane identifies as most relevant in the conception of this 
philosophy is the notion of truth gained “though unrestricted public discussion among 
citizens” (1991: 17). J.S. Mill’s essay On Liberty makes a strong case for the necessity 
for truthful opinion to circulate. An immense portion of the utility of an opinion lies in the 
element of truth that it presents. The press, argued J.S. Mill (cited by Keane 1991), 
must not be limited by laws that restrict freedom of opinions, otherwise society 
becomes dominated by dogmas, prejudices, and absolutisms. In his plea for freedom 
of the press, Mill expands his arguments for freedom of expression in general 
(Lichtenberg 1990).  
 
Another milestone in the defence of ‘liberty of the press’ in western tradition has been 
the First Amendment in the United States Constitution (Kelley and Donway 1990, 
Schudson 2003). Enacted in 1791, it states that Congress or federal government “shall 
make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press” (cited by Keane 1991: xii). 
Many authors draw on this brief text to argue that government may not intervene with 
the free print and circulation of information or opinion, and that government shall pose 
no restriction to individuals or group of individuals to express their ideas in the press 
(Kelley and Donway 1990). As expressed by McQuail, the First Amendment “has 
become a shorthand term to cover all matters of freedom of expression and opinion in 
the United States” (2005: 555).  
 
Moreover, many authors since the eighteenth century, as argued by Judith Lichtenberg 
(1990), have claimed that the standards for freedom of the press should be the same 
as those of freedom of speech and of expression. She contends that, contrary to the 
argument of some authors who claim not to make any distinction between the different 
ideas of ‘freedom’, the freedom of the press might be curbed by specific postulates of 
the theory of free speech. In contemporary media 
 
many suppress information and stifle ideas rather than promote them… 
[Also], the modern press consists largely of vast and complex 
institutions that differ in essential respects both from individuals and 
from the early press, around which the concept of freedom of the press 
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grew (Lichtenberg 1990: 105-106).   
 
In a similar line of thought, Onora O’Neill (1990) finds that the theory of freedom of 
expression relies exclusively on rights-based thinking and pays little attention to 
obligation-based thinking. It tends to protect the rights of individuals to express or say 
what they want, but hardly takes into account the individuals who receive such 
information nor the effects of whatever is expressed on those in the receiving end. The 
media, as argues O’Neill, have a communicating function – it is not essentially about 
self-expression – and are important in democracies, because they are tools of a 
communicative nature, much more than because they can function as organs of self-
expression (Ibid).  
 
Freedom of expression and systematic scrutiny of the authorities have been regarded 
by liberal theorists as the main values that the media must defend and reinforce in 
order to be actively democratic (Keane 1991, Curran 2002). In this sense, within the 
liberal tradition the watchdog function of the media has been historically formulated in 
relation to the newspaper press. Classical liberalism has conferred to the press the role 
of investigating and exposing the improprieties of authorities, monitoring the activities 
of the powerful, and defending the free circulation of ideas and opinions (Curran 2002, 
McQuail 2005). According to this view, the watchdog role is considered the most 
relevant in a democratic society, and it is set 
 
by the end of government, the protection of rights, and would be 
required regardless of whether or not such government employed 
democratic means of operation. The implication of this priority is that 
even if… the government could use its power effectively to strengthen 
the democratic function, it would not be justified in doing so at the cost 
of the watchdog function (Kelley and Donway 1990: 97). 
 
Various authors have defended the watchdog perspective while drawing from the idea 
that the press functions as a ‘fourth estate’. The term is accredited to Edmund Burke, 
the eighteenth-century statesman, who claimed that the press operated as a power at 
least equal to the three existing powers: “There are three estates in Parliament, but in 
the reporter’s gallery yonder sits a fourth estate more important than they all” (Carlyle 
1841 cited by Franklin et al 2005: 273). Advocates of the idea that the ‘fourth estate 
power’ should exist within the press in order to keep the government in check and 
benefit the general public assume, as Sanford J. Ungar observes, that the media must 
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at times operate as “the conscience of a nation”, and that such role may drive them to 
act as “a lonely adversary of the government in power” (1990: 378).   
 
2.3. ‘Four theories of the press’ and the prevalence of media libertarianism  
   
The pervasiveness of the liberal narratives and theories of the press (and media) are 
possibly best exemplified by the influence that the ‘four theories of the press’ still have 
internationally (Sparks 2000, McQuail 2005). These were elaborated by Fred S. 
Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, and originally published in the 
context of the Cold War, during 1956. The four theories were conceptualised as 
‘authoritarian’, ‘libertarian’, ‘social responsibility’, and ‘Soviet communist’. Though they 
argue to be evaluating the media broadly, it is the press that is their principal focus 
because it is the oldest form and has gathered over the years more of the theory of 
mass media (Siebert 1963). 
 
These theories have been critically assessed and refuted by various authors. 
Moreover, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the four theories – that of 
‘Soviet communism’ – is not seen as pertinent by some critics (McQuail 2005). Others, 
such as John C. Nerone (1995), contend that Siebert and colleagues only managed to 
elaborate a single theory with four examples and not a set of different theories in their 
work. Yet, although critical of them, authors such as Sparks (2000), Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) claim that the ‘four theories’ hold a significant explanatory power and reflect a 
normative ideal. Also, the broad framework of the ‘four theories’ seem to operate in an 
apparent alignment with the basic notions of Hayek’s non-collectivist democracy.   
 
The first theory to be presented by Siebert (1963) is authoritarianism, with scarce 
theoretical formulations, and in a predominantly descriptive manner. The authoritarian 
theory, as argued by him, emerged mainly in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Britain 
and Western Europe. Monarchical rule or the government was thought to be the most 
adequate voice for expressing and deciding the collective action, and decisions by the 
state were always above those of any individual (Ibid). It was this power elite, 
conformed by few ‘wise men’, which was ‘destined’ to guide the organised society, in 
part by systematic control and surveillance of what was published and expressed in the 
press. Under such authoritarian paradigm the press is not permitted to check on the 
government or to interfere with its decisions. It is the state that determines all 
communication policies and has the exclusive right to license and to censor when it 
considers it pertinent (Siebert 1963). Even so, authoritarians are argued to have 
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permitted some level of political discussion among its citizens, providing this was 
elaborated only in broad theoretical terms and as long as it did not represent an attack 
on the form of government and its sovereign (Ibid).  
 
The libertarian theory, as argued by Siebert (1963), took shape during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and was strongly influenced by the writings of advocates of 
‘liberty of the press’ such as Milton, Locke and James Mill. They believed that 
‘liberating’ the press from the monopoly of authorities was an “epic, heroic fight of the 
individual against political power” (Keane 1991: 37). This struggle was fuelled by the 
conception that individuals were rational beings who wished to make their own 
judgments and choices regarding the different accounts of reality (Siebert 1963). If 
truth was ever a ‘property’ of the state under the authoritarian paradigm, in the 
libertarian view it is to emerge from the ‘free-market place’ of ideas. In this context the 
media become a means to check on government, instead of one of its instruments of 
power (Ibid, Gurevitch and Blumler 1990).  
 
The basic rationale of the freedom of the press theory is endorsed in Siebert’s 
elaboration of ‘libertarianism’. Moreover, the author seems to attempt to formulate an 
updated and celebratory version of it. But, as Keane (1991) would argue, hardly any 
questions are made about the nature of freedom and equality of communication in this 
liberal theory of the media. Siebert does recognise that libertarianism has not been 
able to produce a criteria by which to differentiate between “liberty and abuse of liberty” 
(1963: 71) in the media, but he claims that its principles have been pivotal to the 
development of democracy, “which has resulted in the stupendous advancement of the 
well-being of humanity…, as the guiding principle of western civilization for more than 
two hundred years” (1963: 70). 
 
Siebert’s ideas of western civilization and democratic paragons are drawn within the 
context of the United States. The same can be said about his model of media 
libertarianism. Within the U.S. liberal tradition he finds that the ideals of “objective 
reporting” (Ibid: 60) and of watchdog function are most entrenched (Schudson 1995, 
Curran 2002). It is also in that liberal pro-market environment that freedom tends to be 
defined as the “absence of interference” from government (Street 2011: 307). Under 
such rationale this can only be achieved in a context where media outlets compete with 
as little regulation as possible, or none at all. What authors such as Curran, 
Lichtenberg, Keane, Nerone and O’Neill argue is that not all freedoms are compatible. 
Furthermore, market-led media tend to be “self-paralysing” (Keane 1991: 68), and 
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erode free competition while creating monopolies (McChesney 2000).  
 
Curran explains that the watchdog function is a key factor in the “democratic 
functioning of the media” (2002: 219). Yet, he argues, it seems unrealistic that it should 
define media policy solely. In traditional liberal or libertarian theory it is common to 
regard essentially the government as the place power is focalised in – within this 
framework there is a tendency to forget the economic elites and the way these exercise 
power through the media. A revision of the libertarian theory seems required so as to 
comprehend the media as “being a check on both public and private authority” (Ibid). 
This conception has led to the formulation of a social responsibility theory.  
 
In his Anglo-North American-centred account, Peterson (1963) argues that the social 
responsibility theory emerged in its most integrated version as a product of the 
Commission on Freedom of the Press, which set up an inquiry in 1942 about an array 
of criticisms of the United States’ local newspaper press, and was reported in 1947. 
One of the members of the commission, William Hocking, wrote:  
 
Inseparable from the right of the press to be free has been the right of 
the people to have a free press. But the public interest has advanced 
beyond that point; it is now the right of the people to have an adequate 
press (cited by McQuail 2005: 171). 
 
The idea of an ‘adequate’ media, capable of representing and promoting diversity, 
balance, independence, and responsible information was developed partially as a 
reaction to the criticisms formulated by the commission, and which Peterson (1963) 
synthesised as follows: the press was argued to be controlled by a socio-economic 
elite, tended to exert its power for its own interests while promoting deregulation, was 
notably contrary to social change, lacked active support of public morals, provided 
significantly more superficial entertainment content than a formative and informative 
one, invaded the privacy of citizens without the information disseminated being of 
authentic public interest, and endangered the “free market of ideas” by allowing the 
powerful to control it (Ibid: 78). 
 
The commission drew various standards by which the media should operate in a 
democratic society. This followed that the media should offer a “truthful, 
comprehensive, intelligent” and accurate account of events which should entail 
meaning for the collective; serve as a forum for public discussion in which different 
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viewpoints and interests are present; respect and promote plurality for all interest 
groups and minorities; present and clarify the values and virtues of the society; and 
guarantee plural access of information to all citizens (cited by Peterson 1963: 88-91).  
 
This theory stresses that freedom of expression cannot be limited to the powerful, and 
that citizens are not to be treated exclusively as market-led consumers (Keane 1991, 
McChesney 2000 and 2008). Yet, and in contrast with libertarianism, such freedom 
should not be understood as an absolute right (Peterson 1963). Nerone points out that 
if the press is a “depository of the individual freedoms of its readers, then it certainly 
must have responsibilities” (1995: 6). Media owners and practitioners must find ways 
by which to agree on common codes of ethics and of professional practice, and any 
type of regulation conformed must not stimulate control of the media by the 
government (Peterson 1963, McQuail 2005).   
 
In the Soviet communist theory the state (or the central communist party) owns and 
controls the media, and the function of each outlet is instrumentally defined by its 
leaders. In Siebert’s view the media within the Soviet framework “achieve their own 
ends by assisting in achieving the ends of the state” (1963: 27).  
 
This theory formulates that its interpretation of Marx’s call for a dictatorship of the 
proletariat has promoted an absolutist instrumentalisation of the media by the 
communist state (Ibid). Moreover, Schramm and Siebert argue that the Marxist-Soviet 
media paradigm varies little from the authoritarian one, and yet in classic 
authoritarianism the media were “in bondage with the state” whereas under the Soviet 
model the media are “in and of the state” (Schramm 1963: 140).  
 
The basic difference between these two theories – the Soviet communist and the 
authoritarian –, according to the authors, is that communism utilises the media to 
promote and accomplish revolution, and that it leaves no space for any privately-
owned media enterprise. It is the state alone that employs the media as an 
instrumental tool exclusively for propaganda, agitation and collective organisation 
(Ibid).  
 
Apologists of the Soviet model argue that market-led media, as it exists in the United 
States, cannot be free from capital and bourgeois individualism (Schramm 1963). On 
the other hand, freedom within the media in Soviet communism is to be expressed 
within the limits of the egalitarian ideal that the state has established for society.  
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Critics of neo-liberalism affirm that the libertarian media tend to privilege the circulation 
of information that supports the status quo and the ideology of the elite including, 
naturally, those who own the private media (McChesney 2000 and 2008, McQuail 
2005). Also, these authors have argued that the basic notions of power relations in 
libertarian theory tend to overlook issues of private ownership of the media 
(Lichtenberg 1990, McChesney 2000, Street 2011). They argue that non-regulated 
private ownership creates non-democratic media in the sense that in pursuing private 
interests they limit the access to information and the supply of it (Ibid).  
 
In his critique of the four theories of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, the author 
Sparks (2000) explains that in their study – like in the majority of media theory that has 
followed – discussion about the media and democracy tends to fluctuate around the 
dichotomous clash between state and market. The two are obviously different, but in 
their extreme forms their non-democratic results are not too dissimilar. This is 
highlighted by Robert W. McChesney when he contends that a market perception of 
democracy tends to be one in which “rights to buy, sell, and invest for private gain in 
the market place are the only non-negotiable freedoms”; whereas in the Soviet 
conception, apparent ‘democratic’ elections are permitted only “as long as the power 
of the commissars and the dominance of the Communist Party is unchallengeable” 
(2000: 286).  
 
While McChesney (Ibid) indicates that the media debate should promote aspects of 
social engagement that seek to reform and change the nature of the structure and 
control of the media, Sparks argues for a shift in discussion away from the debate 
about the “relatively empowering virtues of state and the market” and a need to focus 
on what kind of relations the media have with the “mass of the population” (2000: 47). 
This implies defining to what extent both media practitioners and the public have a 
genuine say in how the media are to operate and how their interests are represented 
in them. 
 
2.4. Ideology and class struggle in the media: the legacy of Marxist theory 
 
There are a variety of theories that have focused mainly on the relations between how 
media relate to power and equality. According to McQuail (2005), these are by no 
means uniform in their views and assumptions, yet they tend to address the same key 
issues in relation to media and democracy. 
 
 
44 
 
 
The classic Marxist study of the media places exceptional emphasis on class struggle 
and on the way the media tend to be used as an instrument of control by the dominant 
social class and to preserve the status quo (Garnham 1990, Curran 2002, McQuail 
2005). In its evaluation of power in the media and contrary to most affirmative 
historical narratives, Marxism stresses that the way media are used depends on how 
the relations between classes is developed and how these are able – or not – to 
negotiate (Artz et al 2006). According to Curran and Michael Gurevitch, in its appraisal 
of capitalist societies, Marxism asserts that the media  
 
relay interpretative frameworks consonant with the interests of the 
dominant classes, the media audiences, while sometimes negotiating 
and contesting these frameworks, lack ready access to alternative 
meaning systems that would enable them to reject the definitions 
offered by the media in favour of oppositional definitions (cited by 
Curran 2002: 108). 
 
In this view, even media practitioners, though they might be under the impression of 
possessing a sense of autonomy, can only reproduce the dominant mode of 
communicating and socialising (Ibid). Ultimately, under the Marxist logic, it is the 
message of the owner of a specific media outlet that the journalist reproduces. This, in 
turn, reflects how media owners and some journalists, in producing and disseminating 
information content, tend to affirm the “legitimacy and the value of a class society” 
(McQuail 2005: 95). This framework of thought has found arguably one of its most 
radical western propositions in what Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have 
defined as the ‘propaganda model’ (Sparks 2006). Both authors claim that the very 
structure and functioning of media seek to reproduce the capitalist model and free-
market logic in a systematic way. It is a formulation that tends to explicate the media as 
“one reactionary mass”, but that overlooks, according to Sparks, that media in capitalist 
democracies can be characterised “not for their crushing uniformity but their limited 
diversity” (Ibid: 112).  
 
However, Callinicos (1991), McChesney (2000 and 2008) and Lee Artz (2006) contend 
that in capitalist societies there exists uniformity, in the way in which a dominant class 
exploits to varying degrees other classes or productive forces. From this perspective, 
capitalist owners of media – or of any means of production – through an exploitative 
relationship and manipulation of the labour forces seek to maximise their own profits 
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(Garnham 1990, Bolaño 1999, McQuail 2005, McNair 2006). The contradictions that 
emerge from these relations are, in classical Marxism, not between individuals but 
between social classes. The power and social influence of each class “depends on the 
outcome of its interactions” – such as negotiations, alliances, or confrontations – with 
other classes (Artz 2006: 29).  
 
Drawing from Gramsci’s ideas, for the media owners – as part of the dominant class – 
to achieve hegemonic success they must incorporate challenges and negotiations from 
the subordinate classes into the type of “ideology that may modify but reinforce an 
existing relations of production” (Artz 2006: 33). This ideology, overtly or subtly 
promoted by the media, tends to alienate those who are not in power and create a 
false consciousness. Marcuse (1991) argues that such ideology, promoted in the 
media, paradoxically encourages a representation of social reality that is 
simultaneously repressive and desirable.    
 
Neo-Marxist authors such as Artz (2006) and Dana L. Cloud (2006) contend that 
theories of media embedded in liberal and capitalist narratives lack any concern for 
inclusion and egalitarianism. Both stress that these narratives diminish democratic 
principles rather than strengthen them. They claim that these tend to advocate for 
individual freedoms, but that they are ultimately calls for freedom for capitalist 
entrepreneurs who own the media and who seek to preserve their privilege within the 
socio-economic structure. Additionally, the authors stress with worry the lack of 
attention paid in recent studies to what they consider a central factor in the relation 
between media and democracy – the capitalist system of class and the ways the 
subordinate classes struggle and negotiate with the dominant one in conditions of 
disadvantage (Ibid). In a call for a shift of media control, to be brought about through a 
radical emancipationist or revolutionary process, by and for the working class and 
disenfranchised, Artz affirms that, historically, social struggles “reveal that 
transformation of capitalist society cannot occur without knowledge of the social 
relations that oppress and depress subordinate classes” (2006: 48). 
 
According to McQuail (2005) and Sartori (2007b), in its call for radical democratic 
transformation Marxism fails to answer various issues regarding the media, such as: 
How can collective ownership be achieved?; are all media structured in the same way 
in capitalist societies, even those that are under state ownership?; how would multi-
partisan media flourish under the power of proletarian dictatorship? While addressing 
these issues in both capitalist and Marxist approaches to media, Sparks (2006) points 
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out that although Marx’s asseveration that the ideas that define a historical age are 
determined by the dominant class was unequivocal, he concedes that communication 
structures and technologies were very different in Marx’s time when compared to 
contemporary times.  
 
2.5. Approaches in critical political economy  
 
Broad aspects of heterodox Marxist positions provide part of the framework of 
contemporary critical political economy, as do to a degree some principles embedded 
in classic liberal traditions (Mosco 1996 and 2006, Bolaño 1999, McQuail 2005), yet 
the central concern for political economy theorists is arguably the social and power 
relations that charter the “production, distribution, and consumption of communication 
resources” (Mosco 2006: 88). In other words, this strand of thought pays particular 
attention to assessing how media outlets function and how their products, from news 
content to paid publicity, move from producers to the audience, and what effects – in 
terms of control, negotiation, hegemonic tension – they are likely to have.   
 
A media system that does not cultivate social inclusion, nor balanced representation of 
the subordinated or minority classes, cannot be considered democratic (Keane 1991, 
McChesney 2000, Artz et al 2006, Sartori 2007b). Political economic thinkers have 
been critical towards the logic of market-led societies in the sense that these are 
argued not to be committed to the promotion of minority voices in the media and to 
plural access (Sparks 2006, Curran 2010).  
 
Bernard Miège, differently, formulates a critique of media conglomeration and 
imperialism while establishing a rupture with classical Marxism, and more specifically 
with Theodor W. Adorno’s idea that all forms of media and of cultural expression are 
embedded within a ‘culture industry’10, which ultimately obeys the dynamics of the 
market and the interests of the elite (Adorno 1991, Mosco 1996 and 2006). He argues 
that the media, as a most significant part of cultural production, is substantially 
transforming “both the content and form of both works and products” (Miège 2000: 
62), with a tendency to intensify English language in developing nations and the 
primacy of its ‘cultural industry’ – formulations that concur with the critique of Stuart 
Hall (1986 and 1997) regarding the worldwide English-language dominance in cultural 
                                                          
10 Adorno’s notion of “culture industry” belongs to a dialectic, non-affirmative narrative, critical of 
capitalism, from which it is formulated that cultural products are developed within a profit-centred 
mentality that ultimately imposes social conformity (Adorno 1991, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010).  
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production and the media.  
 
Emphasising the existence of an important divide between conservative and Marxist-
oriented currents within political economic thought, Vincent Mosco (2006) argues that 
the prevalent one within this theory is the ‘institutional’ approach, and is arguably most 
wholesomely exposed in the works of economist John Kenneth Galbraith. The latter is 
based in the appraisal of constraints of a technological and institutional nature that 
conform “markets to the advantage of those corporations or governments large and 
powerful enough to control them” (Ibid: 91). Under such conditions, media outlets and 
networks are able to limit social representation, curb variety of content, and restrict 
access to production. Ultimately, the media are argued to be portraying the views of 
the owners and promoting ‘depolitisation’ – to use Marcuse’s expression – within the 
public thus sustaining the status quo. In doing so, as both McChesney (2000) and 
Curran (2002 and 2011) explain, they impede scrutinising social and economic 
institutions, not only checking the state.  
 
A variant of theorists regard the audience as the key element in the media structure, 
and under this theoretical standpoint these are viewed in capitalist societies as 
‘mediatically’ influenced to a significant extent by the commercial content of, for 
example, televised product advertisements. In the contrasting view of technological 
determinism, this commercial dynamic in media has led to an increase of consumerist 
behaviour and a decline in ideological debate (McQuail 2005). Ideological diminution, 
Mosco (1996) indicates, seems to be a result of the process by which information is 
turned into a marketable commodity, within a capitalist logic. As this trend of power 
concentration and cultural transformation prevails and increases in the media of the 
free-market economies, social inequality and class divisions deepen (Ibid). Not only 
that: racial, gender, ethnic and other minorities are negatively affected under such 
patterns of power, cultural dynamics and media ownership (McChesney 2000, 
Benhabib 2005). Ultimately, these lack both democratic access to information and the 
representation of their interests and social realities.   
 
McQuail (Ibid) highlights the point made broadly by critical political theorists that the 
structure and dynamics of the media, as they exist under liberal capitalist frameworks, 
undermine the existence of social and cultural diversity, as would be argued by 
democratic theorists such as James S. Fishkin (1991), Seyla Benhabib (1996 and 
2005), and Víctor Sampedro (2000). Furthermore, he affirms that the dominant elite 
tend to marginalise “opposition and alternative voices”, while the “public interest in 
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communication is subordinated to private interest” (2005: 100). If, as noted by authors 
of varying theoretical standings, the process of internationalisation or globalisation 
advances, then according to the critical political economy current, so does the global 
media conglomeration (Thussu 2000, Curran 2002, Mosco 2006, Sparks 2007). As 
expressed by Mara Einstein, this group of critics 
 
denounce the hegemony of the media and the ever-increasing power 
of the consolidated media conglomerates. These criticisms stem from 
the idea that whoever owns the media, sets the agenda for what will be 
communicated by that medium… Media corporations control the 
‘pipeline’ and, therefore, control the messages the medium transmits 
(2004: 5).  
 
From a different perspective, Mosco adds that, although the media tend to project and 
promote information and communicational content aiming to perpetuate the status 
quo, the subordinate classes cannot be defined simply by their scarce access to the 
media, but by their “relationships of harmony, dependency, and conflict to the 
capitalist class” (2006: 102). In this sense, it is worthwhile adding – as do César 
Bolaño (1999), and Armand Mattelart and Michele Mattelart (2005) – that, for a 
political economy of communication to be comprehensive and more inclusive, it 
cannot rely alone in class structuration as its essential focus.  
 
Dimensions such as race, gender, ethnicity, religion, sovereignty, social and cultural 
movements, need to be evaluated, be it as confrontation or complimentary forces to 
class structure (Mosco 2006). However marginalised, these groups arguably tend to 
configure resistance, formulate alternatives, or elaborate ways by which to negotiate 
with the powerful (Miège 2000, Mosco 2006).  
 
2.6. The globalisation debate and the case of the state  
 
Although a broad debate about globalisation emerged mainly within the academic 
circles during the 1990s, it seems to have been present in one way or another since 
the emergence of industrialisation (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al 2002). Literature 
related to globalisation is vast and its main themes have criticised – or partially 
replaced – in western debate earlier approaches in critical political economy and the 
paradigm of imperialism (Tomlinson 1999, Sreberny-Mohammadi et al 2002, Sparks 
2007).   
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There is, however, a broad set of interpretations and theories of globalisation which 
has been drawn in almost all areas of sociological, political, cultural and media 
studies (García Canclini 1999, Tomlinson 1999, Held 2006, Sparks 2007). 
Globalisation, explains John Tomlinson, has become an extremely flexible concept in 
its “capacity to generate speculations, hypotheses and powerful social images,” that 
reaches beyond data and social facts (1999: 2).  
 
In a generalising account, formulated by Held, globalisation implies, firstly, that an 
array of “political, economic and social activity are becoming worldwide in scope”; and 
secondly, that there is evidence of “intensification of levels of interaction and 
interconnectedness within and between states and societies” (2006: 293-94). This 
follows Anthony Giddens’ interpretation of a new stage of modernity characterised by 
the high level of “time-space distanciation” and the corresponding ways in which 
relations between local and distant social modes intensify and become “stretched” 
(1990: 64). Such a view is challenged by various authors, including Latin American 
theorists and scholars that are reviewed in the next chapter. 
  
Globalisation involves not only a new asymmetry of economic, political, and military 
power between the ‘centre’ (nations of dominant political and economic positions) and 
the ‘periphery’ (developing nations with weak or relatively dependent economies), but 
also in terms of cultural flow and recognition (Hannerz 2002, Ferrer 2007). In this 
asymmetric relationship generally “when the centre speaks, the periphery listens, and 
on the whole does not talk back” (Hannerz 2002: 11), and this dynamic may arguably 
lead to a global cultural homogenisation.  
 
Although some authors claim that this view is quite alarmist and that local popular 
cultures in the periphery are by no means under threat by the increasing flow of 
transnational cultural products and information contents, others contend that global 
culture imposes a dynamic of political and ideological submission to the powerful 
nations (Schiller 1991, Mattelart and Mattelart 2005). Following this argument, it is 
implied that global media also becomes ‘transnationalised’ thus producing a dynamic 
of dependency in both the media professionals and the audience/readers belonging 
to the periphery (Boyd-Barnett 2002, McQuail 2005).  
 
Yet, enthusiasts of globalisation claim that it has increasingly gained a ‘decentred’ 
and ‘disorganised’ character, reflecting a multidirectional interconnectivity and 
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enhancing a new sense of international cosmopolitanism, in sharp contrast with the 
geopolitical view that had been reflected, for example, during the late 1950s in the 
work of Siebert and colleagues (Curran and Park 2000, Curran 2002, McNair 2006). 
One significant claim made in relation to this interconnectedness is the key role 
communication technology has played in it. As argued by McQuail, mass 
communication has become “by definition global in character” (2005: 251).  
 
Some advocates of the ‘Information Society’ and other media-centric theories find that 
the expansion of media and communication technologies, emerging as part of the 
dynamics of capitalism, have become a key source of wealth and have contributed to 
the configuration of a more plural and democratic civil society (Curran 2002 and 2011, 
McQuail 2005). Others, as McNair formulates, argue that global media may well be 
serving as one key basis for a “unifying collective identity, or imagined community, 
and even some kind of global governance” (2006: 147).  
 
These enthusiasts of the information society paradigm have reinvigorated Marshall 
McLuhan’s idea that media technology has had a greater social impact globally than 
the content of media (McLuhan 1994, Thussu 2000, McQuail 2005). This view 
surpasses Giddens’ notion of a ‘decentred’ modern world and essentially proclaims 
the existence of a ‘technologically-determined decentred cosmopolitan’ one. It is 
arguably from within this sense of new cosmopolitanism that various “pan-
communicational idealists” and “techno-determinists” (Bolaño 1999: 26)11 maintain 
that globalisation promotes increasing diversity and hybridisation within nation-states 
(Martín-Barbero 1993, Curran 2002).  
 
The idea that globalisation enhances plural connectivity, promoting a sort of ‘trans-
national empathy’ among societies – as in McLuhan’s ‘global village’ – is strongly 
challenged by authors such as McChesney (2008). He argues (Ibid) that the 
evaluation of globalised media must rest in arguments of an economic and political 
nature – these essentially relate to the global rise of market-oriented economy. He 
critically identifies various tendencies within the capitalist framework that have given 
rise to globalisation. Firstly, he argues (Ibid), the intensification of trans-border capital 
flow has reduced the capacity of national governments to act free of the constraints 
and interests set by transnational business. State autonomy has suffered as a result, 
particularly in developing countries. Secondly, the greater leverage that international 
                                                          
11 Direct quote from author Bolaño –belonging to a work not published or not available in English– 
has been translated by me, from Spanish.  
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corporations have been gaining over national and local government has led to 
deregulation “in the hope of luring capital and reducing the power of labour and labour 
unions” (Ibid: 372). Thirdly, the decreasing economic growth in advanced capitalist 
nations outlines a tendency towards economic stagnation and a significant reduction 
of buying power – in contradiction to capitalist rationale.  
 
Lastly, the power that the transnational financial markets have acquired, while 
harming the political and economic sovereignty of most states by which these should 
articulate effective policies for its citizens, has caused economic instability worldwide 
and accentuated class stratification. McChesney concludes that globalisation 
represents a facet of concentrated corporate ownership and advanced commercial 
support for the media that has “destroyed the capacity for the press to fulfil a 
democratic mission” (Ibid: 371).  
 
Critics of market-led globalisation – as is the case of McChesney – also argue that 
the growth of transnational corporate power significantly undermines the capacity of 
the state in promoting and executing media regulation in the interest of the public 
(Beltrán 1999, Thussu 2000, Mattelart 2005). In a similar tone, Curran and Park 
explain that  
 
in a globally deregulated world, all economies are subject to the 
pressure of market norms and behaviour. The power to resist, and the 
power to support values and social arrangements that reflect the will of 
the people through the democratic system have been diminished 
(2000: 10). 
 
Yet, national governments, either in the so-called ‘centre’ or in the ‘periphery’, can 
function as ‘mediators’ between transnational corporations and the public, and also 
define the framework in which regulations and communication laws are to operate. In 
sum, and following Curran’s (2002) observations, there seem to exist sufficient 
arguments for proposing that the nation state can be a starting point for charting and 
understanding the dynamics of democracy in the media.  
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
Since one of this study’s main objectives is to assess journalistic practices in a 
politically-polarised national context, the principal aim of this chapter lies in 
 
 
52 
 
understanding the diversity and complexity of theories and narratives related to 
democracy, media and journalistic practice.  
 
There seems to be agreement among the majority of authors reviewed that liberal 
press (or media) theories are not only the longest established but arguably the most 
pervasive in media analysis. An important normative/professionalism dimension is 
prevalent in the works of liberal and communication and journalistic theorists. Key 
normative assumptions in the democratic performance of the media from this trend’s 
perspective are varied and tend to emphasise aspects such as public interest, 
fairness, independence, scrutinising of authorities (‘watchdog function’), and plural 
dialogue across society (Keane 1991, Curran 2002, Bisbal 2009, Waisbord 2013).  
 
Authors of different theoretical currents contend that the media and journalism are 
driven primarily by the “imperatives of private enterprise capitalism and by the values 
of a consumer society” (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990: 269), and that liberal-leaning 
views fail to evaluate the power structures of the media and/or their lack of incentives 
for promoting egalitarianism and diversity. These critiques emerge from contrasting 
schools of neo-Marxism, critical political economy, dependency paradigms, cultural 
studies, among other narratives in media analysis. 
 
Importantly, globalisation also seems to reconfigurate the debate about media and 
democracy. In this regard, there is a clash of contrasting views that, if appreciated in 
a binary fashion, have been set by a ‘technophiliac’ current – which broadly holds that 
technological advances are the primordial condition for globalisation – and a 
diversified radical trend that affirms that the decisive forces behind globalisation are 
essentially economic, political and market-driven (McQuail 2005). Yet, all theoretical 
strands discussed seem to agree, in different ways and through varied mechanisms, 
that “democracy needs an informed citizenry and that the media are the chief vehicle 
for achieving it” (Dahlgren 2000: 322).   
 
Even under occasional Manichean modes of presenting and contrasting media 
systems and normative logics (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 14), most approaches 
discussed in this chapter – albeit having been developed predominantly in a western 
context – hold worthy explanatory ideas for helping understand the media and 
journalistic cultures in hybrid or non-western democracies, as are the cases of most 
Latin American nations.  
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Paradigms of media, culture and journalism that have emerged from within the region, 
and especially from Venezuela, are charted and assessed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Latin American theories in media, culture and democracy 
 
 
In order to assess the democratic role of the news media and journalistic practice in 
the context of Venezuela, it is necessary to explore existing theories and ideas of 
communication that relate directly to the social and political realities of Latin America 
and of the nation. Moreover, the dominant perspectives in media and social studies 
that have emanated essentially from western authors and that seem to prevail within 
the theoretical canon, should be complemented – or at times, challenged – by others 
that have been elaborated within non-western scholarly approaches (Curran and Park 
2000, Beltrán 2008, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010) and which tend to keep a closer bearing 
on the regional and local contexts.  
 
Debates about democratisation and media, power and ideology, popular cultures and 
institutions, communication policies, journalistic ideals, and related topics are “one 
thing when conducted in the liberal-democratic climate of Europe or North America,” 
but something very different “when taking place under the dictatorial cloud that 
covered eight out of ten countries” in South America by 1977 (Schlesinger 1993: ix). 
  
Various authors have highlighted Latin America’s own analytical richness in media 
analysis and the ways in which its critical traditions have contributed significantly to 
amplify the debate in media, journalism, and cultural production (Aguirre and Bisbal 
2010), as a general current committed to “progressive politics and the foundational 
principle of praxis as intrinsic to academic work” (Murphy and Rodríguez 2006: 268).  
 
In more than one way, Latin America represents a pioneering region in the 
development of media experience, models and theories, which have at various stages 
either criticised or reinterpreted western views (Beltrán 2008, Barranquero 2011), 
particularly in their elaboration of democratic and inclusive guidelines by which to link 
communication and media praxis to plural access, participation, and social change. 
Jesús María Aguirre and Marcelino Bisbal argue that the study of communication, 
media and journalism in the region has been characteristically non-lineal in its 
development, but “highly competitive and polemical”, with different authors drawing in 
an eclectic manner from different currents of thought – which range from Marxism and 
its derivations to cultural studies – and from various disciplines, such as sociology, 
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economics and semiotics, among others (2010: 11-12)12. Broadly speaking, these 
studies have been concerned, according to Luis Ramiro Beltrán (2008) and Aguirre 
and Bisbal (op. cit), with media democratisation, social transformation, definitions of 
cultural identity within the globalisation process, and tensions with ideas of 
professionalism. 
 
3.1. Globalisation and the media: views from Latin America   
 
There has been broad debate among regional authors in Latin America about the 
nature of globalisation and the ways it has been transforming the region’s social, 
cultural and media landscape (Mattelart 1999 and 2010, Martín-Barbero 2002b, 
Pasquali 2007). Globalisation has been interpreted as a process of social, economic, 
political and cultural linkage that goes beyond varying forms of integration of nation-
states to become “the emergence of a new socio-historical nexus” which defines the 
world and the way to think about it (Martín-Barbero 2002b). It is a view shared by 
many Latin American cultural theorists, and tends to represent a celebratory position 
towards potential communicational interconnectivity, promotion of diversity, plural 
access in the media, journalistic autonomy, and social resistance (García Canclini 
1995 and 1999, Curran and Park 2000).  
 
To a certain degree, the assumption by these authors that globalisation encompasses 
a potential platform for social and political power transformation, is not too dissimilar 
from Giddens’ assumption that globalisation, as a new stage of modernity, has 
‘stretched’ local modes, ‘extended’ communicational exchange and ‘decentred’ 
previous dominant forms of social integration (Giddens 1990, Curran and Park 2000).  
 
However, the premise of Giddens (1990) that globalisation is the result of an 
international shift inherent to capitalist modernity and its alleged decentred character, 
has been challenged by authors such as Mattelart (1999) and McChesney (2000 and 
2008), who regard it as a process that maintains key traits of both dependency and 
imperialism, whereby the governments of post-industrialised powers and 
transnational corporations dictate ‘global’ economic and political policies, thus 
potentially modifying the cultural and media landscape of entire nations. 
 
                                                          
12 In this chapter, I have translated direct quotes from authors Aguirre and Bisbal, Bisbal and 
Nicodemo, Bolaño, Garretón, Mattelart, Mattelart and Mattelart –all belonging to works not 
published or not available in English– from Spanish.  
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In a similar vein, Aldo Ferrer (2007) argues that globalisation is framed within an 
hegemonic dynamic, which is ultimately functional to the interests of the economically 
dominant nations and to specific social groups within them, and tends not to lead 
‘periphery’ nations to genuine global integration. He emphasises that a way for these 
countries to overcome relative political, economic and cultural dependency towards 
dominant nations is by strengthening national policies of democratic participation and 
social distribution, while also implementing effective regional integration strategies in 
media (Ibid).  
 
In her assessment of globalisation, Seyla Benhabib claims that its dominant trajectory 
is “from the centre to the periphery, rather than vice versa” (2005: 182). Through 
different elaborations in their respective works, Nestor García Canclini (1999) and 
John Tomlinson (1999) contend that globalisation is not univocally a discourse of 
dominance from the ‘centre’ to the ‘periphery’, but a set of processes that 
simultaneously encourage both homogenisation and fragmentation throughout the 
world. In doing so, argues García Canclini (Ibid) while focusing on the case of Latin 
America, globalisation reorders social inequality and differences without suppressing 
them.  
 
He stresses, together with Jesús Martín-Barbero (2002a and 2002b), that most 
globalisation theorists tend to vindicate integrationism and egalitarianism as inherent 
traits of globalisation, but fail to observe and analyse inequality, exclusion and 
segregation as part of its nature. In this sense, both García Canclini and Martín-
Barbero evaluate the phenomenon of globalisation as a highly complex one, which 
can also be defined by the tensions that appear to be evident in the interdependence 
and interchange of what is ‘local’ and what is ‘global’ in societies (García Canclini 
1999). Both analysts seem to engage critically – to some degree – with the dynamics 
of economic power in globalisation as part of their cultural theories of Latin America.  
 
In a less ‘culturalist’ critique of globalisation that seeks to draw for Latin America a 
normative framework in media and which maintains some arguments similar to those 
of Mattelart and Mattelart (2005) and McChesney (2008), the work of Beltrán (2008) 
has stressed that the dominant discourse of globalisation has stimulated another 
wave of media deregulation both intra and internationally, thus undermining both state 
and communitarian policies for journalism and the media, and weakening the 
backbone of democratic media. In his appraisal of the market-driven ideals that have 
allegedly underpinned the information society and its technophilia, he argues for 
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‘responsible’ national and regional media policies and reforms that enhance 
democratic participation and social mobilisation in the media, while curbing the power 
of media transnational corporations (Ibid). 
 
Yet, further critical stances towards the effects of globalisation in the region are to be 
found in the political economy and neo-Marxist currents. César Bolaño (1999), 
McChesney (2000 and 2008), Mattelart and Mattelart (2005) and Mattelart (2010) 
argue that the negative consequences of globalisation of the media go beyond the 
exacerbation of deregulation – local and national identities are affected negatively 
and become decentred.  
 
An additional critique, as expressed by Bolaño (1999), is that globalisation has 
become a “fetish-concept” supported and reinforced by a market-led discourse, 
reductionist in nature, and lacking any regard for its ideological implications within 
society. He argues (Ibid) that globalisation has been promoted as part of the neo-
liberal ideological order, with the principal aim to stimulate the flow of capital in favour 
of the centres of financial, economic and political power – mainly the United States – 
in detriment to the nations on the periphery and their attempts at democratising 
media.  
 
Critically, Mattelart (1999) claims that there are some cases in Latin America where 
organised civil society, through democratic deliberation or activism, has achieved 
important shifts in media regulation since the mid-1990s. Also, there is evidence of use 
of autocratic forms of regulation imposed by local governments for both national and 
international media – as has been the case of some ‘hybrid’ democracies or 
authoritarian populisms in Latin America – which in more than one way have defied the 
hegemony of the United States and other western powers (Bisbal 2009). This latter 
aspect brings to the foreground the argument that, contrary to the views of Giddens 
(1990 and 1998) and Benhabib (2005) which stress that nation-state systems are 
waning under the pervasiveness of globalisation, national governments still seem to 
maintain a key role in society’s power structure.  
 
In contradiction with the narratives of both market and technology enthusiasts, nation 
states seem to prevail as very important “markers of differences” (Curran 2002: 183). 
These still seem to be able to define, to varying degrees and depending on 
geopolitical and economic contexts, all sorts of policies – social, economic, political 
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and communicational13.  
 
3.2. The dependency model and cultural imperialism 
 
The question of hegemony has been central to Latin American critical debate since 
the late 1960s (Mattelart 1999, Murphy and Rodríguez 2006, Lozano 2007). In 
debating the character of media and cultural hegemony in the region, many Latin 
American authors have primarily based their critique in the dominance of western 
models, but more specifically in the way the United States’ media and their content 
flows unidirectionally in the region and the ideological and social consequences of this 
dynamic (Ibid). This has been one of the key arguments of Latin American analysts 
and theorists of media such as Beltrán, Armand Mattelart, Antonio Pasquali, Elizabeth 
Fox, and Carola García Calderón (Beltrán 2005 and 2008, Lozano 2007, Pasquali 
2007, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010).   
 
Arguably, the critical approach of Mattelart provides a warning about the media 
dependency within Latin America, and its supposed ideological domination by the 
United States. His work pays special attention to class struggle, while moving beyond 
certain aspects of canonical Marxism (1999 and 2005). Arguably the most notorious of 
these is his refusal to interpret the media’s social function as an exclusive derivation of 
the way in which ownership and social classes are structured (Bolaño 1999). Mattelart 
(1999 and 2010) argues that the media can be used as a key instrument for 
emancipation and resistance. This, he argues, should apply particularly to developing 
non-western societies in their struggle to “oppose western control and create 
indigenous news and entertainment media” (Mosco 2006: 94).  
 
Mattelart’s research during the 1970s, led primarily in Latin America, has 
amalgamated the analysis of both national and international power structures, of 
ideological struggles in everyday life, with a formulation of proposals of “resistance to 
the dominant classes and to the imperialistic culture” (1999: 9). He observes that, 
although the paradigm of ‘cultural imperialism’ – particularly that of the United States – 
has been caricaturised over the decades within an “uncritical globalized” ideal, it still 
has relevance when appraising non-western societies, in the sense that it foregrounds 
                                                          
13 During the 2000s, the left-wing governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and 
Venezuela have implemented national laws and regulations for the media, in contrast to the 
prevailing deregulation and market-led policies of the 1990s, leading to intense critiques from the 
private sector (Kitzberger 2012). 
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the discussion of participative democracy and media of “returning the voice to the 
people” (Ibid: 9-10) and fostering self-development collectively, as theorists of the New 
Left have explained.  
 
To illustrate this, Mattelart draws from his experience as a government communication 
advisor in Chile (Mattelart 1999, Mosco 2006). He argues that the “ideological sanitary 
cordon” – to use Chilean President Salvador Allende’s14 expression – that the United 
States imposed on Latin America during the Cold War era, led to the development of a 
critical awareness by Latin American theorists and policy-makers of the transnational 
character of the media, the U.S.-led hegemonic neo-liberal project, and the necessity 
to formulate changes within such “asymmetric” framework (1999: 10). Aspects of this 
ideological order and U.S. socio-political influence, some authors would argue, 
continue to be present in twenty-first century Latin America and its media, to the 
extent that media discourse and practice can be considerably affected by this alleged 
one-way dynamic (Mattelart and Mattelart 2005, Pasquali 2007, Barret et al 2008).  
 
Examining various Latin American countries, Andre Gunder Frank, finds that however 
politically independent, these have maintained a relation of cultural and media 
subordination primarily to the United States, whose condition of “metropolis” imposes 
monopolistic power over its “satellites”, namely Latin American nations and other 
developing countries, thus leading to the “underdeveloped development” of the latter 
(2004: 40). In his elaboration of a ‘dependency’ model, as Sparks explains, Frank 
argues that developed nations like the United States have maintained 
 
an exploitative relationship to the less developed ones: surpluses that 
were generated in Latin America were diverted to North America. At 
the same time, the developed countries constantly interfered… in the 
economic, political and social life of the developing world in ways that 
polarized the societies (2007: 82). 
 
Theorists and scholars Beltrán, Pasquali, Fox, Frank, and Mattelart argue that a 
structure of dominance and dependency has been maintained between a ‘centre’ and 
a ‘periphery’, the former consisting of the developed neo-liberal economies and the 
                                                          
14 Salvador Allende (1908-1973) was the first democratically-elected left-wing President in Latin 
America. Of nationalist, Marxist, reformist credentials, he met strong opposition from Chile’s 
conservative sector throughout his mandate. He died during the U.S.-backed coup d’état on 
September 11, 1973, led by General Augusto Pinochet (Reid 2009, Williamson 2009). 
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latter of the developing and underdeveloped economies (Beltrán 1999 and 2008, 
Bolaño 1999, Lozano 2007, Sparks 2007). ‘Centre’ and ‘periphery’ have been 
structurally connected to each other, and “the condition for the prosperity of the 
developed was the misery and exploitation” of the developing or underdeveloped 
(Sparks 2007: 83). This argument has permeated the rationale behind the 
dependency model elaborated by Latin American authors and, in doing so, has 
stressed the importance of power structures within the media while also observing the 
way in which foreign interests and economic dynamics can shape media systems 
(Waisbord 2000b). 
 
The flow of communication between the peripheral countries tends to be limited, 
according to this model, and it is in the interest of the dominant developed countries 
for this to be so in order to force the ‘periphery’ into a market dynamic which is 
essentially created by the transnational corporations and governments of developed 
economies (Thussu 2000, Waisbord 2000b, McQuail 2005). The latter are generally 
understood to be, from the post-war years to the twentieth-first century, the United 
States and the larger nations of Western Europe, such as France, Great Britain, and 
Germany15. 
 
One constant of the dependency model has been that the ‘centre’ has been 
permeating the ‘periphery’ with a unidirectional media flow, promoting – mostly in a 
non-direct way – the values, ideologies and broad cultural traits of the dominant 
market-led societies. Such dynamics, as explains Silvio Waisbord (2000b), tend to 
reinforce foreign domination and the weakening of national cultures. Another constant 
has been the idea that media that are built around the international power structures of 
capitalism “constitute obstacles rather than conduits for democracy” (Ibid: 52).   
 
The dependency model has been elaborated, in part, as a response to the 
‘developmentalist’ thesis of media and communication. The latter is an alleged product 
of western attempts to integrate an international framework of communication into “an 
explanatory perspective on development” aligned with the political and economic 
interests of elite groups and their society characteristics (Mosco 2006: 94). It emerged 
from a technological determinist narrative, built partially on Schramm’s and Siebert’s 
works, and has been at core market-oriented. As Jan Servaes and Patchanee 
Malikhao explain, it interprets development  
                                                          
15 Non-western countries such as China, Japan, and Russia also possess their own ‘peripheries’ 
(McQuail 2005).  
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as an unilinear, evolutionary process and defines the state of 
underdevelopment in terms of observable quantitative differences 
between so-called poor and rich countries on the one hand, and 
traditional and modern societies on the other hand (2007: 2). 
 
By contrast, under the Latin American developmentalist perspective the media 
represent – together with levels of education, urbanisation, employment and social 
forces – an “index of development” for the periphery nations and a resource by which 
democratic values of neo-liberal models can be enhanced (Mosco 2006: 94). Yet, 
according to various authors, its principal theoretical challenge emerged from Latin 
American scholars and researchers who elaborated the dependency model and 
played an active role in the debates of both the New World Information and 
Communication Order (NWICO)16 and the National Communication Policies debates 
(Bolaño 1999, Servaes and Malikhao 2007, Beltrán 2008, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010). 
 
Even though various Latin American and western authors recognise the importance of 
the dependency model and the appraisal of ‘imperialist hegemony’, some have 
questioned the premises of its critique. The dependency model and the imperialism 
paradigm have been challenged, as Sparks explains, since the emergence of 
important shifts in the international media landscape, as studies showed in the mid-
1980s, when both economic and technical changes contributed significantly to the 
transformation of world communications into more complex systems, in which “there 
were multiple centres of production and exchanges flowing through many different 
channels” (2007: 119). The dependentistas, argues Waisbord (2000b), fail to observe 
and assess the nuanced relation of power between the state and the local public 
sphere in developing media systems; and adds conclusively that the dependency 
school’s main problem has been not conceding 
 
sufficient autonomy to the political, which is fundamental to recognizing 
and exploring divisions within states and markets, as well as 
differences across political regimes… Thus media dependency has 
correctly signalled the importance of the market but has neglected the 
                                                          
16 The New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) is a term elaborated within 
the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) during the 1970s as a 
means to design and operate standard international policies for the media, under the so-called New 
World Economic Order, adopted in 1974 by the United Nations General Assembly (Thussu 2000, 
Beltrán 2008, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010).  
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persistence and autonomy of politics, which cannot be assumed to 
perfectly mirror business intentions (Ibid: 54). 
 
Also, regional cultural theorists argue that there is a theoretical displacement of the 
concept of ‘periphery’ by the idea of a complex form of cultural and political ‘hybridity’ 
in Latin American societies (Martín-Barbero 1993 and 2002b, García Canclini 1995). 
These critical views stress that, in order to assess the articulation of democratic 
practices within the media in the region, it seems relevant to observe beyond the 
binary framework of ‘periphery-centre’ relation, and evaluate the relation of national or 
internal politics and the media in Latin America (Ibid, Waisbord 2000b, Szurmuk and 
Waisbord 2011).  
 
3.3. The NWICO and media reform theories in Latin America 
 
The debates within the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) 
were fuelled by a critique of the unidirectional free flow of information, from centre to 
periphery, and of the ‘cultural imperialism’ that such dynamic arguably promoted. 
These discussions were highly politicised under the Cold War frame and their clashing 
discourses (McQuail 2005, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010).  
 
Freedom and censorship, autonomy and media plurality, economic dependency, 
cultural domination, monopolistic ownership, national sovereignty, educational output, 
and democratic access in the media were the main aspects discussed in what later 
became known as the MacBride Commission17 (Thussu 2000, Carlsson 2003, Sparks 
2007). The final report of these sessions was approved in 1980. In it, the vast majority 
of Latin American countries backed the ideas that proposed the creation of a 
normative framework for journalism as well as the implementation of some control in 
news content and distribution “on grounds of equity, sovereignty and fairness” 
(McQuail 2005: 262). Representatives of fifteen countries – mostly non-western – 
participated in the elaboration of the report18. 
 
Although Latin America, as Beltrán (2008) argues, did not play the central role in the 
                                                          
17 The Commission was named after the Chairman of the UNESCO sessions, Irish government 
minister Sean MacBride (1904-1988). 
18 In the Declaration of Talloires, formulated afterwards in 1981, the main western media systems –
led by the United States and the United Kingdom– argued for ‘free-flow’ of information, endorsed 
deregulation and free-market ideals, and rejected the propositions defined in the McBride report 
(McQuail 2005).  
 
 
63 
 
political definition of the NWICO, it carried out key contributions mainly in the 
theoretical and technical fields. Elizabeth Fox (1988) suggests that views and 
propositions emanating from Latin American scholars within these debates did have 
an important political effect. Moreover, she argues that Latin America 
 
was the first Third World region as a whole to identify certain problems 
in its national media systems, propose national communications policies 
and in some cases carry out major structural reforms of broadcasting 
and the press (Ibid: 6). 
 
Latin American scholars, intellectuals and some reform-minded governments were 
highly critical of the dynamics by which news information flows from the ‘great powers’ 
to developing nations, the way in which non-western cultures are misrepresented in 
news in developed countries, the dominant form of media ownership in the hands of 
the elites, and the exclusion of popular and subordinate sectors of society in the media 
(Pasquali 1980, Fox 1988, Beltrán 2008). These critiques led in a significant manner 
to the elaboration of new communications and media policies and reforms in various 
Latin American countries, most of which aimed to achieve a degree of national control 
over the media and a stronger disassociation with the transnational systems, springing 
mainly from the United States (Ibid)19. 
 
It can therefore be argued that the NWICO discussions had an impact in Latin 
America, following the formulation of different proposals of national communications 
policies and reforms during the second half of the 1970s, in various countries of the 
region. However, very few of these proposals were implemented by national 
governments, and by the early 1980s had become generally abandoned by almost all 
of the region’s governments mainly due to the pressure of the private media sector, its 
“usual commercial exploitation and often abuse, and the usual government neglect” 
(Fox 1988: 8).  
 
Pasquali (2007) contends that, although the debates about the NWICO did have a 
partial effect in identifying national media problems in Latin American societies and 
helped shape arguments for new national media policies in the region, the NWICO 
discussions centred their focus on establishing international agreements and this 
                                                          
19 A particularly important event in spurring Latin American proposals for media reforms at the 
time was the UNESCO-sponsored regional meeting of San José, Costa Rica in 1974 (Aguirre and 
Bisbal 2010). 
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arguably became an obstacle for national media policies to advance (Ibid).  
 
The different debates that followed in the region, known as National Communication 
Policies, generally set forward various appeals for the state to regulate the media 
within a framework of social responsibility and to promote active participation of the 
civil society in policy-making related to media and journalistic practice. This set of 
propositions was in some ways similar to those elaborated by Peterson in his social 
responsibility model of the press. They sought to balance the promotion of freedom in 
media through government legislation with plural and equal access to the media from 
the different communities (Pasquali 1980). As Bolaño explains, the principal aim of 
these concerted policies in the region was to “democratise the media as a basic 
condition for attaining social equality” (1999: 21).  
 
In their respective analyses, Pasquali (1980 and 2007) and Fernando Reyes Matta 
(1983) have drawn the basic traits of these sets of national policies, which were the 
product of intense local and regional elaboration in both theoretical and technical 
terms. These are: the definition of the media as an information and educational 
service that is to be regulated by the state according to the public interest – this 
includes the reorientation of commercial media towards a social responsibility model 
of operating; the implementation of social and political mechanisms by which the 
media can function not only as an informative tool but as a key part of the process of 
free debate; the organisation of media as vehicles of expression and of social 
participative principles, particularly for the poor and disenfranchised; the 
instrumentation of media as a means to diagnose local citizen conflicts and to assist in 
finding solutions; and the redefinition of the media as forums for the development of 
indigenous cultures of the region (Ibid, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010).  
 
Arguably, during the 1970s and early 1980s, while most of the region was under 
military rule, the more engaged and progressive calls for policy implementations and 
reforms emanated from Mexico, Chile (during Salvador Allende’s government), Peru 
and Venezuela. Although each country presented a different array of reform petitions 
and shifts in the local media, the above-mentioned aspects were common 
characteristics in many of the region’s countries. They were all 
 
concerned in one way or another with introducing public-service 
functions in the media, preserving cultural and creative traditions and 
formulating policies for the large disadvantaged sectors of society. In 
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their own way they were also concerned with devising democratic 
structures and financial and management arrangements that would be 
representative, participatory and workable (Fox 1988: 23). 
 
The Latin American debates related to the media and how the latter should empower 
national democratic culture, and their attempts to develop national reforms during the 
1970s and 1980s, were met with the opposition of many media owners, transnational 
corporations, local advertisement establishments, and some sectors of media 
professionals. According to Fox (1988) and Beltrán (2005), this led to a strong 
ideological division between the reformists and the neo-liberal trend – the latter mainly 
represented by both regional and U.S. private media owners and professionals – who 
considered “state or public intervention in the media the beginning of totalitarianism 
and the end of freedom of expression” (Fox 1988: 24).  
 
After the representatives of both the United States and Great Britain withdrew from 
UNESCO between 1984 and 1985 – they would retire again in 1994 and 2003 at the 
World Summit of Information Society–, the communications and media initiatives 
debated in NWICO were not continued further (Beltrán 2008, Matos 2011). Similarly, 
the plan of National Communication Policies in Latin America lost impetus and the 
media reforms aspired in the region’s countries were not achieved (Ibid). This, 
according to Fox (1988) and Bolaño (1999), was mainly due to the influence of neo-
liberal political and economic trends and the way in which these had gained 
importance in the sectors of information, communications and culture. In the context of 
a majority of Latin American countries during the 1970s and part of the 1980s under 
military rule, their dictatorial regimes had no interest in media regulation for the public 
interest and tended to pursue economic profit through “an autocratic state employing 
technocrats in increasingly close association with the transnational corporations”, 
using these and the local media elites to control information at the will of the 
government, minimise political awareness and social activism, intensify propaganda, 
and broadly maintain the status quo (Fox 1988: 26). 
 
Bolaño argues that the neo-liberal conception of media structure and operation has 
accelerated and radicalised significantly in the region with “the expansion of 
information technologies, deregulation and privatisation of systems of 
telecommunications and the Internet” (1999: 22). Others contend that this trend has 
clashed in Latin America with some national cases of substantial state regulation – in 
some instances characterised by authoritarian traits (Bisbal 2005 and 2009).  
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Yet, even though the implementation of such a set of national media policies failed 
during the late-twentieth century, the debate they have generated has led to the 
reformulation of theoretical and normative aspects of national and regional media 
since (Beltrán 2005 and 2008). It can be argued that part of the left-wing regimes in 
Latin America – most notably Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela – that 
have been in power between 2000 and 2010, have favoured the revision and partial 
redevelopment of some of NWICO’s earlier discussions and National Communication 
Policies previously elaborated in order to advance media democratisation (Aguirre and 
Bisbal 2010, Matos 2011).    
 
3.4. Latin American cultural theory: hybridity, mediation and the media 
 
Latin American media and cultural studies have developed significantly since the late 
1980s, and have spurred vigorous debate in the areas of media and cultural 
phenomena, while underpinning a critique of the dependency model (Bolaño 1999, 
Bisbal and Nicodemo 2010, Szurmuk and Waisbord 2011). Cultural theorists Martín-
Barbero and García Canclini contend that the dependency model relies too much on a 
‘structuralist sociological’ view, pessimistic in its diagnosis of mass media, that tends 
to explain cultural and media dynamics essentially in the binary terms of centre-
periphery relations (Ibid).  
 
In an analytical tenor that holds parallelisms to the works of Stuart Hall and John Fiske 
and their ideas of post-Gramscian hegemony and resistance, both Martín-Barbero and 
García Canclini find that the argument which formulates that the media function as 
agents of ideological dominance needs to be reassessed, because ultimately ‘the 
masses’ possess significant levels of autonomy, and the manner in which these 
assimilate foreign and commercially-produced media contents derives to a large 
degree from their particular view of the world and their cultural backgrounds (Martín-
Barbero and Silva 1997, Bolaño 1999, Curran 2002).  
 
Both authors question what appears to be a binary reading in neo-Marxist 
understanding of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. On the one hand, there is the 
fatalistic view that the dominated social classes are essentially passive and can only 
attain mobilisation from ‘outside’ forces. On the other, there is the radical view that the 
subaltern classes possess an unlimited capacity for defiance and for producing 
change (Martín-Barbero 1993, Bisbal and Nicodemo 2010). Yet, as expressed by 
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Martín-Barbero in the context of Latin America, “not every assumption of hegemonic 
power by the underclass is a sign of submission and not every rejection is resistance” 
(1993: 76).   
 
The approach to cultural and media analysis of both Martín-Barbero and García 
Canclini has emanated from the way their respective works have evaluated how 
modernity is produced in Latin America, the nature of the region’s heterodox and 
diverse paths in modernity, and how Latin America’s particular ‘peripheral modernity’ 
relates to global capitalism and to dominant western political, social, cultural and 
media discourses (Martín-Barbero 1993 and 2002a, García Canclini 1995, Szurmuk 
and Waisbord 2011). The western discourse of modernity, argues Martín-Barbero, has 
always been ‘decentred’ in Latin America, in the sense that it relates much less to 
European “Enlightenment doctrines and high culture aesthetic” than to the way in 
which mass education and cultural industries – particularly the media – have 
expanded in the region (2002a: 42-43). 
 
In his critique of the dependency model and cultural imperialism, Martín-Barbero 
questions the dichotomous scheme by which cultures are understood and analysed, 
and insists that ‘centre’ culture and ‘periphery’ culture do not necessarily exist in 
opposition to one another, but rather relate to each other in a highly fluid and hybrid 
dynamic (Martín-Barbero 1993). Ideology, class consciousness, identity and media 
power in Latin America, he (Ibid) and García Canclini (1995 and 1999) formulate 
separately, need to be interpreted in the context of the hybrid nature of the region’s 
cultural specificities and dynamics, particularly emphasising not the ‘high culture’ and 
‘cultural industries’ that, for example, the School of Frankfurt focus on, but the ‘popular 
culture’ and the ‘mass culture’ – from folk art and salsa music to soap operas and 
community radio – ; in brief, those hybrid and permanent combinations of “cultural 
expressions that do not fit conventional dualistic categories” (Szurmuk and Waisbord 
2011: 15).  
 
The shift of analysis that these cultural theorists represent has placed particular 
emphasis in observing and rescuing the category of “the people” and “the popular” 
from both Marxist and conservative theorists who “identify the popular with the 
masses” (Schlesinger 1993: xii). Their views contend the notion – evident in Marxist 
class-reductionism – that popular culture is necessarily assimilated within class 
struggle. In this sense, García Canclini, turning to the Gramscian conception of 
hegemony, explains that  
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popular cultures are not a passive or mechanical effect of the 
reproduction controlled by the dominators; they are also constituted 
by retaking their own traditions and experiences in the conflict with 
those who exercise hegemony, more than domination – that is, with 
the class that, although it directs reproduction politically and 
ideologically, must allow spaces in which subaltern groups develop 
practices that are independent and not always functional for their 
system (1995: 198).  
 
Thus, even though popular cultures have arguably been utilised and exploited within 
the neo-liberal logic of the market, these have also been capable of subverting the 
market rationale in the way the people consume, re-process and re-make cultural and 
media products (Ibid, Martín-Barbero 2002a and 2002b). It is particularly this aspect – 
the hybrid, contradictory and nuanced subversive ways in which popular cultures 
receive and consume media and cultural products – where the prevailing brand of 
Latin American cultural theorists place the centrality of their investigations 
(Schlesinger 1993, Szurmuk and Waisbord 2011). Furthermore, argues García 
Canclini (1995), it is mainly in the relation of the popular cultures and modernity where 
the levels of democratisation of a society should be evaluated. 
 
In this sense, argues Martín-Barbero (1993), when assessing the relation between 
democracy, culture and media, a thorough approach to research would imply moving 
away from the conception that media operate as an hegemonic tool of control by the 
powerful and that media consumption and reception tend to be passive. Instead he 
proposes that the analysis should focus on what he defines as ‘mediations’, that is, the 
‘places’ from where day-to-day use of media in a national context or that of a family or 
community find a means of articulation and transaction with media products (Martín-
Barbero 1993, Schlesinger 1993, Orozco 2002 and 2008)20.  
 
According to this paradigm, it is through mediations that the narrative discourses of 
the media, in the context of Latin America, tend to adapt and accommodate the 
growing urban movements, the region’s specific melodramatic cultural vein, the 
tradition of popular myth, to the point where audiences or readers or consumers learn 
                                                          
20 Martín-Barbero’s idea of ‘mediation’ is also defined as “that cultural instance by which the 
public or the audience of the media make sense, by means of appropriation, of the communication 
process” (Ollivier 2008: 127).  
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to recognise both the way in which they are represented and their collective identity 
within the media (White 1989, Martín-Barbero 1993).  
 
Within Martín-Barbero’s concept of mediation, various forms of cultural and social 
‘compensations’ are highlighted in the relation between the powerful and the 
subordinate, the elite and the people, when producing and consuming media output 
(Orozco 2008, Szurmuk and Waisbord 2011). Hence, media is no longer 
comprehended under a dualistic view of ‘the dominant versus the dominated’ – as 
sustained by authors of the School of Frankfurt –, but rather as a process by which the 
‘popular’ and the ‘mass mediatic’ are linked to such a degree that it can offer a 
potentially subversive character to the people (Orozco 2002 and 2008, Bisbal and 
Nicodemo 2010).  
 
It could be argued that these forms of popular ‘subversiveness’ and the potential for 
transforming cultural and media products from within ‘the popular’ can be extended to 
other non-western cultures (Straubhaar 2010), Yet, the historical, political, socio-
economic and cultural contexts of Latin America differ from those of Africa and Asia 
when considered as regions – as do their respective colonial and post-colonial 
experiences. This is stressed in the views of Martín-Barbero (1993 and 2000b), García 
Canclini (1995 and 2008) and many Latin American cultural theorists. They argue that, 
in Latin America, the popular cultures have been more concerned than in other 
developing regions in bringing forth social democratisation of culture and media and 
have shown a more solvent disposition to relate popular culture with both community 
and national projects.  
 
Additionally, they argue that, unlike dominant trends in African and Asian societies, 
Latin America is characterised by a significantly high urban demographic 
concentration, and it has been particularly in its metropolises where the products of 
media and modernity have been integrated in a particularly hybrid manner with the 
popular cultures, their traditions and narratives (Ibid, White 1989, Bisbal and Nicodemo 
2010). Hence, these authors tend to draw a certain typification of seemingly exclusive 
forms in which ‘mediation’ and ‘negotiation’ are mechanisms of Latin American popular 
cultures by which to engage socially and politically – and not without certain 
subversiveness in the contexts of culture and media.   
 
Arguably, under such a view news media can also be understood as a way by which 
to create and negotiate culture between various interest groups and social factors. In 
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this sense, Martín-Barbero’s idea of mediation can be a useful analytical instrument by 
which to understand media production and consumption as an alternative way to 
generate cultural and political positions, and in order to comprehend new “hegemonic 
tendencies formalized in a determined production” of media within a social, political or 
cultural tension that is ‘mediated’ between the market and the people (Bisbal and 
Nicodemo 2010: 138). 
 
Mónica Szurmuk and Waisbord (2011) argue that too often Latin American cultural 
studies fail to sufficiently address issues that are pivotal to the relation between media 
and society such as, for example, the power structure within the media, the 
connections between news organisations and the political regimes, the use of the 
media as ideological tools, freedom of expression, social responsibility, plural 
representation. Furthermore, they contend that in assessing how media institutions 
operate, the changes “in journalistic practice, as well as production and performance 
across the media industries” is a critical issue in order to understand “the political and 
social dimensions of the media” (Ibid: 22).  
 
These aspects, according to scholars outside the cultural studies current, are not 
comprehensively appraised by Latin American cultural theorists, and need to be 
researched in order to answer complex questions about the nature of journalistic 
practice and the role of the media in democracy, both regionally and nationally. They 
claim that authors such as García Canclini and Martín-Barbero tend to focus on 
culture as an overarching concept that disregards some central questions of 
journalism and of the media, and which should not be reduced to the notion of cultural 
hybridity (Ibid, Orozco 2002, Bisbal and Nicodemo 2010).  
 
Moreover, little can be inferred in the evaluation of Latin American cultural processes 
and their relation to modernity, as underpinned by the principal regional cultural 
theorists, about the patterns of media ownership, characterisation of journalistic 
cultures, changes in journalistic practice, power struggles in media between 
government and political opposition, and the ways in which professional journalists 
understand and address their audiences/readers, to name some key issues in the 
media. 
 
3.5. Latin American media and the populist paradigm 
 
Culturally and politically, Latin America has had an unsteady tradition of democratic 
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practice (Ansaldi 2007, Castañeda and Morales 2008, Keane 2009). Democratic 
institutions and constitutional rule have been historically frail whereas authoritarianism 
and dictatorship have had a strong presence. There has prevailed a 
 
tradition of unchecked government intrusion on media affairs, and the 
utilization of the government-owned media as political patronage and 
propaganda… Contemporary party systems, particularly in countries 
governed by populism, are often described in terms of being in 
“disarray” and “crisis” given the notorious difficulties of political parties 
to articulate and represent social interests (Waisbord 2011: 109).   
 
Most authors of the Latin American cultural trend seldom assess the ways in which 
the interactions and negotiations between the popular and the elite, ruled and rulers, 
develop under populist authoritarian regimes in the region, and the ways in which the 
latter may represent an obstacle for the deepening of democratising media.  
 
The notion of the popular in Latin America and the way in which it inserts itself within 
civic society, according to authors such as Manuel A. Garretón (2006), should not be 
entirely modelled in the Habermasian or other western conceptions of civic society. In 
contrast to, for example European Welfare states or former communist nations, the 
re-emergence in modern times of civil society in Latin America is related to “the 
unfulfilled expectations and the voids in an incomplete political democracy” (Ibid: 46).  
 
In normative terms, the civil society ought to be able to scrutinise government as an 
autonomous and equilibrating force (Curran 2002, Garretón 2006, Waisbord 2011). 
Historically and culturally, this has not been the predominant case in Latin America; 
principally because civic societies in the region have been mainly structured from 
above, that is sustained essentially by the state (Ibid). If, as Garretón argues (2006: 
47), civil society – and the media as one of its essential components – has been 
forged in the region by “the people, the classes or social movements which are mainly 
structured around a state political principle that might be conflictive or integrationist”, 
then the limited autonomy it entails may be further weakened under a populist regime.  
 
 
There are, however, varied reactions towards populist media politics from the region’s 
civic societies and analysts, sometimes with contrasting views about what should be 
a positive or normative relation between society and media democracy (Waisbord 
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2011). One strand argues that 
 
ownership patterns and runaway commercialization are the main 
challenges for media democratization, the other is primarily concerned 
about the role of the media in the improvement of the quality of 
democratic governance. The former supports populism out of the 
conviction that its policies effectively regulate the power of business 
corporations and strengthen public access to the media. The latter… 
believes that populism aggravates the consuetudinary deficit of 
government transparency and accountability in Latin American politics 
(Ibid: 110). 
 
In the context of caudillista populism (Keane 2009) – a type of ‘hybrid regime’, to use 
Diamond’s (2002) liberal definition – where democracy is affected by authoritarian 
practices, as in some Latin American nations, it seems pertinent to assess the power 
struggle between the government and the political opposition and how this is reflected 
in media practice and production, as well as the general political and economic 
conditions that shape the media system (Waisbord 2000b, Lugo-Ocando 2008, Bisbal 
2009). The latter are arguably not a reflection of direct transplants of liberal media 
systems and models as defined, for example, according to the ideals drawn by the 
Freedom of the Press theory or other liberal-derived paradigms. Moreover, there is 
evidence that authoritarian and ‘hydrid’ regimes have exploited the media imperialism 
discourse and varying nationalistic doctrines as tools for legitimising their “illiberal 
control against their own people” (Curran and Park 2000: 5). 
 
Authors such as Laclau (2005), however, find that populism, particularly in Latin 
America, is an adequate mechanism – highly complex in its expressions – by which 
the state can lead an increasingly egalitarian, participative and communitarian form of 
democracy while undermining the social and political tradition of domination as led by 
the powerful elites. Under this perspective, populist media politics – statist, 
centralised, nationalist and anti-market – are argued to be a key tool for social 
transformation, by which liberal or capitalist paradigms can be challenged and even 
repudiated in the name of notions of ‘egalitarianism’, ‘national sovereignty’, ‘popular 
emancipation’, among others.  
An examination of the existing views of authoritarian populism highlights a tendency 
in these types of regimes to adverse liberal media models. As argued by various 
critics, in Latin America it does not seem evident that populist regimes have promoted 
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in the media core values and concepts underpinned by liberal theories, such as 
freedom of expression, right of information, watchdog function, polyarchical 
distribution, among others, within a national context (Cañizalez 2009b, Keane 2009, 
Waisbord 2011). Instead, such regimes have clashed variably with both traditional 
liberal and neo-liberal principles of the press and the media (Bisbal 2009). The lack of 
“social and political consensus” sought by populist governments as part of their 
strategies imposes various challenges “to firm up professionalism” in the media and 
to prize normative ideals among journalists, as promoted by liberal views (Waisbord 
2013: 39).  
 
The mechanisms in Latin American populism by which liberal media are restrained or 
refuted while reforms and statisation of the media are implemented leads, as observe 
Bisbal (2009) and Waisbord (2011 and 2012), to the intensification of social division – 
between the ‘pro-regime’ and the ‘oppositional’ segments of the population – and to 
political and ideological polarisation.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter charts various tendencies of Latin American theoretical and analytical 
development that focus on the media and their role in the region’s political, cultural 
and socio-economic transformation. In doing so, it identifies various contributions to 
the debate of media and democracy, and discusses different perspectives in relation 
to the ways in which specific political, cultural and economic factors define and affect 
media operations, power relations and struggles, professional tensions and 
journalistic practice within the region – key aspects that, through their observation and 
assessment, contribute to meeting the objectives and answering the questions of this 
research. 
 
The media-related analysis that has emerged in Latin America has been crucial to 
contextualising media systems and practices in the region, and to understanding the 
nuanced dialogues these have maintained – or not – in relation to western discourses 
and models (White 1989, Waisbord 2000b, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010).  
 
The diverse perspectives concerned with the way in which Latin American culture and 
media have inserted themselves in the process of globalisation are contrasting. A 
group of scholars have argued in favour of the intensification of media access and 
plurality brought by globalised market dynamics and technological innovation in the 
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region, but seemingly a majority of authors contend that globalisation has been 
characterised by centre-periphery dependency and imperialism (Bolaño 1999, Boyd-
Barrett 2002, Ferrer 2007). Importantly, a broad Latin American debate emerged 
aiming to reinsert proposals of media democratisation by means of national media 
policies and regulations as first developed in the mid-1970s (Reyes Matta 1983, 
Beltrán 1999 and 2005).  
 
Another important theoretical contribution, anchored in Latin American cultural 
studies, has derived from the appraisal of the dynamics by which popular segments of 
society have found alternative ways to engage with media, and how this can arguably 
underpin the democratisation of the national systems of media and communication, 
while shifting the configuration of power relations between the state, media 
professionals and civic society (Martín-Barbero 1993 and 2002b, Beltrán 2005). 
These ‘culturalist’ assumptions have been critically challenged as lacking normative 
propositions in relation to media ownership, civic and media institutions, journalistic 
practice and other key political and ideological aspects in the media, particularly when 
assessing authoritarian populist or ‘hydrid’ regimes in the region (Mattelart 1999, 
Szurmuk and Waisbord 2011).  
 
If, as Curran explains, there had been evident “polarisation between liberal and 
radical traditions” (2002: 107) in the western media-democracy debate during the 
1970s and 1980s, this seems to be present to a large extent in twenty-first century 
Latin America. In nations like Venezuela, which according to some critics has been 
under an authoritarian populist regime since 1998 (Diamond 2002, Castañeda 2006, 
Ansaldi 2007), there is evidence of a clash of paradigms between theorists – and 
within society at large – in relation to how media and democracy should operate 
(Bisbal 2009).  
 
Political, cultural and historical aspects that are inherent to Venezuelan media, 
journalism and their relation to democracy are described and reviewed in the 
following chapter, with the aim to gain a more focused, contextual and detailed 
understanding on this research’s subject-matter.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Venezuelan journalism, media and politics in historical 
perspective 
 
 
The previous chapters have focused on outlining specific theories, analysis and 
scholarly views related to media, journalism, culture and democracy. The various 
perspectives and currents of thought reviewed bring to the forefront the debate 
anchored in the role of media and journalism in strengthening democracy and in 
shaping political thought and action.  
 
In order to comprehend this phenomenon within the specific context of Venezuela, it is 
necessary to provide – as does this chapter – a historical framework, with some 
analytical insights and practical explanations, of the trajectory of journalism and the 
media in Venezuela, their political and socio-economic relevance, their defining actors, 
and the challenges the press and the news media have faced in developing as a 
democratic force. This section of the study has been elaborated utilising texts that 
mainly belong to an eclectic set of Venezuelan historians and analysts. Very 
importantly, it also refers to studies related to the sociology of media organisations, 
communications’ regulations and journalistic professionalism – though there are very 
limited works of this nature focused on Venezuela.   
 
There are arguably common historical traits and similar cultural influences between 
Venezuela and other nation-states of Latin America, and both local and global 
dynamics have determined to a significant degree the media systems and practices in 
the region (Fox and Waisbord 2002). Yet, it is worthwhile stressing that most Latin 
American scholars find that it is the national media systems that offer the most effective 
explanation for understanding media dynamics nationally (Beltrán 2005, Lugo-Ocando 
2008, Bisbal 2009). Additionally, charting the history of Venezuela’s intersection of 
journalism, media – particularly the press and news media – and politics can help 
characterise, to some degree, the relation of the national media with those dominant – 
and more studied – journalistic models and ideas developed in Europe and the United 
States.  
 
4.1. Emergence of the press under caudillismo and polarisation 
 
The first steps towards democracy in Venezuela arguably took place when President 
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Juan Crisóstomo Falcón dictated the Decree of Citizen’s Guarantees on August 18th, 
1863 (Carrera Damas 2007). Previously, since the nation’s declaration of 
Independence in July 5th, 1811 – after two decades of armed struggle under the 
leadership of General Simón Bolívar against the Spanish Empire – the country had 
been governed essentially by authoritarian regimes, albeit most were elected 
constitutionally. The nature of rule during most of the nineteenth century in Venezuela 
and most of Latin America reflected, as argues Keane, a substantial contradiction for, 
although the constitutions of the emerging republics that broke from Spanish rule were 
remarkable and even innovative by world standards, 
 
strangely they worked against democracy and in favour of wealthy 
men with a hunger for power, politically ambitious men for whom 
government based on elected representatives was a way of ensuring 
subordinación of the represented: their quiet deference to political 
rulers and silent acceptance of massively uneven distributions of 
wealth (2009: 393). 
 
The new republics had, in effect, “brand-new forms of representative government”, 
which were elected under constitutional law, and established “basic freedoms of 
assembly and the press” (Ibid: 391). Yet, caudillismo or rule by strongmen backed by 
the military was democratic only in appearance. And it was under such political and 
social logic that the press existed. Newspapers followed a highly-partisan trend 
established in the early nineteenth century by Gazeta de Caracas (1808-1822) and 
Correo del Orinoco (1818-1822)21 (Grases 1967 and 1981, Febres Cordero 1993).  
 
President Falcón’s proclamation of “total freedom of individual and political rights for all 
Venezuelans” in 1863 was a direct call for a more profound democracy, stronger 
institutions and federal system (Carrera Damas 2007: 161)22. However, this timid first 
step towards a representative democracy was to end six months after its declaration, 
without implementation of any sort, as a new Constitution disapproved it. Some eighty 
years had to go by until the second stage in the nation’s “long march towards 
                                                          
21 Gazeta de Caracas is considered the first newspaper to be published in Venezuela, of a 
monarchist bent; Correo del Orinoco was founded by independence leader Simón Bolívar, and re-
launched by President Hugo Chávez in 2009 (Grases 1981, Febres Cordero 1993). 
22 In this chapter, I have translated direct quotes from authors Aguirre, Aguirre and Bisbal, Bisbal, 
Botía, Britto García, Capriles, Caballero, Carrera Damas, Castellanos, Díaz Rangel, Febres Cordero, 
García Ponce, Grases, Quiñonez, Parra, Pellegrino, and Pasquali –all belonging to works not 
published or not available in English– from Spanish.  
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democracy”, which was to be initiated by a group of social-democrats and left-of-centre 
ideologues on October 18th, 1945 (Ibid).  
 
With its strong patriotic tone and based in the town of Angostura, Correo del Orinoco 
served as a tribune for the confection of a republican ideal, spearheaded by Bolívar  
and fellow Venezuelan independentistas. By 1822 various newspapers had emerged, 
based mainly in Caracas, Maracaibo and Angostura, and were used as political and 
ideological tools in the “republican task of conforming public opinion” after 
independence had been gained (Aguirre 1998: 40). They followed during the early-
nineteenth century the “journey of the revolution for independence” (Grases 1981: 5), 
and Article 181 of the new Venezuelan Constitution, signed in 1811, where it was 
stated that  
 
men shall be free to manifest their ideas through the press, but in case 
public stability and social dogma, Christian morale, property, the 
honour of a citizen are attacked or perturbed by someone, that person 
shall be made legally responsible (cited by Grases 1981: 5).  
 
The first newspapers in Venezuela had a very short lifespan and fluctuating publicity 
content, mainly due to the intense levels of power-shift among the various combating 
political factions and to the economic hardships that such cycles entailed (Grases 
1981, Febres Cordero 1983). During and after the armed struggle for independence 
there were continuous clashes of interests between the pro-monarchy, republican, 
conservative, liberal-federal and other caudillista groups – it was yet another example 
of the dominant trend of partisan press in Latin America (Grases 1967 and 1981, 
Febres Cordero 1983). Readership was very reduced, and yet communication through 
the press “was almost the only form of expression of ideas and the mechanism par 
excellence to influence the public opinion” (Aguirre 1998: 41). Yet, the press was 
highly-politicised, and journalists had little regard for accuracy and balance (Febres 
Cordero 1983).  
 
On various occasions Bolívar himself advised that newspapers be informative on topics 
that were of public interest and newsworthy (Febres Cordero 1983). He also expressed 
the need for the press to publish debates that helped society build a new national 
identity. However, debate became essentially political, and journalism politically 
polarised (Ibid). Moreover, the figure of Bolívar divided the press to significant degrees 
and after, during the successive power struggle between Liberals and Conservatives, 
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the polarising figure became General José Antonio Páez, a conservative caudillo who 
was elected president by Congress in 1982 (García Ponce 2001, Williamson 2009). 
Such were the traits of his autocratic regime, that paecismo and anti-paecismo – that 
is, Liberals and Conservatives – were to dominate the press up until the 1860s (Ibid).  
 
During the Páez era most newspapers portrayed a distorted reality of the country, 
according to their respective political agendas (Grases 1967, Madero 2009). Most of 
the intellectuals and politicians who demanded unrestricted freedom of the press 
tended to be partisan in their practice (Graces 1981). Arguably, this would become a 
characteristic of the press during the nineteenth century In Venezuela, which presented 
its more militant facet under Paéz, and later during the Federal War and during the 
regime of President Antonio Guzmán Blanco. 
 
Venezuela’s Federal War was the result of the armed insurgency of ‘federalists’ who, 
under the slogans of ‘Death to the oligarchy!’ and led principally by General Ezequiel 
Zamora23, called for land reforms and popular revolution. Zamora would not live to see 
his party in power, but the other two federal caudillos, Generals Juan Crisóstomo 
Falcón and Antonio Guzmán Blanco, were to rule the country throughout ongoing 
uprisings that followed the war (Salcedo Bastardo 1996).  
 
4.2. Modern autocracy and first ideas of press professionalism 
 
President Falcón’s Decree of Citizen’s Guarantees in 1863, which Carrera Damas 
(2007), among others, considers the republic’s first step towards democracy, was 
preceded by an 1861 manifesto in which he stated that Venezuelans were tired of 
“half-freedoms” and “half-repressions” imposed by a political system that places 
freedom under an antagonistic framework; a system of “two different faces where 
neither one says the truth” (cited by Capriles 1976: 72). His demand for freedom, 
pluralism and social justice, under a new federal political and legal scheme, would be 
disregarded soon after by the oligarchy and by his successor as President, the autocrat 
Antonio Guzmán Blanco.    
 
A leading federal figure during the war against the conservatives, Guzmán Blanco 
became President in 1870. Although during his first of three periods as head of state 
he took the law of ‘universal suffrage’ to a new level and carried out civic reforms, he 
                                                          
23 The radical reformist ideas of Ezequiel Zamora (1817-1860) have been very influential for Hugo 
Chávez’s personal political ideas (Barrera and Marcano 2006). 
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would betray the democratic principles that the federalists had defended (Salcedo 
Bastardo 1996, García Ponce 2001). Guzmán Blanco established a dictatorship that 
was to last eighteen years, systematically crushing armed insurgency and denying the 
existence of a free press (Ibid, Madero 2009).   
 
Yet, albeit a restrictive environment for a free press, some pro-democracy clandestine 
newspapers emerged under the regime of Guzmán Blanco (García Ponce 2001), and 
arguably modern journalism began to develop. Pro-government editor Fausto Aldrey, 
according to many, is considered a precursor in the professionalisation of the trade 
(Grases 1981, Ibid). It is with him that in Venezuela 
 
a truly informative journalism begins… His is the first newspaper in the 
country that pays collaborators… He invests in quality columnists and 
printing equipment,… the never-ending and polemical letters to the 
Director are replaced with information related to what is happening in 
the nation (Febres Cordero 1983: 485-486).     
 
It could also be argued that Aldrey’s newspaper, La Opinión Nacional, among other 
pro-Guzmán Blanco outlets, unwillingly prompted the appearance of some informative 
anti-regime, satirical publications, which helped channel resistance towards Guzmán 
Blanco’s non-democratic regime and towards those that succeeded his government 
into the end of the nineteenth century.   
 
After clashing for over three decades with the Conservatives, and succeeding in the 
Federal War, the Liberals never fulfilled their promises of pluralism, freedom and social 
justice. On the contrary, the latter fortified “agricultural oligarchy” and a “semi-feudal 
caudillismo” (Febres Cordero 1983: 487). Admittedly, during the Federal War period 
there had been no innovation in the press whatsoever, yet in the last three decades of 
the nineteenth century, albeit working under non-democratic conditions, some changes 
took place in news practice, dynamics of news gathering, and informative agendas 
(Grases 1967 and 1981, García Ponce 2001). Aguirre argues that normative, 
professional journalism did not exist in Venezuela during the nineteenth century, yet 
those who pioneered and wrote in the press arguably represented the country’s 
intelligentsia, and had a “dual occupation” in the sense that  
 
when they were not occupied in political or governmental activities, 
they were dedicated to the study and circulation of themes and ideas 
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like the construction of viable progress; freedom of the press as the 
only expression of a civilized society; the need of education as the only 
route for fighting despotism, etc; all of which denotes that (these 
pioneers) are the first historical figures associated with that of the 
journalist (1998: 41-42).   
 
According to the main figures that spurred the early press in the country, its principal 
aims, particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century, were twofold: to 
serve as an important tool in the formation of republican and democratic citizenship; 
and to enhance public debate among society while checking on the government 
(Grases 1967 and 1981). The latter claim echoes the European and North American 
forms of canonical liberal thought.  
 
Hallin and Mancini have argued that the press in Latin America during the nineteenth 
century was practically an instrument through which “dictators and political factions 
promoted their ideologies and ambitions” (2007: 92). They explain that the dominant 
model in the region was that which was ‘inherited’ from Spain and southern Europe, in 
which the press tend to operate as a mechanism for “political intervention” (Ibid). Yet, 
according to Pedro Grases (1967 and 1981), during much of the nineteenth century in 
Venezuela, the pioneering figures expressed the influence of the liberal principles of 
the press of Great Britain and of the United States – and not of Spain – in the shaping 
of their ideals and craft.  
 
The rights-based content of the First Amendment in the U.S. Constitution, and the 
notion that government should not interfere with speech and publication unless it is 
done so in order to protect other important rights, were crucially influential in the 
Venezuelans’ ideas of practice within the press and the formation of a normative 
character (Ibid, Aguirre 1998). These ideals were certainly very difficult to live up to in 
the practice of journalism. The intermittent clashes between political factions – mainly 
resolved through armed conflict and coup d’états – ; the personalistic leadership, with a 
lack of interest for genuine institutions; and the sustained social and economic 
inequality among the population were arguably the key aspects of the broad socio-
political context in which the press operated (Capriles 1976, Aguirre 1998, García 
Ponce 2001). As a partial consequence of such conditions, a gap was evident between 
the alleged libertarian and liberal ideals that journalists aspired to reflect in their work 
and the reality of their journalistic daily practice.   
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4.3. Gómez, clandestine media and the Generation of 28 
 
One very distinctive aspect of Venezuela within the Latin American region has been its 
sustained exploitation of the western hemisphere’s largest oil reserves within its own 
territory; the exportation of the product24; and more importantly: its economic 
dependency on it and the ways such dependency permeates social and political life 
(Martínez 1971, Salcedo Bastardo 1996, Caballero 2010). It could be argued that the 
“irruption of oil” brought forth the economic and political changes that “consolidated the 
modern state” in Venezuela during the early-twentieth century (Capriles 1976: 71).           
 
Ironically, the events that brought about the exploitation of oil, which were to drastically 
shape the nation’s history and culture, occurred under one of its most absolute 
despots, General Juan Vicente Gómez (Salcedo Bastardo 1996, Caballero 2010). He 
seized power after sending his ‘boss’, president Cipriano Castro, into exile in 190825.  
 
The ultimate caudillo, Gómez perceived the army as the “base of the state”, and with a 
strong hand ruled the country until his death in 1935 (Caballero 2010: 35). During the 
first years of his regime he promoted an ‘ideal’ of relative freedom for the press (García 
Ponce 2001, Díaz Rangel 2007, Hidalgo 2009). His predecessor, Castro, had showed 
scant tolerance for dissident newspapers and even imprisoned some of its writers and 
owners (Ibid).  
 
Under a similar journalistic tendency but in a political climate of apparent lesser 
restrictions, some newspapers that had been closed during the Castro regime 
reappeared under the first years of Gómez being in power. El Eco Venezolano, El 
Nuevo Diario and El Universal were the main pro-Gómez dailies. The latter, founded in 
1909 and which arguably inaugurated the country’s “modern commercial press” 
(Caballero 2010: 58), was considered at the time a liberal daily – in the Anglo-
American sense of the term – and was to be very influential to the current date. In 
general, during Gomez’s early days as head of state, the press was relatively free yet 
could not be critical of the President. Apparently, the press no longer needed to be an 
extension of a political party, and Gómez “welcomed their criticisms of both the liberals 
and the conservatives” (Ibid).  
                                                          
24 Since its discovery in 1914, the significant majority of Venezuelan crude oil has been exported to 
the United States; which has been historically its main buyer (Martínez 1971).  
25 President Cipriano Castro had ruled since 1899 with a corrupt and frail regime, and accumulated a 
foreign debt which in 1903 caused a blockade in the Venezuelan ports imposed by British, German 
and Italian ships (Caballero 2010).  
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However, Gómez’s tolerance for a dissident press was tested most emphatically in 
1913, when El Pregonero published an editorial backing a rival presidential candidate 
of Gómez for the constitutional elections in 1914. The government ordered the 
imprisonment of both the editor and the candidate, and the newspaper’s offices were 
destroyed by presidential orders (Díaz Rangel 2007). As of 1913, Gómez gained 
increasing power, and was able to dissolve political parties and crush all attempts of 
insurgency. Torture was widely used in prisons, mostly to dissuade political prisoners 
and journalists (Salcedo Bastardo 1996, Caballero 2010).  
 
Gómez brought relative peace to the republic – something most citizens valued as 
priceless, since Venezuela had been in an almost constant state of war during and 
since its independence. Peacekeeping under his regime was also highly beneficial for 
the foreign companies – mainly U.S., British and Dutch – that began exploiting the oil 
fields (García Ponce 2001, Caballero 2010). The nation’s economy began to gravitate 
almost exclusively around petroleum. And Gómez became a mere instrument for the 
extraction of oil by foreign companies, imposing “the solution of order, peace and work 
– the basis of an autocracy – which ended up turning Venezuela into a modern 
bureaucratic state” (Capriles 1976: 76). 
 
This process pushed Gómez towards a strong political centralisation backed by the 
military and a government-controlled network of communications (Ibid, García Ponce 
2001). By the mid-1920s the press had no freedom whatsoever (Ibid, Hidalgo 2009).    
 
The social and economic consequences of a newly oil-driven industry, which prompted 
a slow exodus of the rural population to urban areas, determined to a significant 
degree the dynamics of the news media. The traditional political role of the press 
began to give way to one in which entertainment content prevailed, and print outlets 
started to concentrate in the largest urban centres. Political commentary in the press 
was scarce and was seemingly supplanted by an apparent “ideological neutrality while 
a dependency in foreign news agencies became evident” (Capriles 1976: 81).  
  
Under Gómez the “great industry” of the press had been born in Venezuela, and “there 
was no room in it for small outlets” nor for “idealist experimentalists” (Ibid). Yet, 
following the example of newspaper Fantoches, launched in 1923, some satirical and 
experimental newspapers surfaced. In 1928 a clandestine newspaper, El Imparcial, 
was launched exclusively by students. It was highly critical of Gómez and formed by 
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those who would become the pro-democracy intelligentsia during the first half of the 
twentieth century (Hidalgo 2009, Caballero 2010). Many of these students – known as 
the Generation of 28 –, who were either imprisoned or forced into exile, developed their 
own anti-Gómez, pro-democracy, revolutionary plan. It was inspired mainly in Marxist 
readings and in the Mexican Revolution26. Known as the Plan of Barranquilla, it was 
written in 1931 by young left-wing politicians and formulated the ideal of a future 
revolution and the need for an alternative model of democratic governance, in what 
became Venezuela’s “first political essay based in historical materialism” (Caballero 
2010: 111). 
 
4.4. First steps towards modern democracy (and in radio) 
 
The first radio station experience in Venezuela was Broadcasting Central de Caracas, 
launched in 1926. It functioned irregularly and closed down two years later. In 1930 the 
first privately-owned radio station was launched, Broadcasting Caracas – which would 
later become Radio Caracas Radio (RCR). Though it offered some news content, most 
of its programming was based on entertainment (Bisbal 2007). In order to ensure 
advertisements by sponsors, it did not broadcast any criticism towards Gómez’s 
regime and offered scant political comment. Six years later, the Venezuelan state 
founded Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV), which has since operated as a state-ran 
outlet, with news content that adheres to the interests of the ruling government (Ibid, 
Pasquali 1980). Once RNV was launched, the first set of radio regulations was 
approved. Thirteen new radio stations operated in Venezuela then, all of which broadly 
adopted the model laid out by Broadcasting Caracas, with few differences (Ibid).  
 
In 1935, following Gomez’s death, Congress elected General Eleazar López Contreras 
as President. He initially promoted some reformist policies which included the 
liberation of political prisoners and softened restrictions to the press. Students and 
intellectuals who had been in exile during the Gómez era returned to Venezuela, in the 
hope of being active agents of democratic change and receiving support from the 
Venezuelan society (Madero 2009). The press and the universities became “the two 
pillars” of a new yet “fragile” democracy (Caballero 2010: 122)27.  
                                                          
26 The Mexican Revolution began with the liberal movement of Francisco Madero aiming to 
overthrow President Porfirio Díaz’s authoritarian regime, and was spurred by popular calls for land 
reform and for rights for the peasantry, and by anti-Díaz insurrections led by rural revolutionaries 
Emiliano Zapata, Pascual Orozco and Pancho Villa, throughout Mexico between 1910 and 1913 
(Williamson 2009).   
27 In 1935, newspaper El Heraldo published a daring manifesto stating that the people of Venezuela 
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Conditions had changed dramatically by early 1936: Contrera’s government 
suspended constitutional warranties, imposed press censorship, and prohibited the 
publication of advertisement and propaganda without previous government 
authorisation (Díaz Rangel 2007, Madero 2009). A newly-established ‘censorship 
committee’ approved or not the circulation of information and advertisement.  
 
At one point the ‘censorship committee’ seemed not to have read in detail a text 
submitted by newspaper La Esfera, entitled ‘Democracy or dictatorship?’. Once 
published, it provoked an immediate reaction among both the civil society and the 
regime (Díaz Rangel 2007). Sanctions were imposed on the newspaper. This was 
arguably the main trigger of a general strike that took place on February 14th, 1936. 
The people took to the streets of Caracas, in part led by the two main political leaders 
of their generation, Rómulo Betancourt and Jóvito Villalba (Hidalgo 2009, Caballero 
2010).  
 
The media, student unions, and pro-democracy movements backed the strike. It was 
the first time in Venezuela that “the press, in bloc, responded decisively and 
energetically against an arbitrary and irrational act of the government”; while some 
radio stations backed the press (García Ponce 2001: 146). Caballero argues that to 
many this moment represented the nation’s entry into “political modernity and 
democracy” (2010: 124). At the time, intellectual Joaquín Gabaldón Márquez wrote 
that on that date Venezuelans became “conscious of the true meaning of freedom of 
the press” (cited by García Ponce 2001: 148). 
 
In a similar scenario to that of Gómez’s regime, various news outlets were closed 
down and journalists and dissidents imprisoned; yet Contreras made certain 
concessions due mainly to the immense pressure of a growingly stronger civil society, 
but also following his will to introduce a more institutional character to his regime 
(Madero 2009). When Isaías Medina Angarita, another military man, was voted 
President by the Congress in 1941, the vast majority of the population expected a 
significant democratic aperture. In this sense, one of the most relevant actions of 
Angarita’s first year in power was to allow influential left-wing party Acción 
Democrática and the Communist Unión Popular to gain legal status (García Ponce 
2001, Caballero 2010).    
                                                                                                                                                                          
aspired “to be part of democracy that is specific and elective” (García Ponce 2001).  
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When the Second World War broke out, Venezuela was the world’s third largest oil 
producer and its first exporter. The United States relied on that exportation strongly. 
Yet, most citizens and the government could no longer view the petroleum industry as 
“a foreign enclave” but rather as something truly “important for the people whose arms 
extracted it from its soil” (Caballero 2010: 127). Angarita introduced new oil policies in 
the country, which seemed beneficial for its sovereignty and its people (Salcedo 
Bastardo 1996). This was celebrated even by his opponents as another important step 
towards democracy – Venezuelans seemingly felt they owned part of the country’s oil, 
symbolically; and this would serve to promote “not an industry of war”, but one “more 
inclined to peace” (Caballero 2010: 127). 
 
The political and social climate during Angarita’s regime was rather favourable for the 
media and journalism. In 1941, the nation’s first professional journalists’ association, 
AVP, was founded. This organisation succeeded in opposing a regime-formulated 
press regulation programme, while establishing the “defense and improvement of the 
moral, social and economic-judiciary status” of both national and foreign journalists 
working in Venezuela “regardless of their political or religious beliefs” (cited by García 
Ponce 2001: 160). That same year a new Law for Telecommunications was approved. 
In the document, it was expressed that the state was the “exclusive entity that 
regulates national telecommunications”, since all are considered of ‘public service’ 
(Quiñonez 2010: 65). The regulations also established that the state was the sole 
provider of permissions and concessions for a particular person or group to exploit 
telecommunications activity (Pasquali 1980, Ibid). Capriles argues that, even though 
 
the state had the virtual monopoly over radio broadcasting and only 
admitted one form of concession,… it would renounce to its right, as 
offered by a favourable law, of elaborating a comprehensive 
communications policy… and would ultimately grant concessions which 
were by no means precarious… to privately-owned outlets in the hands 
of an elite group (1976: 92-93).    
 
Although the Telecommunications Law established that broadcasting concessions had 
to be requested by the privately-owned outlets to the state on a one-year-period basis, 
this was hardly the case. Once a radio outlet proved not to be critical of the 
government, it was permitted to carry on its lucrative operations and the concession for 
broadcasting was tacitly extended (Capriles 1976, Quiñonez 2010). It is not surprising 
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that since its emergence in Venezuela – and arguably until the arrival of Chávez in 
power in 1998 – a minor segment of radio content has been news-oriented and has 
provided a check on the government. Pasquali argues that radio in the country has 
been, since its beginning, a “vehicle for selling publicity” and “not an instrument for 
information” (1980: 225).  
 
During the early 1940s the daily Últimas Noticias – arguably the first modern popular 
newspaper in Venezuela, and to this day one of the most influential – was launched, 
prioritising informative content and offering pages for free comment (García Ponce 
2001, Díaz Rangel 2007). By then, both El Universal and La Esfera attributed great 
importance to competing for news scoops, a novelty within the country’s journalistic 
culture (Ibid). Together with Panorama, Últimas Noticias and El Nacional  – a daily 
founded in 1943, which went on to become one the nation’s most influential – this set 
of newspapers began to redefine Venezuelan journalism: accurate information became 
an inherent value, the sources became more relevant and diverse, news gathering 
was carried out in a more direct manner, meetings between editors and reporters to 
discuss news stories were introduced, and the reporter became a substantial 
communication figure (Ibid, Díaz Rangel 2007).  
 
4.5. The Pact of Punto Fijo, new dictatorship, and advocate media  
 
According to Carrera Damas (2007), the second great moment of the nation’s 
democracy was initiated on October 18th, 1945, when the emerging social-democratic 
political parties and a modern strand of the military forces joined efforts to overthrow 
the regime of Angarita and begin a process of political democratisation. Part of this 
included installing universal and direct presidential elections for the first time, 
enhancing freedom and social justice, and strengthening democratic institutions 
(Madero 2009). A key problem of the regime had been that it had indeed “opened up 
political debate across the nation, but had closed it down during the elections” 
(Caballero 2010: 129).  
 
Leftist party Acción Democrática (AD), under the leadership of Betancourt, had 
conspired with the military, but it was the latter that had a greater responsibility in 
overthrowing the Angarita administration. Both groups formed a revolutionary junta, 
and called for Constituent Assembly elections and for Presidential elections in 1946 
(Carrera Damas 2007, Caballero 2010). In December 1947, Rómulo Gallegos, member 
of Acción Democrática, was elected president in the most pluralist elections the nation 
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had known. The recently founded parties COPEI (Political Electoral Independent 
Organisation Committee) which was a Christian centrist democratic group, and URD 
(Democratic Republican Union) which represented a secular centrist position, both 
participated in the elections. Political poignancy was evident, and this was reflected in 
the media (Díaz Rangel 2007). 
 
During the 1946 Constituent Assembly elections and the 1947 Presidential elections – 
the first in Venezuela’s history to be “direct, universal and secret” – the media proved 
to be predominantly partisan, calling for people to vote for a specific party or candidate 
(Ibid: 105). Yet, this democratic aperture was to end soon. In November 1948 
President Gallegos was deposed by a military coup, backed by “social forces which did 
not approve of democratic changes” (Carrera Damas 2007: 162).  
 
A military junta was to rule for almost two years before one of its members, General 
Marcos Pérez Jiménez, took power after another coup d’état in 1952. His regime again 
imposed censorship on the dissident press, and opposition leaders were imprisoned or 
forced into exile. Newspapers that had backed parties AD, COPEI, and the Communist 
were banned (Díaz Rangel 2007, Madero 2009). Any media outlet – the majority of 
them opposed Pérez Jiménez – that presented a pro-democratic profile had to deal 
with newly-established censorship committees and suffered restrictions similar to the 
ones experienced under Gómez (Ibid, Bisbal 2007).  
 
Just like radio was first introduced in Venezuela during one of the harshest 
dictatorships – that of president Gómez – the first regularly-operating television station 
was launched under the military junta that Pérez Jiménez presided. In 1952, state-run 
Televisora Nacional de Venezuela (TVN 5) made its appearance as a dependency of 
the Ministry of Information; its content was also an extension of the government’s views 
(Pasquali 1980, Hernández Díaz 2008). Venezuela became the ninth nation in the 
world to have a television service. 
 
One year after, commercial television appeared, and seized the vast majority of the 
audience – the new outlets were Televisa and Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV) 
(Capriles 1976, Pasquali 1980). Like Televisa, three regional TV stations that emerged 
outside Caracas between 1956 and 1957 had a short lifespan. During this period, both 
the state-run and the commercial television outlets were concentrated in Caracas, 
reaching less than ten percent of the national territory (Ibid, Bisbal 2007). Also, their 
content relied mostly in programmes produced in foreign countries, mainly in the U.S.    
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The oil boom contributed to Pérez Jiménez’s possibility to invest strongly in public 
construction and transport development, but the repressive nature of his regime 
provoked a strong rejection from the popular sectors of society, while the proscribed 
political parties, mainly AD and the communist, provided the main focus of resistance 
(Capriles 1976). Pérez Jiménez’s attempts to disguise the dictatorial character of his 
military regime through apparent electoral calls all failed.  
 
The country’s only School of Journalism, based in Caracas and founded in 1946, was 
closed down by the dictator’s orders in 1951. But it was the invalidation of political 
parties and workers’ unions, the annulment of the 1947 Constitution, and the setbacks 
to the democratic advancements achieved during the late 1940s which became more 
unpopular among most of society (Carrera Damas 2007). Students took to the streets 
in protest during the last months of 1957, and an attempt of military coup took place. 
Though it failed, the action set the main stimulus for a popular insurrection that was to 
overthrow Pérez Jiménez in 1958. A significant number of news outlets backed the 
popular uprising. The media strike that followed the failed military coup was a decisive 
factor for the initiation of a general strike which, together with a new pronouncement of 
the military, forced the President to hand in all powers on January 23rd, 1958 (Díaz 
Rangel 2007, Caballero 2010). 
 
It is on this day that, according to Carrera Damas, the third step in Venezuela’s “road 
towards democracy” is taken (2007: 164). The events of January 23rd, 1958, 
demonstrated that the impulse for democratic change did not come from the 
government, but rather from the civil society. And, although much political agitation 
followed those events,  
 
on many occasions it was the call from democratic leaders, through 
the media, which spurred the extensive and massive popular 
manifestations against those that, time after time, attempted to 
perpetuate military rule (Ibid).    
 
The people in the street had shown not only their strength as a social force but their 
will to live in democracy and to defend it (Caballero 2010). The gains of this “renovated 
democracy” were to be established in the Constitution of 1961, in which the democratic 
advancements of “political, economic and social rights” were evident (Carrera Damas 
2007: 164). The dominant political parties capitalised on these popular demands – 
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leaders Rómulo Betancourt of AD, Rafael Caldera of COPEI, and Jóvito Villalba of 
URD signed in October, 1958, a pact of governance known as the Pact of Punto Fijo 
(Salcedo Bastardo 1996, Caballero 2010). This agreement was backed by the armed 
forces, the largest business organisations, trade unions, and the Catholic Church 
(Lander 2008). The Communist party was excluded from the puntofijista deal in order 
not to preoccupy the predominantly anti-communist military sector and to send an 
assuring political message to the U.S. (Carrera Damas 2007). Political parties AD and 
COPEI would dominate the political spectrum during the second half of the twentieth 
century.   
 
The fall of Pérez Jiménez was followed by successive civilian leaderships; all of them 
with presidents elected through plural, direct and universal vote. These elections were 
supervised by a neutral electoral commission, and its verdicts at all moments “were 
accepted almost unanimously by the Venezuelan society, and not only by the political 
establishment” (Caballero 2010: 205). Betancourt was voted president in January 
1959. After him Raúl Leoni, Rafael Caldera, Carlos Andrés Pérez, Luis Herrera 
Campins and Jaime Lusinchi were successively elected presidents for five-year terms. 
Each of them implemented varying government policies, but their regimes can be 
considered a part of a “systematic application of broad guidelines for a national liberal-
democratic project” (Ibid).  
 
Carrera Damas (2007) argues that a key aspect of such liberal-democratic project was 
the statist character of the regime, with a strong tendency to centralising power. This, 
he argues, led to the conformation of a society that became too reliant on the ‘big 
state’ (Ibid).   
 
The press and news media had played a key part in the breakdown of the dictatorship, 
and as of 1958, with Betancourt as elected president, were arguably the first 
beneficiaries of the popular and liberal democratic regime: they regained relative 
freedom of information and opinion (Botía 2007, Díaz Rangel 2007). 
 
Betancourt’s instalment of his democratic project became threatened by successive 
military revolts – all of which failed – , and by radical leftist insurgent movements that 
attempted to follow in the steps of the Cuban Revolution (Díaz Rangel 2007, Caballero 
2010). But even though Betancourt had fierce enemies in both the radical Right and 
Left, by 1964 he became Venezuela’s first President elected democratically by the 
people to end his full constitutional period in office.   
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In the early 1960s, news outlets that either sympathised with the Pérez Jiménez’s 
regime or promoted communist ideals were suspended or shut down, while it became 
common for constitutional guarantees to be suspended (Díaz Rangel 2007, Lander 
2008). The most influential newspapers and broadcast outlets, with the exception of El 
Nacional, aligned themselves with the governmental projects and with the parties of 
the Pact of Punto Fijo (Botía 2007, Díaz Rangel 2007).  
 
During the first years of the ‘newly-born democracy’, the audience of commercial 
television grew significantly. In 1960, the Cisneros financial group bought Televisa and 
founded Venevisión – it was to become for the rest of the twentieth century, together 
with RCTV, the nation’s most viewed media outlet (Capriles 1976, Bisbal 2007, 
Hernández Díaz 2008). The state-run station was to have less than two percent of the 
viewers’ share, while RCTV and Venevisión combined had over 90 percent (Ibid). 
Ironically though, the private commercial outlets relied primarily on government 
publicity for their functioning. So, an aspect underlying the battle of television stations 
for audience rating – particularly RCTV and Venevisión – was their dependence on 
government publicity and loans, their low financial investment compared to their almost 
exclusive profit-making goals, and their heavy reliance in foreign programmes of all 
genres (Capriles 1976, Pasquali 1980). Politicians believed then that neither radio nor 
television – whether state-owned or private-owned – would represent a political or 
ideological threat: news content averaged eight percent of the total broadcast content, 
and did not play a systematic watchdog role (Pasquali 1980, Caballero 2010). Political 
and social critique in news content and opinion was significantly more evident in the 
press.    
 
4.6. ‘Clientelar’ media and the consolidation of a two-party system  
 
The oil revenues were also contributing to economic growth and a general 
improvement in the population’s quality of life. Industrial and economic expansion 
brought about upward social mobility, even though there was still significant inequality 
and some levels of repression towards overt political dissidence (Lander 2008). But, 
insurgency and revolution were not welcomed by the majority of the people in the 
1960s (Caballero 2010). During the regimes of Raul Leoni and of his successor, 
Rafael Caldera, founder of COPEI party, the “legitimacy of the democratic regime was 
strengthened and the two-party system consolidated” (Lander 2008: 70).  
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In a climate of relative social, political and economic stability during the mid-1970s 
great expectations were generated among Venezuelans (Madero 2009). The Inter-
American Press Society declared that, for the first time, the Venezuelan government 
had championed “freedom of expression” within a regime of “freedom and democracy” 
(cited by Díaz Rangel 2007: 133). Importantly, Caldera’s electoral campaign 
introduced a controversial facet of media and power: for the first time a news media 
group – Cadena Capriles, owners of Últimas Noticias daily and nine other publications 
– openly backed a candidate in exchange for obtaining seats in Congress if Caldera 
was elected president (Botía 2007, Díaz Rangel 2007). This changed aspects of the 
relations between news media and political parties, with outlets openly campaigning 
for specific parties28; and had negative repercussions in news media: some outlets 
relinquished balanced, accurate and fair information, and began to function on the 
basis of the political affiliations of its owners (Ibid).  
 
While most of Latin America was under dictatorial rule in the 1970s, Venezuela proved 
to be strengthening its ‘democratic project’ through the broadening of a party system, 
civic political participation, independence of institutions, and more consistent freedoms 
of the press and of expression. Caldera, argues Caballero, was probably the first 
leader in Latin America in achieving that democracy be “accepted by those who 
despised it as egalitarian (‘communist’) and as secular (‘atheist’)” (2010: 225). Carlos 
Andrés Pérez, of rival party AD and who succeeded him as President in 1974, 
inherited a country with a well-consolidated political system, loyal armed forces, a 
relatively upright opposition – particularly after the foundation of progressive left-wing 
party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)–, massive popular support, and a rise in oil 
prices so high that the “outlook became not only optimist, but delirious” (Ibid: 235). 
 
During the mid-1970s a “collective delirium of ‘Great Venezuela’” began to take form 
within the country’s society; an image of richness and consumption “without much 
effort” developed among Venezuelans (Lander 2008: 70). This was arguably 
exacerbated by the nationalisation of oil and iron ore by the Pérez administration. With 
political and economic measures such as those it became difficult for left-wing parties 
to accuse Pérez of being pro-Imperialist or neo-liberal. His politico-economic 
programme, argues Caballero, could instead be defined as “bourgeois democracy” in 
which the exploitation of oil and its revenues was developed through “state capitalism” 
                                                          
28 An important example of political campaigning took place during the 1973 general elections, 
when influential media group De Armas overtly sided with Acción Democrática party in exchange 
for possible legislative posts (Díaz Rangel 2007). 
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and then allegedly distributed among the population (2010: 238). It became difficult for 
the critical socialist voices to find receptive ears in a society that believed in the idea of 
being prosperous (Lander 2008).  
 
The news media reflected such feast of prosperity and consumerism, with the 
emergence of new outlets, expansion of broadcasting networks – which were 
amassing local media enterprises from different parts of the country within a 
corporativist frame – and an audience or readers that had more income than 
previously (Capriles 1976, Pasquali 1980, Caballero 2010). Under such a social and 
economic climate, it seems hardly surprising that there existed significant reduction in 
government sanctioning of critical news media.  
 
In 1976, state-funded television network Venezolana de Televisión (VTV) was created, 
and during its early stages did not accept publicity (Ibid, Bisbal 2005). With VTV and 
TVN-5, Venezuelans counted with two nominally ‘public service’ television outlets – 
which have since transmitted information elaborated by successive governments 
(Hernández Díaz 2008). It was also during this time that regional and communitarian 
television stations began to emerge.  
 
By the late 1970s, television had become Venezuela’s media platform with the widest 
demographic reach and penetration: around 80 percent of homes owned a television 
set and the coverage of the three main stations reached almost 70 percent of the 
national territory (Bisbal 2005). Even though by 1975 commercial radio outlets had 
grown to 137, their reach was more local than that of television and their audiences 
significantly smaller. Importantly, both broadcasting mediums dedicated very limited 
time to news content, and its quality was poor (Pasquali 1980 and 1991, Bisbal 2005).  
 
Overall, by 1980 approximately 96 percent of Venezuela’s radio stations were 
privately-owned, as were 80 percent of television stations (Pasquali 1991). Over 52 
percent of the combined broadcasting content was imported, including news – a 
tendency that seems to have been maintained into the twenty-first century (Ibid, 
Hernández Díaz 2008), and which has been systematically criticised by authors of 
developmentalist and political economy trends (Capriles 1976, Pasquali 1991, Beltrán  
 
2008). In contrast to such broadcast trend, a daily founded in 1979, Diario de Caracas, 
became an example of a vigorous and analytical style of news elaboration. It was the 
country’s first newspaper to develop a book of style and was able to work with relative 
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independence (Botía 2007, Díaz Rangel 2007)29.  
 
The Pérez regime arguably culminated the triumph of the ‘democratic project’ set by 
the leaders of Pact of Puntofijo, but it also became the first government to initiate the 
nation’s rapid economic downfall and social deterioration (Caballero 2010, Parra 
2010). 
 
The electoral triumph in 1978 of Luis Herrera Campins, representing the COPEI party, 
stressed that bipartisanship had become the norm in Venezuela’s representative 
democracy – the vast majority of people, and the media included, tended to side with 
either AD or COPEI, even though there existed over twenty different parties of different 
ideological shades participating in elections (Ibid, Lander 2008). Left-wing parties 
found it very difficult to confront effectively the populist political mechanisms of 
bipartisanship, and radical insurgency had been discarded as a means to attain power 
– not only in Venezuela, but in most of Latin America – as institutional democracies 
gained ground in the region during the 1980s.  
 
By the early-1980s, under President Herrera Campins, Venezuela ceased to have 
Latin America’s strongest economy and, instead, began to experience a financial crisis 
and a sharp rise in levels of poverty. Oil prices dropped dramatically, inflation rose, the 
external debt became unsustainable, the official exchange rate of the national currency 
was devalued significantly, the flight of local capital grew – a set of financial and 
economic constraints which were being experienced by Venezuelans for the first time 
(Madero 2009). If, during the Pérez administration the state had become a sort of 
Leviathan, with high expenditures, in the ones that followed this reality was met with 
increasing bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption and clientelism (Caballero 2010). 
Arguably, the combination of two factors – an economic crisis and an oversized state – 
led to intense public corruption, a trait that has accompanied Venezuela’s political and 
social landscape since.  
 
4.7. News media: from critical passivity to mirrors of social unrest 
 
In the news media, from the mid-1970s onwards, governmental and political parties’ 
advertisements represented over a third of the total of publicity in the media. As a 
                                                          
29 Diario de Caracas developed reporters’ specialisation in thematic areas and arguably formed a 
new generation of journalists in a non-traditional vein of what entailed parallelisms with Anglo-
America’s New Journalism. 
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partial consequence, many news outlets became quite submissive to the government 
and not critical of any of its policies and of parties’ actions (Capriles 1976). Also, many 
media owners had become part of the political establishment, and this was arguably 
reflected in such critical ‘passivity’. Some of them had decided that in order to obtain 
greater profits, attain relative autonomy and political influence, a strategy to follow was 
to become more active in formal politics while expanding their media properties – even 
if that meant being congressmen and editors simultaneously (Botía 2007). President 
Herrera said at the time: 
 
In Venezuela, media owners determine beforehand which events are to 
occur during the day and request their reporters to find data that would 
corroborate such information. In effect, in Venezuela there exists more 
freedom of enterprise than freedom to inform (cited by Díaz Rangel 
2007: 79). 
 
It seems likely that some media owners were capitalising in the deterioration of the 
leading political parties and trade unions. Public opinion – spurred by the news media 
– pinpointed the flaws of the government party’s economic and political policies and, 
more importantly, the growing state corruption. This critical stance was further 
strengthened when the government, in the early 1980s, imposed a policy of fiscal 
control and the administration of currency exchange through an official body.  
 
Paradoxically, as argue Díaz Rangel (2007) and Caballero (2010), most of the 
Venezuelan media did not react critically to such draconian economic measures or to 
the growing corruption in the public sector. Some news outlets, particularly within the 
press – which had always maintained a more critical informative vein than the 
broadcast media in Venezuela, as argued by most analysts (Aguirre and Bisbal 2010) 
– feared that the government would not grant them the permission and beneficial 
currency exchange rates to buy the required materials for publishing (Ibid). In turn, 
many newspapers, in what can be considered self-censorship, decided not to check on 
the government nor investigate cases of corruption for fear they might not be able to 
buy supplies and equipment, of which over 90 percent needed to be imported. Most of 
the news broadcasting media remained uncritical. Yet, a handful of newspapers 
adopted a critical attitude, and began investigating political ‘scandals’ and promoting 
social debate (Botía 2007). 
 
During the regime of Jaime Lusinchi, who had been elected President in 1983, the 
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official currency exchange control was selectively used to impose restrictions towards 
many media. Not since the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez had the Venezuelan media 
experienced such restraints and limitations (Botía 2007, Díaz Rangel 2007). Yet, the 
private press and some broadcast news media began reacting to the way most 
Venezuelans were alarmed by the government’s corruption. Arguably, the most 
intense political debates within society and the media began to gravitate around the 
corruption in the official sector, as of the mid-1980s (Madero 2009, Caballero 2010). 
Defiantly, some news media – led by dailies El Nacional, Panorama, and El Impulso30 
– investigated cases of corruption in Lusinchi’s cabinet (Díaz Rangel 2007). 
 
In 1988, Carlos Andrés Pérez ran again for the nation’s Presidency as candidate of the 
AD party, and defeated his rivals in a landslide. During the following electoral period, in 
1993, Rafael Caldera was also re-elected. Both had held relatively successful previous 
governments, but ended their respective second periods not in a memorable manner: 
Pérez was forced out of the Presidency by the Supreme Court; while Caldera, at the 
end of his presidential term, had to symbolically bury the document which had given 
shape to Venezuela’s representative democracy, and of which he was one of the three 
signers: the Pact of Punto Fijo (Reid 2009, Caballero 2010).  
 
The deterioration of the political system and the inefficiency of the public administration 
became too evident (Carrera Damas 2007). Political parties and trade unions had 
gradually spiralled into a crisis and were no longer the “main channels of expression of 
popular demand” (Lander 2008: 73). The democratic project of the puntofijistas – or 
rather the AD-COPEI bipartisanism – was arguably in a state of emergency, and the 
economy was very unstable. It was in this context that Pérez decided to introduce neo-
liberal policies of economic adjustment, in accordance to the International Monetary 
Fund’s guidelines (Lander 2008, Caballero 2010).  
 
A few weeks after Pérez had announced his new economic measures and government 
policies a social explosion, which would later be known as El Caracazo, took place in 
February, 1989 (Ibid, Williamson 2009). The popular revolts started in Caracas and 
spread to other places in the country. Rioting and looting took place on a scale 
unknown to twentieth-century Venezuelans, to which the government reacted by 
suspending some constitutional guarantees and declaring a state of emergency (Ibid). 
                                                          
30 El Impulso (based in Barquisimeto) and Panorama (based in Maracaibo) have been, since their 
foundation in 1904 and 1914, respectively, two of the most influential non-Caracas dailies in 
Venezuela (Botía 2007). 
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These events, which resulted in the death of between 1000 and 3000 citizens, mainly 
at the hands of the police forces and the National Guard, were at the time interpreted 
as a mass protest against speculative prices (Ibid, Hernández 2008). Others claimed it 
was a popular ebullition of “communism in its purest form”; but, as expresses 
Caballero, it was arguably a mixture of both (2010: 319). 
 
Generally, the media reacted to the El Caracazo cautiously. Pérez had only been a 
few weeks in power and was regarded by most media owners as a leader that would 
stimulate a freer environment for news media (Díaz Rangel 2007). The media portrayal 
of El Caracazo was therefore predominantly one that focused on the looting and social 
disorder caused by protesters, and partially overlooked the political and social 
meaning of such events. For, as Lander argues, El Caracazo represented the “terminal 
crisis” of a twenty-year deterioration of the puntofijista political programme and of the 
dysfunctional social welfare in Venezuela (2008: 71-72).  
 
The social and political crisis was to worsen: in 1992 President Pérez suffered two 
coup attempts. The first, on February 4th, was carried out by the Bolivarian 
Revolutionary Movement (MVR 200) with Lieutenant-Coronel Hugo Chávez as its 
visible leader (Reid 2009, Williamson 2009). The loyal armed forces crushed the 
insurgents. The second putsch took place on November 27th, and was led by a group 
of high-ranking officers. The military insurrection was, again, defeated by the army 
(Ibid). In both cases there was bloodshed, and even though the armed insurgents’ call 
for Venezuelans to ‘take to the streets’ to back them failed, it became evident that they 
had gained the sympathy of many citizens and of part of the media (Botía 2007, 
Caballero 2010). 
 
Following the first coup, the government reacted with the temporary suspension of 
some constitutional rights and restricted the flow of news nationwide (Botía 2007). 
Since the 1960s, Venezuela had not experienced military coups; and neither had its 
media experienced such official emergency measures of restriction (Ibid). Some news 
media reacted against the censorship measures and called for a ‘media’ strike, which 
turned out to be only partially successful (Díaz Rangel 2007).  
 
Constitutional rights were again suspended after the second 1992 coup. Yet, unlike 
months earlier, Pérez did not impose censorship on the media. It seems that were he 
to have executed such actions again the outcome would have been similarly negative 
for his administration. But by then various media had already began a crusade of 
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denouncements against the President (Botía 2007). During and after 1992 the hostility 
of the news media towards Pérez grew in intensity, sometimes at the price of 
manipulating or even partially making up news that condemned the President at a 
personal level (Ibid)31. The nation’s most influential media succeeded in debilitating the 
President and his cabinet, particularly after accusing him of the misappropriation of 
public funds and of the presidential discretionary fund.  
 
In May 1993, the Supreme Court began a legal process to remove him from office. 
Pérez became Venezuela’s first and only President to have been forced out of office 
institutionally by the Attorney General – and the media was a key component of such a 
political event (Botía 2007, Caballero 2010).    
 
4.8. Media’s role in the end of puntofijismo and the rise of Chávez 
 
The negative perception of Venezuela’s two main political parties was such that, for 
the first time since 1958, a candidate that did not belong to either won the presidential 
elections in 1993 (Díaz Rangel 2007). Caldera, who had founded one of those parties, 
COPEI, decided to run for the Presidency with a hybrid party, Convergencia. After 
winning elections, he initiated his mandate aware of the political power the media had 
gained, their growing tendency towards a journalism of accusation, and called for the 
media to respect the “ethical values of democracy” and provide the people with “their 
right for a truthful information” so that “justice and veracity” was not manipulated or 
altered (cited by Díaz Rangel 2007: 149). 
 
Caldera’s project for a new media law and a code of ethics was perceived by the 
majority of the media as a threat to freedom of expression. His cabinet emphasised 
that the owners of the media – not so much the reporters – were seeking to demonise 
the government and were being abusive of their freedoms (Ibid, Hidalgo 2009). The 
news media continued underlining the crisis in the democratic system and, to a lesser 
extent, the economic measures – labelled ‘neo-liberal’ by Caldera’s opponents – that 
had been taken in an attempt to find solutions to the financial depression and the 
vertiginous inflation the country was experiencing (Hidalgo 2009, Caballero 2010). 
 
                                                          
31 By the late 1980s, the media had gained significant power, and became pivotal in the refutation of 
President Pérez’s project of constitutional reform (in 1992) that entailed, among many of its aims, 
the prohibition of media monopolies and promotion of the right for ‘truthful’ information (Díaz 
Rangel 2007). 
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During the 1998 Presidential elections some media did not hesitate to present Hugo 
Chávez, a leading figure of the first of the two 1992 military coups, as a political 
alternative to the traditional parties and to Punto Fijo politicians (Hidalgo 2009, Reid 
2009). Also, the main parties of the Left backed Chávez’s newly-founded Movimiento 
Quinta República (Fifth Republic Movement), as he began campaigning as presidential 
candidate (Lander 2008).  
 
It was arguably Chávez’s reformist, anti-establishment, and nationalist discourse that 
won him most followers during his electoral campaign (Sánchez Urribarri 2008, 
Caballero 2010). Contrary to many European nations and the U.S., the establishment’s 
neo-liberal policies were no longer seen as acceptable generators of social justice and 
material well-being by most Venezuelans, just like in most of Latin American societies 
(Barret et al 2008, Williamson 2009). Authors of different ideological strands agree that 
there was also an important military ingredient in Chávez’s political discourse, as well 
as a component of radical populism which appealed to many voters (Lander 2008, 
Caballero 2010). Yet, his discourse, like his political project, began to polarise opinions 
early on during his electoral campaign.   
 
Caballero argues that Chávez’s political and ideological project has been best 
characterised by the ideas of sociologist Norberto Ceresole, who proposed a 
“communion” between the caudillo, the army, and the people which “excluded all 
institutions and mediators” such as political parties, unions, syndicates (2010: 361). 
Furthermore, he argues that his was a personalist and authoritarian project. Lander, on 
the other hand, formulates that Chávez’s political project, albeit with a militarist stance, 
was anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist in character, seeking to broaden popular 
participation (2008).  
 
Such polarisation was evident in the way some influential media – Venevisión and El 
Nacional, for example – backed him; while others – RCTV and El Universal, among 
others – opposed him vehemently (Bisbal 2009). During the electoral campaign, 
though, most media were biased against Chávez; and the organisation Bloque de 
Prensa declared that he represented a “threat to the freedom of the press” (Díaz 
Rangel 2007: 154).   
Chávez became the first military putschist to be democratically elected as President of 
Venezuela. Two months after taking office in February 1999, he called for an open 
referendum to elect representatives of a Constitutional Assembly who would, in turn, 
write and pass a new Constitution (Barrera and Marcano 2006, Botía 2007, Reid 
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2009). The new constitution was approved, introducing a “generous catalogue of 
fundamental rights and different venues for their protection”, empowerment of minority 
groups, relative freedom for the private sector to “exploit and commercialise natural 
resources”, elements of participatory democracy such as various types of referenda 
and promotion of “new associative forms for social and economic ends” (Sánchez 
Urribarri 2008: 183).  
 
Among its many changes and reformist clauses, the new constitution allowed for 
presidential second-term elections and increased presidential terms from five to six 
years, while also granting more power to the head of state. It is in this context that 
Chávez renamed the nation ‘Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’, stressing his 
ideological affinity with independence hero Bolívar (Barrera and Marcano 2006, 
Williamson 2009).  
 
The opposition reacted by expressing that the National Assembly was handing over 
too much power to Chávez and to the armed forces. According to the new constitution, 
elections needed to be held in order for the president to be legitimatised again. In July 
2000 these took place and Chávez was re-elected while his allied parties obtained the 
majority of seats in the newly established National Assembly (Botía 2007, Williamson 
2009).  
    
Sánchez Urribarri argues that, in the initial power struggle between Chávez’s 
government and the opposition, both showed certain moderation and pragmatism, but 
this “uncomfortable equilibrium” became ineffective, as of 2001, when both forces 
“engaged in a zero-sum confrontation for power” and radicalised their political 
positions (2008: 183).  
 
In April 2001, Chávez said publicly that the media were enemies of his Bolivarian 
revolution; and two months later, during celebrations of Journalists’ Day, he expressed 
that he maintained “a complex system of relations with the media as part of a historical 
clash” (cited by Bisbal 2009: 17). Three months earlier the first mass protests against 
Chávez took place, as a reaction to the President’s wishes to introduce new Bolivarian 
educational curricula in schools. Other protests followed in reaction to the way the 
President was allegedly governing “by decree using power legislation”, and he was 
accused of authoritarianism, “reducing basic freedoms”, and promoting a proto-
totalitarian social model inspired in Fidel Castro’s Cuba (Sánchez Urribarri 2008: 184). 
On the other hand, Chávez’s followers – the Chavistas – interpreted his new economic 
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and political measures as a means to deepen a revolution for the underprivileged, and 
welcomed the social programmes of health-care, education, and communitarian 
production – known as misiones (missions) – that were introduced (Ibid, Lander 2008).  
 
Opposition parties and groups formed, in 2001, the organisation Coordinadora 
Democrática, in an effort to articulate political ideas and actions; but it was arguably 
the media that played the most effective confrontational role as critics of Chávez 
during the early 2000s. The two main traditional political parties – AD and COPEI – 
had lost mass support, and fragmented partly into parties such as social-democrats Un 
Nuevo Tiempo and Alianza Bravo Pueblo, and Christian-democrats Primero Justicia, 
among others (Petkoff 2010). These, however, were still associated to the traditional 
party system and, during the first half of the 2000s, lacked mass support – albeit by 
2007 their support grew and represented around 45 per cent of the electorate (Ibid, 
Romero 2008)32. 
 
The vast majority of private-media editors and journalists were not balanced in their 
opinion and news agendas, favouring to varying degrees anti-Chávez positions. 
Newspaper TalCual, founded in 2000 by left-wing politician and editor Teodoro Petkoff, 
reintroduced front-page editorials, most of which were critical of the government (Botía 
2007). By then, the media that had once sympathised with Chávez, such as 
Venevisión and El Nacional, began to show an anti-government bias in their news 
coverage (Díaz Rangel 2007).    
 
President Chávez launched officialist newspaper El Correo del Presidente and began 
to increase his presence in broadcasting mediums. Aló Presidente was the 
government’s first formal attempt to launch a regularly broadcasted programme in 
which Chávez addressed the audience (Castellanos 2009, Bisbal 2009). The first 
format was launched through the RNV radio network; and after 1999 it was switched to 
the television network Venezolana de Televisión (VTV). After then, the President 
appeared regularly on screen, talking to citizens, supporters, members of his cabinet, 
reporters, in a conversational mode that rarely lasted less than four hours (Ibid). The 
broadcast programme Aló Presidente was arguably conceived to have a twofold 
                                                          
32 During the 2008 regional elections, oppositional parties gathered a total of 45.1 per cent of the 
general vote, while the pro-Chávez forces obtained 53.8 per cent. 61.2 per cent of eligible voters 
(18.2 million) participated in the elections - the lowest abstention index during the 2000s for a non-
Presidential election. By comparison, during the 2004 regional elections, pro-Chávez parties 
obtained 58.7 per cent of votes, and the opposition 41.2 percent. In a four-year period, oppositional 
parties augmented 4 per cent in electoral following (Romero 2008).  
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function: one was to establish a direct connection between “the leader and the people”, 
and the other was for Chávez to “impose to the media and oppositional organisations” 
the news agenda of political and social issues that he thought to be crucial 
(Castellanos 2009: 35).  
 
4.9. Chavismo, opposition and the politicised media battlefield 
 
By early 2002, the bulk of the private media – with few exceptions – systematically 
reproduced a negative image of Chávez and his administration, and assumed an overt 
role as political agents (Botía 2007, Díaz Rangel 2007). Like the state-owned media, 
they reflected – and promoted to varying degrees – political polarisation, which 
intensified as the opposition carried out multiple protests on the streets (Hawkins 2003, 
Cañizales 2009b). Arguably the largest one took place on April 11th, 2002, in which 
demonstrators clashed with Chávez supporters, as the former marched towards the 
Presidential palace demanding the President stepped down (Ibid, Villegas 2009). 
Twenty people died due to gun violence – including one journalist – and over one 
hundred were injured.  
 
Amid the chaos and civil unrest, a faction of influential military officers, together with 
business groups and some figures of oppositional political parties joined forces to 
execute a coup d’état (Barrera and Marcano 2006, Reid 2009, Villegas 2009). Chávez 
allegedly resigned as President (Ibid). The head of business organisation 
Fedecámaras, Pedro Carmona, was immediately sworn in as interim President, the 
state and legislative institutions were dissolved, and the Constitution abolished. 
Various authors have argued that the George W. Bush administration was supportive 
of the coup, and that various governments of Latin America and Western Europe 
welcomed the ousting of Chávez (Lander 2008, Villegas 2009).  
 
There has been heated debate about the role of the Venezuelan media in the April 
2002 coup d’état, yet all analyses stress the key role they played in this crucial 
historical event. During the mass demonstrations that took place on April 11th, 2002, 
almost all of the private media covered the anti-Chávez protests considerably, 
maintaining an anti-government informative bias (Hawkins 2003, Botía 2007, 
Cañizalez 2009b, Villegas 2009). The President waged long and successive official 
blanket messages – known as cadenas – which all national broadcasting outlets were 
obliged to transmit at the same time, arguably in order to impede the flow of 
information related to the protests against him (Ibid). The main television networks 
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reacted by simultaneously, in a split screen, showing both the President’s message 
and live images of the mass demonstrations against him in various parts of the 
country. Similarly, most radio outlets transmitted both events, while the majority of the 
press carried out intense coverage of the protests (Ibid).     
 
As a reaction to the rebellion of the majority of the media, the President attempted to 
force off the air those influential media outlets that were opposing him – namely RCTV, 
Venevisión and Televén. However, these found a way to partially broadcast the 
demonstrations – which they backed (Hawkins 2003, Díaz Rangel 2007). During the 
coup many media outlets that were state-owned or that supported the government 
were besieged by Carmona’s security forces (Botía 2007, Villegas 2009). After Chávez 
was forced to resign as head of state and the coup was consummated, the media – 
during April 12th and early April 13th – barely published or transmitted any relevant 
information about the country’s political and social situation. Newspapers, with few 
exceptions, did not circulate during those two days; while most private television and 
radio stations decided not to transmit news content (Ibid).  
 
When Chávez returned to power, on April 13th, most of the private media maintained 
what many considered a concerted ‘information blackout’ (Botía 2007, Britto García 
2010). Even by April 14th, the main opposition newspapers did not circulate, under 
various pretexts – Últimas Noticias and Panorama, both moderately pro-Chávez did 
circulate. According to Luis Britto García, during the events of April 2002, most of the 
private media in Venezuela “lied about Chávez’s supporters killing opposition 
demonstrators”, made pacts with “the new dictatorship”, “lied about Chávez resigning”, 
and “contributed to the communication blackout that ousted Chávez” (2010: 24).  
 
Media owners denied any involvement in the coup, and there is no evidence that the 
private media conspired for there to be one, even though most owners and editors 
were overtly contrary to Chávez’s political position and ideological narrative (Cañizalez 
2009b). Some communitarian media outlets challenged the ‘information blackout’ of 
the opposition media, demanding for constitutional order to be restored (Parra 2010). 
By April 14th, the signal of state-owned VTV was re-established and some opposition 
commentators, such as Petkoff, condemned the coup in various media platforms 
(Botía 2007, Villegas 2009).  
 
The manner in which most of the Venezuelan media covered and treated the events of 
April 2002 led to a significant drop in their credibility – for the first time since ‘media 
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credibility’ surveys began, more than 55 percent of Venezuelans expressed they did 
not trust the media (Bisbal 2005 and 2009). Also, and in part as a consequence of the 
‘information blackout’, hostility and physical aggression among Chávez supporters 
towards private-media journalists increased significantly from 2002 (Botía 2007, 
Cañizalez 2009b).         
 
Following the coup, Chávez’s tone towards his adversaries became somewhat 
moderate, but this changed in December 2002 when the opposition, this time led by 
workers’ union leaders, representatives of the Fedecámaras organisation, and 
directors of state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA)33, called for a 
general strike (Barrera and Marcano 2006, Reid 2009). The news media that were 
affiliated to either Bloque de Prensa or Cámara de Radio y Televisión and many of 
their reporters decided to assume a political role by supporting the strike, abandoning 
“the necessary equilibrium and impartiality” to inform about the development of the 
strike (Botía 2007: 282). In order to reactivate the oil industry, the government resorted 
to the military, foreign investors, and co-opted some economic groups. Amid the 
economic deterioration Venezuela was going through with oil production falling by 
around 80 percent, this action was crucial in bringing “the oil industry – and the country 
– back on track after the conflictive 2002” (Sánchez Uribarri 2008: 184). 
 
4.10. The rise of state media, legal framework, censorship 
 
Having survived the coup and the general strike, Chávez was able to start to 
consolidate himself in power. Very importantly, his government realised that one of the 
“weaknesses” they experienced during the events of 2002 was the “limited quantity of 
state media to transmit their political message – and not the content of the latter” 
(Castellanos 2009: 36). Chávez announced at the time “an acceleration of his drive to 
achieve ‘twenty-first-century socialism’”, and for the first time defined himself publicly 
as a “communist” (Reid 2009: 172). A key aspect of his socialist and statist plan 
consisted in creating, intervening or buying existing broadcast media, newspapers, 
magazines, web sites, and in setting up a network of communitarian or ‘alternative’ 
media (Ibid, Bisbal 2009). Pro-government voices argue that the hegemonic control of 
the media laid in the private sector, which predominantly opposed Chávez (Parra 
                                                          
33 State-owned and state-run petroleum corporation Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) was 
founded in 1975, by President Carlos Andrés Pérez. It explores, refines, distributes and 
commercialises Venezuela’s natural gas and oil. It is by far the country’s largest business 
corporation and main source of national income; and has been ranked # 36 as the world’s largest 
and wealthiest corporation by Fotune and BNAmericas (2003).  
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2010). However, the opposition and the majority of the private media argue that the 
state was establishing a communicational hegemony not only by increasing 
significantly the number of media outlets it owned, but also by trying to eliminate or co-
opt dissident voices in the media (Bisbal 2009, Aguirre and Bisbal 2010).  
 
Indeed, the number of media outlets owned by the state grew significantly. If in 1999 
only one television station belonged to the state – Venezolana de Televisión (VTV) – 
and one news agency (AVN), by 2007 it had added to its list of television outlets 
TVES, ANTV, Vive TV, Ávila TV, and TeleSur34 – the latter has had a signal for 
Venezuela, and another one that is international (Ibid, Cañizalez 2011). Of the four 
television channels that in 2007 had national coverage, two were state-owned; the 
other two – Venevisión and Televén – have been private and, since 2003, shifted to 
politically moderate positions. In 1998 the state owned one radio network – Radio 
Nacional de Venezuela (RNV) –; by 2010 it had added networks YVKE, Radio 
Rumbos, and the international Radio Sur; while at least 200 communitarian 
broadcasting outlets began to operate in political-ideological alignment with the 
government (Ibid, Conatel en red 2012)35. 
 
In relation to the press, Chávez launched or re-launched four newspapers with public 
funding: Vea, Correo del Orinoco, Ciudad Caracas, and El Correo del Presidente36 
(Bisbal 2009, Cañizalez 2011). To these, the government has added the Bolivarian 
News Agency, formerly known as Venpres, which became part of the Ministry of 
Communication and Information (Ibid).  
 
By 2008, only two private-owned television networks were operating with a nationwide 
broadcast signal: Venevisión and Televén; and the two others that continued working 
with a limited geographical coverage were news channel Globovisión – which has 
maintained its strong anti-Chávez viewpoint – and sports channel Meridiano TV 
(Palencia 2009, Quiñonez 2011). Approximately forty private, small local channels 
                                                          
34 TeleSur represents one of Hugo Chávez’s most ambitious media projects. It is a 24-hour news 
television network that is funded by states of the region: Venezuela’s government provides 51% of 
the funding, the Argentinean 20%, the Cuban 19% and the Uruguayan 10% (Palencia 2009).   
35 Even though state-owned and state-sponsored media outlets have increased in numbers 
significantly since 2002, the vast majority of the readership/audience consumes media content 
produced and distributed by the private media. For example, between 2000 and 2010, private 
television stations averaged an audience share of 77.6 per cent, whereas state stations averaged 5.8 
per cent (satellite television/cable television/ other television averaged 16.6 percent) (Bisbal 2009, 
Weisbrot and Ruttenberg 2010).   
36 State-funded newspaper Correo del Presidente was closed during 2002, after allegations of 
corruption (Quiñonez 2011). 
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operated, some of which have linked up with others in order to create commercial 
circuits (Ibid).   
 
It is estimated that 412 commercial private-owned FM radio outlets and 209 private-
owned AM radio stations were operating nationwide in 2008, a quarter of which were 
operating from the three largest cities: Caracas, Maracaibo and Valencia, and affiliated 
to networks (Cañizales and Lugo-Ocando 2008). By comparison, the amount of 
communitarian radio stations had by 2010 reportedly grown to around 300 (Conatel 
2008, Bisbal 2009), and almost all of them supported the government’s political 
standings (Cañizalez 2009b and 2011, D’Elia and Reyna 2011).   
 
The vast majority of the Venezuelan press, however, has maintained private 
ownership: out of the 95 daily newspapers and five weekly newspapers that were 
being published by 2008, less than ten percent were state-owned or state-subsidised 
(Ibid). During the second half of the 2000s, all main press outlets developed highly-
active online platforms for their news and comment dissemination. It is noteworthy 
that, by 2008, around 21 per cent of the population connected to the Internet for 
informative and communicational purposes; while in 1998 only two per cent did 
(Conatel cited by Farreras Rodríguez 2008). This follows that Venezuelan news-
content websites have grown significantly during the 2000s, with sites Analítica, 
Aporrea, Noticias 24 and Noticiero Digital being the most popular.  
 
Arguably, during the Chávez era “both the national and regional media” continued to 
be “characterised by their diversity” and the private media “has not been concentrated 
in the hands of few” – instead, the media system has hardly been maintained as 
“vertical”, as is the case in most of Latin America (Cañizales and Lugo-Ocando 2008: 
193). Yet, by 2008 there had been significant shifts in media ownership and 
conglomeration in Venezuela, mainly due to the government’s statist and 
interventionist strategies – these have been driven “essentially by political and 
ideological motives, rather than by economic ones” and in detriment of private 
ownership (Pellegrino 2010: 47)37. 
 
Luz Neira Parra argues that, the acquisition and creation of media outlets by the state, 
is part of a strategy to generate an “integral system” of information and communication 
that addresses the “expectations of citizens” living in a society that is changing from a 
                                                          
37 For a description of the main media groups in Venezuela and their ownership characteristics, see 
Appendix B.   
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neo-liberal one to “a more inclusive democracy” (2010: 118). Bisbal contends that the 
rise of state media property was part of a Chávez-led strategy that sought to establish 
an informative and communicational hegemony, authoritarian and defined by the 
President, in order to steadily silence independent and private media (2007 and 2009). 
It is noteworthy to mention that Chávez benefited immensely from a 1,400% rise in 
prices of state-owned oil between 1998 and 201038; and that his administration was 
able to inject much of that income into buying media outlets, designing a robust 
communications strategy, while continuing to invest in the social programmes or 
misiones. 
 
The new media judicial framework set forward by the Chávez administration, since 
2000, has allegedly had a restrictive effect on the critical, private media (Bisbal 2008a 
and 2009, D’Elia and Reyna 2011). To some critical observers, not only have the set of 
telecommunication reforms established restrictions for news content, but have 
allegedly been manipulated by the government to censor critical media (Ibid, Cañizalez 
2009b and 2011). Furthermore, there have been allegations that these media reforms 
were drafted in an ambiguous manner and have been used in non-constitutional ways 
by the government to also impose prior-censorship, punitive financial sanctions, 
remove broadcast licences, and close down media outlets either temporary or 
permanently (Hawkins 2003, Bisbal 2009, D’Elia and Reyna 2011). 
 
Others contend that the new set of media laws were part of Chávez’s political project, 
which seeks to establish a “normative system” of broadcasting that is “adequate to the 
media reality” (Parra 2010: 119). Like Parra, pro-government commentators affirm that 
through this legal framework, the media is expected to become less monopolised by 
family groups and conglomerates; while opening up effective ways for popular activism 
and inclusive participation (Ibid, Hawkins 2003, Conatel 2008). Some argue that 
together with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Venezuela is the Latin American country 
with the best telecommunications policies and infrastructure (Parra 2010, Conatel 
2008).  
 
Very importantly, a part of this legal framework contributed significantly to the rise of 
communitarian media during the 2000s. With the increasing amount of state-owned 
news outlets, an expansive network of communitarian media that supported the 
Bolivarian process, and the foundation of the personally-controlled political party 
                                                          
38 Prices of crude oil rose from approximately U.S. $ 8 a barrel in 1998, to around U.S. $ 116 a 
barrel in 2008 (PDVSA and Econometrica 2008). 
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Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Venezuelan Party, or 
PSUV)39, Chávez attained a strong hold on the country’s power during the second half 
of the 2000s (Bisbal 2008a and 2009, Caballero 2010).  
 
In 2007, the Chávez administration decided not to renew pro-opposition RCTV 
network’s broadcasting licence, accused RCTV of supporting the April 2002 coup, took 
away its infrastructure and equipments and handed it to the state-funded TVES, whose 
programming reflected the state’s political and ideological position (Bisbal 2009, 
Palencia 2009, Cañizalez 2011, Páez 2011)40. Popular rallies took to the streets in 
support of RCTV, while the network directors argued that they had never conspired in 
any coup and no legal stance had linked them to it. Significantly, stations Venevisión 
and Televén, both also accused by Chávez loyalists of having supported the 2002 
coup, significantly moderated their former pro-opposition position, and both of their 
licences were renewed (Bisbal 2009, Cañizalez 2009b and 2011). Less than two years 
later, the government ruled a legal motion in January 2010 which prohibited RCTV to 
operate through cable or satellite platforms in the country (Weisbrot and Ruttenberg 
2010).  
 
By 2009, the government had closed down 34 private radio and television stations, 
most of these of dissident, critical content (Reporters Without Borders 2009, Cañizalez 
2011). That same year, followers of Chávez attacked the headquarters of pro-
opposition television station Globovisión, and the government imposed economic 
fines, legal sanctions, and temporary arrests for some of its staff (Committee to Protect 
Journalists 2009, Ipys 2010). International and local non-government human rights and 
freedom of the press organisations – including Reporters Without Borders, Committee 
to Protect Journalists, Ipys and Provea – which had condemned Chávez’s measures 
towards RCTV, reacted even more critically towards the state closure of the 34 
broadcast outlets41.   
 
                                                          
39 The United Socialist Venezuelan Party, or PSUV, was founded on March 24th, 2007. It represents 
the umbrella political party for all pro-Chávez political and social forces, and is arguably the largest 
left-wing party in the Americas with an estimated 5.5 million members, in 2007 (www. 
psuv.org.ve). 
40 RCTV was, until 2007 and together with Venevisión, Venezuela’s most popular television outlet. 
Its average audience was 5.6 million when it operated with open terrestrial signal, its share of TV 
audience averaged 31 per cent, and its publicity investment 26 per cent of the television market 
(Cañizales and Lugo-Ocando 2008, Pellegrino 2010).  
41 For Reporters Without Borders’ report (02/08/2009) on governmental withdrawal of broadcasting 
licences to 34 outlets, see Appendix C.  
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4.11. Growth of journalistic professionalism and its limitations  
 
Allegedly, not only had legal hostility from the government to private news outlets and 
critical reporters increased, but so had physical attacks, threats and harassment 
towards media workers since 2002 (Ayala-Corao 2005, Ipys 2010)42. Such a hostile 
environment for journalists – unknown since the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez – is in 
large part the product of social and political polarisation (Hawkins 2003, Bisbal 2009, 
Ipys 2010, Lozada 2011). Even though the majority of victims are professionals of the 
pro-opposition news media, pro-Chávez journalists have also been intimidated, 
beaten, and their equipment destroyed or confiscated (Ipys 2010, Provea 2010, 
Freedom House 2010). There is no governmental policy for the protection of journalists 
(Ibid, Ayala-Corao 2005). By early 2010, there were approximately one attack on a 
journalist reported every three days to various local NGOs, six media workers were 
killed in violent circumstances, and at least five attacks with explosives on the private 
residences of dissident journalists or on private news headquarters were reported, 
while social unrest and repression of dissidence increased (Ipys 2010, Amnesty 
International 2010)43. 
 
It is important to stress that, although media censorship and harassment towards 
journalists have become widespread and have risen to critical levels during the 
Chávez era,  
 
direct censorship by political and legal means and the exercise of self-
censorship using the government’s resources were a reality in 
Venezuela long before Chávez came to power… self-censorship has 
been routinely achieved through threats, bribes or indirect pressures by 
editors (Cañizales and Lugo-Ocando 2008: 207). 
 
During Venezuela’s democratic era the above-mentioned aspects of censorship and 
other forms of limitation to journalistic autonomy have clashed variably with the 
process of professionalisation of journalism (Aguirre 1998 and 2010). Since 1958, 
academic formation and professionalisation in media practice have grown significantly 
in the country, mainly due to certain social mobility and to the establishment of 
                                                          
42 For reports and surveys carried out by various local and international non-government 
organisations on the freedom of the press in Venezuela and journalists who have been victims of 
violence in the 2000s, See Appendices D and E. 
43 For Amnesty International 2010 Freedom of expression and Human Rights report on Venezuela, 
see Appendix F. 
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normative and legal frameworks in the national media market and workplaces (Ibid, 
Garrison and Goodsell 1996). Aguirre argues that, throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, Venezuelan journalists and 
media workers can be characterised as “middle class in their formation, incomes, and 
social status”, and can be politically and ideologically defined as predominantly leftist 
(2010: 64).  
 
However, the idea of journalistic professionalism that evolved during Venezuela’s 
democratic era, the presence of normative professionalism and of its ethical tenets – 
like in most parts of Latin America – has not been cemented intensively or uniformly 
(Aguirre 1998 and 2010); instead it arguably “lacks the standing as the all-powerful, 
consensual model which it had during the ‘high modernism’ of journalism in the United 
States and the United Kingdom” (Waisbord 2013: 194).  
 
Liberal, western notions of media professionalism and journalistic ethics have informed 
to varying degrees the practices of editors and reporters, but have not developed as 
core principles, while it seems that a hybrid construct – drawing from different models 
and embedded in a specific national context – is the predominant form of 
understanding journalistic professionalism (Ibid, Aguirre 1998, Botía 2007).  
 
As partisan media and advocate journalism practice intensify in the Chávez era and 
under the logic of polarisation – paradoxically in parallel with the relative intensification 
of the presence of western, liberal-influenced, professional  journalistic ideals among 
some dissident, pro-opposition reporters and editors – the very idea of journalism’s 
role in democracy, its practical and ethical tenets, remain strongly contested.  
  
4.12. Conclusion 
 
This part of the study explicates and discusses the history of Venezuela’s media and 
journalism and their relation to key political and social events that have defined the 
country’s difficult – and at times tortuous – path towards democracy (Carrera Damas 
2007). It charts the different mechanisms which the press and other media have 
reflected and been an active part of the power struggle in Venezuela. Addressing 
selectively the political and socio-cultural evolution of the nation, and the development 
of its media, are necessary steps in providing a contextual space from which to 
examine and understand empirical aspects of the news media and journalistic practice 
during the Chávez era.   
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In doing so, the chapter also explores the historical tensions between an authoritarian, 
caudillista, elitist tradition and an institutionalist, liberal-inspired, democratic project that 
have existed since the nation’s independence from Spanish rule. Evidently, neither one 
is clear-cut; instead, they are highly-nuanced and – even when assessed somewhat 
schematically – both maintain patent elements of populism and statism to varying 
degrees, and a longstanding deficit of social justice – all of which arguably represent 
characteristic traits of Latin America’s political culture. 
 
Overall, the press in Venezuela was constituted as partisan during the nineteenth 
century and more often than not suffered the effects of intense political polarisation, 
censorship and limitations to freedom of expression. If, during its beginnings, 
journalism was mainly influenced by Iberian cultural models – and to some extent by 
those of France and Great Britain –, during the second half of the twentieth century the 
regional impact of U.S. culture and its geopolitical hegemony became patent in the 
nation’s culture and in the configuration of most occupational/professional identities. 
This was arguably the product of Venezuela’s vertiginous – albeit chaotic and 
incomplete – entrance into modernity, during the second and third decades of the 
twentieth century (Caballero 2010).  
 
As Waisbord explains, journalism, which is “located at the crossroads of politics, 
economics, society, culture, and technology” is extremely “sensitive to broad 
transformations” (2013: 5). Key transformations brought about during the twentieth 
century include the exploitation of oil deposits by U.S. corporations, the penetration of 
liberal capitalism, the redefinition and implementation of electoral democracy, and the 
delegitimisation of the political class as epitomised in the social upheaval of El 
Caracazo in 1989 (Capriles 1976, Reid 2009, Caballero 2010).  
 
Evidently, a notable transformation in Venezuelan society was the result of the rise to 
power of Chávez and the prevalence of his hybrid, statist and populist political project 
of national re-foundation.   
 
The news media and journalists, as explained in this chapter, have systematically 
mirrored and been active participants of these changes. In the political and social 
conflict which divides Venezuelan society under Chávez, the media and its workers 
have been at the centre of the ideological clash – among colliding views and models 
with problematic consequences for media pluralism, journalistic autonomy, fair and 
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balanced reporting, normative and ethical news production, and constructive 
democracy debate.  
 
 
112 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Methodology 
 
 
This study investigates issues and questions related to news media and journalistic 
practice in Venezuela, the extent to which these may be embedded or not in 
democratic tenets and whether or not they promote such values. Research focuses 
mainly on exploring professional practice in a limited national setting – the context of 
Venezuela –, within a defined period of time (2000-2010) during which president Hugo 
Chávez and his government have ruled the country.    
 
The main questions that underpin this research are:  
 
 How do journalists in Venezuela evaluate their practice and the ways in which they 
represent the nation’s political and social reality?  
 How do media professionals interpret the implications of journalistic practices in 
Venezuela for democracy? 
 How do journalists and media-related workers characterise Venezuela’s socio-
political environment and democracy during the Chávez era?  
 How do politics, ideology and cultural/historical factors shape news production in 
Venezuela, and to what degree do journalists consider themselves agents of 
politicisation and of democratisation?  
 
In order to address this study’s principal research questions and those that are 
tributary, it is necessary to review methods of research and identify those most 
appropriate for this study. The various perspectives, theories and models examined in 
the study’s literature and historical reviews have informed, to a degree, the research 
techniques that are best suited to the research questions outlined above.  
 
Media studies allow one to research both quantitatively and qualitatively a determined 
phenomenon (Silverman 2001, Jensen 2002). In quantitative research it is required 
that the “variables under consideration be measured,” and how often each variable is 
present (Wimmer and Dominick 2006: 48). It is essentially framed within a 
methodology consisting of data gathering, categorizing and quantifying it (Silverman 
2001, Ibid). Its numerical findings arguably permit greater accuracy and exactitude in 
the reporting of certain results, and some of the most common of these techniques are 
surveys, questionnaires, content analysis, and experiments of mathematical 
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measurements (Berger 2000, Ibid). The use of these quantitative techniques did not 
seem the most appropriate for the research questions under examinations here. As 
stressed earlier, this study focuses on analysing the opinions, perceptions and 
subjective experiences of a group of people – practising journalists and media-related 
professionals in Venezuela – and in order to answer the research questions the study 
does not require that the statements and opinions of the latter be “tested or ‘explained’ 
by their confirmation and frequency” in quantitative data (Flick 2009: 25). 
   
5.1. Use of qualitative methods  
 
If ‘quantitative’ refers to “how much, how large, the amount of something”, ‘qualitative’ 
emphasises the “essential character of something” (Kvale 1996: 67). Qualitative 
research in social or media studies explores and evaluates the characteristics and 
implications of a given phenomenon, by evaluating the socially-constructed nature of 
reality in the past and the present, and by answering questions related to how meaning 
is created and interpreted within such social experience, with sufficient accuracy for 
them to have analytical consistency and be potentially falsifiable (Jensen 2002, Seal et 
al 2004, Denzin and Lincoln 2005).  
 
In most qualitative methods of research the variables may or may not be quantified or 
measured (Wimmer and Dominick 2006). These variables are believed to provide for 
certain researchers a “deeper understanding of social phenomena than would be 
obtained from purely quantitative data” (Silverman 2001: 32). Thus, for examining 
individual opinions and social factors that cannot be measured, for example, through 
exclusive statistics use or numerical data due to the investigative nature of the study, 
qualitative methodology is recommended. Techniques and methods of a qualitative 
approach include in-depth interviews, field observation, discourse analysis, case 
studies, focus groups, among others (Bertrand and Hughes 2005, Wimmer and 
Dominick 2006). These seem particularly suitable when there is a preference for 
understanding both meaning and behaviour, that is when “attempting to document the 
world from the point of view of the people studied” (Hammersley 1992, cited by 
Silverman 2001: 38), and for observation rather than experiment. Among the 
advantages of using these methods are the possibilities to view “behaviour in a natural 
setting without the artificiality that sometimes surrounds experimental or survey 
research”, thus potentially increasing the “researcher’s understanding of a 
phenomenon under investigation” (Wimmer and Dominick 2006: 49).  
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Additionally, qualitative methods – embedded in an inductive and hypothesis-
generating approach – allow greater flexibility when analysing uncharted phenomena, 
thus also allowing the researcher to pursue new ideas (Silverman 2001). The 
questioning approach may vary, depending on the technique used, but all generally 
reflect an exploratory vein that enable the researcher to initiate the study with a 
predetermined set of questions, and to then develop follow-up questions as demanded 
by new findings (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, Wimmer and Dominick 2006).   
 
 
Some critics have pointed out certain limitations of qualitative research (Ibid, Berger 
2000). One is that samples can sometimes be too small to offer the researcher a 
means by which to quantify and compare information that may prove to be more 
‘reliable’ or ‘objective’. As expressed by Roger Wimmer and Joseph Dominick, a 
qualitative approach is occasionally used as a “preliminary phase of a project to further 
investigation” (2006: 49). Yet, they also argue that qualitative data may be all the 
investigation required for a particular research. Another critique is the risk of some of 
these methods not being used objectively enough, due particularly to “the human 
interaction inherent in the interview situation”, or to the difficulty an observer may 
present in detaching professionally from his subject matter (Kvale 1996: 64).  
 
This critique is questioned by Steiner Kvale and other authors in the sense that if 
objectivity refers to “reliable knowledge, checked and controlled, undistorted by 
personal bias and prejudice” which can be “cross-checked” and “verified”, then various 
methods of qualitative research comply with this notion of objectivity (Ibid: 66). 
Moreover, qualitative techniques such as person-to-person, in-depth interviewing can 
sensitively “reflect the nature of the object investigated”, since they are able to gain 
“objectivity of knowledge” through a “intersubjective interaction” between the 
researcher and the object researched, that is through rational argumentation and 
understanding of meaning in language and texts (Ibid). Like many other authors 
(Berger 1998, Wimmer and Dominick 2006), he finds that there exists a dichotomised 
idea about quantitative and qualitative research, in which the “hegemony on the 
quantitative side” may still be dominant, since it tends to be viewed as more 
‘scientificist’. Yet, he insists that it is necessary for social science researchers to gain 
further competency in analysing social experience as a linguistic construct rather than 
a merely mathematically-constituted reality (Kvale 1996).  
 
Due to the nature and complexity of this study, qualitative techniques of research 
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proved to be most suitable. As mentioned above, the main questions of this study 
address news media and journalistic practice in the context of contemporary 
Venezuela, between 2000 and 2010. The research sets out to examine factors and to 
use variables that lead to documenting a phenomenon from the perspectives of 
different people: news media practitioners, and also editors, media owners, NGOs’ 
representatives, media scholars, politicians, public functionaries, commentators.  
 
5.2. The qualitative interview as a research technique  
 
To meet the standards of effective research while gathering and processing information 
in order to assess the way journalism and media-related occupations have been 
practiced in Venezuela during a specific period of time, and answering the main 
research questions, original research for this study relies mainly on interviews. 
Interviewing is regarded as “the central resource through which contemporary social 
science engages with issues that concern it” (Atkinson and Silverman cited by Rapley 
2004: 15).  
 
Importantly, during the preliminary stages of this study other qualitative methods were 
also considered for the research, so as to underpin the rigour of the findings obtained 
through qualitative interviewing and the analysis of these. As highlightened by various 
authors, the utilisation of qualitative techniques such as content, narrative, discourse, 
and conversational analysis can be valid tools through which to asses and interpret the 
meaning of the data obtained by various qualitative means, including interviews 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998 and 2005, Silverman 2001, Flick 2009). The use of the 
above mentioned qualitative techniques would possibly entail varying levels of validity 
and reliability for this research as secondary methodologies, yet would represent a 
diversion from its essential focus and in relation to its main objective, which rely on the 
collection and analysis of “the personal and the political” in the explanations and 
opinions of individuals (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 279), within the socio-political 
environment of Venezuela during the Chávez era. Also, the prospect of using such 
techniques arguably represents a risk in shifting the emphasis of the analysis towards 
the ordered meaning of codes and language, rather than privileging the nuanced ways 
in which individuals – reporters, editors, media-workers and media-related 
commentators – express and interpret their daily experiences within a specific national 
context (Manning and Cullum-Swan 1998). For this purpose, as already expressed, the 
qualitative interview represents the most adequate methodological tool (Kvale 1996, 
Berger 1998, Silverman 2001, Denzin and Lincoln 2005).  
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Typically, the interview consists of an “asymmetrical encounter”44 in which a researcher 
or interviewer requests information from an informant or interviewee (Gubrium and 
Holstein 2001: 3-4). A basic interviewing process entails extracting relevant information 
from interviewees through their linguistic constructions, by the researcher or 
interviewer (Ibid, Wengraf 2002, Bertrand and Hughes 2005). At first glance, 
interviewing as a way of collecting information might appear self-evident and 
empirically simple, yet in practice it represents a potentially sophisticated methodology 
and an affective technique for understanding and assessing the “rhetoric of socially 
situated speakers” and their thoughts, perceptions and feelings (Lindlof cited by 
Bertrand and Hughes 2005: 74). 
 
According to Kvale (1996), there are various inherent and specific aspects to 
qualitative research interviewing when seeking to understand and describe the 
perceptions and opinions of interviewees. Understanding meaning is arguably the most 
important aspect of this type of interview. What is said and expressed by interviewees 
must be understood and interpreted clearly by the researcher. Both levels of factuality 
and meaning are to be covered in qualitative interviewing, but it tends to be more 
difficult to interview “on a meaning level”, since the interviewer must listen to the 
“explicit descriptions and meanings” as well as what is “said between the lines” (Ibid: 
32). It is crucial for the researcher to obtain nuanced opinions and descriptions from 
the interviewees with precision. For in qualitative interviews it is “precision in 
description and stringency in meaning interpretation” that would correspond to 
“exactness” in quantitative techniques (Ibid).    
 
Although general opinions from interviewees can be highly relevant in a study, 
qualitative interviewing tends to pursue opinions, insights and descriptions related to 
specific themes, situations and events. Therefore, specificity in this type of interviewing 
is important. This aspect directly relates to that of focus. Another aspect inherent to the 
interview process is the potential ambiguity that some interviewees show in their 
answers (Kvale 1996, Silverman 2001, Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Sometimes 
different statements from the informant might even be contradictory or the person 
might be concealing data or opinions that the interviewer is eager to know. In some of 
these cases, as Silverman argues, such responses can be interpreted as “displays of 
                                                          
44 Gubrium and Holstein (2001) formulate that interviewing involves the exercise of power 
differential, whereby the interviewer/researcher, during the interviewing process, holds more power 
than the interviewees.  
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perspectives and moral forms” (2001: 112). But, as formulated by Kvale (1996), 
ambiguity and contradiction in answers might also spring from the way the questions 
are formulated or as a result of a general failure of communication in the interview 
process. Conclusively, he argues that the aim of qualitative research interviews is 
 
not to end up with unequivocal and quantifiable meanings on the 
themes in focus. What matters is rather to describe precisely the 
possibly ambiguous and contradictory meanings expressed by the 
interviewee (Ibid: 34).   
 
However, it could be argued that certain statements of the interviewees may arise from 
accurate and transparent reflections of what seem objective contradictions of a social 
reality. In these cases, it is worthwhile asking follow-up questions to interviewees or 
even point out the contradictory responses expressed (Berger 1998, Wengraf 2002). 
This, however, must not be done in a way that contaminates or frames the 
respondent’s answers.  
       
The aspect of the qualitative interview as an interpersonal situation coincides with the 
idea of Jaber Gubrium and James Holstein (2001) of the interview as an “asymmetrical 
encounter” through which specific knowledge can be attained. During the interview 
process the interviewer and the interviewee tend to influence each other (Kvale 1996, 
Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Such influence can be reciprocal or unidirectional, and 
can operate on both emotional and cognitive levels, depending on the individuals, the 
context and the theme of the interview.  
 
Researchers must be conscious of this interpersonal dynamic, both during and after 
the interview, while analysing its results (Ibid, Silverman 2001, Rapley 2004). As long 
as this type of influence is recognised and adequately acknowledged by the researcher 
it does not represent a methodological mistake (Kvale 1996, Gubrium and Holstein 
2001).  
 
5.3. The semi-structured, in-depth interview 
 
Of the different techniques of interviewing, the in-depth, semi-structured approach 
represents the most suitable for the objectives of this research. Semi-structured, in-
depth interviewing entails “a certain degree of standardization of interview questions, 
and a certain level of openness of response by the interviewer” (Wengraf 2002: 62). 
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Such openness allows respondents to articulate opinions and ideas which may not 
necessarily relate directly to a specific question asked by the interviewer, allowing 
subjective information to build naturally which can ultimately have a valuable bearing 
on the research (Kvale 1996, Bertrand and Hughes 2005).  
 
As a way of generalising, Kvale argues that this type of interview should not be “strictly 
structured with standardized questions” nor be completely “non-directive”; rather it 
should focus on a set of themes, which have been predetermined by the interviewer in 
order to answer the research questions (Ibid: 34). Importantly, Kvale’s and Brinkmann’s 
(2009) criteria for interviewing qualities – which stress the need for the interviewer to 
be knowledgeable, structuring, gentle, sensitive, open, steering, critical, remembering 
and interpreting – pertain particularly to the in-depth interview.     
 
Indeed, this type of interview process requires previous preparation of questions and 
some degree of ‘structuring’ (Ibid, Wengraf 2002). For example, the researcher may 
decide to have six standard interview questions and, optionally, use one or various 
follow-up questions after each answer (Ibid). Alternatively, the researcher may prefer to 
selectively allow some “digressions” by certain interviewees providing the former seem 
productive and if they raise valuable information and ideas that had not been 
contemplated as part of the pre-elaborated sets of questions (Bertrand and Hughes 
2005: 79).  
 
It is worth highlighting that at times the interviewer might not find it pertinent to use 
many of the specific pre-elaborated questions (Ibid, Rapley 2004). Ultimately, this 
depends on the complexity of the information that is being sought for the research, and 
on the interviewee’s propensity to answer in depth and unambiguously.  
 
Some problems can arise when using the in-depth, semi-structured approach. For 
example, some interviewees may be reluctant to answer what they consider sensitive 
issues, or may be too shy, or perhaps may feel constrained to talk freely and might end 
up offering irrelevant and inconsequential information (Ibid, Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009). Also, some interviewees might not be ready to dedicate at least twenty minutes 
of their time – as recommended in this type of interview – or elicit responses that relate 
to the research goals (Ibid). To tackle these issues it is crucial for the interviewer to 
follow optimal qualification criteria on the one hand, and on the other to prepare a 
sample of interviewees that is both representative of the population studied and in 
which each individual is knowledgeable of the topic and can express ideas logically.     
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Like all research methods, in-depth, semi-structured interviews may present some 
limitations. Wimmer and Dominick (2006: 122) have argued that “generalizability” can 
represent a difficulty in this type of interview process, because it is generally carried out 
with a non-random sample and the questions asked are non-standardised. Hence each 
interviewee might respond very differently or, for example, one interviewee might 
answer a question which was exclusively asked to him or her. This might pose 
problems for effective and non-bias interpretations of individual answers. Arthur Berger 
(1998) and Ina Bertrand and Peter Hughes (2005) stress the need for applying 
complex analytical and interpretative techniques to the data gathered so that the study 
is qualitatively sound. Also, they find that, in semi-structured interviews, time needs to 
be carefully monitored, compared to other types of interviews, so that the researcher 
can obtain the required data or information for the study to be effective.  
 
However, according to many authors, the use of the in-depth interview technique offers 
many advantages, particularly when carrying out qualitative research (Berger 1998 and 
2000, Gubrium and Holstein 2001, Wimmer and Dominick 2006, Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009). Arguably the most important asset of this technique is its capacity to gather a 
great amount of detailed information and for the researcher to pursue topics that seek 
to answer the study’s questions (Berger 1998 and 2000). Furthermore, if compared to 
other research techniques, an in-depth, intensive interview “provides more accurate 
responses on sensitive issues” (Wimmer and Dominick 2006: 122). The 
knowledgeable, sensitive, and understanding rapport between interviewer and 
interviewee tends to facilitate an environment of confidence and trust.   
 
Another positive aspect of the in-depth interview is that it is a technique through which 
unexpected yet relevant information can be obtained, due to its relative flexibility and 
sense of adaptation to specific contexts and subjects. In fact, a respondent may raise 
an important issue, highly relevant to the topic studied, which had not been included in 
the general thematic structure of the interview and, additionally, responses can be as 
personal as insightful (Ibid, Bertrand and Hughes 2005). Yet, this form of in-depth 
interview should also impel the interviewer to prepare questions, themes, categories 
that relate to the study’s main questions, thus clarifying the goals of the researcher 
(Ibid).  
 
Because of the reasons explained in previous paragraphs, face-to-face conversation is 
generally encouraged above other forms for in-depth, semi-structured interviewing 
 
 
120 
 
(Kvale 1996, Gubrium and Holstein 2001, Wengraf, 2002, De Leeuw 2008). Yet, the 
conducting of these by telephone – albeit less flexible than a face-to-face process – 
can be a technique of similar levels of effectiveness (Shuy 2001). Arguably, in-depth 
interviewing conducted by telephone is the most adequate technique after face-to-face 
interviewing, when the latter is not viable (Ibid, De Leeuw 2008). Among its 
advantages, telephone interviewing tends to present greater cost-efficiency – a 
relevant consideration for this research, since travelling from Great Britain to 
Venezuela was required. Also, it offers respondents who are sensitive to the presence 
of interviewers and to questions of delicate content the possibility of physical 
detachment, which can contribute to enhancing a more open form of conversation 
(Ibid, Wimmer and Dominick 2006).  
 
A communication tool which can be put at the service of semi-structured interviewing is 
e-mail correspondence. Even though this technique is generally used to administer 
questionnaires, surveys, or short structured interviews through the Web, it represents a 
useful means to underpin, if used selectively and efficiently, the interviewing process 
(De Leeuw 2008). For instance, email correspondence can be used to request 
interviewees to expand on certain issues which were presented during the interview or 
to request them to respond to structured questions or provide additional data (Ibid).  
 
5.4. Application of interviewing techniques, sample, and fieldwork 
 
 
Drawing from various explanatory works about research methodology, as reviewed in 
the above paragraphs, this study’s research questions demanded an empirical 
approach based on a qualitative investigation of the practices, attitudes and 
professional approaches of active journalists in Venezuela. 
 
A total of forty-two semi-structured, in-depth interviews were carried out. Thirty-four of 
these were set up with an array of Venezuelan journalists and editors; and eight with 
news media owners or managers, media scholars and commentators, media-related 
NGOs’ spokespersons, politicians and public functionaries – the list of the names of all 
interviewees, their occupations/posts, and the media organisations they worked for 
during the 2000-2010 period, are presented in Appendix G. During the fieldwork, 
newspaper professionals were prioritised over broadcast media ones for various 
reasons. Firstly, newspapers in Venezuela are perceived as the most analytical, 
opinionated and intellectually robust of all mediums (Pasquali 1991, Aguirre 2010). 
Secondly, Venezuelan print media employ as a collective the largest amount of 
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journalists (Ibid). Thirdly, newspaper journalists proved to be more accessible for 
interviewing than those of broadcasting, and after carrying out a number of interviews 
the former seemed to be arguably more knowledgeable about professional journalism. 
Lastly, under Chávez’s media policies and legislation, newspapers seem to be 
permitted a more critical stance than broadcast media – the press is, overall, more 
independent than the broad spectrum of broadcasting outlets (Botía 2007, Cañizalez 
2009b and 2010)45.  
 
To achieve breadth of scope and to obtain a representative qualitative sample, the 
study identified forty-two interviewees that displayed significant variation in the 
opinions, information, and general data they were able to provide (Gobo 2004). To 
achieve that, I had to ascertain in advance what represented a meaningful variation 
and which combination of discerning interviewees was likely to provide it (Ibid, Weiss 
1995). The nature of the research questions required that the sample of professionals 
and commentators interviewed was heterogeneous – particularly in their political and 
ideological viewpoints. The media professionals interviewed were chosen primarily on 
the basis of their own political and ideological alignment and that of the news media 
outlet they work or had worked for. Due to the highly-polarised political and social 
environment in Venezuela, it became quite feasible to define the sample of the 
interviews in terms of the ideological and political positioning of the news organisations 
these worked for during the 2000s. Also, the levels of public influence and opinion-
making power the news outlets the professionals worked for are argued to entail, 
according to existing studies, was an important factor for selecting the journalists 
interviewed (Bisbal 2008b, Cañizalez 2009b).  
 
Another important aspect of the selection criteria was that, whenever possible, 
journalists had some degree of “editorial responsibility” (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986: 23) 
and that they covered news related to politics or community or legislation or the 
economy, or a combination of these. The sample purposely mixed professionals of 
varying hierarchical levels working within the outlets. Overall, and having taken into 
consideration the time and logistic limitations of the research, the sample was both 
representative of a universe of news media professionals in Venezuela and arranged 
so as to assist resolving the research questions. Such representativeness can 
therefore lead to varying degrees of generalisations in its findings (Gobo 2004).  
                                                          
45 The legal framework for telecommunications and the media, established by Hugo Chávez since 
2001, has introduced reforms and laws that directly affect the broadcast media more than the press 
(Hawkins 2003, Bisbal 2009, Cañizalez 2009b).  
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Initially, over fifty potential interviewees were contacted, but nine refused to be 
interviewed, and had to be replaced. To avoid possible imbalance in the sample, those 
media workers that were contacted and declined being interviewed were replaced by 
others of similar political standing and overall professional profile. Also, some 
journalists, during the 2000-2010 period, had worked in different news organisations, 
so they were able to comment about the experience of working in various outlets.  
 
Thirty-seven interviews with the broad group of respondents were carried out face-to-
face, each of at least forty-five minutes duration. Five of the in-depth interviews of 
similar time extension had to be elaborated over the telephone, because of time and 
financial limitations, and due to issues related to the interviewees’ logistics. Email 
correspondence was used with three individuals that had been previously interviewed 
in person or by telephone, requesting their follow-up responses and additional insights 
on the basis of what they had already expressed. The questions in the emails were not 
extensive – far from it: three short questions were asked to each of the three 
respondents46.   
 
The face-to-face interviews were conducted in Caracas, Venezuela’s capital city, since 
it concentrates by far the largest amount of the influential news media outlets. All 
interviews were carried out in Spanish – which is the native language of all 
interviewees and myself –, and afterwards transcribed (in Spanish), then selectively 
translated into English. The majority of the interviewees were non-English speakers 
and preferred to speak in their native language. All interviews completed were 
recorded, so as to capture the information provided by the interviewees, and facilitate 
listening to them for transcription and later analysis. From the total time dedicated to 
the interviewing process, the average time dedicated per interviewee was of fifty-four 
minutes. In order to arrange the meetings, potential interviewees were contacted by 
email or by phone, or both.  
 
Face-to-face interviews were carried out in Venezuela during three different fieldwork 
spells (26th March 2012 to 14th April 2012; 20th May 2012 to 09th June 2012; 22nd 
December 2013 to 5th January 2014). In April 2012, and during late May and early June 
2012, Presidential election campaigning was beginning to take place in Venezuela – 
                                                          
46 Email correspondence was established, after carrying out interviews, with the following 
interviewees: Clodovaldo Hernández (15/10/2013), Felipe Saldivia (25/05/2013), and Fabiola Zerpa 
(27/05/2013).  
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elections were held on October 7th, 2012 – and these political circumstances could 
have influenced aspects of the interviewee’s responses; and arguably shaped the 
highly-polarised political context in which the interviews took place. The process of 
telephone interviewing, through which the opinions and views of five persons were 
collected, commenced on 25th May 2013 and was finalised on 12th July 2013.   
 
When all potential interviewees were first contacted, over seventy-five per cent agreed 
to being interviewed as soon as I had briefly explained the nature of the study, aspects 
of confidentiality and transparency for the process of interviewing. The remaining 
persons contacted requested further information about the purpose of my research and 
my professional background. The majority of these agreed to carry out the interview at 
a later date. A smaller group, however, turned down the proposal. The majority of 
these worked for official or pro-government news organisations, and requested being 
contacted later – which I did, systematically, but to no avail. On the other hand, other 
journalists and scholars contacted were able to offer some recommendations in the 
‘recruitment’ of some interviewees.  
 
As already mentioned, the interviews were focused on a set of themes and questions 
that were pre-structured, following methodological directives (Kvale 1996)47. Yet, 
during the process of interviewing it became necessary to adapt to the varying types of 
responses by the interviewees, following their comments and opinions, so as “to follow 
up on and to work with them and not strictly delimit the talk” to a pre-established 
agenda and set of questions (Rapley 2004: 18). Notwithstanding the central insight into 
the interviewees’ experiences and perceptions, it also became important to address, to 
some extent, their knowledge of the profession and their interpretation of key concepts 
for the research, such as ‘democracy’, ‘socialism/capitalism’, ‘community’, 
‘professionalism’, etc. Very occasionally, some anecdotal digressions from the 
interviewees seemed necessary in order to allow an effective interaction and allow me 
to return to the main questions. 
 
The sample of the news reporters and editors interviewed was taken from the following 
representative set of news media organisations, all of which have websites which in 
part reproduce the work of journalists/collaborators:  
 
 
                                                          
47 For the semi-structured interviews’ guide, preliminary structure and questions, see Appendix H. 
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Newspapers: 
• Últimas Noticias: Daily tabloid, moderately pro-government, popular/middle 
class readership, group-owned, nationwide circulation.  
• El Universal: Daily broadsheet, pro-opposition, conservative, middle-class 
readership, family-owned, nationwide circulation. 
• Correo del Orinoco: Daily broadsheet, officialist, popular/middle-class 
readership, state-owned, nationwide circulation. 
• El Nacional: Berliner-format daily, pro-opposition (formerly pro-regime), 
popular/middle-class readership, family-owned, nationwide circulation. 
• Diario Vea: Daily tabloid, pro-government, family-owned, popular/middle-class 
readership, state-subsidised, nationwide circulation. 
• TalCual: Daily tabloid, pro-opposition, ideologically centre-left, group-owned, 
mainly middle-class readership, nationwide circulation. 
• Ciudad Caracas: Daily tabloid, officialist, popular/middle-class readership, state-
owned, local circulation. 
• Panorama: Berliner-format daily, moderately pro-government, centrist ideology, 
popular/middle-class readership, family-owned, non-Caracas-based 
(Maracaibo), regional circulation. 
• El Mundo: Berliner-format daily, moderately pro-government, mainly financial 
content, middle-class readership, group-owned, nationwide circulation. 
• El Libertario: Of varying format and periodicity, independent, anarchist, group-
funded and group-owned. 
 
Radio networks: 
• Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV): State-owned, officialist, socially-mixed 
audience. 
• YVKE Mundial: State-owned, officialist, socially-mixed audience. 
• Unión Radio: Group-owned, commercial, moderately oppositional, socially-
mixed audience. 
• FM Center: Group-owned, commercial, oppositional, mainly middle-class 
audience.  
• Radio Voces Libertarias: Community-owned, state-funded, local popular 
audience.  
• Radio Tiuna: Community-owned, state-funded, local popular audience.  
• Fe y Alegría Radio: Catholic Church-funded, socially-mixed, national audience.  
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Television stations/networks: 
• Venezolana de Televisión (VTV): State-owned, officialist, socially-mixed 
audience, mixed content, open-signal nationwide reach. 
• Globovisión: Group-owned, commercial, oppositional, socially-mixed audience, 
mainly news/opinion content, open-signal, reaches Caracas and Valencia.  
• TeleSur: Owned by six Latin American states, state-subsidised, officialist, 
socially-mixed audience, mainly news/opinion content, transnational reach. 
•  Televisora de la Asamblea Nacional (ANTV):  State-owned, officialist, socially-
mixed audience, political and legislative content, open-signal nationwide reach.  
•  Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV): Group-owned, commercial, oppositional, 
socially-mixed audience, mixed content (closed-downed in 2009; formerly open-
signal nationwide reach).  
•  Televén: Group-owned, commercial, moderate, socially-mixed audience, mixed 
content, open-signal nationwide reach. 
 
The other eight in-depth interviews were carried out with media scholars, news media 
owners, officials of media-legislation institutions, representatives of media-related and 
human rights NGOs, political commentators and columnists, and independent media 
activists. Again, a political or ideological balance was taken into consideration when 
assembling this sample.  
 
Most of these eight interviewees could be selectively considered ‘experts’ in the fields 
of media, politics, governance, legislation, human rights, activism, and related areas. 
They tend to possess richly-grounded practical and theoretical knowledge in at least 
one professional field (Littig 2007; Flick 2009).  
 
Experts’ opinions and motives expressed in interviews – based on their personal 
knowledge, proven experience in specific occupational fields, and sense of critique and 
enquiry – can be very useful for context, conceptual bearings and expansive comment, 
thus enriching research (Ibid, Weiss 1995). This set of ‘experts’ made significant 
contributions in reporting their perceptions of the country’s media and political realities, 
thus deepening the debate on journalism practice and democracy.    
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5.5. Elaboration of thematic strands  
 
The theoretical framework and the historical research informed, to a significant degree, 
the themes to be developed in the interviews. Yet, it was the array of responses and 
opinions of the interviewees from where these emerged more clearly. The thematic 
strands or variables that were defined in this study are not destined to measuring data, 
but rather to support the qualitative analysis of the interviewees’ opinions and reports, 
and relate these to the research questions. Ten thematic threads were thus developed: 
 
 Democracy, populism and Venezuela’s non-liberal shift; 
 Polarisation and journalism as political struggle; 
 Ownership, economic factors and ideological hegemony; 
 Press freedom, censorship and legal challenges; 
 Gatekeeping, journalistic autonomy and ‘internal’ censorship; 
 Presidential/official messages and agenda-setting; 
 Community, democratic participation and coverage of elections; 
 Sources, access to information and the idea of news balance; 
 Credibility, watchdog role and investigative journalism; 
 Ideas of professionalism, journalists’ contribution to ethics and to democracy. 
 
5.6. Ethical considerations 
 
When carrying out fieldwork and using the above-explained research methodologies it 
was imperative to be aware of ethical considerations and to apply them. Even though 
there is no fixed international normative of ethical standards (Ryen 2004), there is a 
relevant degree of agreement among theorists about the broad guidelines, necessity 
and implications of ethical work. John A. Barnes elaborates what seems a well-
grounded formulation about ethical factors when he argues that these  
 
arise when we try to decide between one course of action and another not 
in terms of expediency but by reference to standards of what is morally 
right or wrong (cited by Henn et al 2006: 26). 
 
Formulations such as the above places, on the one hand, the participants or 
interviewees, rather than the researcher, at the core of the research plan; and on the 
other, it amplifies ethical issues beyond fieldwork to the various stages and aspects of 
the whole research process (Ibid, Ryen 2004). Qualitative research techniques 
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involving direct contact with participants, such as semi-structured and in-depth 
interviewing, tend to emphasise the need to protect the respondents’ interests and to 
communicate to them transparently and professionally the nature and purpose of the 
research (Ibid).   
 
The above-mentioned ethical considerations have been an integral part of this study. 
Yet, when describing the fieldwork experience – since each essential component of the 
research involved a direct rapport with participants and weighted their opinions – it is 
pertinent to address specific aspects of how, during the process of interviewing, I was 
aware of ethical research principles and applied them.  
 
All interviewees and persons contacted for interviews, comments, recommendations 
and opinions were informed about the purpose of the research and its main aims. 
When asked for further information related to the study design, the sample, logistical 
aspects and my professional background I delivered it in a direct and transparent 
manner. Therefore, there was always ‘informed consent’, and none of the interviews 
were the product of a casual or accidental encounter, nor was there concealment about 
the nature of the study (Ryen 2004, Ruane 2005). However, I was conscious of the 
existing polarised views on journalism, culture, society and politics, and during both my 
interview design and its undertaking I tried not to offer excessive personal information 
about myself to the interviewees for, the more information a researcher in this type of 
contexts provides, the more the interviewees “will inevitably ‘slant’ what they say in the 
light of their interpretation of ‘who’ they think” the researcher is and what they assume 
“the effect of the researcher will be” (Wengraf 2002: 189). 
 
None of the participants requested a promise of anonymity. Very importantly, in six 
interviews, at different times, the respondents requested a promise of confidentiality, 
which is that some information they provided would neither be used in the research nor 
made known publicly. This, as Wengraf argues, tends to refer to what “journalists 
consider ‘confidential background briefing’”, in which none of the information may be 
published and “any background briefing or contact may not be revealed either” (2002: 
187). Such promise of confidentiality was only requested by the six interviewees in few 
brief parts of the process of conversational interviewing.  
 
In order to build trust with the participants prior and during the process of interviewing, 
recommendations – which have been described in previous paragraphs of this chapter 
– from various texts were followed, most notably those of Kvale (1996), Wengraf 
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(2002), and Kvale and Brinkmann (2009). Trust is the key component in building a 
good field relation, and should establish a positive environment for effective 
communication between the researcher and the participants (Ryen 2004). In this 
sense, the questions were designed so that they presented the least conflicts of 
interests as possible, and no ideological or political positioning on my behalf.  
 
Throughout the process of interviewing I became aware that predominantly I had 
become a ‘listener’, who occasionally ‘steered’ the conversation towards the focus of 
the main and tributary questions when there had been long digressions by the 
interviewees. In the vast majority of the occasions the place and site of the interviews 
was decided by the participants, and these tended to be quiet places such as closed 
offices or work cubicles. Knowing about their journalistic and professional work 
previously also proved to be helpful in establishing a good rapport and in trying to build 
an empathic fieldwork relation.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
The topic and character of this research, as argued in this chapter, demands a 
methodological approach that is essentially qualitative. For mapping and evaluating 
journalistic practice in a highly-polarised national context, the technique of in-depth 
semi-structured interviewing proved to be consistent and pertinent.  
 
The samples for this form of qualitative interviewing were defined using critical 
variables, from a purposely diverse universe of people, in which contrasting political 
and ideological perspectives and practices were underpinned. Ethical aspects were 
considered during the various stages of the research, from designing specificities in 
methodological techniques and carrying out fieldwork, to contextualising and analysing 
the data gathered. The elaboration of thematic strands for organising the analysis 
emanated, firstly, from ideas and information generated in the interviews and, 
secondly, from the varied scholarly literature reviewed. The ten thematic threads 
developed proved to be an effective organising frame in the gathering data, as well as 
in the critical analysis, of the study’s findings, as highlighted in the following chapters.   
 
 
129 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Description and explanation of findings 
 
 
This extensive chapter presents the main findings of this research’s in-depth interviews 
with Venezuelan journalists, editors, media owners, media-related public functionaries, 
media-related NGOs’ spokespersons, journalism scholars, and political commentators 
– representing the core of the study’s data gathering and fieldwork48.  
 
The wide and substantial range of the interviewees’ nuanced, contrasted views and 
perceptions are in this section gathered and discussed in a predominantly descriptive 
vein, whereas in the chapter that follows these are analysed through a process of 
linkage of the empirical findings and theoretical and historical narratives49. In order to 
interpret the broad and substantial content emerging from the in-depth, semi-structured 
interview process, while being consistent with the central aims and research questions 
of this study, ten different themes of discussion were developed. These ten thematic 
areas, amalgamated around ideas and concepts explored in the theoretical chapters of 
this study, and encompassing opinion-patterns emanating from the interview process, 
are not mutually-exclusive nor self-confined. Due to the intrinsic characteristics of the 
qualitative research techniques employed, some thematic strands may occasionally 
overlap. The ten themes elaborated and evaluated are the following:  
 
 Democracy, populism and Venezuela’s non-liberal shift; 
 Polarisation and journalism as political struggle; 
 Ownership, economic factors and ideological hegemony; 
 Press freedom, censorship and legal challenges; 
 Gatekeeping, journalistic autonomy and ‘internal’ censorship; 
 Presidential/official messages and agenda-setting; 
 Community, democratic participation and coverage of elections; 
 Sources, access to information and the idea of news balance; 
 Credibility, watchdog role and investigative journalism; 
 Ideas of professionalism, journalists’ contribution to ethics and to democracy. 
 
Each theme concludes with a brief summarising paragraph. 
                                                          
48 The list of the names of all interviewees, their occupations/posts, and the media organisations they 
worked for (2000-2010) are presented in Appendix G. 
49 I have translated from Spanish into English all direct quotes from interviewees, in this and other 
chapters.  
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6.1. Democracy, populism and Venezuela’s non-liberal shift 
  
Under this thematic strand this research seeks to chart and assess the way various 
Venezuelan journalists and relevant media commentators understand democracy and 
the democratic role of news media. Evidently democracy, as illustrated in the first 
chapter, has different meanings according to different people. It is hardly a consensual 
concept, and its normative proposals are varied (Corcoran 1983, Duncan 1983, Bobbio 
1987, Callinicos 1991, Dahl 1991 and 1999, Held 2006, Keane 2009). The role of the 
media within a democracy conceptually follows such diversity of views and 
interpretations (Keane 1991 and 2009, Bolaño 1999, McQuail 2005, Sartori 2007b, 
Aguirre and Bisbal 2010). 
 
Very importantly, the following paragraphs seek to illustrate the ways the study’s 
interviewees perceive and evaluate the political shift brought about by the Chávez 
administration, its basic characteristics, and the likely democratic and non-democratic 
components of his socio-political project.  
 
The majority of the interviewees, when asked about the nature of democracy and 
whether or not the Chávez-led political project entailed democratic values, reflected an 
almost binary divide in terms of their understanding of democracy and the government’s 
democratic credentials. It also became patent that Chávez has, according to every 
interviewee, attempted to shift the country’s political path, and in doing so has become 
a very divisive figure. 
 
6.1.1. Pro-Chávez and ‘revolutionary’ views on democracy 
 
Editor-in-Chief of the Últimas Noticias daily and press historian Eleazar Díaz Rangel50, 
considers that democracy under Chávez should be mainly characterised by the 
introduction of a plural and participatory means of debating and making decisions 
collectively. In this sense, he claims that Chávez’s government has not only made the 
disenfranchised sectors of society active political decision-makers, but also the military 
who, prior to Chávez’s petition for the draft of a new Constitution in 1998, were not 
eligible to vote. According to Díaz Rangel, the nation has witnessed a revolutionary 
process that is “undeniably popular, and which has upended an old two-party corrupt 
political system, and its neo-liberal policies.” 
                                                          
50 Eleazar Díaz Rangel, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th March 2012.  
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All of the interviewees that work in official news outlets and organisations agree in 
defining the socio-political project led by Chávez as both democratic and revolutionary. 
Marco Hernández51, who worked at various private news outlets prior to becoming 
Director of Corporate Communications at state-run Conatel (National 
Telecommunications Commission) and co-founding NGO Periodistas por la Verdad52, 
finds that a key aspect of the revolutionary character of Chávez’s political process has 
been the way the government has “embraced socialism and broken down an 
entrenched capitalist tradition”. He and Mercedes Chacín53, who worked at Últimas 
Noticias as a reporter before joining officialist daily Ciudad Caracas as Deputy Editor, 
find that prior to Chávez’s arrival to the Presidency, the political and economic model 
that dominated Venezuelan society was distinctively capitalist, and not truly democratic.  
 
Clodovaldo Hernández54 – who worked at El Universal as a reporter and has been a 
collaborator at state-funded dailies Correo del Orinoco and Ciudad Caracas – claims 
that this liberal model neglected the essential needs of the popular sectors and was 
clientilistic, exploitative and corrupt in nature. As with seven other interviewees, Chacín, 
Clodovaldo and Marco Hernández defend a socialist-inspired democracy modelled in 
Marxist ideals of egalitarianism, direct deliberation, and rule by the workers and 
exploited social groups.  
 
Chávez‘s government, according to both Chacín and Carlos Revette55 – who works as a 
reporter/host at National Assembly Television (ANTV) and at pro-government radio 
network YVKE Mundial – represents a new way to understand democracy, particularly 
because it has deepened the participation of the majority, that is, of the poor. Michel 
Caballero56 – a political reporter at state-owned Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV), 
who worked until 2006 at officialist news agency Agencia Venezolana de Noticias 
(AVN) – argues that “those who support the President are primarily those that were 
excluded, almost invisible during previous governments; now Chávez has empowered 
them by making them key political agents.” 
 
When Chávez’s political project is defined by some interviewees as anti-imperialist, they 
also articulate a need to challenge the “dominant” and “interventionist” political role that 
                                                          
51 Marco Hernández, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 31st March 2012. 
52 Periodistas por la Verdad (“Journalists for the Truth”) is a pro-Chávez non-government 
organisation of journalists, founded in 2005. 
53 Mercedes Chacín, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 5th June 2012. 
54 Clodovaldo Hernández, interview by author, 11th and 12th July 2013. (Telephone interview). 
55 Carlos Revette, interview by author, 25th May 2013. (Telephone interview). 
56 Michel Caballero, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 8th June 2012. 
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the U.S. – the Empire, as Chávez refers to it – has played in Venezuela and Latin 
America during the twentieth century. According to Ernesto Villegas57 – who worked as 
reporter in El Universal until 2002, afterwards in state-owned VTV and in Ciudad 
Caracas as Editor-in-Chief – under Chávez’s government Venezuela “no longer 
behaves as a colony of the U.S.; it stands up to Washington’s attempts to dominate it”. 
The social and economic policies brought forward by Chávez and his populist 
reconfiguration of foreign policies have, according to most pro-government 
interviewees, strongly deepened the nation’s sense of sovereignty. Chacín says: 
“sovereignty is an important component for democracy, and Venezuela under Chávez 
has regained it.” 
 
A reporter at TeleSur TV and at daily Correo del Orinoco, Douglas Bolívar58, considers 
that the Chávez administration represents a non-conventional type of democracy. Editor 
and co-owner of Vea daily, Tania de García59, agrees with such broad characterisation, 
in the sense that it is not framed within western, representative and liberal models. 
“Democracy is not only about the popular vote and elections, like some right-wing 
people think – it must offer participation and social justice for everyone,” says De 
García. Similarly, it is argued by journalist Bolívar that democracy is essentially about 
creating the best possible means for all citizens to exchange ideas in a free and plural 
way; to have access in equal terms to welfare, public services and information; and very 
importantly, to empower the whole of society. This, Bolívar, Chacín, De García and 
Villegas claim, is what Chávez proposes, and such has been the popularity of his social 
and political policies that he has won elections repeatedly.  
 
Marco Hernández indicates that the Chávez government represents a significant shift in 
the way democracy has been understood and experienced in Venezuela and in Latin 
America. He argues that Chávez became president promoting a political project that 
bears no resemblance with the “light, complacent, non-radical Left” that Venezuelans 
were accustomed to. Furthermore, he and Alexis Colina60 – coordinator at 
communitarian radio Voces Libertarias – argue that “Bolivarian socialism” derives from 
a different vision of the European social-democratic tradition. Social-democracy, 
according to Marco Hernández, Chacín and Colina, is not revolutionary and is a political 
model based in preserving the status quo of the elite; it is not primarily concerned with 
                                                          
57 Ernesto Villegas, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 31st May 2012. 
58 Douglas Bolívar, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 1st June 2012. 
59 Tania de García, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 10th April 2012.  
60 Alexis Colina, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 4th January 2014. 
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ending the exploitation of workers and the impoverished.   
 
This radical process of popular empowerment and social transformation, according to 
the views of most of the pro-government media professionals interviewed, should be led 
by Hugo Chávez. They argue that he has spearheaded a movement of social inclusion 
and alleviation of poverty, and that he possesses a unique capacity to connect with and 
express “the will of the people”. Both his personal and political traits place Chávez as a 
leader who, according to Rafael Caraballo61 – head of programming at communitarian 
outlet Radio Tiuna –, goes “well beyond the traditional canons of a President”. A 
majority of pro-government interviewees agree with Caraballo’s formulation that the 
President has a “unique connection with the people”, and that the latter expect him to 
be their leader in the country’s political and social transformation.  
 
6.1.2. Liberal critiques to Chávez’s political project 
 
Teodoro Petkoff62, a former guerrillero turned moderate-left-wing political leader and 
Editor-in-Chief of daily TalCual, contends that Chávez’s “hyper-leadership” has 
gradually turned into an autocracy of sorts. “There is nothing very democratic about a 
political project that tries to tie up all aspects of the national political life around 
Chávez’s persona,” says Petkoff. Political reporter Hernán Lugo-Galicia63, who works at 
daily El Nacional, argues that the manner in which the President’s words and actions 
permeate all spheres of the political and social life, particularly among his followers, is 
not genuinely democratic because it offers no space for plural and open debate.  
 
After 2007, according to Petkoff, it became clear that Chávez’s political project relied 
entirely on his personal leadership: “All political and economic policies have been 
increasingly gravitating around Chávez. It’s he who decides everything”. Similarly, 
former left-wing party leader and dissident columnist Américo Martín64, argues that 
Chávez has, mainly through the media, kept repeating that his “socialist project” 
depends exclusively on his leadership and continuously emphasising that this should 
not be questioned.  
 
Eighteen of the interviewees that work in private pro-opposition media argue that a key 
trait of democracy should be to nurture open political debate and deliberation, within a 
                                                          
61 Rafael Caraballo, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 27th December 2013. 
62 Teodoro Petkoff, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 6th April and 4th June 2012. 
63 Hernán Lugo-Galicia, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 27th March 2012. 
64 Américo Martín, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 10th April 2012. 
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context of freedom and diversity. Lugo-Galicia claims that debate has been restricted 
under Chávez. Not that there is no freedom of expression, he argues, but its quality has 
been “diminishing dramatically”, particularly because of the “intimidation and bullying” 
critics of Chávez suffer from the government and its followers. Petkoff and Martín argue 
that under the Chávez administration there have been limitations to freedom, yet some 
spaces have remained open for the opposition to express their political and economic 
ideas, as well as their critiques. 
 
Taisa Medina65, Information Editor at daily El Universal, has a more trenchant view: 
“Chávez’s political process is not a democracy – end of story”. According to her, the 
President has imposed an autocracy, curbing human rights and limiting basic freedoms. 
“He has turned the notion of ‘the people’, in a strident populist discourse, to signify his 
own persona – for him they are one and the same thing, and this cannot be called a 
true democracy.” 
 
Seventeen professional journalists and editors interviewed disagree with the definition 
of the Chávez regime as a socialist democracy or as plainly “socialist”, yet most 
concede that it entails socialist elements. “Even though Chávez’s rhetoric is radical in 
its confrontational tone, his regime is neither truly socialist nor truly revolutionary,” says 
Petkoff. Though he considers that Chávez’s government has introduced political 
changes in Venezuelan society, he emphasises that these do not hold a profound 
revolutionary nature; nor have revolutionary changes taken place. Journalist Ewald 
Scharfenberg66, who was Director of Media NGO Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (Ipys)67 
during the 2000s, argues, in a similar tenor to that of Petkoff and Martín, that in 
Venezuela as of 2002, there has existed a formal pseudo-institutional structure but 
there has been no real separation of powers. “The estate, the legislative power, the 
judiciary power and so on are all dominated by one person: Hugo Chávez,” says 
Scharfenberg.  
 
Like most interviewees who have taken a critical stand towards the Chávez 
administration, Moraima Guanipa68 – media professor at Central University of 
Venezuela (UCV) – believes that democracy should rely on the strength and 
independence of institutions, fairly-elected politicians, robust political parties, and 
                                                          
65 Taisa Medina, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 26th May 2012.   
66 Ewald Scharfenberg, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 11th April 2012.  
67 Instituto Prensa y Sociedad Venezuela (Ipys) is a non-government organisation working in 
defending rights for journalists and freedom of expression. It was founded in Caracas in 2002.  
68 Moraima Guanipa, interview by author, 2nd July 2013. (Telephone interview). 
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freedom to check on the government and to dissent. Alonso Moleiro69, political reporter 
in El Nacional during the early-2000s before joining the Unión Radio network, argues 
that the Chávez government has weakened institutional and multi-party democracy. 
“We have a president who, early on, decided to strengthen conflict because he believes 
that political pacts and political concessions is something that belongs to the bourgeois, 
whereas conflict is revolutionary,” he argues. Similarly, Pedro Pablo Peñaloza70, 
presenter with Globovisión TV and political reporter in El Universal, says that Chávez’s 
is a “dogmatic government which accepts no critiques”, and that “the government party 
(Venezuelan United Socialist Party, PSUV) and its policies are determined by whatever 
the leader says.” 
 
Marcelino Bisbal71, media professor and analyst at Andrés Bello University, claims that 
Chávez’s political project cannot be called a democracy, but nor is it anti-democratic. 
He defines its paradoxical and hybrid nature as that of “a mixed creature with strong 
populist and militarist elements, which have been part of the history of Latin America; 
riding under Chávez on a wave of pseudo-leftist, anti-neo-liberal rhetoric”. Petkoff, 
Martín, Moleiro and Bisbal argue that Chávez’s “populist” and “anti-liberal” rhetoric 
owes a lot to the Cuban leftist model led by Fidel and Raúl Castro, in which the state 
rules in the name of revolution.  
 
Martín, coinciding with eleven interviewees, also argues that Chávez’s political project 
belongs to the tradition of Latin American caudillos. He finds a paradox in Chávez 
“claiming to be a democratic and radical socialist, when truly he is a typical Latin 
American caudillo”. Yet, Petkoff claims that although Chávez leads a militarist and 
authoritarian regime, with some traits of caudillismo, he does not belong to the Latin 
American tradition of military dictatorships of the twentieth century. Even though the 
President has gradually broken down traditional norms of political coexistence, 
promoted the belief in a personal leadership and an unwillingness to negotiate politically 
with the political opposition, according to both Petkoff and Moleiro, he has not been 
inspired by the dictatorships that ruled most of South America between the 1960s and 
1980s. 
 
Chávez’s hybrid political project has both socialist and neo-liberal elements, according 
to Martín, Moleiro and Petkoff. They hold the view that Chávez has maintained an anti-
                                                          
69 Alonso Moleiro, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 8th June 2012.  
70 Pedro Pablo Peñaloza, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 24th and 26th May 2012. 
71 Marcelino Bisbal, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 3rd and 4th April 2012.  
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liberal rhetoric, and has made alliances with anti-liberal regimes such as the Cuban, 
Iranian, Belarusian, among others; but that the “rentist way in which he has managed 
the oil industry and the reliance on oil money, especially with the U.S. as its main 
energy-trading partner, is one example of a capitalist-modelled economic plan,” argues 
Martín.  
 
Journalist Hugo Prieto72, who has worked as political reporter at El Nacional and at 
Últimas Noticias, argues that the Left-Right political framework when assessing 
Chávez’s democratic credentials is not too relevant. Similarly, Guanipa argues that 
“Chávez’s political model is a complex new thing in which, through his own hyper-
leadership, the President has tried to impose a hegemonic plan that has not been fully 
assimilated and understood – not even within Chavismo.” 
 
According to Prieto, Chávez benefited from the fact that previous governments in 
Venezuela had overlooked key democratic aspects such as promotion of equality and 
inclusion, plural political participation, and social responsibility. Rafael Uzcátegui73, 
coordinator at Provea74 and co-founder of anarchist newspaper Libertario, describes the 
old puntofijista political system as “decaying, clientelist, corrupt and unwilling to address 
effectively the basic concerns of the majority of the population – the poor”. Under 
Chávez’s rule these social sectors have been, in Prieto’s words, “empowered by the 
regime, even if they are still in a state of poverty. They have a President who talks to 
them and about them, and this is a major gain.” 
 
6.1.3. Hyper-polarisation and democracy 
 
Uzcátegui and Prieto, albeit being critical of many aspects of Chávez and his policies, 
separately argue that the disenfranchised under the Chávez’s administration feel much 
more visible, valued and dignified than before; and that such a major shift in their 
political empowerment and representation constitutes a democratic feature. The 
discourse of Chávez has also brought forth the novelty of hyper-politicisation among the 
poorer sectors, according to the majority of interviewees. And what seems apparent, 
argue Guanipa and Prieto, is that hyper-politicisation has been deliberately promoted by 
the government in order to be able to impose a specific political model. If many 
                                                          
72 Hugo Prieto, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 6th June 2012 and 23rd December 2013. 
73 Rafael Uzcátegui, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th December 2013. 
74 Provea (Programa Venezolano de Educación y Acción en Derechos Humanos) is a non-
government organisation, which operates in the defence of human rights, workers’ rights and 
assistance to grass roots movements. It was founded in Caracas in 1988.          
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professionals such as Clodovaldo and Marco Hernández, Villegas, and Chacín consider 
such hyper-politicisation as positive for democratic advancement; others – like Bisbal, 
Guanipa, Lugo-Galicia and Medina – consider that it has also had negative 
consequences: the emergence of a divided and polarised society and the 
impoverishment of democratic debate.  
 
Just as the understanding of democracy and its values proves to be varied among 
interviewees, so are the reflections of these about the nature of the media in a 
democracy and the way they interpret their own professional roles as media 
practitioners and commentators within Venezuelan society. For this study, assessing 
the intersection of democratic practice and journalistic values through the perspective of 
media-related workers in Venezuela is of uppermost importance. The above-mentioned 
aspects – central to this research – are covered throughout the following thematic 
threads in more depth.    
 
6.2. Polarisation and journalism as political struggle 
 
The high levels of politicisation have defined a most significant character of Venezuelan 
society under the Chávez administration (Bisbal 2009, Petkoff 2010, Lozada 2011). The 
traits and dynamics of such politicisation within a social framework of political conflict 
have been defining a new form of intense polarisation in the nation (Ibid). Social and 
political polarisation within a national context tends to represent a crisis of democratic 
values such as plurality, inclusiveness, deliberation and public security; and its negative 
effects can permeate “all the vital spaces of every person” (Diez 2011: 60).  
 
This part of the research charts perceptions and opinions of journalists and of media-
related professionals in relation to the way journalistic practice in Venezuela has 
become politicised, through which mechanisms, and to what degree. In attempting to 
characterise such politicisation and its effects, the interviewees offered some relevant 
insights regarding the role the media have played in reflecting polarisation and 
intensifying it. Various scholars and commentators have argued that, in Venezuela, 
polarisation can be understood by looking at its news media (Bisbal 2009). Through the 
views of its practitioners one may be able to comprehend how the media operate at the 
centre of a politically-polarised confrontation, and how journalists and editors have been 
working in such a contested environment during the Chávez era.   
 
All interviewees believe that political polarisation has increased markedly in the 
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Venezuelan media during the 2000s. A notable majority of the journalists and media-
related professionals interpret polarisation as a negative circumstance, one which tends 
to represent an obstacle for democratic exchange and inclusive conflict solutions within 
society. Journalist Felipe Saldivia75, Editorial Advisor for daily Ciudad Caracas and 
reporter at El Universal until 2002, considers that the diversity of voices is an 
indispensable democratic component, and that “extreme political polarisation and 
confrontation in Venezuela has been weakening the dynamics of democracy”. 
According to Petkoff, polarisation in Venezuela “relies on that harmful friend-enemy 
equation, and hardly offers space for rational and moderate views, while closing down 
dialogue and civic debate”. Víctor Hugo Febres76, journalist at RCTV and Televén 
television networks during the early-2000s and co-founder of Los del Medio group77, 
argues that polarisation exacerbates “conflict, intolerance, exclusion, social and political 
violence – all anti-democratic features.”   
 
6.2.1. Dynamics and strategies of media polarisation: pro-opposition views 
 
Thirty-three of the professionals interviewed contend that journalistic practice has, since 
1998, become increasingly polarised and militant. Bisbal argues that political and 
ideological struggle found a “new space” in the Venezuelan media, which “ended up 
changing the identity of the media landscape in the country and the role of news and of 
journalists”. He suggests that the news media during the Chávez era has become 
characterised by “the dominant elaboration and consumption of information and 
counter-information, propaganda and manipulated news, underpinned within a frame of 
polarised and polarising views at previously unknown levels.”  
 
Yet, the intensity and types of polarisation, most of the interviewees argue, have varied 
throughout the 2000s. In this sense, Xabier Coscojuela78, Deputy Editor at daily 
TalCual, arguably condenses the views of many – particularly of those journalists of 
moderate pro-opposition leanings – and offers a pertinent descriptive account of the 
different “stages” of political polarisation in the news media during the period studied.  
 
In Coscojuela’s opinion, it is important to consider that during the 1980s and 1990s 
there was some level of polarisation within Venezuelan society. During these two 
                                                          
75 Felipe Saldivia, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 25th March 2012.  
76 Víctor Hugo Febres, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th May 2012. 
77 Los del Medio is a group of journalists of different political and ideological leanings, who joined 
efforts to discuss political and professional issues as a consequence of the 2002 national crisis. 
78 Xabier Coscojuela, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 30th May 2012. 
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decades successive governments promoted a predominantly neo-liberal economic and 
political agenda and reduced social assistance, generating discontent among the 
popular sectors. The media played a crucial role in attacking political parties at the time, 
as argued by eight interviewees. Díaz Rangel argues that polarisation within the media, 
although significantly exacerbated during Chávez’s rule, is by no means new in 
Venezuela. “Political polarisation has historical roots – it suffices to analyse our press 
during the nineteenth and twentieth century and find that at various stages they were 
radically partisan and polarised,” explains Díaz Rangel. 
 
Coscojuela argues that “from the 1980s and during the 1990s Venezuelan private 
media played anti-politics, they began to promote a polarisation between the political 
class and the people”. “Soon enough the media realised the mistake they had made”, 
he says. During his 1998 presidential campaign, Chávez capitalised on this negative 
perception of traditional party politics.  
 
Guanipa, Medina, Petkoff and Cristina Marcano79, who worked as Politics Editor at El 
Nacional, express that as soon as he became president, Chávez overtly attempted to 
divide the country between “friends” and “enemies”. They argue that, during the 
beginning of his rule, Chávez was the most visible element in promoting an antagonistic 
scheme through a discourse that clearly defined two blocs of opposing ideological and 
political projects: “the people” versus “the oligarchy”.  
 
Between 1999 and 2006, according to Coscojuela, polarisation was reshaped as the 
private, pro-opposition media played a very active political role. Most of the private 
media began to discourage any intention of dialogue with the government. The pro-
opposition media felt, as argued by Coscojuela and Zerpa80 – investigative journalist at 
El Nacional –, that they could play the role of political parties and become defining 
elements in what seemed a symmetrical struggle for power between Chavismo and the 
opposition.  
 
Most journalists working in private, pro-opposition media agree that the most 
confrontational and politicised anti-Chávez positions within the media appeared during 
2002 and 2003. This became evident in the way that the most influential private media 
mishandled information and displayed a strong anti-government bias during their 
coverage of the April 2002 coup d’état, and of the general strike between December 
                                                          
79 Cristina Marcano, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 7th June 2012. 
80 Fabiola Zerpa, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 10th and 11th April 2012.  
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2002 and February 2003. Coscojuela, Febres, Moleiro and María Alejandra López81 – 
who worked as a journalist and then as manager at Unión Radio network – observe that 
the private pro-opposition media showed their most radical political facet during the 
coverage of those events. They argue that the actions of these news organisations 
were mistaken, and were also harmful for democracy.  
 
The way most of the private and pro-opposition media operated in their news coverage 
of the opposition-led anti-Chávez actions during 2002 and early 2003 was refuted by 
the majority of the population, and it became patent very soon that beliefs of credibility 
towards the media declined significantly. This is the shared view of the majority of 
interviewees. Yet, in the opinion of most of the private-media journalists interviewed, 
many private media organisations after 2003 shifted to a more normative role, albeit still 
maintaining their political tendencies. “They realised they should not continue trying to 
replace political parties and being so radically biased,” says Lisseth Boon82, 
investigative journalist with El Mundo and Últimas Noticias dailies; while Zerpa argues 
that most of the pro-opposition media “restored a more balanced and less strident role, 
and this has to do with the relative strengthening of the political opposition of a more 
moderate leaning during the second half of the decade”. According to Boon and Aliana 
González83, who in 2000 worked as Community Editor at TalCual and El Universal 
before joining El Nacional as Information Editor, the intention to recover normative 
journalistic proceedings was more evident among journalists at the time than it was 
among some media owners.  
  
Coscojuela, Guanipa and Marcano argue that in 2007, when the more moderate 
opposition leaders gained control of the main parties rivalling the President, it became 
evident that Chávez resolved to strategically intensify polarisation for political purposes. 
If the government had been following a policy of confrontation before, once Chávez won 
re-elections in December 2006, it “manifestly became less tolerant of any type of 
criticism in the media,” says Coscojuela. Most pro-opposition interviewees agree with 
the view that “the President and the regime since then tried to systematically humiliate 
journalists or critics,” as argued by Juan Antonio Alonso84, tribunals and courts reporter 
with El Universal.  
 
                                                          
81 María Alejandra López, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th December 2013. 
82 Lisseth Boon, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 7th April 2012. 
83 Aliana González, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 27th March 2012. 
84 Juan Francisco Alonso, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 24th May 2012. 
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The vast majority of pro-opposition media journalists and editors share the view that the 
main promoter of political polarisation during the second half of the 2000s was the 
President, while the most visible opposition leaders and private news media had shifted 
to a less confrontational tone. Martín says that “Chávez has been very effective in 
increasingly stimulating and provoking polarisation – it’s his best way to win elections by 
turning them into a plebiscite of sorts.”  
 
During the second half of the Chávez era, in Coscojuela’s assessment, the state and 
officialist media began closing down almost all access to critics of the President. Within 
that same period of time, as formulated by Alonso, it became very rare for government-
affiliated or officialist columnists to write in pro-opposition media outlets. During the first 
half of the 2000s it had been common for some pro-Chávez commentators to write in 
the critical, private press or to appear in critical broadcasting media. But, as the 
government “raised its level of aggressive rhetoric, its sympathisers in the media 
became even more radical,” argues Diana Carolina Ruiz85, reporter and programme 
host at Globovisión TV. 
 
Moleiro believes that the “aggressiveness” of the state media towards critics has been 
so intense and systematic – particularly during the second half of the 2000s – that he 
sometimes justifies the use of news in critical media as a means to openly confront the 
government. Javier Mayorca86, reporter of military affairs and crime with El Nacional, 
argues that “in a regime that has become as sordid and autocratic as Chávez’s, 
independent news media should use their agendas to uncover and denounce the 
regime’s manipulation and corruption.”  
 
Bisbal, Guanipa and Petkoff argue, in a similar manner, that Chávez and the state 
media seek to exacerbate polarisation and in doing so impose a hegemonic 
communication and information supremacy on all Venezuelan society. “In order to 
achieve supremacy in power, the regime seeks to annihilate all its political rivals, all its 
media critics,” says Petkoff.  Part of this process, according to Bisbal, consists of 
“neutralising or coercing the media that the government sees as critical or potentially 
critical”87. These views are shared by the majority of the pro-opposition interviewees.  
                                                          
85 Diana Carolina Ruiz, interview by author, 4th July 2013. (Telephone interview). 
86 Javier Mayorca, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th May 2012.  
87 Marcelino Bisbal exemplifies “silencing” or “coercion” of some private news outlets by the regime 
with the cases of broadcasting networks Venevisión TV and Unión Radio. These were outlets that 
were quite oppositional during the early years of Chávez’s first term in office. He explains that 
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6.2.2. Binary schemes in news, binary audiences 
 
According to eighteen interviewees, the scheme whereby opinion programmes have 
one pro-government presenter alongside an oppositional one has become much more 
common during the second half of the Chávez era. This binary scheme of presenting 
opinion and news stresses the environment of polarisation, as argued by Marcano. 
However, Globovisión TV, which is the most fervent pro-opposition broadcast media 
according to the vast majority of interviewees, “rarely has government officials and 
spokespersons in its opinion and interview programmes’ people – they dare not go 
there,” says Ruiz.  
 
Similarly, state television network VTV hardly broadcasts anti-government 
spokespersons or critics in its programmes. VTV and Globovisión TV, most 
interviewees concur, represent the two most radically polarised broadcast outlets of 
national impact in Venezuela, each in an opposite extreme of the spectrum of political 
and ideological polarisation. Ismael Bravo88, news reporter with RCTV until its closure in 
2007, argues that “it is also noteworthy pointing out that Globovisión, since the mid-
2000s, has been the only television station left with a critical stance and a certain 
watchdog role towards the government, but does not have nationwide coverage”. 
Similarly, in the opinion of Víctor Amaya89 – who worked as news producer at Unión 
Radio and afterwards as Politics editor in TalCual – it is “revealing” the way a “highly-
polarised radio station like YVKE Mundial has radicalised its pro-Chávez position 
throughout the decade; whereas private-owned Unión Radio, had to neutralise its pro-
opposition tendency after 2006 – this has been the trend in Venezuela’s broadcast 
media.” 
 
By most accounts of pro-opposition journalists and editors, in private television and 
radio outlets political opinion has been decreasing – particularly the type that 
denounces government actions and policies. This, according to Bisbal and Moleiro, is a 
partial consequence of the media owners’ reaction to the implementation of 
telecommunication laws by the government, directed primarily at the broadcast media. 
The press are less affected by these new regulations, and have arguably been “allowed 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sacrificing the critical stance it once had towards Chávez while Unión Radio, which had been pro-
opposition in its news and opinion content, was coerced by the government as of 2006 to introduce 
pro-regime presenters in its programming.” 
88 Isnardo Bravo, interview by author, 6th July 2013. (Telephone interview). 
89 Víctor Amaya, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th May 2012. 
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more freedom and less coercion, so we have seen that the most critical voices and 
news of denunciation are to be found in the printed media,” explains Amaya.  
 
Prieto believes that most journalists have fallen into “the trap” of polarisation which has 
been principally promoted by the government, and followed by the opposition. He finds 
that the most noteworthy mechanism of such a “trap” has consisted in many media and 
journalists deciding to prioritise not the relevance of information but the fulfilment of 
their audiences’ expectations. “The accuracy and veracity of information lost relevance 
in relation to what the radicalised audiences wanted to see, read or hear. This had not 
happened in Venezuela before,” argues Prieto.  
 
During the Chávez era, in Prieto’s assessment, a tendency has grown among most 
journalists to seek information which allows them to confirm a specific point of view, that 
best represents the journalist’s political beliefs and, very importantly, that is aligned with 
those of his or her audience. Boon, Febres, Medina and Uzcátegui express sharing this 
view.  
 
In the described polarised environment, in which many journalists are more concerned 
about their audiences than in the nature and quality of news, information “can be 
reduced to a lifeless merchandise,” argues Prieto. The majority of journalists in 
Venezuela, according to him, have become convinced that they should only respond to 
an audience, and in doing so they have assumed an already-established view of reality 
– be it ideological, political or economic. These types of concessions towards an 
audience, in the opinion of Febres and Prieto, affect negatively the journalistic 
profession, and society at large. 
 
For those media professionals who do not identify themselves with either Chávez’s 
political programme or with that of the opposition parties, it has become increasingly 
difficult to find a receptive audience, according to Uzcátegui. Prieto claims that he 
belongs to a minority of journalists who have “not fallen into that dynamic of extreme 
polarisation” and that, although he has lost an important part of the readers or audience 
he previously had in the pre-Chávez era, he senses that it was his own non-polarised 
stance that allowed him “to have access to sources on both sides of the political 
spectrum”. Cases such as his are rare.  
 
Eighteen interviewees expressed the view that, during the 2000s, they witnessed a 
growing tendency of reporters interviewing sources that think alike and align with their 
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respective ideologies. This, they agree, was not evident in journalistic practice before 
2000. Such tendency reveals a journalistic position which “lacks depth, sense of 
contrast and debate: sometimes it even lacks ideas,” says Marcano. A troubling aspect 
of such tendency is that information and opinions emanating from news media outlets 
have become very predictable for the public, lacking contrasted representations of 
reality – this view is shared by Febres, Prieto, Uzcátegui and Villegas. 
 
6.2.3. Pro-government and Chavista perspectives on media polarisation 
 
Chacín argues that “an openly ideological media which addresses an equally overtly 
ideological audience is positive for journalism and society”. Saldivia agrees to a degree 
with Chacín’s opinion. He argues that for socialism to permeate Venezuelan society, a 
certain level of politicisation must be introduced and promoted by the state and by as 
many social agents as possible.  
 
However, as argued by Saldivia and Marco Hernández, political participation of the 
popular sectors and their politicisation has been combated by the traditional elites and 
by most of the private media, as has been the political project Chávez promotes. “It is in 
the interest of the political ultra-right wing for the people and for Chávez’s followers not 
to have a political voice; so the right-wing media has tried everything to discredit the 
President and his followers; but both the government and the people reacted to this, 
and this led to polarisation,” argues Saldivia. According to Jordan Rodríguez90, reporter 
with TeleSur TV after working with ANTV in the early 2000s, before Chávez rose to 
power “the media was an integral part of the ruling elite, but the President defied that in 
the name of socialism; the reaction of the private media was to confront him – this is 
how political polarisation started, back in 1999.” 
 
Díaz Rangel and Argelio Pérez91, Deputy Editor at daily Vea, argue that the private, pro-
opposition media have contributed more significantly to the highly-polarised climate 
than the state and pro-government media. Díaz Rangel argues that “most of the 
responsibility should fall on the oppositional media, because of the way these openly 
campaigned against the government as soon as Chávez took office”. Pérez explains 
that “because we promote a revolution and class struggle, the private sector or the right 
wing demonised us and said we caused the polarisation”. A majority of pro-government 
professionals interviewed agree with the above-mentioned opinions of Díaz Rangel, 
                                                          
90 Jordán Rodríguez, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 8th June 2012. 
91 Argelio Pérez, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 22nd May 2012. 
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Rodríguez and Pérez.   
 
According to Caballero and Ameliut Hernández92 – news reporter with VTV –, prior to 
2003 Chávez-sympathising journalists could work comfortably in any news media 
regardless of their political leanings. During the second half of the 2000s they believe, 
like Pérez and Villegas, that a pro-government journalist would not be allowed by 
private owners to work in a pro-opposition news organisation. “I don’t think that during 
the second-half of the 2000s there were news media outlets in the country that were not 
political, – maybe with the exception of a few television and radio stations – ; but in 
general, one finds only small variations of political leanings within our media,” says 
Hernán Canorea93, news reporter at Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV). 
 
Chacín argues that a news outlet “can only be honest towards its audience by clearly 
showing its ideological standing, and not by appearing to be supposedly neutral and by 
hiding its political nature”. She and Saldivia maintain that “socialist” and “truly 
democratic” media must be politicised, ideological and formative in terms of political 
discussion. Saldivia finds that, for example, Globovisión TV, albeit being “hysterically 
oppositional, pro-U.S., and recklessly biased towards the right-wing”, is carrying out “its 
own role in politicising – this is positive, even though I don’t agree at all with their 
ideological outlook”. He argues that this type of media content, from a revolutionary 
perspective, is “much preferable to outlets which essentially seek to stimulate 
consumerism, capitalistic values and alienation by means of frivolous content, such as 
the large television stations Venevisión and RCTV.”  
 
Nine journalists and editors working in pro-government media say that Chávez has led 
politicisation in the media as a means to get across his policies of popular participation 
and confront the opposition. “Chávez was the first leader to address media owners and 
reporters publicly, by their name, in his speeches, when he felt they were misguiding 
the people. He exposed their wrongdoings and obviously this did not go down well in 
the private right-wing media,” says Rodríguez. According to Villegas, as soon as the 
President “exposed the abuses and hidden agendas of the right-wing media, these 
intensified their adversarial character”. “Soon enough, particularly between 2000 and 
2003, it became an open media war,” explains Clodovaldo Hernández. 
 
                                                          
92 Ameliut Hernández, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 2nd June 2012. 
93 Hernán Canorea, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 4th June 2012. 
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During Chávez’s rule, Chacín argues, both “revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries” 
have been increasingly able “to overtly express their own ideology and from which 
standpoint each one looks at reality – now I can express the way I look at reality from 
my socialist perspective”. Bolívar says that, although politicisation in Venezuelan 
society reflects a “positive step”, such have been the high levels of polarisation, political 
conflict and animosity that it “seems necessary to promote a truce between all media in 
all sides of the political spectrum”. According to the majority of interviewees this might 
seem desirable, but not probable in the near future. Prieto argues that “polarisation, like 
Chavismo, is here to stay; for it has indeed acquired a historical character.” 
 
The foregoing thematic section has charted the opinions and perceptions of journalists, 
editors and media commentators in relation to the increasing tendency to hyper-
polarisation among Venezuelan media and its workers, and the impact this has been 
having on journalistic practice. It seems evident that the news media – and Venezuelan 
society – had not experienced such high levels of politicisation and ideological struggle 
during its twentieth century democratic period. The majority of interviewees – 
regardless of each one’s political tendencies – agree that, in general, the media in 
Venezuela not only have reflected political and ideological polarisation, but have 
promoted it. From the opinions expressed by journalists, it could be argued that most 
would endorse Bisbal’s formulation that the clash of doctrinal ideas in Venezuela 
between two very different national political projects – one Chávez-led, the other 
oppositional – have found in the media a “new space for militancy and confrontation”. 
Some journalists, on both sides of the ideological spectrum, express a desire to rise 
above hyper-polarisation, while adopting a more balanced and normative role as media 
professionals. However, another group – whose political standings are mainly premised 
on radical narratives, and who support Chávez’s government – view polarisation as 
positive within the media, because it allegedly galvanises social mobilisation and 
revolutionary ideals.  
 
6.3. Ownership, economic factors and ideological hegemony 
 
As explained in previous chapters, the configuration of media ownership is a key aspect 
– as stressed in the neo-Marxist tradition and in critical political economy – in the 
definition of information and communicational content produced by media organisations 
(Mosco 1996 and 2006, Mattelart and Mattelart 2005, Sparks 2007). News and opinion 
content in commercial and private media, under such critical perspectives, tends to curb 
representation of social diversity, restrict access to production, depoliticise the public, 
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and ultimately represent a tool for elitist dominance (Mosco 1996 and 2006, Bolaño 
1999).  
 
The largest and most influential media in Venezuela, as highlighted already, have been 
traditionally owned by family groups and local corporations (Bisbal 2009). During the 
twentieth century these have operated predominantly under a commercial framework, 
loosely adopting liberal-inspired values (Ibid, Díaz Rangel 2007). Yet, the wide majority 
of interviewees in the study expressed the view that, during the 2000s, important 
changes took place in the structure of media ownership.  
 
There is general consensus that prior to Chávez’s arrival to power there was limited 
possibility for public service and communitarian media to gain terrain and a larger share 
of the audience. Saldivia argues that the media had been operating in a “capitalist and 
oligarchic framework” during decades until the Chávez administration began “its 
struggle to change things around”. “The media here had been run by a group of 
families, and the prime-time audiences belonged to them – the share of people 
watching state television or listening to state radio was very small, but has grown under 
Chávez,” explains Revette. However, as expressed by Rodríguez, “the revolutionary 
media still need to grow much more, we are still far from having half of the national 
audience.”  
 
6.3.1. Pro-government outlook of media ownership 
 
According to Díaz Rangel, during the 1980s and 1990s the media in Venezuela became 
more powerful than in previous decades and played a stronger political role. Thirteen 
interviewees agree with Díaz Rangel’s view that during the early 1980s the media – 
particularly certain newspapers – intensified their politicised stance. At the time, most of 
the private-media owners aspired for national political activity to gravitate around the 
media, and not the other way around. “The Chávez administration inherited a media 
landscape in which news outlets had a lot of political and economic power,” says 
Rodríguez.  
 
Bolívar, Caballero, Chacín, and Saldivia are critical about the way the “elitist” 
concentration of the most influential media reflect and promote the political and 
economic interest of its owners, while reducing possibilities for the media to present and 
represent the diversity of many interest and minority groups, their opinions and a 
pluralistic portrayal of reality. Bolívar argues that part of Chávez’s early policies 
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consisted in “democratising” the media spectrum, strengthening the state media in 
order to “effectively offer the people the means to inform and debate through their own 
voices – this implied a revolutionary change.” 
 
Such a radical shift, by which the state would grow significantly in ownership of outlets 
while also stimulating community media, in the words of Marco Hernández, was not 
welcomed by the private media and the political opposition during Chávez’s first years 
in power, with very few exceptions. El Nacional, for example, which traditionally had 
been a left-wing or left-of-centre daily, like some other media, backed Chávez during his 
electoral campaign and his first months in office, but soon after “gave a right-wing turn,” 
according to Saldivia94.  
 
There is consensus among the interviewed journalists working in state media that 
during the 1990s clientelism between some members of government, business 
corporations and the owners of private media was deeply engrained. This dynamic, 
they argue, affected the functioning of the news media in a negative way because these 
interest groups would hardly check on the economic elite’s wrongdoings. Part of the 
Bolivarian process in relation to the media, they suggest, implied changing this 
situation.  
 
According to some interviewees, as soon as it became evident that Chávez was 
challenging the dominant family-owned or capitalist corporatist structure of the media 
during the early 2000s, most news outlet owners reinforced their journalistic advocacy 
approach. Some pro-Chávez interviewees defined the advocate, anti-government 
procedures of most of the private news organisations then as “media terrorism”. This 
type of “terrorism” has been, according to Pérez, a “Machiavellian” and “anti-ethical” 
reaction to the President’s “revolutionary plan” to turn the media into an instrument with 
which to stimulate community media and mobilise his followers. In the opinion of the 
majority of pro-government professionals, most of the private media set out to play an 
anti-Chávez agenda-setting role, criticising his actions and policies, promoting the idea 
of his ousting, and at times, as argued by De García, “depicting him as a Latin 
American Hitler.” 
 
                                                          
94 The Editor of El Nacional during 1998, Alfredo Peña, became member of Chávez’s first Cabinet. 
Similarly, Carmen Ramia, wife of the newspaper’s owner, Miguel Henrique Otero, became the first 
Minister of Information of the Chávez administration. This situation, however, lasted for less than six 
months. They then became strongly oppositional towards Chávez.  
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This confrontation, according to almost every interviewee, led to the break-up between 
the private media and the state. On April 11th 2002, a massive anti-Chávez street 
protest took place in Caracas. Protesters demanded the President step down from 
office, and Chávez surrendered after an influential faction of the military and some 
business leaders led a coup d’état. Almost all the private media carried out what 
became known, in the words of many pro-government interviewees, as a “media 
sabotage” followed by an “information blackout”. Villegas explains that after very tense 
days of confrontation between most of the private media and the state, during April 11th 
the main commercial television outlets decided to “illegally split the screen into two 
parts”. In one half they transmitted the obligatory official message from the President, in 
the other the oppositional march towards the Presidential palace. “It was evident that 
the private media owners were involved politically in the coup that followed,” says 
Villegas. The “information blackout” would last until April 13th, and was implemented “by 
its owners in clear orchestration with those that carried out the coup,” says Marco 
Hernández. “The events of April 2002 represent better than anything else the 
hegemonic struggle for power in our media,” says Rivette.  
 
6.3.2. The rise of hyper-politicised newsrooms 
 
Since the April 2002 coup d’état, the migration of media workers from one outlet to the 
other has been increasingly determined by the ideological affinity of journalists and 
owners. “After 2002 and 2003 it became very difficult for a pro-Chávez journalist to work 
in a pro-opposition media organisation,” says Díaz Rangel. “In earlier decades that had 
not been the case – newsrooms were ideologically mixed,” he adds. “After 2002, 
newsrooms in almost every media began to be less diverse in their ideological 
composition,” says Clodovaldo Hernández. De García, Bolívar and Marco Hernández 
argue that pro-government media are more likely to accept pro-opposition professionals 
working as reporters, than the reverse.  
 
Most journalists working in private media contradict the above formulations. Dissident 
journalists González, Mayorca and Medina argue that in the private-owned newspapers 
where they have worked there is no political or ideological discrimination in the 
newsroom. “We’ve learnt to live with political differences and, very importantly, most 
reporters are increasingly aware of the need for dialogue and diversity,” says González. 
In the private news media, as argued by Mayorca, the owners and editors “do not try to 
unify the political criteria of its journalists” and most of them operate in a “more 
independent and pro-democratic way than those in the Chavista media, which tend to 
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operate as instruments of state propaganda.”  
 
In the opinion of Uzcátegui, the officialist media are “essentially propaganda tools of the 
state”, while most of the communitarian or ‘alternative’ media are “not truly alternative, 
but rather artificial” and have “been gradually reduced to projects of the state”. Like 
sixteen other interviewees, Uzcátegui argues that the Chávez government has tried to 
“co-opt and appropriate” all notions of alternative media. “It is a paradox that the 
communitarian media claim to be ‘alternative’ and ‘independent’, when it is the opposite 
– the vast majority of them are allowed to operate as long as they only promote state 
policies,” says Coscojuela. 
 
6.3.3. Ideology and “newsroom migration” 
 
All pro-opposition journalists interviewed argue that newsroom constitution in private 
media has been during the 2000s more ideologically diverse than those of the state 
media. Yet, most agree that this type of diversity has been diminishing. “After the 2002 
coup and the 2003 general strike it became very difficult for Chavista reporters to work 
in any opposition media,” explains Moleiro, not because barriers were set by the owners 
or the organisation, but mainly because polarisation also brought forward a “newsroom 
migration”. Since then, according to Zerpa, a “new logic” began to operate in 
newsrooms, and it dictated that “if I’m a revolutionary then I should work in a 
revolutionary organisation, and if I’m pro-opposition then I should be working in a pro-
opposition outlet.”  
 
Díaz Rangel says that Últimas Noticias’ newsroom presents political diversity, but even 
so he admits that it is gradually becoming more homogeneous, like the rest of 
Venezuela’s news media, due to the dominant polarisation. The majority of the 
interviewees agree with the notion that newsrooms in general have become significantly 
more politically and ideologically homogenous than in previous decades. Most express 
that this is not desirable, but that it is an inevitable consequence of the broad social and 
political clash of ideas in Venezuela. Exceptions to this view, like those of Chacín and 
Pérez, do not find that a lack of ideological diversity within a news organisation – or 
within society for that matter – is negative for journalistic practice. “Within a revolution 
you want politically-conscious reporters who are fully engaged with the revolution,” 
argues Pérez.  
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6.3.4. The surge of state-owned and state-sponsored media 
 
April 2002 also became a defining moment in the strategic approach the government 
had maintained towards media ownership. According to Caballero, Clodovaldo 
Hernández and Rodríguez, after the efforts of most of the private media in supporting 
the ousting of Chávez the government realised it needed to further reinforce its media 
influence and ownership. “Chávez opted not to openly attack the traditional, 
oppositional media but to create a robust alternative media system,” says Clodovaldo 
Hernández. As someone who monitors closely Venezuela’s media landscape, he 
claims that between 2002 and 2010 communitarian media outlets grew from around ten 
to more than 300. “The state does not want to own media outlets, it wants to 
democratise them,” he argues. Saldivia contends that with the existence of a vigorous 
network of community media, Venezuelan society can have a more participatory role in 
the media while communitarian outlets “also serve as communication and information 
shields against the hegemony of the private media.” 
 
Even though the state owns or funds more media outlets than any previous government 
in the country’s history, Marco Hernández argues that it does not want to grow into a 
“media behemoth”. The state, in his view, has developed a policy for non-profit 
‘alternative’ media so that these can have an autonomous voice. “History in Latin 
America has taught us that it is important to have an autonomous media that can inform 
with independence from U.S. influence and capitalist forces,” he argues. In case there 
is a change of government, Bolívar, Canorea and Marco Hernández believe that 
communities throughout the country would be able to maintain their media spaces for 
debate, critique and dissidence.    
 
Bisbal is one of many critical voices assessing the Chávez-led process of launching 
over 300 communitarian media outlets. “The so-called ‘alternative’ or ‘communitarian’ 
media work essentially as information and communication instruments in favour of the 
state hegemony,” he expresses. In his view, not only does the state own more media 
outlets than ever before, but the vast majority of communitarian media are an integral 
part of the government’s political strategy – a phenomenon unseen before in the 
country. Similarly, Diana Lozano95 – reporter of legislation at El Nacional – argues that 
the state “not only has television outlets such as VTV, ANTV, Tves, TeleSur, Avila TV, 
Catia TV; it also has almost all of the so-called communitarian media to support its 
                                                          
95 Diana Lozano, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th May 2012.  
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political discourse.” 
 
Before the Chávez administration, according to many journalists, it was rare to find a 
community radio dedicated to broadcasting overtly advocacy journalism. This, by most 
accounts of pro-opposition interviewees, has changed drastically. Very importantly, 
public broadcasting, which has been traditionally controlled and run by the government, 
has been radically politicised. “These media, unfortunately, no longer play a normal role 
of public service”, argues Bisbal, but instead have increasingly grown into the “media 
apparatus of a state-communicator”. To exemplify this phenomenon, he highlights the 
growing state-ownership of television stations: “by 2010 the state owned seven 
television stations with national coverage, two of regional coverage and finances over 
30 communitarian pro-government television outlets, so the government has more than 
40 television stations in total”. The private sector, according to Bisbal, Bravo and López, 
owns 35 television stations, but most of these have been politically neutralised through 
government pressure. Similarly, Petkoff argues that the state has become a “media 
monster”, owning significantly more news outlets than any previous government, while 
promoting “communitarian media within a model similar to that of the ‘Soviets’ – all of 
which depended on the central political party”96.  
 
The majority of interviewees working in private media argue that the state media have, 
on the one hand, grown significantly during the Chávez administration and, on the 
other, promoted content that is almost exclusively aligned to what the President and his 
government dictate. According to Bravo, Guanipa, Mayorca and López, the Chávez 
administration has succeeded to a significant degree in its “hegemonic media and 
communicational strategy” – to use Bisbal’s terms. But, as seventeen interviewees point 
out, even though the government have a quantitative dominance in media ownership, 
the significant majority of the audience and readers consume mainly private-media 
information. “All existing surveys and data – even those of state institutions – show that 
over 85 per cent of Venezuelans prefer watching, listening or reading the private media, 
and not the content offered by the state media,” says Bisbal. This, he, Bravo and Ruiz 
argue is because, in general, private outlets are less propagandist in their pitch and 
offer content that is of better quality and more diverse in terms of genre or themes.  
 
Most pro-opposition interviewees believe that the state has become, since the second 
half of the 2000s, the principal owner and sponsor of the country’s broadcast media. 
                                                          
96 “Soviet” is here used to connote the supposedly locally-elected communal councils, through 
independent mechanisms, in the former Soviet Union.  
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There is consensus that the majority of the press is owned by large families or 
corporate groups. Most of the pro-government journalists interviewed defined the latter 
type of ownership as “oligarchic”. As explained by Canorea, Marco Hernández and 
Villegas, such oligarchy refers to a traditionally capitalist model of ownership, by which 
the owners seek to utilise the media as platforms for their political agendas. Yet, eight 
interviewees maintain that, given the significant shifts in the country’s media landscape 
and ownership, such a definition is not fit. “Only the government and its followers talk of 
an oligarchic media, but that is only a caricaturesque view of the media structure today; 
in reality it is Chávez’s government that has become oligarchic” says Prieto.  
 
Like Bisbal, Prieto argues that the Chávez government has tried to monopolise the 
media and that it has set forth a hegemonic agenda; “but not hegemonic in the strict 
sense Gramsci defined it, for Chávez imposes everything, and he does not believe in 
soft power but in decrees. This is evident in the way public-service content has been 
supplanted by state propaganda”. Many pro-opposition interviewees agree with the 
above formulation, while stressing that the Chávez administration has become the 
leading government of the Americas in media ownership.  
 
6.3.5. Effects of official regulations and state economic strategies on the media 
 
Two important aspects of Chávez’s “hegemonic” media strategy, as argued by nineteen 
interviewees, have been, on the one hand, the new legal framework the government 
introduced for the media and, on the other, the economic strains on the private sector 
imposed by a statist government. Scharfenberg explains that the Social Responsibility 
Law for Broadcasters (Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio, Televisión y Medios 
Electrónicos, or RESORTE) and the Telecommunications Law (Ley Orgánica de 
Telecomunicaciones), decreed in 2003 and 2010 respectively, have been a means for 
the government to further control ownership and content in the media. The RESORTE 
law, as explained by Lugo-Galicia and Scharfenberg, allows for a fast change of 
ownership, and the government has taken advantage of this97. 
 
Opinion is divided almost in a binary scheme among interviewees in relation to the 
political purpose of the media laws the Chávez administration established. Bisbal, Ruiz 
                                                          
97 According to Lugo-Galicia, an example of governmental capitalisation of new media laws in 
terms of state ownership and control over content was evident in Miranda State, once Chávez-
loyalist Diosdado Cabello became its governor in October 2004, and forced the acquisition of eight 
local private radio stations by the government. 
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and Scharfenberg argue that, before 2000, the private media worked with relatively little 
regulation, but since then have met an increasing number of laws that have a clear 
political purpose in undermining private ownership and dissident opinion. In contrast, 
Clodovaldo Hernández, Rodríguez and Stephanie Sartori98 – news reporter at VTV – 
argue that the set of new laws for media, particularly in broadcasting, is a means to 
change the traditional elitist ownership to a more democratic one, while also curbing the 
alleged destabilising efforts some private media have made against Chávez.  
   
Almost every interviewee expressed being aware of the way the news media in 
Venezuela, particularly the press, have been traditionally reliant on state financial 
support and patronage. “The economic base for the majority of the press has 
traditionally depended to a significant degree on state capital,” explains Moleiro. Under 
the Chávez administration, according to most pro-opposition journalists, the 
government began to withdraw all sponsorship from any news outlets that was critical 
or that was not predominantly pro-government in its news and opinion content. Most of 
these private news outlets – as argued by Bravo, Coscojuela and Lugo-Galicia– have 
suffered financial setbacks as they have lost all the state sponsorship and 
advertisements they once had. Yet, many of these news organisations, rather than 
shifting their news agenda towards a “neutral” or a pro-government one, or resorting to 
making any sort of political pact with the state, searched for new business models and 
financial strategies so as to remain operative and have relative independence in news 
production and opinion.  
 
El Nacional and TalCual, which in the views of the majority of journalists represent the 
most adversarial pro-opposition press, are two key examples of news outlets which 
have had to reduce significantly since 2000 the number of staff members and of 
newspaper pages because of financial constraints, mainly deriving from a significant 
drop in both private and state advertisement. Similarly, the two most vocal oppositional 
television networks – RCTV and Globovisión TV – suffered economic difficulties 
because of their critical stance towards the government. Additionally, Bisbal, Bravo and 
Ruiz argue that the official obligatory blanket broadcastings or cadenas have also been 
used by Chávez as a means to financially affect commercial media outlets, since these 
cannot transmit their planned programming and agreed advertisements. 
 
                                                          
98 Stephanie Sartori, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 2nd June 2012. 
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Lugo-Galicia and Laura Weffer99 – an investigative reporter with Últimas Noticias who 
worked in the early 2000s at El Nacional, TalCual, and Fe y Alegría radio station – 
explain that an additional obstacle for the growth and independence of the private news 
media has been the political instrumentalisation of currency-exchange control, import 
permits and price regulation by the government. “Chávez also tries to asphyxiate the 
private news media by restricting the acquisition of foreign currency, and in an economy 
that is heavily dependent on imports it becomes very hard to buy all sorts of equipment 
and products,” says Lugo-Galicia. “A lot of private radio stations, for example, have had 
to become more entertainment-driven and government-friendly in their content in order 
to be allowed to purchase dollars – everything has to be bought in U.S. dollars – so as 
to buy technical equipment,” explains López.  
 
In the view of over half of the interviewees, a significant part of the private media was 
undergoing important managerial changes during the early years of the Chávez 
administration. The new and younger owners proposed operational models which were 
arguably more commercial and less politicised for the outlets they acquired. This also 
implied that they originally sought to strengthen a more normative form of journalism, 
somewhat modelled, according to Saldivia, in the “traditional North American 
commercial practice”. However, as expressed by Bolívar, politicisation among 
Venezuelan society became so entrenched early on in the Chávez’s era, that the new 
proprietors were unable to escape from the emerging polarising scheme in the political 
environment. “Reality forced them to become political,” says Saldivia.   
 
In the preceding paragraphs, the theme explored has provided different views about the 
shift in media ownership under the Chávez administration, and the manner in which the 
state has significantly augmented the number of news outlets it owns and supports 
financially. Opinions can offer an almost binary reading in relation to the reasons for, 
and the character of, the Chávez-led strategy to increase and reinforce the media that 
are supportive to his political project and that echo his ideological messages. The 
composition of newsrooms has undergone significant transformation, generally guided 
by the political leanings of reporters, editors and owners.  
 
Very importantly, in the view of pro-Chávez interviewees the private, pro-opposition 
media still have a larger share of the audience/readers and aim to undermine the 
revolutionary process spearheaded by Chávez. Most pro-opposition journalists claim 
                                                          
99 Laura Weffer, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th May and 4th June 2012. 
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that, on the contrary, the state has sought to outweigh in number and quantity of 
production – by also using hundreds of communitarian media, which are predominantly 
of Chavista leanings – the private news outlets and dissident voices in the media. The 
latter have been facing new economic pressures and legal challenges from the 
governmental and judiciary bodies.  
 
The newly-established telecommunications regulations have had a negative impact in 
most of the private news media, according to pro-opposition interviewees, in curbing 
their critical agency. For pro-Chávez journalists, these new laws have allegedly 
promoted popular, participative democracy.  
 
6.4. Press freedom, censorship and legal challenges 
 
As explained in previous chapters, the ideals of freedom of the press and of freedom of 
expression are considered basic principles for the media to operate as a democratic 
force – this has been mainly stressed by western, liberal authors (Siebert 1963, O’Neill 
1990, Keane 1991, Curran 2002). According to many interviewees, limitations to 
freedom of expression, censorship and prior-censorship – critical obstacles for 
independent, fair, balanced, and professional journalism – have been present 
throughout media practice during the nation’s democratic era. However, many claim 
that under the Chávez administration significant shifts have occurred in Venezuelan 
media in relation to freedom of expression and of information, just as censorship and 
prior-censorship in news media have been increasingly experienced by many 
journalists.  
 
It should be noted than when interviewees were asked about freedom and censorship 
in Venezuela’s media, the vast majority of extended explanatory comments were 
offered by those who have been working in private media. Many said that this not only 
responded to their own experiences and to those of their close colleagues but that 
associations of professionals, civil society organisations and NGOs have reported that 
journalists in Venezuela have been facing restrictions and threats from the Chávez 
government and from some of its supporters100.  
                                                          
100 Some of the professional organisations and NGOs –as mentioned by critical journalists– that have 
denounced alleged threats to freedom of expression and harassment to journalists are Colegio 
Nacional de Periodistas (National Association of Journalists), Bloque de Prensa (Press Bloc), 
Sindicato de la Prensa (Press Workers Union), Cámara de la Industria de la Radiodifusión (Chamber 
of Broadcasting Industry), Amnesty International, Reporters without Borders, Provea, Ipys, Somos 
Radio and Espacio Público. Various NGOs that work on human rights issues or on freedom of 
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6.4.1. The rhetoric of violence, and aggressions towards journalists  
 
Boon, Bravo, González and Zerpa, who work in the private media, express the view that 
the state has been the main agent in attempting to curb freedom of information and in 
imposing censorship. They also argue that private media owners have hardly been 
responsible for censorship of reporters and news workers whereas the President and 
government officials have exerted actions and established policies in an attempt to 
suppress or weaken dissident news media.  
 
Uzcátegui, backing his opinions with data from local NGO Provea compiled in 2009-
2010, says that the majority of hostile actions against journalists have been generated 
by government officials and by Chávez’s sympathisers. Like many pro-opposition 
journalists and commentators, he argues that the President’s “violent rhetoric against 
the private media” has stimulated these actions. In his view, the government has been 
responsible for around 45 per cent of the cases of aggression against private-media 
journalists, while oppositional parties and its sympathisers account for 13 per cent of 
the cases of aggression against official and state media workers. Police and army 
agents have been responsible for approximately ten percent, and the Chávez’s own 
paramilitary forces for eight per cent. In around 20 per cent of the cases the aggressors 
have not been identified.  
 
“It is evident that it is primarily the state and the public powers that violate the principles 
of free information and of expression in the media,” argues Uzcátegui. Peñaloza says 
that in relation to attacks towards news media and journalists, during the decade nine 
per cent have been carried out against public and official media, and the rest – 91 per 
cent – has been against the private media. “The state openly and with total impunity 
promotes the aggression towards journalists of the critical media,” maintains Peñaloza.  
 
The majority of interviewees working in private media argue that, during the Chávez 
era, journalists and editors who have maintained critical postures towards the 
government have been the target of intimidation, aggression and assault by the 
government and its most radical followers. This was arguably summed up by Marcano: 
“In Venezuela there is a constant threat towards journalists, to one degree or another. 
One feels threatened in the streets by certain regime loyalists. There is a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
expression and protection of journalists have emerged during the second half of the 2000s.  
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confrontational and intimidating attitude towards journalists coming from the President 
and some regime officials.”    
 
This situation, according to Marcano and seventeen other media professionals, was not 
the case prior to Chávez’s arrival to power. There existed during the previous 
democratically-elected governments, they argue, some levels of threat and censorship 
exerted from the state, but allegedly never in Venezuela’s democratic history had 
journalists and private-media owners experienced such high levels of personal threat 
from the government and some of its supporters. “The President ‘legitimised’ a 
confrontational and violent behaviour towards the critical media through his discourse – 
some of his more radical followers have turned his verbal attacks on some journalists 
into physical ones,” argues Guanipa.  
 
Most dissident journalists agree that one of the ways in which the government has been 
trying to silence or intimidate critical journalists is through verbal and physical 
aggression. “Reporters had never felt less safe when reporting in the street than since 
Chávez took power and social confrontation began to increase,” says Mayorca. 
According to Weffer, before 2000 identifying oneself as a journalist was “something 
positive” and “people respected you”, but after that it “became almost a taboo, because 
some people see you as the bearer of a radical political position and are ready to insult 
you or harm you physically”. It has not been uncommon, argues Alonso, to find 
“Chávez’s sectarian loyalists attack workers of the private media even inside the news 
outlet’s buildings”. Like sixteen other interviewees, he says that he witnessed how state 
police and National Guard officers have been “illegally confiscating work-material and 
equipment from private media professionals, and have been preventing some 
journalists from carrying out their reporting.” 
 
The majority of private media workers interviewed offered examples of direct 
aggressions towards them, allegedly led by government supporters and approved by 
some of the government’s most influential officials. Ruiz explains how in 2009 “a group 
of armed radical Chavistas attacked the Globovisión’s headquarters and threw tear gas 
shells and explosives – it was not the first time the television station had suffered these 
violent attacks”. Peñaloza mentions that there have been more violent cases, such as 
with pro-opposition newspaper Qué Pasa, in the city of Maracaibo, where a hand-
grenade was thrown by pro-Chávez radicals and exploded in the interior of the building.  
 
Scharfenberg explains that since the 2002-2003 period there have been episodes in 
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which violence and threats towards journalists have been less evident. Yet, he says that 
data from the NGO Ipys shows that aggressions to news media increased towards the 
end of the decade. He believes that this is a “sombre consequence” of the Chávez 
administration’s “clear promotion of an open war” against all media “that are critical or 
are not aligned with its political doctrine, ignoring basic principles of human rights and 
the country’s Constitution”. Scharfenberg argues that “in this context of continuous 
threat and persecution it has become very difficult for journalists to carry out their work 
and be able to check on the state and the powerful – much harder than before”. All the 
reporters working in the private media that were interviewed agree with Scharfenberg’s 
above-mentioned observations.   
 
First-hand accounts of harassment, verbal and physical attacks, and death threats 
abound among private media journalists. An alarming sign, according to Alonso, 
Guanipa, Marcano, and Martín, is that most of society seems to have become used to 
media workers being threatened and harmed constantly by the state and its supporters. 
“This tragic situation brings to the foreground a violent and non-democratic facet of 
Chavismo”, says Weffer. Sixteen other interviewees mention that most of these cases 
of physical aggression, death threats, and intimidation towards journalists, as well as 
attacks on media installations, have been reported to various professional 
organisations, media workers’ unions, human-rights-related and media-related NGOs. 
According to these interviewees media workers and owners who have been victims of 
such violent behaviour, have for the most part not feared denouncing it to public 
institutions, as well as to NGOs and international organisations that deal with media 
issues and human rights.  
 
Local NGOs and international institutions have, in turn, compiled significant and 
detailed data, and have sought to assist the victims and denounce the injustice done, 
according to López, Lugo-Galicia and Scharfenberg. Yet, many journalists and some 
observers suggested that, although these denouncements have reached both local 
public institutions and international organisations like Amnesty International, Reporters 
Without Borders, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and 
Human Rights Watch, the Venezuelan government disregards these organisations’ 
reports and recommendations. “We cannot rely on public institutions – these are under 
Chávez, and lack any autonomy–, so we resort to local and international NGOs, multi-
state organisations and also to local journalists’ associations,” says Mayorca.  
 
Twenty-five journalists expressed the view that the levels of physical aggression 
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towards them have risen to such levels in the street that, since 2000, many had to start 
employing bullet-proof vests and gas masks while covering certain gatherings and 
protests. When asked if such levels of violence towards some journalists had in any 
way acted as a deterrent to reporting certain topics or visiting certain environments, 
González, López, and Weffer express that in a few occasions editors have requested 
journalists of their respective outlets not to cover certain events, like anti-opposition 
street demonstrations, because they can potentially be attacked and risk their lives. 
“The lives of our journalists are a priority, so we’ve had the moral obligation to tell them 
not to go to certain places where they might get harmed while reporting,” says Medina. 
The majority of private-media journalists explained that having to use bullet-proof vests 
was indeed an undesirable novelty, but that this did not deter them from covering 
events that could be considered risky.  
 
6.4.2. Media regulations, state communications policies, and censorship 
 
In the opinion of most interviewees working in private media, since 2001 the Chávez 
administration began to elaborate a broad legal framework which has allegedly 
presented restrictions to freedom of expression and of information. In their view, a key 
component of this supposedly restrictive framework has been the Social Responsibility 
Law for Radio and Television (Resorte). “The Resorte is really a law to control and 
restrict content, much more than for promoting social responsibility in the media,” 
argues Bisbal.   
 
Another set of laws that has brought about limitations for journalists – in the opinion of 
Bisbal and thirteen other interviewees – is the Penal Code. In its articles it is 
established that the President, government officials, members of the Supreme Court 
and other official representatives cannot be “disrespected” in the media and that their 
“honour” must be protected. Established in 2005, its implementation was followed by 
the Organic Law on Education, the Organic Law for the Protection of Children and 
Youngsters, the Organic Code of Military Justice, all of which have – according to 
Medina – “worked as instruments by which to restrict freedom in the media, and have 
been used arbitrarily against journalists and media owners”. In addition, the Organic 
Law against Organised Delinquency and Terrorism Financing has been set forth. In it, 
as expressed by Lozano and Zerpa, one of the notions of “terrorism” equates to 
“generating social commotion”. Mayorca says: “What exactly is ‘social commotion’? 
Well, in the regime’s interpretation it’s become any information that’s negative or 
antagonistic towards the government”. The set of laws are, in the opinion of the majority 
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of private media interviewees, elaborated in a very vague language, lending themselves 
to different interpretations. “The wording of these laws is purposely ample and vague, 
that way the government can use them discretionally, as it pleases,” argues Petkoff.     
 
According to most of the private media journalists and to media observers like Bisbal, 
Scharfenberg and Uzcátegui, this legal framework, elaborated by the Chávez 
Administration and with the National Telecommunications Commission (Conatel) as a 
governing body, has had the most significant impact in limiting, restricting and 
censoring journalists, while also being utilised to establish administrative punitive 
measures towards private media. López, Lozano and Uzcátegui point out that Conatel 
had been officially working first as part of the Ministry of Infrastructure and then as a 
direct dependency of Venezuela’s Vice-Presidency. This is not only non-democratic, 
argues Lozano, but violates the Organic Law of Telecommunications, because a 
regulatory body for media and telecommunications “ought to operate autonomously, 
within an institutional framework”. “This is yet another example of the non-existence of 
separation of public powers in Venezuela,” says López.  
 
A majority of dissident journalists agree with Prieto’s formulation that the legal 
framework has “certainly harmed freedom of expression and that Chávez’s government 
in many ways supervises the information agendas of certain private media”. The above-
mentioned group of journalists say that the type and intensity of “criminalisation of, and 
judiciary harassment towards, the media” – to use Moleiro’s expression – had not been 
previously experienced in Venezuela’s democratic history.  
 
Guanipa and Prieto argue that by means of this legal framework, Chávez’s government 
has been capable of selectively pressuring the private media politically or economically, 
or both. Most of the interviewees working in private media concur that the new 
regulations have presented more restrictions and limitations to the broadcast than the 
press and online mediums. In this sense and according to the same sources, private 
television outlets have suffered more than the radio ones. Bravo explains that when the 
government decided not to renew the broadcasting license of RCTV, in 2007, it sent an 
explicit message to other critical and pro-opposition media outlets. “If the government 
forced a media giant such as RCTV to end its transmissions, why would it not do the 
same with smaller critical outlets?,” argues López.  
 
Amaya, López and Ruiz argue that, since 2000, television and radio outlets have had to 
make adjustments to their news and opinion programming, as a consequence of the 
 
 
162 
 
increasingly discretionary use of the media legal framework by the government. “Critical 
opinion spaces have been reduced, and in private radio pro-Chávez journalists have 
been incorporated as hosts or regular commentators as a result of governmental 
pressure. Also, strongly oppositional figures have been dismissed,” says López. Like 
Amaya and Peñaloza, she argues that there is a “judicial void” whereby the government 
employs laws and regulations to revoke broadcasting licences, transmission 
frequencies, and sponsorship. “There are direct government pressures on private 
broadcast and, unlike in any previous governments, the war against critical media is 
direct and open,” says Ruiz. In the opinion of most workers of private news outlets such 
a ‘media war’ has been so far won by the government, particularly in the way critical 
voices have been forcibly reduced and partially silenced. 
 
6.4.3. Censorship, auto-regulation, and self-censorship: perceptions in the private 
media 
 
As recounted by Bravo and Petkoff, after 34 private and independent radio outlets were 
closed down in 2009 by official orders, self-censorship and prior-censorship became 
more evident in private broadcasting outlets. “Both owners and reporters began 
avoiding denouncing certain wrongdoings of the government and started replacing 
critical news with entertainment and ‘light’ content,” says López. Fifteen interviewees 
agree with these claims and concur that this situation has been more noticeable in 
television than in radio.  
 
During the second half of the 2000s the only television station to have maintained news 
coverage that checked on the government was Globovisión, according to the vast 
majority of journalists of the private media. “Being the only television station to cover 
some news that showed the government’s failings has had a high price for Globovisión: 
it has been penalised financially on many occasions and has a pending fine of nine 
million bolívares101,” explains Peñaloza. Ruiz argues that in official television the same 
rules do not seem to apply: “In (state-owned) VTV, hosts can swear all they want, but 
will never get fined for that; but if a Globovisión host does that, the authorities will make 
charges and fine the station.”  
 
A significant majority of pro-opposition interviewees are very critical of the way most 
private broadcast outlets have decided to curtail news content and previously-existing 
                                                          
101 At the time, in 2009, this amount represented approximately 925,000 GB Pounds.  
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critical stances. However, they explain that they and most of their colleagues are aware 
of the government pressure towards critical news organisations, and most find that 
there is “hardly a way out” – to use Peñaloza’s words – for the outlets but to stay on air 
by narrowing down critical news. According to twenty-two interviewees, most of these 
outlets and their journalists remain, at their core, pro-opposition and some find 
alternative spaces for advocacy or adversarial journalism and commenting in the press, 
blogs and social media.  
 
Even though the significant majority of private-media journalists do not agree with most 
of the content and wording of the media laws the Chávez administration installed, many 
argue that certain forms of journalistic auto-regulation should exist. It emanated from 
their opinions that many consider Venezuelan journalists should evaluate more carefully 
declarations and information that can potentially promote violence and radical 
confrontation, or that can lead to morally or physically harming a person, or cause 
unnecessary negative exposure of minors, or damage the well-being of sources that 
need to be protected, or negatively affect national security, among others aspects.  
 
Boon comments that the new legal framework and a sense of auto-regulation have 
stimulated among journalists in the private media a need “to watch their own backs and 
to be more professional when doing their work”. Zerpa concurs: “Many journalists in the 
private media have been forced to work extra carefully in part because of the new 
legislation, so in order to avoid sanctions by the authorities – which tend to be very 
arbitrary – we are taking great care of content, form and verification of data and 
sources”. Weffer argues that such an ‘effect’ is only visible in a reduced group of news 
media, and that it is the result of an effort set primarily by the journalist, which has 
permeated some part of the newsrooms and editorial boards. However, she says that 
during the Chávez era it has become more risky to report news which offer a negative 
portrayal of the government, so opinion pieces have grown significantly in detriment of 
news. The new media laws and aspects of the local journalistic culture seem to allow 
for a degree of dissident opinion in most of the private print media – much less so in 
private broadcast outlets –, but the news pieces in print are valued in a different light by 
regime authorities when compared to comments since the former are related to aspects 
of veracity and accuracy, according to Febres, Scharfenberg and Weffer. 
 
Judicial hostility towards dissent and critique in the private media became rife in the 
2000s, according to the majority of private media workers. Not only have media 
professionals been prosecuted and sanctioned in an alleged arbitrary manner, but this 
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situation represents a constant threat for journalistic practice, according to Alonso and 
Scharfenberg. “Most of these legal proceedings have been initiated by the government 
institutions, yet some have also been pursued by the private sector”, says 
Scharfenberg. Naturally, the majority of pro-opposition journalists consider that a direct 
effect of these judicial proceedings has been the strengthening of legal censorship and 
of self-censorship.  
 
According to Alonso, “even though it is true that no journalist has been imprisoned 
under the Chávez administration, it is no less true that never had so many journalists 
had to undergo such arbitrary trials”. He and Weffer explain that between 2002 and 
2009 there have been over 150 judicial actions against active journalists – the vast 
majority of whom have been investigated for informing or expressing news 
unfavourable to the government. Alonso, Guanipa and Lozano argue that legal hostility 
and trials against journalists augmented significantly since the Penal Code was 
reformed in 2005, and that this augmented sanctions for ‘disrespecting’ government 
officials while broadening the list of functionaries that could not be ‘disrespected’ – 
particularly members of the High Military Command.  
 
Boon and Zerpa argue that the possibility of certain private-media journalists being 
objects of unfair judicial manoeuvring has led many of them to change the way they had 
been carrying out news reporting and writing. “Now we can hardly write versions of 
anonymous and off-the-record sources, when elaborating denouncement that involves 
the government because of the new media laws,” says Boon. According to Lugo-
Galicia, this has turned watchdog news production into a more difficult craft, and there 
is growing fear among some journalists that cover potentially delicate government 
issues. Additionally, he says that journalists have “suffered emotionally and 
economically” from these arbitrary proceedings, “at times having to pay lawyers for 
months or years, their families suffering immensely – it is not surprising that the output 
of their work becomes less productive, they live in a situation of anxiety and fear”. 
Fourteen interviewees agree that these types of judicial actions against journalists have 
affected negatively their approach to news gathering and production, and argue that the 
government’s use of the new media regulations has been successful in diminishing 
certain critical voices in the media.  
 
6.4.4. Financial constraints and judicial limitations in the private media 
     
According to almost all private media professionals interviewed, another significant 
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impact the new media regulations have had in the private, pro-opposition media relates 
to the financial and administrative restrictions the former have imposed to the latter. 
They contend that Conatel, the Ministry of Communication and Information, and the 
National Integrated Service for the Administration of Customs and Taxes (Seniat) are 
the public institutions that most noticeably engage in financially and administratively 
sanctioning the critical, private media. These have allegedly worked together to 
penalise and bring about the closing down of critical private media. Eight journalists 
mentioned that arbitrary and discretionary measures have been carried out by Seniat to 
financially sanction or revoke the transmitting licence of some private media because of 
them making minor administration mistakes. Lozano explains that the financial 
penalisation is “outrageously disproportionate to the nature of the irregularities”, and 
that these proceedings “essentially target critical and dissident media”. The same group 
of journalists argue that the purpose of the fines is to intimidate owners and journalists 
of private critical media, as part of the broad government strategy. 
 
Also, as explained by Alonso, Bravo, López and Lozano, various private news outlets 
have been fined for containing advertisement that is considered offensive according to 
the newly-established media laws. There have been cases – particularly within the 
broadcasting spectrum – in which the news outlets have been fined “exaggerated 
amounts of money” for transmitting or printing advertisements “that the regime feels are 
critical towards or contrary to its political project,” argues Alonso.  
 
The above-mentioned administrative and financial proceedings have had a negative 
impact on journalistic practice, according to most interviewees working in private or pro-
opposition media. “These are measures that, on first impression, seem only destined to 
affect media owners, but they affect journalists significantly,” says Zerpa. Bisbal, Bravo, 
Medina and Scharfenberg point out that these arbitrary and restrictive mechanisms of 
penalisation have intensified censorship and self-censorship in news media. “When 
investigating cases that reflect failed government policies and actions, many reporters 
fear they could be prosecuted and the news organisation fined millions,” explains 
Bravo.  
Whereas Scharfenberg argues that, according to NGO Ipys, during the period 2009-
2010 reported cases of harassment and violence towards journalists and private media 
workers increased compared to any year since 2002, Uzcátegui maintains that, during 
2009 and 2010, fewer cases of harassment to journalists and violations to freedom of 
expression were reported to NGO Provea. Like Bisbal, Uzcátegui finds that this is not 
necessarily a healthy indicator for news media. The reduction of cases in the 2009-
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2010 period reported by journalists for abuses, threats and attacks as well as the 
diminution of legal and administrative proceedings against media – compared to 2004, 
2005 and 2006 – can be a consequence of the growing presence of self-censorship 
within the news media, argues Uzcátegui. “Media that presented critical views of the 
government have become scarce, particularly along the broadcast spectrum. It’s 
evidently a partial result of the restrictive character of the regime,” argues Coscojuela. 
Yet, Petkoff says that some news outlets have defied “the state bullying” by, for 
example, resorting to its collaborators and general public to “raise the money in order to 
pay a fine arbitrarily imposed by the government.” 
 
A majority of pro-opposition interviewees agreed that, even though there are significant 
limitations for journalists, many media workers of dissident views consider that political 
confrontation and hardship can help them find alternative ways to inform and to debate 
more creatively. Yet, there is consensus among private-media journalists that fear of 
the government’s actions and of its most fervent followers against them has become 
very entrenched, and self-regulating has gradually grown into selective self-censorship 
in much of the media. “For the private media, caution in journalistic practice under 
Chávez began to turn into fearing for their lives,” says López. Most of these journalists 
feel that attacks directed to them and their criminalisation by the Chávez administration 
might gain further strength overtime, and that its effects – particularly censorship and 
self-censorship – might increasingly restrict their journalistic practice. 
 
6.4.5. Aggressions towards journalists: opinions from the state/official media 
 
Among the majority of pro-government interviewees the dominant opinion is – as in the 
case of pro-opposition journalists – that violence towards journalists and media workers 
increased during the 2000s. However, according to their estimation these actions have 
not been primarily targeted to the private, dissident media. Rather, the prevailing 
opinion among pro-government media workers is that the verbal and physical 
aggressions, threats and assaults, have been the result of a highly-polarised political 
environment in which the opposition and its allied media have had much of the 
responsibility. Also, most of them concur that officialist and pro-government journalists 
have been objects of aggression in equal measure as private-media journalists.  
 
Rodríguez argues that members and sympathisers of oppositional political parties, and 
also some local police forces – mainly those in constituencies run by opposition leaders 
– have established a “strategy of apartheid” through which officialist reporters have 
 
 
167 
 
been harassed and excluded from most events organised by opposition forces. “Many 
journalists of the official media, especially of VTV, are systematically attacked by right-
wing mobs and by security personnel of opposition leaders,” explains Rodríguez. 
According to Caraballo and Colina, during the late-2000s such attacks spread to 
various communitarian radio outlets in the interior part of the country. 
 
According to Chacín, Marco Hernández and Sartori most of the denouncements of 
attacks, threats and intimidation to journalists are formulated by those working in the 
private media. They consider that this does not reflect the reality of the violence towards 
journalists but is, instead, part of a concerted strategy of media owners and the political 
opposition aimed at discrediting the government and its followers. “Because their media 
strategies haven’t been able to overthrow Chávez, they (journalists and owners of 
private media) resort to exaggerating or making up stories of attacks,” argues Sartori. 
“The government has not banned or sent to jail one single journalist – there is definitely 
freedom of expression in Venezuela, but the private media want freedom to conspire 
against the government,” says Chacín.  
 
Eight interviewees argued that the NGOs and international organisations to which the 
private media formulate being victims of attacks lack credibility and predominantly hold 
an “ultra-liberal or right-wing agenda” – to use Marco Hernández’s words. Five other 
journalists agree with this view. 
 
Most of the interviewees working in pro-government media argue that the time they felt 
most threatened while carrying out news-reporting was during 2002 and 2003, 
particularly when the April 2002 coup d’état took place, during its aftermath, and while 
the 2002-2003 general strike or “industrial sabotage” lasted. “The social and political 
confrontation was such then that many journalists who backed the revolutionary 
process feared for their lives,” says Canorea. Even though many pro-Chávez journalists 
argue that physical attacks towards officialist reporters by opposition forces had 
diminished since 2003, these were still present throughout the rest of the decade.   
 
6.4.6. Media regulations, censorship, self-censorship: pro-government views 
 
Most of the professionals working in state-owned media maintain that the new 
telecommunication laws were a necessary step in both pluralising the media spectrum 
and curbing the power of the private media. Very importantly, the majority of them 
argue that the legal framework for the media set forth by Chávez has not limited 
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freedom to inform nor prompted censorship or self-censorship. On the contrary, they 
argue that the Resorte law and the various reforms to legal Organic Codes have 
enhanced social responsibility and development for the country’s population, while 
offering a normative framework by which media and journalistic practice can be 
improved. 
 
Marco Hernández explains that the legal framework for media and telecommunications 
is part of a new inclusive communicational model, which seeks to democratise the 
media, broaden citizen participation and improve journalistic standards. “Before, 
journalists reported on what the media owners wanted; now these laws function as a 
counterbalance against the media oligopoly and allow the community to become active 
and critical in the media,” he argues. Caballero, Chacín, Pérez and Revette argue that 
the new laws have aligned journalistic standards with the nation’s interests and with 
those of its popular sectors, while also strengthening independent news production.  
 
None of the pro-government interviewees said that any of the new laws for the media 
have negatively affected their work, or set restrictions to their journalistic practice. 
“These sets of laws allow us journalists to be more critical and responsible about our 
work, but they do not censor us by any means,” argues Ameliut Hernández.  
 
The vast majority of journalists who work in pro-government media say that in their 
experience state censorship in the news outlets is non-existent. However, Clodovaldo 
Hernández, Rodríguez and Saldivia claim that, like in the pro-opposition media, they 
have known cases of censorship within the state media. “Certain news material has 
been omitted in my presence because it could jeopardise some revolutionary policies,” 
says Saldivia. Clodovaldo Hernández explains that he has not suffered restrictions or 
censorship while working in either pro-Chávez or opposition media, but that 
partisanship has “forced journalists and editors never to do the ‘other side’ a favour in 
news coverage”. In this sense, he argues, the predominant type of journalism that has 
emerged in Venezuela is similar to that which existed in the country during the 
nineteenth century – highly partisan. 
 
Although Saldivia says that there is evidence of censorship in both state and private 
media, he argues that the news project he helped built and works for – newspaper 
Ciudad Caracas – represents a good example of officialist-media journalists carrying 
out news coverage and checking on the government without any sort of censorship or 
 
 
169 
 
prior-censorship102. However, Ameliut Hernández and Sartori express that, as reporters 
of state-owned VTV, they would wish to rely less on an information agenda defined by 
the Ministry of Information, and to check on the public sector when it is of public 
interest.  
 
Even though a majority of pro-Chávez interviewees claim that there is no censorship or 
prior-censorship in state and pro-government media, many explain that self-censorship 
represents a different matter. In this sense, Saldivia says: “self-censorship is by 
definition an obscure and elusive term – it is difficult to establish if there is political and 
ideological self-censorship”. In Pérez’s view self-censorship in media is subjective and 
“varies according to the values of each person”. He was the only pro-government 
journalist among those interviewed that, when asked, admitted he had occasionally 
experienced self-censorship because he is “a political person and a political journalist, 
who is defending a revolutionary process – so defending the values of a revolution 
becomes a priority, and not criticising revolutionary officials,” argues Pérez.  
 
In conclusion, this theme highlights the increasing intimidation of, threats to, and attacks 
on, journalists during the 2000s in Venezuela. The violence experienced by reporters 
and media workers – a partial result of the country’s polarised social scheme – is 
considered a crucial limitation for free and independent journalistic practice. Many 
consider that President Chávez’s confrontational rhetoric towards the private media has 
fuelled the attacks carried out by some of his supporters on pro-opposition journalists. 
Yet, pro-government reporters have been victims of attacks from anti-Chávez groups. 
The general climate of violence towards much of the news outlets and their workers has 
been a key cause for censorship and self-censorship, in the opinion of most 
interviewees. The set of new media laws, prompted by the government, has also had a 
significant impact on the intensification of censorship, according to the majority of pro-
opposition interviewees.  
 
6.5. Gatekeeping, journalistic autonomy and ‘internal’ censorship 
 
Journalistic independence and autonomy are widely understood as guiding principles 
for the media to effectively contribute to plural civic debate and overall democratic 
practice (Keane 1991, Schudson 2003, McQuail 2005, Cañizalez 2009b and 2011, 
                                                          
102 Ciudad Caracas is, since its foundation in 2008, financed by the Mayor of Caracas’ Municipality 
of Libertador and member of government party PSUV, and who previously was Vice-President of 
Venezuela and Director of the Electoral body, CNE. 
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Waisbord 2013). Independence in news-media production is desirable for most 
practitioners irrespective of their political-ideological standings and occupational ideals, 
as can be gathered from this section of the study. Autonomy in journalistic practice can 
be evaluated by the manner and dynamics in decision-making within newsrooms, 
selection of news material or gatekeeping, influence of actors that are external to news 
organisations, levels of anti-normative pressures within the newsrooms, and general 
respect for journalistic sovereignty within reasonable parameters.  
 
6.5.1. News-production and gatekeeping in private outlets 
 
From the accounts of the majority of interviewees, in private news media a hierarchical 
and traditional pattern of decision-making in the selection of news material and in news-
making has been somewhat loosened during the 2000s in Venezuela compared to 
previous decades. However, in most cases of the private news media the owners and 
editors have been the main protagonists in defining the type of news agenda and 
general content. Yet, with the exception of four journalists, all of those interviewed who 
worked in private media concur that, during the 2000s, decision-making in news 
production and gatekeeping became more plural and participative, thus involving 
reporters and other media workers more actively than before.  
 
Moleiro argues that in “private broadcast media the news and opinion programmes are 
more closely supervised by the owners”, and that “broadcast reporters and 
commentators in private television, broadly speaking, have lost some autonomy in 
relation to the themes and topics they can critically talk about”. López explains that, 
although some private broadcast media have occasionally been biased while reporting 
on political issues, their professionals “are one step from silencing themselves” because 
of “pressure and coercion exerted by the government”. In the press, however, these 
pressures are – according to the majority of these interviewees – not as intense and 
print outlets have maintained, as a whole, a more critical and watchdog stance towards 
the government than most broadcast organisations. Most of these interviewees explain 
that this has contributed to the configuration of a less hierarchical dynamic when 
discussing gatekeeping, news-making and overall news production in the private press; 
but that political, ideological and managerial factors have been just as important in the 
recent shifts in newsroom decision-making. 
 
Weffer, who has worked in radio and in three of the country’s most influential 
newspapers, says that the relation between reporters and owners/editors when 
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determining what news are to be produced varies slightly from one private outlet to the 
other and that, in broad terms, in the private press reporters have gained some ground 
in terms of the influence their opinions have in defining specific news content. In this 
sense, González, who has also worked in three of Venezuela’s main print outlets, says 
that even in a daily such as El Universal, which is considered rather traditionalist, “there 
is active participation by most reporters, and the majority of news themes are proposed 
by them.” 
 
Nine interviewees working in private print media defined the nature of decision-making 
in relation to news production as “multidirectional”. This has also been the case in some 
private broadcast outlets, in which reporters, hosts and producers have been gaining a 
more active presence in news-production decisions – according to Bravo, López and 
Ruiz. 
 
Scharfenberg, López and Medina find that important attempts have been made by 
some leading private media to integrate more of the personnel working in a newsroom. 
There has also been a degree of multimedia convergence in most of the private media. 
“Sometimes newspaper sections competed against each other within the same outlet, 
rather than cooperating between themselves; but this has been gradually changing and 
there is growing integration among newsroom sections,” explains Scharfenberg. 
Similarly, in Weffer’s opinion, during the 2000s there has been a growing trend in the 
country’s news media by which the information sections have become more integrated 
between themselves, and convergence between different media platforms is sought by 
certain media owners and journalists. This, according to her, Moleiro, Ruiz and Zerpa 
has contributed to create a less vertical and hierarchical working dynamic within private 
news organisations.  
 
6.5.2. Journalistic autonomy and ‘internal’ censorship in the private media 
 
According to Díaz Rangel, there have been “progressive-minded” managerial changes 
in some private media, and newsrooms have generally allowed more participation, but 
only to a degree. In his view, although in various news outlets some gains have been 
made in achieving some participation from both journalists and readers, ultimately 
reporters have scant participation in gatekeeping, news-making and editorial decisions. 
He argues that mainstream media in Venezuela “hardly work as a democracy”, but that 
some advancement has been made “in turning news-production and gatekeeping into a 
more plural and participatory process”. Yet, according to him, “the last word in a 
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Venezuelan news outlet is still that of its (private) owner.” 
 
Coscojuela, Boon and Medina do not entirely agree with Díaz Rangel’s view. In their 
opinion some outlets have been able to work more independently than others, and it is 
precisely within these that reporters have had more autonomy and where discussion 
has been more dynamic between owners, editors and reporters. The size of the news 
outlet, in their opinion, plays a key part in this, as does the extent in which the news 
organisation is publicity-driven.  
 
The alleged lack of political diversity in media newsrooms is not what has determined at 
core the increasing autonomy among journalists, according to most interviewees 
working in the private sector. “In the private media, but especially in the press, reporters 
have been able to work, broadly speaking, with more autonomy than in the past 
decades,” says Marcano. According to Peñaloza there is a “good degree” of autonomy 
for journalists in most of the private press and the private broadcast stations. Zerpa 
claims that reporters who are “more proactive in news proposals and news production 
are those who demonstrate having more autonomy”. The opinions of Marcano, 
Peñaloza and Zerpa are echoed by fifteen other interviewees.  
 
In Petkoff’s view, the idea of professional autonomy is different between critical 
journalists and those that are pro-government. Referring to the state and officialist 
media he asks: “How can you have autonomy when you must always do whatever 
Chávez says?”. He argues that reporters in an independent newspaper “are heard by 
their colleagues and editors, and there is discussion about news-making”; whereas in 
the official media “they only hear what the government party says and transform it as 
news”. Discussing the private broadcast media, López and Ruiz say that reporters at 
both Unión Radio and Globovisión TV have felt that their autonomy is respected by the 
outlet’s directors, but is undermined by the lack of access they have to government 
sources and the harassment most journalists suffer from pro-government forces while 
reporting.  
 
Although a majority of journalists in the private media claim to work with significant 
levels of autonomy in the newsrooms, six of these mentioned having directly 
experienced some incidents of restrictions and censorship within the news institution, or 
as many of them define it: “internal” censorship. Lugo-Galicia offers the example of how 
a news story he wrote in 2004 about the parliamentary approval of bonuses for 
congress members was censored by editors of El Nacional. Mayorca uses the word 
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“punishment” when describing the consequences of having had strong disagreements 
with his then editors about a news story. “I had covered the military for years, but then I 
had professional differences with my editor; for that I was ‘punished’ by ceasing to be 
the section’s main reporter and having to cover crime stories,” says Mayorca.  
 
Bisbal, Moleiro, Scharfenberg and Weffer argue that most of the internally-produced 
restrictions and newsroom censorship in the private media tends to occur in the finance 
and economy news sections. This, according to Scharfenberg, was quite noticeable 
prior to Chávez’s arrival to power, and it has been prevalent in most of the private 
media. “There are still some vestiges of economic patronage between some sponsors 
and news outlets; and in most of the private media the largest patrons or advertisers 
are mainly banking and financial groups,” explains Weffer.  
 
Guanipa says that the private media heavily relies on the sponsorship of, and the 
advertisement spaces bought by, the banking and financial sectors and that, as a result, 
many outlets have experienced self-censorship or internal censorship when dealing 
with sensitive information about financial institutions, or indeed about corruption cases 
of those that sponsor a specific news outlet. “Before the arrival of Chávez, the private 
media relied to a significant degree on governmental advertisement, but not anymore; 
they depend more on private financial organisations – it’s a very difficult situation and 
some finance news-stories have been censored within newsrooms,” explains Bisbal.  
 
In smaller news outlets of the Venezuelan province, according to the majority of private 
media journalists, internal censorship in the economic and finance news sections is 
more common. Even though the private news media grew significantly in the 
Venezuelan province during the early 2000s, these have worked under increasing 
economic constraints, particularly because of their dependency on a reduced number of 
large sponsors, as argued by Bisbal, Guanipa and Ruiz.  
 
Some journalists working in private media explain that the state-owned and pro-
government media generally have less economic constraints than the private outlets – 
unless the latter are politically aligned with the government. This group of interviewees 
argues that these news outlets in their denouncements target the private financial 
sector, particularly if the owners of the businesses are sympathisers of the political 
opposition. Yet, according to these opinions, journalists working in the state, pro-
government and most of the communitarian media do not check on the government, 
and operate with less autonomy than the average reporter of a private outlet.  
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The relationship of most of the community media with the state is one of dependence 
and a significant degree of subordination, according to the majority of interviewees 
working in the private sector. Uzcátegui argues that the “journalistic conduction” of the 
community media is the same as that which prevails in traditional private media. “The 
relations between editors and journalists in state media are even more hierarchical than 
in the corporatist or family-run media; and a very similar vertical pattern is visible in 
communitarian media between the state and the community,” suggests Uzcátegui. 
Even though the Chávez administration has empowered community media and the 
amount of outlets of this nature are by far the largest in the country’s history, according 
to Amaya, these “lack autonomy, and if they don’t operate as para-state media they 
won’t survive.”   
  
6.5.3. News-production and autonomy in official and communitarian media 
 
The majority of pro-government journalists argue that participation in the gathering and 
production of news is encouraged in the news outlets they work at. Moreover, as 
Caraballo says, the communitarian media in particular aim to provide a platform for 
plural participation, in which both non-professional and professional reporters play an 
active role. Marco Hernández argues that the official or state-owned media must 
operate as a counterweight to the “neo-liberal and right-wing agenda” of the private 
media, and that communitarian media have organised themselves so as to provide “a 
voice for the disenfranchised”. In this sense, he and Sartori argue that those working in 
state-owned media are conscious of the need to offer the public a different view of 
reality to the one offered by the private and dissident media. Also, Colina argues that “in 
communitarian media journalists and participants have a great sense of autonomy and 
spontaneity.”  
 
Most pro-government interviewees argue that pro-opposition journalists work – with few 
exceptions – according to the interest of media owners, all of whom have a specific 
political agenda. Most of the former define this agenda as “bourgeois”, “right-wing”, 
“anti-revolutionary” and “pro-imperialist”. In their opinion, both the state-owned and the 
communitarian media have contributed to socialising the right to be informed. Yet, most 
of them argue that the working dynamics, the organisation of newsrooms, and decision-
making in news can be different between the state-owned media and the 
communitarian outlets.  
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Canorea, Rodríguez and Saldivia argue that, in official or state-owned media, working 
dynamics and relations among professionals of different positions is not too different to 
those of traditional private media. Clodovaldo Hernández and Bolívar also express that 
internal decision-making and news production, as well as interpersonal dynamics in the 
newsroom, is not very different between the private and the state or official media. 
Clodovaldo Hernández says that in both types of media – the state-owned and the 
private – the majority of workers are professionals who have graduated from similar 
schools of journalism and that, regardless of the type of ownership, newsroom 
dynamics have in general become more open and participative in the country when 
compared to previous decades.  
 
Chacín, Colina, Saldivia and Clodovaldo Hernández maintain that in pro-government, 
official, and community media there is a significantly higher percentage of workers 
directly linked to local communities. Information and news decisions “are taken keeping 
the communities and the revolutionary movement as priorities,” says Chacín. This 
“sense of responsibility towards the community”, as argued by Saldivia, has contributed 
in re-shaping to some degree the relations within certain newsrooms: many non-
professional media workers, in their role as members of a community, are “able to 
express their viewpoints and report events that directly affect them in the official and 
pro-government media”. As Revette explains:  “with the media dynamics set forth by the 
revolution, media professionals have become used to working with reporters that do not 
have a formal journalistic training – we respect them and are conscious of their 
importance in news production.”   
  
According to Caballero, Díaz Rangel and Clodovaldo Hernández, community 
participation has grown and communities have contributed to defining the news agenda, 
albeit very partially. They argue that political factors and counterweighting the political 
opponents’ views are what mostly determine gatekeeping and news elaboration in 
political, social, and economic issues. “Most private media try to highlight only negative 
aspects of the government, so the pro-Chávez media have set their news agenda in a 
defensive manner, and sometimes in an offensive one,” says Clodovaldo Hernández. 
Most of the time, according to him and to Díaz Rangel, gatekeeping and the newsroom 
agenda in both pro-government and pro-opposition media are determined by stressing 
the positive aspects of the political actors the news outlet has affinity with or openly 
backs, and underlining the negative of the opposite political strand.  
 
Eleven interviewees maintain that the news and opinion content of these two 
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organisations – VTV and Globovisión TV – have entailed the most polarised takes on 
the country’s social and political reality, and that the news agendas of some other 
broadcasting outlets are determined to a degree by the content of these two media. 
Bolívar says that in the officialist media, informative agendas vary according to the 
medium and the audience, but that all tend to confront “the attempts of the right-wing 
media in destabilising the country and delegitimising the government”. Ameliut 
Hernández highlights that “when there is manipulation in the news by the right-wing 
media, at VTV we act quickly and accurately, gather reliable sources, and elaborate a 
contrasting story.”  
 
Many journalists and editors in pro-government media say that, in the process of 
newsmaking, reporters confirm with official sources when dealing with “sensible issues” 
involving government members or influential Chávez loyalists. “We are very careful with 
information regarding the Cabinet members, revolutionary members of the National 
Assembly, government figures and public spokespersons – we do not want to elaborate 
news based on rumours, so we mainly resort to official sources,” explains Sartori. She 
and fourteen other interviewees concur that in state-owned media, reporters tend to 
contact government spokespersons and sources so that these might confirm or not a 
given piece of information.  
 
6.5.4. Issues of censorship and self-censorship in pro-government media 
 
The majority of the interviewees operating in official and pro-government media argue 
that they have felt no pressures or restrictions within the newsroom. Internal censorship 
is, according to these opinions, very rare in state-owned and communitarian media. 
Caballero and Chacín claim that the large majority of reporters in pro-government 
media are aware of what is newsworthy and of public interest. “I have not seen 
censorship in the revolutionary media, nothing is imposed on the reporters other than to 
work within the legal structure and with a sense of commitment to the people,” explains 
Chacín. “The official or revolutionary media do not rely on corporate advertisement and 
market interests, they are socially responsible and there are no commercial sponsors 
trying to impose their will in media contents; we’re not censored by advertisers or any 
elite,” argues Saldivia.  
 
However, Clodovaldo Hernández believes there are some levels of internal censorship 
and self-censorship within all media in Venezuela – including the state-owned, 
communitarian, and pro-government. He says he has “heard of cases of internal 
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censorship and witnessed self-censorship in both pro-government and pro-opposition 
media”. Contrary to most pro-government interviewees, Clodovaldo Hernández argues 
that journalists and editors working in such a politically-polarised environment as that of 
Venezuela during the 2000s tend to produce news content that is supportive of a 
political standing, favourable to them both at personal and organisational levels. It is 
within this logic, he argues – as do twelve other interviewees – that some journalists 
incur into self-censorship.  
 
In conclusion, and according to most accounts, during the Chávez era gatekeeping and 
decision-making within newsrooms have shifted towards a more participative and less 
hierarchical model. This seemingly applies mainly to the private media, and to some 
degree to the state-owned and communitarian, according to contrasting views obtained. 
Overall, reporters argue having active participation in editorial decision-making, even 
though there is evidence of varying levels of ‘internal’ censorship, depending on the 
specific working dynamics and political bent of each news outlet.   
 
6.6. Presidential/official messages and agenda-setting 
 
As explained in previous chapters of this study, Chávez’s political project and his 
persona have been characterised as authoritarian, militarist, and caudillista by some 
critical observers; and anti-neo-liberal, revolutionary and anti-oligarchic by others 
(Lander 2008, Bisbal 2009, Caballero 2010, Parra 2010). However, there is consensus 
among rivalling views that the President has utilised the media very strategically as a 
key instrument in seeking popular participation and mobilisation, and for conveying his 
personal messages. Almost every interviewee, when asked about the nature of the 
President’s use of the national media, expressed the view that no Venezuelan head of 
government had utilised the media for political and ideological purposes so intensely 
and skillfully as Chávez. This theme discusses the way the President’s overwhelming 
presence in the media, and the content of his official broadcast messages, are handled 
by the country’s news media, the effect they have in journalistic practice, and the 
degrees to which Chávez’s speeches define the national information agenda.  
 
Thirty-one interviewees defined Chávez as a “highly-mediatic leader”. Fourteen referred 
to him as a “great communicator”, while nearly as many said he is “a great orator”. 
Others – a dozen – characterised him as a “media showman”, and a similar amount 
said he was a “television clown”. Nineteen commented that the way the President used 
the media underlined his traits as a “populist” or as a “caudillo”. Some were of the 
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opinion that Chávez allegedly “governs from the media”, particularly by using a regular 
broadcast space of Presidential allocutions and blanket broadcasts which are of 
mandatory national transmission (cadenas) for all national media outlets. 
 
6.6.1. “Aló Presidente” and its communication impact on pro-government forces 
 
The valuation of Chávez’s media persona among news media workers is varied, and 
seems predominantly constructed within a binary scheme, yet the vast majority concur 
that Venezuela’s President has been an effective strategist in personally using the 
media – particularly broadcasting – to mobilise his political supporters, convey 
important political messages to the public, deepen the reach of his ideals, and portray 
himself as a popular leader. Villegas claims that Chávez’s personality and charisma do 
not belong to any traditional political archetype; hence the ways of expressing himself in 
and through the media are just as unique.  
 
Admittedly, Chávez’s most effective tool for communicating with the public and for 
mobilising supporters has been the broadcast programme Aló Presidente (“Hello, 
President”). Its first transmission was in May 1999 and it has continued its live 
transmissions in the majority of official television and radio stations almost every 
Sunday. Its format is that of a talk-show in which the President himself converses for an 
average of four hours (sometimes for over eight hours) – according to most 
interviewees – about his ideas and political plans, his personal agenda and solutions for 
the country’s problems, selectively answers questions from the public present and 
receives phone calls, while often resorting to personal anecdotes, all in an informal 
manner. The practice of receiving calls and answering to the caller’s comments and 
petitions – hence the name of the programme – gradually decreased, and overtime it 
has become less dialogical and Chávez has acquired almost exclusive protagonism, in 
the opinion of most journalists.  
 
Clodovaldo Hernández describes Aló Presidente as “a unique phenomenon” in terms of 
its format and the “impressive communicational power” it entails. Revette argues that 
Chávez’s Sunday broadcast introduced a media format by which the leader of a 
revolutionary process could have a “permanent dialogue with the people”, particularly 
with “those that had been neglected by the previous governing elites and had become 
socially invisible”. In Rodríguez’s view, the programme has been a “direct way for the 
President to communicate with the people, and offers an authentic exchange of 
progressive dialogue”. When asked for a qualitative evaluation of Aló Presidente and its 
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pertinence as an instrument for democratic communication, all interviewees working in 
pro-government media concur that it has been an asset for democratic exchange and 
popular participation, and that it has been a crucial media tool by which Chávez has 
been able to deepen popular empowerment and to combat oppositional political forces.  
 
Many pro-government journalists consider that in his broadcast programme Chávez 
should not only impart his personal experiences and political views, but also 
communicate any wrongdoings by public officials, and more importantly, in the view of 
these interviewees, the wrongdoings of opposition leaders and pro-oppositional media. 
Indeed, Chávez has used his broadcasts to criticise alleged unlawful activities of some 
of his political rivals and media dissidents. It has been through these types of 
denunciations in his broadcast talkshow that Chávez began to dismantle the previously-
held power of certain private media, in the opinion of Canorea, De García, Revette and 
Saldivia.  
 
6.6.2. Critiques to Chávez’s media presence as “broadcast caudillismo” 
 
Among critical, pro-opposition interviewees the dominant trend of opinions regarding 
Chávez’s Aló Presidente, its type of messages and rhetoric, is that it has been negative 
for the country’s institutionalism and democracy. Petkoff’s words arguably condense 
what many of this group of interviewees express: “Aló Presidente represents Chávez’s 
wish to somehow be omnipresent in every home and to impose his personalist regime, 
through an incendiary and divisive rhetoric that has a lot in common with caudillos of 
the past”. Many of these interviewees also agree with Petkoff’s view that, with Aló 
Presidente, the head of government “has been by-passing the Constitution by accusing 
and harassing persons that are critical of his government, and has done so without 
allowing a trial of any sort for the accused person.”  
 
According to Alonso, Bravo and Febres these types of denouncements made by 
Chávez in his Sunday programme have led the way for mobilising government loyalists 
against the persons who the President accuses – sometimes with very violent results. 
“In his (broadcast) programme, Chávez has given immediate orders to close down a 
particular media, confiscate private property, and even sent judges to jail without any 
trial whatsoever,” explains Febres. “Hard-core loyalists find inspiration for their violent 
attacks on journalists or on dissents in Chávez’s Aló Presidente,” says Amaya. Petkoff 
says that Aló Presidente represents “yet another clear example of the way Chávez is 
trying to asphyxiate all forms of dissidence.”  
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López argues that, although there is no doubt about the populist linkage between 
Chávez and the majority of a popular sector, “it is not true that Aló Presidente 
represents a two-way communication pattern between the people and the leader – it is 
about Chávez’s relentless monologue, with his militarist and authoritarian pitch, 
constantly referring to himself.”  
 
According to Bravo, Lugo-Galicia and Ruiz it is very common for Chávez in Aló 
Presidente to refer to the private media, but especially to RCTV, Globovisión or El 
Nacional, as ‘the right-wing, fascist, putschist media’”. Importantly, as Medina alleges, 
he called the four largest private television outlets of the country “the four horsemen of 
the Apocalypse” in at least two of his allocutions. According to most pro-opposition 
interviewees, Chávez’s recurrent insults to dissidents in his broadcasts set a very 
negative example to members of government, his followers, and the media.   
 
6.6.3. Presidential messages and their effect on the media and on news agenda 
 
A significant majority of interviewees agree that through Aló Presidente Chávez has 
been able to establish an important portion of the news agenda for the national media, 
and to some degree for the foreign ones. There is consensus among interviewees that 
the majority of the content of Aló Presidente refers to themes of politics, followed by 
those of social issues, trailed by economical ones.  
 
Yet, as argued by Saldivia, with the broadcast programme Chávez has not only 
managed to establish the themes for news media agendas, but also most of the themes 
to be talked about and debated in society. “Aló Presidente is both informative and 
educational, and it establishes the news agenda for all the media – only that the private 
media seek to use it to further antagonise Chávez, while the people highlight the 
progress made by the revolution,” says Clodovaldo Hernández. Like Revette, 
Rodríguez and Saldivia, he argues that the news media found an “atypical 
communicational product” in Aló Presidente and that, because of its informative 
importance, most of the Venezuelan media sought ways to create informative spaces 
related to Chávez’s talk-show. “The vast amount of opinions and data produced by 
Chávez in Aló Presidente forced the news media to rethink the Presidential news 
source,” says Caballero.   
 
Amaya, Febres, López and Peñaloza argue that the private media has maintained, with 
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very few exceptions, a rather passive role towards what the President has said in his 
broadcast programme. “Most private news media barely confirm with the adequate 
sources on the same day what Chávez has said in Aló Presidente,” says Amaya. This 
can be related, as explained by Marcano and Weffer, to the increasing lack of access 
for private-media journalists to official news sources and spokespersons. Such a 
situation has meant that Aló Presidente has become one of the few official sources for 
some private media outlets when elaborating news content on national policies.  
 
Febres agrees that Aló Presidente sets the news agenda to a significant degree for all 
media, but maintains that it has reflected “a kind of apartheid on behalf of the President 
and the government” towards the dissident media. Many journalists working in the 
private media point out that the last time Chávez held a press conference with 
Venezuelan journalists was in 2004. Mayorca, like twelve other media workers, 
evaluates this decision by Chávez as “undemocratic”, while also expressing that he 
finds it striking that “Venezuelan journalists, particularly those of the private media, have 
not protested sufficiently against this decision of the President.” 
 
Practically all news outlets in Venezuela assign one or various reporters to cover Aló 
Presidente during Sundays. As López says, this sometimes means “listening during six 
or seven hours to what the President had to say, often including long hours of irrelevant 
personal anecdotes”. She argues that news radio outlets transmit either selected parts 
of the programme or the whole of it, and afterwards the most important messages of the 
President tend to be highlighted as part of the news segments. According to most 
interviewees, the press have offered more analysis on Aló Presidente than the 
broadcast media, among private outlets.  
 
In a critical tone, Coscojuela, Peñaloza and Zerpa argue that many private news outlets 
have fallen into a “comfort zone” when covering and reviewing Aló Presidente. “A lot of 
news media could at times propose a more creative selection of news for Monday and 
beyond, but instead they decide to go along with whatever Chávez said on his Sunday 
broadcast programme, regardless of its quality and newsworthiness,” says Coscojuela.  
 
When compared to the private, critical news outlets, the official and pro-government 
media seek to actively echo and amplify much more what Chávez says in Aló 
Presidente as part of their news agenda. Nine of the journalists working in state or pro-
government news media described their reliance on covering the President’s broadcast 
programme as both “positive” and “necessary” for elaborating a significant part of their 
 
 
182 
 
news content, particularly during the first days of the week.  
 
Additionally, Bolívar argues that “by broadcasting Aló Presidente we are responding to 
the demands of the communities, because its members become social protagonists in 
the word of Chávez”. Moreover, Villegas maintains that with his Sunday broadcast 
programme, Chávez has introduced not only a new communication strategy, but “a new 
language, which is emancipatory in nature and aims to empower the people.”    
 
The communication linkage between the President and the communities by means of 
Aló Presidente is acknowledged by some private-media journalists, but these 
emphasise that in their opinion the main aim of the broadcast programme is for Chávez 
to try to impose his views on the general national news agenda, and for him to become 
as ubiquitous as possible in the media. In this sense and according to most private-
media journalists, another key media tool which Chávez’s government has used in 
order to combat the political opposition and the pro-opposition media are the use of 
national blanket Presidential or official broadcasts or cadenas.  
 
6.6.4. Official blanket broadcasts and their effects: pro-opposition views 
 
With the exception of cable or satellite television stations, all broadcasting outlets in the 
country are under the legal obligation to transmit the Presidential/official blanket 
broadcasts. This means, as pointed out by various interviewees, that regular 
programming in all television and radio outlets must be interrupted when any one of 
these official messages is transmitted. In the opinion of all interviewees working in the 
pro-opposition media, the government has transmitted this type of messages, or 
cadenas, abusively. It is this broad group of interviewees which emitted very critical 
opinions about what they argue has been a systematic interruption of regular 
programming and curbing of freedom in the media because of the transmittal of these 
blanket messages103. 
Petkoff argues that the cadenas have become an “Orwellian way” for Chávez to try “to 
impose his presence in every home via radio or television, and show his contempt 
towards anyone who does not follow his ideas”. Scharfenberg says that the cadenas 
“continuously interrupt” regular programming in all national broadcasts “almost on a 
                                                          
103 It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010, there have been national blanket broadcasts an 
average of 32 minutes per day, according to nine interviewees, accounting for just over 1,400 hours. 
Such an estimate (1,400-hours) does not include Aló Presidente, for the latter is not of mandatory 
transmittal for all national broadcast outlets, as established in the communication laws (Ipys 2010, 
Cañizalez 2011).  
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daily basis”, and that this “violates elemental norms of freedom of expression” in the 
media. The majority of interviewees working in the private, critical media concur with 
Petkoff’s and Scharfenberg’s comments.  
 
In López’s opinion, cadenas represent “probably the government’s most perverse 
media excess – it shows to what degree the regime wants to impose its own message 
regardless of any notion of balance in information”. “The authoritarian quality and 
quantity of cadenas have no parallel in the history of Latin America,” says Bravo. The 
content of the cadenas – in the opinion of López, Mayorca, Medina and Uzcátegui – 
respond more to a propaganda strategy than to an informational one. Very importantly, 
this group argue that the Presidential/official blanket broadcasts are also aimed at 
weakening the presence of criticisms and denouncements in radio and television, and 
in the press to a lesser degree.  
 
It is evident, as gathered from the opinion of most private-media workers interviewed 
that broadcast media have been significantly more affected by cadenas than the press. 
The telecommunications laws are explicit about the obligation of all national broadcast 
outlets to carry out the live transmission of every one of the national Presidential/official 
broadcasts. And, as explains Bisbal, for the government it is “more feasible to become 
omnipresent through television and radio, than it is through the press – the broadcast 
media have a larger audience than the press, and the press is more difficult to 
regulate.” 
 
Yet, according to Bisbal, for all their systematic and mandatory transmissions cadenas, 
like Aló Presidente, have “quite a reduced audience: five per cent of the audience share 
in a good day for the President – evidently, people are not too interested in these official 
messages and in their ideological content”. This, in the opinion of Amaya, Bisbal, Bravo 
and López has led to a “migration” of part of the audience to cable or satellite television. 
Presidential/official blanket broadcasts are set about without previous announcement 
for all national broadcast media outlets, and they tend to coincide with information 
content previously programmed by each news media organisation. “It is no coincidence 
that many cadenas are initiated when there are important news which may seem 
favourable to an oppositional leader or when a case involving the government is being 
scrutinised by the private media,” says Ruiz. 
 
Very importantly, mandatory blanket broadcasts increased during election periods, as 
expressed by the majority of interviewees working in private media. According to 
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information provided by Bisbal, the NGO Reporters Without Borders estimated that 
between 1999 and 2008 Chávez talked in obligatory blanket broadcasts for 1,200 hours 
– the equivalent of 50 days –, and almost half of these were during elections or 
referenda processes. In the opinion of most of this group of interviewees, escalation of 
cadenas during election periods is the result of Chávez’s efforts to boost his own 
candidacy or that of his chosen local candidates. Petkoff argues that the Presidential 
blanket broadcasts “evidently seek to have an impact in elections in favour of the 
regime”, and that they entail “only militant and proselytising content”. Fourteen other 
interviewees find these broadcasts “abusive”, “coercing” and “anti-democratic.”   
 
The high quantity of on-air time of these blanket broadcasts represents, as the majority 
of pro-opposition journalists argue, not only the alleged interruption of many news and 
non-news contents the Chávez administration seem interested in minimising or 
impeding, but also a financial loss for most of the private media. “Many commercial 
clients do not pay the media if their publicity advertisements are not broadcast during 
the agreed time schedule,” explains Amaya.  
 
As a way of resuming these broad and critical perceptions of cadenas, Ruiz formulates 
that they constitute “not only another tribune for the President to insult and intimidate 
dissidents”, but “a loss of money for the private media, the impossibility of an ample and 
balanced transmission of news, the curbing of dissenting contents, and the imposition 
of government propaganda.” 
 
6.6.5. Blanket broadcasts as revolutionary communication 
 
Contrastingly, pro-Chávez journalists and editors tend to express their support for the 
Presidential/official blanket broadcasts. Revette says that cadenas represent “an ideal 
way to inform all Venezuelan citizens about the decisions, actions and policies of the 
government”. “Because the private media still have a larger portion of the audience, 
cadenas are a necessary means to present the version of things in the view of Chávez 
and his supporters – who represent the majority of the country,” argues Bolívar. Eleven 
other interviewees argue, like Bolívar, that the President has a Constitutional right to 
carry out this type of blanket broadcasts for they entail “both a formative and informative 
character for all citizens about relevant information.”   
  
In official, pro-government and most of the communitarian media Presidential/official 
broadcasts define the news agenda to an important degree, according to most 
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interviewees. Once these official messages are broadcast, relevant aspects of them are 
covered as news in all of the official and pro-government outlets, including the 
communitarian media, according to Colina. Yet, in comparison to mainstream pro-
government media, communitarian outlets rely less in cadenas for news elaboration. 
Caraballo says that the information provided in official blanket broadcasts tends to form 
part of the news segments in most of the communitarian radio and television stations, 
but that many spaces in the programme schedule destined to specific community 
groups may not comment on them.  
 
For journalists working in private radio and television outlets, the Presidential/official 
mandatory broadcasts represent more an interruption of regular programming based in 
state propaganda content than spaces for relevant news content, according to nineteen 
interviewees. Most of this group of interviewees agree with Zerpa’s observation that 
“Aló Presidente broadcasts tend to provide more newsworthy content, particularly 
because they last a lot longer than most cadenas”. Importantly, many echo Alonso’s 
opinion that “cadenas work more as a governmental tactic to weaken and intimidate the 
private media, so their content isn’t always newsworthy – when this occurs it is rare to 
find news in the critical media based on them.”  
 
It should be highlighted, in concluding this theme, that almost all interviewees agree 
that no head of government in the country’s history has had the media exposure that 
Chávez has had, thanks to state transmissions of Aló Presidente and to his mandatory 
blanket broadcasts. By early 2010, Chávez had presented 2,000 editions of official 
blanket broadcasts. A survey submitted by four interviewees, elaborated by Reporters 
Without Borders, found that between 1999 and 2008 Chávez addressed fellow 
Venezuelans through the media during 2,370 hours through Aló Presidente and in 
Presidential/official blanket broadcasts – excluding special transmissions in news and 
opinion spaces. This phenomenon has shaped news production and agenda-setting in 
Venezuelan media as well as in the public opinion. The majority of interviewees working 
in pro-government media believe that the President’s presence in the media and his 
broadcast messages contribute to strengthening a popular, radical democracy. The 
majority of pro-opposition interviewees believe that, conversely, the nature of the 
President’s presence in the media represents an arbitrary means to try to impose the 
news agenda and does not contribute to enhancing democratic practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
6.7. Community, democratic participation and coverage of elections 
 
The news media play a fundamental role in underpinning community identity and self-
expression, and in informing citizens for democratic discussion and deliberation, 
particularly during electoral periods (Bolaño 1999, Sampedro 2000, McQuail 2005). In 
Venezuela and according to most opinions of this study’s interviewees, the Chávez-led 
political project has sought to stimulate a new form of politicisation within society, 
intensify processes of referenda and of elections of people’s representatives, and use 
the media for political participation and mobilisation of the popular and poorer sectors of 
society (Bisbal 2008a and 2009, Parra 2010). These aspects have determined, to 
significant degrees, the function of the news media in Venezuela during the 2000s, the 
re-shaping of its media landscape, and the role of journalists as professionals and 
citizens.   
 
6.7.1. Community and the media: pro-government perceptions 
 
The majority of interviewees claim that under the Chávez administration the 
disenfranchised sectors of Venezuelan society have gained visibility as politically-active 
citizens, and have become empowered through an array of state-founded social 
programmes and the discourse of President Chávez. According to Caballero, “state 
intervention has been essentially about empowering the people, those who before were 
socially excluded”. Such has been the degree of participation and interaction among the 
local communities that, in the opinions of De García, Rodríguez and Saldivia, social and 
political debate has grown exponentially, and a “new political consciousness” has 
emerged, particularly among the poorer Venezuelans. “The opposition accuses the 
emerging communal councils104 of being an appendix of the regime; but this is not so – 
the vast majority of the communal councils are pro-Chávez just like the majority of the 
nation is pro-Chávez,” argues Saldivia.  
 
All interviewees who are pro-government argue that the Chávez administration has 
empowered popular and poor communities by creating a system of communitarian or 
‘alternative’ media105. Very importantly, they also argue that the government has 
                                                          
104 Communal councils are neighbourhood-based councils for “popular empowerment”, which are 
elected and act as guiding groups for community organisation, decision-making, local security and 
political mobilisation, according to pro-government interviewees. The Chávez administration passed 
the Organic Law of Communal Councils in 2006 and it is estimated that by 2010 there were over 
25,000 councils. 
105 Although the government decreed that the terms “communitarian” and “alternative” are used to 
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configured a network of state-funded official media as a way to support those sectors of 
society106. Many journalists working in state-owned or communitarian media argue that 
the Presidential request for the elaboration of a legal framework for communitarian 
media is one of the most salient projects of Chávez’s government in terms of 
democratising the production and flow of information, as well as for the social 
mobilisation of the poorer sectors of the population.  
 
The majority of pro-government interviewees maintain that the information outlets that 
pay more attention to communitarian issues are, indeed, the communitarian media. Yet, 
many of these observers are of the opinion that mainstream media – particularly those 
that are pro-government or official – have been increasingly covering events related to 
the local communities. Moreover, this group of interviewees argues that the mobilisation 
of communities and of the popular sector, fomented by Chávez’s discourse, has had an 
increasing influence on the mainstream media.  
 
In this sense, Revette argues that “all media that is pro-Chávez and revolutionary has 
created a strong and direct link with the communities”. He exemplifies this by explaining 
how in ANTV various programmes broadcasted have reflected “street parliamentarism”, 
where “people gather and openly discuss local and national issues”. Yet, according to 
Saldivia, some pro-Chávez media “are more revolutionary than others”. In this sense, 
Bolívar explains that, for example, outlets such as TeleSur and Correo del Orinoco 
“relate with the community in a more traditional way”, whereas more local outlets such 
as Catia TV or daily Ciudad Caracas, “due to the nature of their informative role, have a 
more direct connection to local communities and these are participative in the 
confection of some news.” 
In general, many believe that thanks to the pro-government and the communitarian 
media, the disenfranchised have become positively politicised. Marco Hernández 
explains that “whereas the oppositional media have politicised society negatively, 
Chavista and communitarian media have politicised people favourably – the common 
people know they now have a voice in our media.”  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
designate the same type of media structure or outlets, their synonymous use has been problematic. 
Most interviewees agree that they are not equivalent concepts in the Venezuelan context. 
106 According to Conatel, in 2010 there existed officially over 320 communitarian media outlets in 
the country –more, per capita, than in any other nation of the Americas. Other estimates indicate that 
by 2010 there were over 400 of such outlets nationwide. These are funded to a significant degree by 
the Venezuelan state, but also by contributions from community members and government-related 
organisations.  
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Bolívar, Chacín, Colina and Ravette argue that, during the 2000s, they have witnessed 
the manner in which both professional journalists and those non-professionals working 
in communitarian media have been gradually accepting each other and collaborating 
towards the same goal. “At the beginning of the revolutionary process there was some 
tension between the two groups, and professional and formally-trained reporters 
showed certain rejection towards communitarian media workers, but that has changed 
immensely,” explains Bolívar. “Under the revolution, a sort of brotherhood has emerged 
between the community media and the professional one,” says Sartori. “The bridges 
that have been established between professional journalists and self-taught journalists 
in both official and communitarian media is another important facet of the success of 
the revolution’s communication strategies,” says Rodríguez.   
 
Contrary to most opinions of pro-government interviewees, Revette and Rodríguez 
argue that, albeit the official definitions, communitarian media and ‘alternative’ media 
should not be understood as the same in Venezuela. An alternative media, in their view, 
should be characterised by its use of non-conventional technical tools – not too different 
to some employed in most of the private media – and its alternative information 
strategies; whereas the communitarian media should rely on an operational structure 
that depends exclusively on the members of a local community, with an information 
agenda centred on community issues. Very importantly, Revette says that 
communitarian media “should not respond to the criteria of a political doctrine or a 
party’s guidelines, as is generally the case in Venezuela – this is a mistake, for these 
media should be politically plural and focused essentially in helping solve community 
problems”. Caraballo contends that community media “should indeed support the 
revolution and its leader, yet should not be propagandist.”  
 
There is also moderate debate, from opinions gathered from pro-government 
interviewees, in relation to the ways in which communitarian or ‘alternative’ media 
should be supported financially. Some argue that they find adequate that these seek 
resources and money, if needed, in the private sector. The majority, however, disagree 
with community media becoming partially or fully commercial, yet concur that some 
state-funding or support is required. Like Caraballo, Pérez and Sartori, Revette believes 
that community media “should not operate as do private outlets, which are concerned 
about publicity – human resources and financial support should come from within the 
community.”  
 
Colina explains that about fifty percent of the “infrastructure” of most communitarian 
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media is financed by the state, regional government, or Conatel. He, like the majority of 
this group of interviewees, agrees with state support of communitarian media on the 
one hand, and with voluntary work within the outlets, on the other. “A truly revolutionary 
scheme within community media would mean self-sufficiency and total independence 
for them – for now though, the state must assist them with some funding; a next phase 
would be self-sustainability,” argues Ravette.  
 
When asked about the extent in which state funding might dictate the nature of news 
agenda confection and overall journalistic practice in communitarian media, the majority 
of pro-government interviewees argue that these outlets essentially voice information 
and opinions from the perspective of community members, and that the vast majority of 
them openly back Chávez’s revolutionary project, regardless of the fact that his 
government has promoted and financed them to various degrees.  
 
Journalists working in official media, such as Saldivia and Clodovaldo Hernández, 
believe that such has been the empowerment acquired by the popular and poor 
communities thanks to Chávez’s leadership, that much of the private media have 
reacted by making efforts to represent local communities and their social issues more 
intensely and fittingly. “A notable gain for the communities, as part of Chávez’s legacy, 
is the way in which they have become relevant for much of the private media,” says 
Clodovaldo Hernández. Yet, some pro-government journalists disagree. “The private 
media only operate as ‘resonance boxes’ of the old establishment, and hardly find any 
relevance in informing about and to the communities,” argues Bolívar. Nine other 
interviewees agree with his opinion. 
 
6.7.2. Community media and popular representation: critical views  
 
Many pro-opposition interviewees acknowledge that Chávez’s policies have provided a 
significant impulse to popular sectors of society by promoting a system of 
communitarian media and a more participative role of local communities in news-
making, cultural production and political activity. Also, this group of professionals 
considers that such underpinning of community and popular power has, to varying 
degrees, permeated most of the media. “The private media has certainly become aware 
of the importance of creating information and communication links with the local 
communities, and most are doing so in their news coverage and media representation 
more than before,” explains Bisbal.  
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There are, however, strong criticisms from the majority of private-media journalists and 
pro-opposition commentators about the strategic nature of the government policies in 
supporting community media, and also in relation to ethical aspects in the way these 
outlets operate.  
 
Seventeen interviewees formulate that, though participative in theory, most 
communitarian media do not promote autonomy and plurality within local communities 
or within the Venezuelan journalistic culture. “We have learnt of many cases within 
community media where there have been ‘witch hunts’ towards those community 
members that have expressed critical views about the government,” says Peñaloza. 
Uzcátegui explains that a salient example of this was the case of revolutionary news 
and comment website Aporrea107, which “expelled some of its contributors from trade 
unions and those of Trotskyite leanings because they did not fully agree with some 
government party policies”. Moreover, and according to him, “these media should 
hardly be called ‘alternative’ or ‘communitarian’ for they are essentially ‘para-
governmental’ or ‘para-state’, dedicated primarily to the distribution of state 
propaganda”. Similarly, Lugo-Galicia says that “whatever journalistic independence 
community media once had, most of it has been ‘kidnapped’ by Chávez”, and that “any 
sense of alternative journalistic practice only exists outside the Chavista dogma.” 
 
Some interviewees who are critical towards the Chávez’s administration argue that 
various members of local communities and citizens in general have been gradually 
turning to the private media, instead of to the communitarian media, seeking to obtain 
information about specific problems in their respective vicinities. Mayorca argues that 
this occurs because “many have realized that the so-called communitarian media have 
become, to a significant degree, state-propaganda tools and forbid criticisms towards 
Chavismo”. Like eight other interviewees, Mayorca says that many community 
members outside of Chavismo find that “the private media is much more receptive to 
their problems and their struggles than official and communitarian outlets”. Also, as 
explained by Bisbal, many community organisations and civilian groups “who have 
become discontent with aspects of Chavismo often resort to the private media so that 
these offer diffusion of their information.”  
 
6.7.3. Citizen participation and media coverage in elections 
                                                          
107 Aporrea (www.aporrea.org) is a pro-Chávez digital news site, founded in 2002. Its name stands 
for “Asamblea popular revolucionaria americana” (or “Popular Revolutionary Assembly of the 
Americas”).  
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Most interviewees consider that it is crucial that the electorate obtain from the media 
valuable and socially-responsible information so as to be able to elaborate political 
ideas and electoral choices. This majority group also finds that the news media are the 
most instrumental organisations for informing the communities about political 
representatives and candidates during electoral periods. However, and according to 
some interviewees of both pro-government and pro-opposition standings, the balance, 
transparency and accessibility in news for assisting the electorate in elaborating 
individual ideas and choices during elections has been increasingly deficient in 
Venezuela. “Although there has been an important surge in popular participation in 
electoral processes, the quality of news coverage during elections and referenda 
processes has been very poor,” argues Febres. Clodovaldo Hernández and Prieto 
argue that during electoral processes the majority of news organisations and many 
journalists tend to become further radicalised in an already highly-polarised political 
environment.  
 
According to Boon and Prieto, the extreme electoral pulse between opposing political 
forces in the media was notably evident during the August 2004 referendum when 
Venezuelans voted for President Chávez to be recalled or not from office. Nine 
interviewees agree with Boon and Prieto that the 2004 referendum represented an 
evident case of overtly advocate and partisan media electoral coverage, which would in 
the successive years escalate. Prieto claims that after that event “all elections were 
presented by the media to the public as plebiscites, with the state media apparatus 
becoming ruthlessly militant”. Ruiz argues that the official media and most of the 
communitarian media “become even more servile to the regime during electoral 
process, and more violent towards the opposition.”  
 
Lugo-Galicia claims that during the fourteen different electoral events he has covered 
since Chávez took power, the officialist media “have not even been minimally critical 
about any aspect of the government and its candidates, whereas the private media 
have provided some critiques towards opposition leaders”. Amaya, Bisbal, Guanipa and 
López explain that in the official and communitarian media there is no coverage of 
oppositional candidates during electoral processes, unless it is under a highly-negative 
light. Most of the interviewees working in private media concur with these opinions.  
 
Some dissident journalists are also critical about the manner in which most private 
media have been covering electoral processes and that many journalists have acted as 
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political militants in news production. “Most of the private media has not maintained 
equilibria in accessing and showing the opinions of the electoral candidates,” explains 
Boon. “Just as official and pro-government outlets have lacked any balance during 
election coverage so have to, a significant degree, private outlets like RCTV and 
Globovisión, as well as some dailies,” says Bisbal. According to Moleiro, during the first 
years of the Chávez administration most of the private media covered elections and 
referenda “arrogantly, erratically, and without much ethical concern, attempting to 
weaken the government”. Yet, all three interviewees point out that during the second 
half of the 2000s, news production by the vast majority of private-media reporters 
during elections became more balanced.  
 
Few pro-government interviewees are critical about the news coverage carried out by 
pro-Chávez media outlets during elections. However, Bolívar, Clodovaldo Hernández 
and Rodríguez express that these media have operated with a strong bias towards 
Chávez and his supporters during elections. But the posture of the majority of pro-
government commentators is arguably best summed up in Saldivia’s words: “Chavista 
media wants to encourage political participation and defend revolutionary values; the 
private media, however, do not regard our citizens as a political-thinking collective, but 
as consumers – so we must use our media to fight neo-liberal ideals, especially during 
elections.” 
  
In the foregoing section opinions offered by most interviewees reveal an overall 
awareness of Chávez’s popular and participatory social policies, and the manner in 
which these have increasingly resonated in the media at large – particularly thanks to 
the surge of communitarian media. There are, however, very divergent opinions 
regarding the nature and function of communitarian outlets. In the nation’s clash 
between two very different political projects, the communitarian media have arguably 
been playing an active advocate role of governmental leaning. The highly-politicised 
confrontation in Venezuelan society and its media has, according to almost every 
account, become increasingly militant and belligerent during election and referenda 
processes.  
6.8. Sources, access to information and the idea of news balance 
 
In journalistic practice, excessive and arbitrary limitations to accessing key sources of 
information and institutional data can significantly weaken a fair, well-contextualised 
and balanced elaboration of news content (Schudson 2003, Bisbal 2009, Dahlgren 
2009). Very importantly, valuable scrutinising on the government and on the socio-
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economic elites can be affected negatively (Curran 2002).  
 
In the context of Venezuelan news media, when assessing the above-mentioned issues 
during the Chávez era, a significant majority of interviewees are of the opinion that, for 
reinforcing democratic practice, it is most important that both state and non-
governmental institutions offer the media information of social interest, in a transparent 
and timely manner, and that the former allow access for journalists to pertinent sources 
of information.  
 
Moreover, there was general agreement among this majoritarian group of interviewees 
that access to institutional information is an important right for Venezuelans, and that it 
underpins the defence of other civil rights. Yet, most of the private-media journalists and 
media analysts consulted expressed their critical concern in relation to the increasingly 
lack of access journalists have to official data and to public officials.  
 
6.8.1. Information accessibility for the private media 
 
Together with the rising harassment and violence towards journalists, the increasing 
absence of access to information sources and to official data is highlighted by many 
interviewees as the main negative aspect to have emerged within news media during 
the Chávez administration. Twenty-one interviewees expressed that the lack of access 
to public information has become one of the key problems in news elaboration and in 
enhancing the news media as a democratic force. Prieto argues that “the accessibility 
to government information which is of public interest has become almost non-existent, 
so there’s almost-zero degree of transparency, which is very dangerous for any 
democracy.”  
 
Similarly, Bravo, Mayorca and Zerpa claim that access to official statistics or documents 
has been alarmingly diminishing for the private media. Zerpa argues that the Chávez 
administration’s “annulment of access to statistics and data on most key public issues, 
such as homicide rate, military spending, public health service data, costs of misiones, 
salaries of Cabinet members, and so on, represents a real tragedy”. Mayorca argues 
that democracy should generate “a culture in which the norm is that a public servant 
receives and talks to a professional journalist, so that the people can be informed – this 
situation has become very rare in Venezuela.” 
 
Many journalists also highlight other negative repercussions of the absence of access 
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to government sources and data. Febres argues that the “poor access to information 
has contributed to the growth of opinion over news; there is less rational interpretation 
and less veracity in the news”. “It has become extremely difficult to contrast information 
regarding the government when none of its spokespersons are willing to declare to the 
private media, so there is a lack of balance, and an impossibility to check on the 
politically powerful,” says Coscojuela. Marcano argues that “with such lack of 
transparency in Venezuela, reality is no longer reflected in the media – there is a media 
reality for the regime and a different one for the opposition”. Guanipa, Lugo-Galicia, 
Scharfenberg, and Zerpa strongly believe that this phenomenon is not only the result of 
political polarisation, but a strategic media policy of the state, which has been gradual 
and steady.  
 
In Zerpa’s word, the Chávez administration “retains a clear and centralised policy of not 
being transparent in its handling of information. The way it operates, concealing so 
much information, is also a result of its project of ‘ideologisation’, and to diminish open, 
rational debate”. Such has been the escalation of this alleged state strategy elaborated 
for the media that, according to Moleiro, the government had by the mid-2000s become 
“something totally encrypted for the private media”. These high levels of secrecy, lack of 
accessibility and of transparency had been unknown to Venezuelan journalists in the 
nation’s democratic history, as argued by twenty-two interviewees.   
 
6.8.2. Concealed state information and news sources in the private media 
 
Lugo-Galicia considers that the “government’s information opaqueness” is best 
exemplified by the way Chávez eliminated the press office at the Presidential 
Headquarters (Miraflores Palace), thus “sending a message to the private media about 
its refusal for transparency and accessibility”. “Before, during previous governments, 
thanks to the access to the Presidential Palace some important cases of corruption 
were dismantled. Today we have no access at all there,” explains Zerpa. This, concur 
Petkoff, Scharfenberg and Uzcátegui, represents a setback in any struggle to reporting 
cases of corruption.  
 
Coscojuela and Scharbenbeg, albeit criticising the government’s alleged corruption, 
secrecy and lack of transparency on public matters, also question the increasing lack of 
interest in some journalists to find alternative sources and elaborate news pieces that 
check on the government. “I’ve witnessed how certain private-media journalists have 
become used to this concealment of official information and have found in this situation 
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an excuse for not obtaining official data and proper sources,” says Coscojuela. “These 
journalists have become passively accustomed to the secrecy of the state, hardly 
seeking sources or verifying information,” says Scharbenberg, and indicates that this 
“disregard for veracity and balance” in news is “justified in some media under the 
pretext that we are living an ‘exceptional historical’ moment under the Chávez regime.”  
 
Boon, López and Weffer contend that the above described situation has been the case 
of a minority of reporters working in the private, critical news media, and that most have 
worked against the odds in order to obtain accurate and balanced information. “Many 
journalists actually challenge most of the polarised audience that wants biased, one-
sided information; and within the private media keep striving for accessing public 
sources,” says Boon. In the view of Alonso, even though lack of accessibility has been 
the “biggest hurdle in elaborating balanced news” for reporters, some of them have 
developed resourceful ways to obtain statements from the official sector.  
 
Even those few interviewees claiming that there has existed some ways of ‘negotiating’ 
access to official information and obtaining statements from public functionaries and 
government figures, argue that some official sources have become more secretive or 
inaccessible than others. In this sense, Lugo-Galicia argues that in his coverage of 
national politics, government representatives have turned “increasingly hermetic,” but 
that “public servants working in the military and police forces, the oil industry and 
economic sector are the most difficult to obtain information from”. Fourteen other 
interviewees agree with this opinion. Mayorca says that there are hardly any 
possibilities to ask questions to the police and the military. Other than very rare 
invitations to press conferences, he explains he practically has no access to sources of 
the police or the military. “Chávez’s regime is essentially a military one, so the military 
source is most relevant, yet it’s one of the most impenetrable,” says Marcano.  
 
Very importantly, as expressed by González, Lugo-Galicia, Mayorca and Zerpa, 
Venezuela has one of the highest murder rates in the world, and the government has 
forbidden homicide indexes to be broadcasted or published. “The regime knows that the 
murder rates are rocket-high and that this significantly affects the whole population; so 
not allowing the problem to be researched and informed about is another example of 
how government actions go against journalistic values,” argues Mayorca. 
 
Lugo-Galicia, Boon, Coscojuela and Medina argue that information of the state-owned 
oil industry and of the public economic sector has become just as sealed as that of the 
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military and the police. “Oil giant PDVSA has become the money-provider for the state; 
prior to the arrival of Chávez to power some of its data was of open access; now it’s a 
complete secret,” says Coscojuela. “If Venezuelans knew the reality of the (state-
owned) oil industry and of its financial planning, everybody would be on red alert: the 
country is falling apart economically and this is precisely why the government has 
become completely secret about its economic information,” formulates Petkoff. 
According to this group of interviewees, there has been a significant decline in state 
financial accountability in the media mainly because of lack of access to accurate 
official data. 
 
There have been many instances in which journalists and private news outlets have 
resorted to NGOs and unions after facing systematic refusal of access to official 
institutions and information. As Lozano explains, “most reporters have become very 
aware of the laws that are there to protect them, but the government does not comply 
with these laws”. “Article 5 of the Constitution establishes that a public functionary must 
inform citizens about issues related to her or his public work, but the official sector has 
become expert in outmanoeuvring laws,” argues Alonso. Petkoff says: “Being informed 
in a timely and truthful way is a right for all Venezuelans – it’s in article 57 of the 
Constitution –, but the government bypasses all laws, discretionally.”  
 
Sometimes, as argued by Amaya, González, López and Zerpa the only way to obtain 
access to official or public information is through state-owned news agency AVN or 
other state-run or pro-government broadcast outlets – particularly VTV –, yet it has 
become very difficult to corroborate the information these outlets elaborate, according 
to the four interviewees. López, echoing the opinion of fifteen journalists, explains that 
most of the time “the only way to obtain official information is by monitoring and partially 
repeating messages coming form the official media”. Yet, as Zerpa argues, “the official 
or state information is of poor quality and data tends to be manipulated, propagandist or 
simply made up.”   
 
6.8.3. The construction of balance, the dilemma of the scoop 
 
The vast majority of journalists working in the private media argue that the absence of 
adequate access to official sources and data has had major consequences in balanced 
elaboration of news pieces. Some of them argue that the notion of journalistic ‘balance’ 
has shifted during the Chávez era. This group claim that journalistic ‘balance’ has 
become framed almost exclusively under a binary scheme, leaving no room for 
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nuances or “grey areas”, to use Prieto’s expression. “Having an official spokesperson 
and one from the opposition as sources in a news piece does not necessarily mean 
journalistic balance – news balance is about the quality of the news story, about the 
rigour of news-gathering and of scrutiny,” argues López.  
 
Prieto argues that balance “should not only be about having the opinion of polarised 
rivals; it should entail context, transparency and fairness – and we’re increasingly losing 
those”. Like Petkoff and Zerpa, he claims that the idea of balance has gradually 
excluded those who have moderate views, while highlighting those that are at both 
ends of the polarised political and ideological spectrum. Before polarisation became 
entrenched within Venezuelan society, the sources “that one would find in the media 
were much more varied and diverse,” says Coscojuela. 
 
According to twenty-two interviewees, before the Chávez era the scoop was a key 
component of the news agenda, but not anymore. Boon argues that this is in part a 
consequence of the government’s concealment of information and the lack of access to 
public sources. “Before, one could see strong competition among private outlets to be 
the first to get an important news story out – now it’s hardly the case,” says Weffer.  
 
Some journalists contend that the scoop has maintained some relevance as an element 
of news-making, but that secrecy among official sources has made it very difficult to 
elaborate scoops that scrutinise the government.  
 
Many interviewees working in state-owned and pro-government media also argue that 
within the newsroom culture during the Chávez era, the previously-held importance of 
the scoop has dissipated. Pérez says that “practically all revolutionary media prefer 
consulting official versions of events before broadcasting or publishing news”. In 
Canorea’s opinion “there should be no competition between revolutionary media, no 
fights for scoops”. Nine interviewees working in state and community media agree that 
the pro-government news outlets tend to operate by sharing information among 
themselves and at times arranging information campaigns defined by Chávez, without 
offering much importance to scoops.  
 
6.8.4. Sources and access to information: pro-government views 
 
Most journalists and editors of pro-government media argue that access to public 
information and government functionaries has been steadily maintained, but that 
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political figures and spokespersons of the political opposition have become increasingly 
unapproachable for them. “There had been bridges between some oppositional 
politicians and journalists of the Chavista media that previously worked in private 
media, but because of the collapse in national dialogue and the polarisation, these have 
become more broken,” argues Rodríguez. Marco Hernández defines the lack of 
accessibility to information of the private sector for the official media as “critical” and 
“grave”. Nine other interviewees agree with his observation.  
 
When asked about issues related to access to information and use of news sources, 
the majority of official and pro-government interviewees spoke very critically about the 
ways the private media have been handling sources and carrying out news-gathering. 
“The private media do not mention sources on many occasions, which underpins their 
lack of accuracy,” argues Bolívar. “In the opposition media one often sees that quotes, 
especially those from official sources, are accompanied by anti-Chávez commentaries 
from the reporter – this is another weakness of these media outlets,” explains Chacín.  
 
In Clodovaldo Hernández’s view, however, the pervasive ‘comment’ in the private 
media can be partially attributed to the efforts of some journalists in explaining to the 
public that official or government sources could not be obtained. “For the private media, 
access to public information has become very complicated, and some of their 
journalists do the best they can; but the public sector has the impression that the private 
media are there to destroy the revolution and, as a reaction, has closed off access to 
private outlets,” argues Clodovaldo Hernández. 
  
Twelve pro-government interviewees maintain that certain types of information should 
not be made accessible to the media, because of the social and political confrontation 
that the country has been going through since 1999. Yet, a minority of pro-Chávez 
interviewees hold a different opinion. Clodovaldo Hernández argues that the public 
sector should be more open and its data more accessible. He and Saldivia concede 
that closure of information is evident in the official sector, and that this has detrimental 
consequences. “The official sector should be more transparent in its information; and 
the National Assembly, the government and public functionaries should be checked by 
responsible media,” argues Clodovaldo Hernández. He maintains that such 
inaccessibility and curbing of information has led to a very negative habit: journalists of 
the private media cover the private sector, and those of the state or official media cover 
the public sector. Saldivia finds that “such concealment of information is not correct”, 
but that it “needs to be interpreted as part of the process of revolutionary change; soon 
 
 
199 
 
enough, when the revolution has fully evolved, the state and its representatives will be 
more transparent.”  
 
This thematic section has found that, overall, the considerable difficulties that journalists 
and news outlets – particularly private, critical ones – experience in their search for 
certain sources has been defined by most journalists as a grave problem. They also 
argue that this has a direct and negative impact on Venezuela’s public democratic 
debate. Furthermore, many accounts emphasise that such lack of access to official, 
state information has been increasing during the Chávez administration. However, 
some pro-government interviewees support the concealment of certain information by 
the governing bodies and agree with the latter selectively restricting access to pro-
opposition news outlets.  
 
6.9. Credibility, watchdog role and investigative journalism 
 
It has been widely argued that within liberal, normative ideals it is expected that the 
media scrutinise authorities and carry out a watchdog role as a key part of its 
democratising role (Keane 1991, Waisbord 2000a and 2013, Curran 2002, Bisbal 
2009). Also, non-liberal trends of thought emphasise the need for the media to check on 
the market-driven social and economic elite, as well as the power structures within the 
media (McChesney 2000, McQuail 2005, Mosco 2006). One desirable way for the news 
media to carry out watchdog and scrutinising functions on the powerful and the official 
sector is accurate and balanced investigative journalism. This form of journalism ought 
to contrast with advocacate, militant reporting. 
 
To assess journalistic production in Venezuela’s increasingly politicised newsrooms, it 
is important to evaluate the way in which reporters, editors, and media commentators 
understand the investigative role of journalists and to what degree they have been 
producing – or not – watchdog news that check on the official sector and the elites. 
Within the existing clashing ideological and normative perspectives among Venezuelan 
media workers, it is equally relevant to discuss their perceptions of how credibility ought 
to be understood and articulated through their journalistic practices.  
 
Taken together, most of the interviewees’ opinions give an idea that the print media in 
Venezuela has been the most trustworthy of all news mediums. It is also, according to 
most accounts, the type of media that employs most professional journalists and 
dedicates most overall content to news stories and political opinion pieces. However, as 
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in most of Latin America, it is television that has the largest audience and the highest 
penetration in homes, as agreed by most interviewees. According to Marco Hernández, 
the press in Venezuela “has traditionally been the most influential media because it has 
been shaping public opinion like no other”. “The Venezuelan press is still more 
respected and credible than television and radio, even though these have a more 
massive reach,” says Amaya. Twenty-three other interviewees agree with Amaya’s and 
Hernandez’s views.  
 
6.9.1. Credibility and media radicalisation 
 
Even though the press is esteemed by most interviewees as the traditional medium that 
sets the news agenda more pervasively, some journalists argue that all types of media 
– printed, radio, television, and online – have been increasingly feeding on each other 
for news coverage and production in Venezuela, and that during the 2000s all have 
gathered similar levels of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in the country.  
 
Peñaloza and Prieto argue that, paradoxically, the most credible journalistic individuals 
for the mass audiences belong to the broadcast media, yet these journalists or 
commentators feed very much on the press and to some degree on social media. 
These “credible figures”, says Peñaloza, tend to be politically polarised in their 
comments.   
 
Since 2002, according to the majority of accounts, journalism and news media in 
general suffered the first significant decline in their credibility vis-à-vis the public. The 
media mirrored – and in many ways promoted – a conflicting polarisation between pro-
government and pro-opposition forces.  
 
The reaction of both the private media and the pro-Chávez news outlets to the April 
2002 coup d’état highlighted the militant nature of many practicing journalists. Bolívar, 
De García and Rodríguez argue that after the private media’s “information blackout”, 
during and following the April 2002 coup, the majority of Venezuelans began to distrust 
the private news organisations as an overall ethical and credible institution, and 
perceived them as deceitful political actors. Chacín defines the events of 2002-2003 as 
a “breaking point” in which most Venezuelan journalists stopped being perceived by the 
public as “defenders of the truth or as responsible social actors.”  
 
Many interviewees of pro-opposition standings partially agree with the above 
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observations. The high levels of political conflict and confrontation, argue Marcano, 
Moleiro and Zerpa, led the private media to incur into errors in their news coverage 
during the early-2000s which had very negative consequences for the public’s 
perception of journalists’ work.  
 
According to Marcano, during the early period of the 2000s, “much of the private media 
lost focus of what was normative journalism; by becoming fervent political agents they 
started forsaking veracity, and much of the population – especially the sectors of 
Chavismo – found that whatever trust had existed had now broken down”. “Until 2004 it 
was mainly the private media which made the bigger mistakes by tacitly or covertly 
backing the April 2002 coup and the general strike in early 2003; this was perceived as 
deceitful by many and the news media lost a lot of its credibility,” explains Moleiro. Yet, 
he and twelve other interviewees also claim that after 2004 the private, critical media – 
with few exceptions – made meaningful attempts to correct the lack of veracity and 
transparency shown during the 2002-2003 period by returning to more ethical and 
normative forms of journalism.  
 
Many interviewees agree that there has been a significant shift in what the public 
perceive as credibility in relation to news media. In this sense, Bisbal critically explains 
that within the “polarised battlefield” that has become the Venezuelan media the most 
radical and polarised news organisations are very often perceived by an equally 
polarised public as the most trustworthy or credible.  
 
According to Prieto, “credibility has become increasingly related to the empathy that 
exists between the journalists’ comments and those of their audiences or readers – this 
represents a terrible risk for good journalism and reveals how irresponsible certain 
journalists have become”. Some reporters working in the private media agree with such 
a view, also arguing that the audience’s values have changed in regards to what is 
trustworthy and credible in news, and that the values of some reporters and editors 
have shifted correspondingly.  
6.9.2. Watchdog role and denunciation 
 
The majority of interviewees agree that a fundamental role of the media is to 
systematically check on the government and the power elites, and to carry forth ethical 
and responsible scrutiny of authorities in both news and opinion pieces. However, 
opinions are divergent among interviewees – depending on their political and 
ideological standings – in relation to the nature of watchdog journalism in Venezuela 
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and the ways it should be employed in news media. 
 
Caraballo, Colina and Marco Hernández argue that both the official and the 
communitarian media should place emphasis in checking on the traditional economic 
elites rather than the government, because the former have allegedly orchestrated 
attempts to weaken and overthrow the Chávez administration. “In community radios we 
make special efforts to scrutinise speculators, people who violate the laws, but just as 
importantly, the right-wing media and the anti-revolutionary forces,” says Caraballo. The 
majority of pro-government interviewees argue that the pro-Chávez media should hold 
accountable the private media and the political opposition in their alleged destabilising 
efforts against the government.  
 
A significant majority of pro-opposition interviewees contend that neither the official nor 
the communitarian media carry out serious monitoring or any sort of scrutiny of the 
government’s improprieties. Lugo-Galicia argues that whereas “practically all officialist 
media are incapable of even acknowledging information about government corruption 
or infringement,” the private media has tried to maintain “a watchdog role on a 
government that has been increasingly arbitrary, secretive and authoritarian”. He, 
Alonso and Zerpa claim that the private, critical media have become the principal 
institution in trying to monitor the government and trying to inform the public about 
corruption and illegalities among state representatives.  
 
However, according to these interviewees it has been increasingly difficult to carry out 
watchdog reporting for the private, critical media. They argue that the Chávez 
administration has manoeuvred strategically so as to cut access to official information of 
public interest, has promoted a very hostile behaviour towards most private news 
organisations, and has installed what this group of interviewees consider a restrictive 
set of media laws. These aspects – all of which have been described in previous 
themes – have turned watchdog and investigative reporting into activities that are very 
difficult and risky for independent journalists, editors and news outlet owners.  
6.9.3. Investigative journalism, non-advocacy initiatives 
 
There exists scant tradition of investigative journalism in Venezuela, according to Boon, 
Scharfenberg, Uzcátegui and Villegas. Scharfenberg, who has dedicated significant 
effort to promoting normative investigate journalism, says that among Venezuelans 
there is “still a lot of confusion between journalism of denouncement (denuncismo) and 
that of investigation – efforts have been made in the past to do investigative reporting, 
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but it has ended in brief denouncement.”  
 
Boon, Scharfenberg and Zerpa explain that during the late 2000s some news media 
workers – particularly those in the press – have become aware of the normative 
elements and mechanisms of investigative reporting: “After 2007, some owners and 
many editors and reporters became aware of the relevance of the features of this type 
of journalism for watchdog and accountability purposes, and of the urgency to 
incorporate it to newspapers in a definite way,” says Zerpa. Seven other interviewees 
agree with her that investigative journalism, which culturally and historically has had 
minimal presence in Venezuela, took “its first serious steps in 2007”. Also, they argue 
that the increasing lack of accessibility to official sources spurred some journalists to 
reveal cases of governmental and public offences and general corruption in 
investigative pieces.  
 
According to nine interviewees, systematic elaboration of investigative journalism had 
been financially too costly for Venezuelan news organisations and had not attracted the 
public. They argue that this gradually changed in the second half of the 2000s, where 
five private newspapers – Últimas Noticias, El Universal, El Nacional, El Mundo, and 
Panorama – successfully began to generate investigative agendas of their own. Yet, 
Amaya, Bravo and López believe that for the broadcast media it is additionally difficult 
to carry out exhaustive watchdog or investigative reportages, because of the 
intimidation journalists may suffer from the government and the latter’s discretionary 
use of new media regulations. They also agree that during the 2000s investigative 
journalism has been carried out almost exclusively by certain newspapers.   
 
The minimal leeway the press has had under Chávez’s government has in part been 
capitalised on by some print outlets by setting up teams of investigative journalism, as 
expressed by Boon and Uzcátegui. Like Scharfenberg and Zerpa, they argue that the 
investigative work of these teams has been promoting democratic values within the 
media and the Venezuelan society. “On the one hand, we publish reportages of public 
interest that monitor on an abusive regime and a powerful new elite; on the other, we’re 
fighting off the growing trend of pseudo-news based on rumours and speculation which 
is very pernicious108,” argues Zerpa.  
 
                                                          
108  As examples of detailed and accurate investigative pieces published, Zerpa mentions one about 
how state-owned petroleum company PDVSA illegally funds activities of the government party 
PSUV, and another related to how public hospitals are mismanaged and neglect cancer patients.  
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Boon and Weffer argue that there is fear among investigative journalists in the private 
media that the government, public institutions or Chávez’s supporters will continue to 
intimidate and threaten them. Weffer agrees that investigative reporters in Venezuela 
during the 2000s increasingly faced the danger of being “censored and neutralised by 
the official sector”, yet she claims that reporters in this area had been working, overall, 
“enthusiastically, meticulously, accurately, and ethically.”  
 
However, among pro-government journalists there is a tendency to argue that 
investigative reporting in the private media is predominantly confrontational, inaccurate, 
and responds to an anti-government agenda. “Some private newspapers have started 
producing what they call ‘investigation journalism’ as a political reaction to the success 
of the revolution, aiming to attack the government,” argues Marco Hernández. “Those 
texts (investigative features) have appeared in some right-wing dailies not out of ethical 
journalistic considerations or not to check accurately on the government, but because of 
their unscrupulous political urge,” says Chacín. 
 
In conclusion, the views exposed in this theme demonstrate that, even though the 
predominant form by which the news media try to check on the government and power 
elites has been denouncement and opinion pieces, investigative journalism has been 
developing in Venezuela, since the mid-2000s, despite economic constraints and a 
hostile political environment. As Scharfenberg explains, there was “a deficit in the 
country in terms of the presence of this form of journalism and its importance as a 
contribution for democratic enhancement had been overlooked”. This situation, by most 
accounts, has changed gradually. Most journalists working in the private media argue 
that, even though it has only been exercised consistently by half a dozen news outlets, 
investigative reporting highlights the desire of some journalists to anchor their practice 
in normative tenets.  
 
6.10. Ideas of professionalism, journalists’ contribution to ethics and to 
democracy 
 
The legitimisation of professionalism in the media is, like normative ideals within 
journalism, a contested ground in both theoretical and practical perspectives (Aguirre 
1998, Hallin 2000, Schudson 2003, Waisbord 2013). A normative framework as 
promoted by professional paradigms is argued to stimulate the production of accurate, 
balanced, independent information; encourage checking on government authorities and 
power groups; underpin ethical standards in working practice; and enhance democratic 
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debate (Siebert 1963, Keane 1991, Aguirre 1998).  
 
Other views, however, suggest that “‘professional journalism’ is problematic for 
democratic expression” (Waisbord 2013: 7), because it represents an elitist mechanism 
of disseminating information in accordance with the wishes and views of a small, 
predetermined group of people, with little regard for inclusive participation of the 
disenfranchised. Such critiques emanate from non-liberal and Marxist-inspired 
perspectives. These, during the Chávez era, have been gaining terrain, and disputing 
liberal understandings of professional practice in the news media. This debate between 
the colliding stances in Venezuela is of utmost importance when assessing the 
institutional and democratic values of journalism.  
 
6.10.1. Journalistic professionalism and ideals: divergent perspectives 
 
Most of the interviewees agree that during the time Chávez has been in power the 
social, political and cultural shifts his mandate has set forth have produced what some 
describe as a “crisis” in professional values, while partisan practice has been 
advancing. Most of the journalists working in private media subscribe Scharfenberg’s 
formulation that “journalists need to establish or re-establish values, norms and 
procedures that define our occupation, our place in society as journalists”. This group of 
interviewees also agrees that professionalism in the media is positive for democratic 
development.  
 
Many pro-opposition interviewees explain that after 2003 most critical journalists have 
reconsidered professional values, and adopted a less political role in news production. 
This, however, has not always been the case during the 2000s among most of the 
editors and journalists working for the official media, according to this group. 
Scharfenberg argues that during the Chávez administration the country’s media 
practitioners have also become divided between a “militant or partisan camp and a 
professional camp – this division has been one of the most perverse legacies of the 
Bolivarian revolution.” 
 
Lugo-Galicia says that most reporters have a clearer idea about the need to be 
professional compared to 2002, “when many turned into active political agents – it has 
indeed become harder to report, to investigate, to have access to public information, to 
work free from government censorship; but most of us are clearer about our 
professional role”. Bravo argues that “professional journalists require a commitment to 
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truth and to democratic debate, a sense of risk in defending human rights and in 
checking on the corrupt”. Yet, some interviewees maintain that journalists’ occupational 
values should combine normative reporting with certain Venezuelan literary and cultural 
elements. For example, Coscojuela says: “I don’t agree with having to be ‘objective’ and 
‘neutral’ at all costs, which belongs to the U.S. journalistic tradition”. Eleven other 
interviewees agree with his view that “there is also great value in the authenticity and 
originality of the literary voice of a good reporter”, which is a distinctive element of Latin 
American journalism. “Many colleagues and I defend the use of literary elements, of 
chronicle in reporting, which is part of a Latin American tradition – it offers the possibility 
to be both accurate and imaginative in reporting,” he says.  
 
A smaller number of interviewees say that they pursue ideals of an objective and 
accurate journalism, arguably akin to the one that is predominantly practiced in the 
Anglo-American tradition. “Journalism must be rigorous and objective, it’s not about 
disguising opinion as news, it’s about facts and balance – that’s why news-making 
should be left to professionals,” says Medina. Scharfenberg defends the idea that 
“extreme polarisation and the rule of an arbitrary regime are no excuse for reporters to 
turn into commentators or partisan journalists when elaborating news”. Weffer argues 
that “for good journalism to prosper in Venezuela reporters require more freedom, 
accessibility to official information, a harassment-free environment, but mainly we need 
to preserve essential journalistic values.”  
 
The strongest opposition to the above arguments are expressed by a group of pro-
government journalists. Bolívar says he does not believe much in the alleged traditional 
norms of journalism for he finds they are contrary to “genuine participatory debate 
among citizens and among journalists, and have become a stagnant and outdated 
Decalogue”. He, Ameliut Hernández, Pérez and Villegas argue that professionalism in 
news production should be understood within revolutionary parameters. Such 
parameters imply, according to Villegas, “establishing direct channels of communication 
with the popular sectors and informing in a truthful and transparent way, outside the 
market orthodoxy”. Similarly, Pérez argues that normative journalism “does not have to 
be about complying with neo-liberal, commercial and capitalist standards, but about 
revolutionary commitment, because in Venezuela we’re going through radical changes.”  
 
Clodovaldo Hernández considers that, contrary to most pro-government interviewees, 
news media should ideally follow the “liberal normative model that was predominant in 
Venezuela during the second half of the twentieth century”. He argues that a militant 
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and highly-biased form of journalism, similar to the one that was practiced in the country 
during the nineteenth century, “is not the best way to inform the people and to empower 
citizens”. “Today we have gone back to a very politically-charged news production that 
resembles nineteenth-century journalism in Venezuela – it’s a consequence of our 
reality under Chávez, which surpasses the question of practising journalism according 
to prescriptive ways,” maintains Clodovaldo Hernández. 
 
6.10.2. Impact of community media and citizen journalism 
 
The vast majority of private media journalists and editors interviewed argue that they 
predominantly support both traditional professional norms and formal journalistic 
training. “Regardless of which media outlet one works for, or the type of audience one 
has, the journalistic values should be the same, and these ought to be better engrained 
among professionals than non-professionals or the so-called ‘citizen journalists,’” 
argues Peñaloza. Similarly, Weffer considers that news-making “should come mainly 
from media professionals, for they tend to be better trained to elaborate news stories for 
audiences with different points of view, and can present information in an accurate and 
balanced way.” 
 
As pointed out earlier, many interviewees concur that professional journalism in 
Venezuela has been tested by factors such as extreme social and political polarisation; 
harassment and threats to media workers; forms of censorship and self-censorship; 
implementation of new media regulations; and lack of access to sources of information 
and official data. Additionally, when asked about the most recent challenges for 
professionalism in Venezuelan news media, some pointed out that the surge of 
communitarian media and the increasing use of digital platforms for comment and 
reporting have been affecting professionalism to various degrees.  
 
A minority of interviewees working in pro-opposition media believes that communitarian 
outlets have been gradually attenuating some tenets of professional journalism, 
particularly because of their pro-government standings and state-propagandist roles. “I 
know many professional journalists who, like me, agree with the ideal that 
communitarian media should proliferate within a popular ‘bottom-up’ approach for local 
development, but not as cheerleaders of Chávez’s party, which is the sad reality,” 
argues Coscojuela. These interviewees, however, believe that the surge of 
communitarian media has not undermined professional journalism to a significant 
degree in the nation, because most of the influential private media organisations have 
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strengthened, during the second half of the 2000s, the promotion of professionalism.  
 
Among pro-government media workers opinions are divided in relation to the impact of 
communitarian media on journalistic professional practice. Rivette argues that news 
reporting has become “too politicised on the one hand, and too amateur on the other”. 
He explains that there should be a clear divide in the communicational objectives and in 
the operational structures of mainstream media and communitarian ones. A small group 
of pro-government interviewees disagree with this view. Moreover, Bolívar, Caballero 
and Caraballo dispute the idea that communitarian media, and its predominantly non-
professional journalistic procedures, could represent a threat to traditional tenets while 
championing non-normative ways to produce information.  
 
6.10.3. Digital/online media and its effects on journalism 
 
The majority of pro-government media workers consider that the new digital media 
platforms – particularly social media – have been gaining a significant place among 
media professionals. This group also believes that blogs, emerging local news 
websites, and social media platforms do not represent, as a whole, a dilemma for 
journalists and news organisations. Their opinions describe a process in which new 
media are continuously gaining presence locally, amplifying participation in media 
production and consumption, and changing to some degree aspects in the constitution 
of news while coexisting harmoniously with the mainstream national media.  
 
Chacín, De García and Sartori say that the vast majority of Venezuelan mainstream 
media have incorporated online news sites, and that convergence between traditional 
and new media has been aptly assimilated by both media practitioners and the 
audience/readers. Also, some established journalists have begun developing opinion 
blogs and political affairs websites. According to seventeen interviewees, such 
tendency in journalistic blogging should expand significantly in the near future.  
 
In Bolívar’s view, online media “is growing vertiginously fast in Venezuela, and this 
should force traditional media to rethink, themselves, the way they operate because 
soon they will be broke”. He belongs to a minority of pro-government interviewees that 
maintain that online media intensifies democratic inclusion and is more plural and 
accessible than traditional, mainstream media. Also, he considers that platforms such 
as Twitter are being increasingly used by local journalists and workers of 
communitarian media. Importantly, Saldivia argues that Chávez’s Twitter account (with 
 
 
209 
 
over 4 million followers) and his constant use of it has created “an interactive 
communication with the people and has stimulated not only media workers but the 
popular sectors to use Twitter for debating national issues.” 
 
Most interviewees working in the private media concur that online media have been 
acquiring increasing importance among both journalists and their audiences. Notably, 
many of these journalists maintain that the multiple online media platforms have had a 
significant impact on Venezuelan news production, but that the new digital technologies 
should not represent a threat to normative journalistic values and practices. Arguably, 
Weffer sums up such idea when explaining that “Twitter, Facebook… indeed the 
Internet, are great tools for our journalistic work, but the essence and principles of 
journalism do not change – one must stay true to the ethics of journalism.”  
 
A large number of private-media journalists has a critical perception of the way some 
new media platforms are being used by journalists and media workers. “Social media 
cannot be treated as a source, but during the last years in Venezuela we’re witnessing 
how speculative tweets are being considered news,” says Prieto. “Social media is de-
professionalising news practice in the country, generating much speculation, 
uncertainty, and undermining whatever little reflectivity we have left in this highly-
polarised society,” argues Marcano. “There is no adequate verification being practised 
in most of the social media or in supposedly independent news websites; and this 
applies to both Chavista and pro-opposition media – we are witnessing a sort of 
‘twitterfication’ and ‘rumourisation’ of news, which goes against professional norms,” 
explains Mayorca. Like twenty-one other interviewees, he laments that some journalists 
carried out what he considers to be non-professional, unethical practices in online 
media by “using Facebook, blogs, and especially Twitter to spread rumours and false 
news.”   
 
Importantly, this large group of interviewees considers that during the 2000s there has 
been scant news generated in social media or in news-aggregating sites. Rather, these 
digital platforms reiterate or expand the news produced by mainstream media. Lugo-
Galicia argues that online media in Venezuela is “reactive to what the mainstream 
media reports on; one cannot say that the news agenda has shifted to social media or 
blogs”. Mayorca says that social media in Venezuela “tend to amplify, in a hysterical or 
hyper-polarised way” what has been communicated through the mainstream media. A 
majority of journalists working in private media agree with Lugo-Galicia’s and Mayorca’s 
views.    
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6.10.4. Professional ethics in “exceptional times” 
 
The growing presence of comment in news throughout all media platforms is only one 
of many aspects which, according to twenty-eight interviewees, have been undermining 
ethical practice among journalists. Most of the interviewees concur that during the 
2000s there has been a crisis in journalistic ethics unknown to modern Venezuela and – 
what seems just as relevant – that such a situation tends to be understood as a result of 
an exceptional historical moment. “The reality of the media under the Chávez-led 
revolution cannot be placed on the same level as the general circumstances of the 
media during the neo-liberal years (1980s and 1990s) – then the media had some 
watchdog elements, but most of the outlets sided with the elites,” explains Clodovaldo 
Hernández.  
 
Clodovaldo Hernández, Saldivia, Sartori and Villegas argue that during the Chávez 
administration ethical standards in the media have not been ideal and must find ways to 
be re-evaluated and exercised in order to underpin a radical democracy. “The ethics we 
studied at the schools of journalism, sadly, have not been viable for now, because the 
country is undergoing an intense political confrontation,” explains Sartori. However, the 
four also concur that a relevant achievement of the state-owned and communitarian 
media has been the ethical manner in which these have become an integral part of a 
revolutionary and democratic process whereby the media have become platforms for 
citizen participation, popular empowerment and public debate in Venezuela.  
 
Most interviewees working in the private and pro-opposition media agree that the news 
organisations they are part of have, since the mid-2000s, shifted towards a more ethical 
journalistic practice. This group argues that journalists working in the private media 
have a clearer understanding of ethical values and are more self-critical about their 
ethical performance than their counterparts in the officialist media.  
A more generalised view among private media journalists is that the politically-polarised 
and advocacy stances among a large group of news practitioners leaves scarce room 
for professional ideals and ethical contributions. Weffer echoes such critical opinions 
when saying: “The ethical journalist has become a very uncomfortable witness for the 
polarised sectors of society, because that ethical journalist cares about balance and 
transparency, whereas most of the audience want biased news and opinion”. In a 
conclusive manner, Prieto explains that for there to exist an ethical approach to 
journalism in Venezuela, journalists and editors “have to step outside the dynamics of 
 
 
211 
 
polarisation and take the risk of working from a non-polarised position, to generate truly 
democratic debate.” 
 
6.10.5. Media’s contribution to democracy  
 
A majority of interviewees expressed that among journalists – as with the rest of 
Venezuelan society – the notions and models of democracy and what these represent 
are varied and contested. Hence, as Saldivia, Bisbal and Petkoff argue, evaluating the 
media’s contribution to democracy becomes a complex task. “A Chavista will say that 
the officialist media have supported the communities and will disregard the way the 
authoritarian regime has persecuted some critical journalists; most oppositional 
journalists, on the other hand, will say that we’re living under a dictatorship”, says 
Petkoff. “If democracy is about trying to amplify the market and to follow a neo-liberal 
agenda, then the private media have contributed to it; if it’s about enhancing popular 
participation and freedom, then the revolutionary media have contributed to it,” explains 
Saldivia.   
 
Most practitioners established in pro-government news outlets claim that the officialist 
and state media – like its journalists and editors – have fortified democracy in the 
nation, especially in the sense of assisting and strengthening community organisation 
and participation, as well as helping debate revolutionary ideals. This is arguably 
summarised by Saldivia’s words: “Revolutionary media have contributed like few sets of 
organisations to democratising political participation and political awareness among the 
people; the poorer sectors now know they have an ally in our media.”   
 
This broad group is critical of the allegedly non-democratic performance of the pro-
opposition media. “The private, right-wing media have not been promoting democratic 
debate but have been inciting chaos, hatred and attempts to damage the revolutionary 
process,” says Marco Hernández. He, like Canorea, Chacín and De García argue that 
the pro-opposition media owners and many of their journalists have been outspoken 
against the “revolutionary” media regulations because the former “see them as a threat 
for their businesses and interests; they dislike that the regulations are designed to 
empower the poor.” 
 
Contrarily, most of the pro-opposition interviewees consider that the Chávez 
administration has sought to curb democratic practice while asphyxiating the nation’s 
critical media, and that the official media have been echoing and defending its 
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authoritarian policies. “The officialist media, and to an important degree the 
communitarian media, stand in opposition to democratic principles – they agree with the 
persecution of dissident journalists, with the shutting down of critical media, with the 
regime’s harassment towards critics of Chávez,” says Medina. “The state media have 
contributed to destroying all sense of institutionalism and lack any autonomy; in 
essence, they are tools of a caudillo, not of democracy,” says Lozano.  
 
When assessing the contribution of the private news organisations and the media in 
general to democracy in Venezuela, opinions tend to vary among interviewees that are 
critical towards Chávez’s policies. Most agree that during the 2000s it became very 
difficult for the private media to operate in relative freedom and to effectively promote 
plural and democratic debate. “Democracy is about debate, about defending rights and 
freedoms, and allows no room for threats from the government – most of the 
responsible private media have sought to encourage democracy through news and 
opinion, but the regime does not tolerate this,” argues Martín.  
 
Twelve interviewees who have worked in the private media accuse the government of 
being authoritarian and the official media of being broadly militant; yet they also argue 
that the private media – to varying degrees – has not played a convincing democratic 
role. Prieto argues that “by no means” has the journalism carried out in the majority of 
Venezuelan private news organisations during the last decade helped strengthen 
democracy. “Journalism here has lost its will to debate ideas; it has mainly become a 
mere political instrument or a merchandising product, with very few exceptions”. In a 
similar tenor, Coscojuela argues that most media professionals are “caught up in the 
dilemma of polarisation and do little or nothing to contribute towards a positive debate 
within the public sphere.” 
 
A large group of other interviewees working in the private sector is less pessimistic. 
They argue that even though it has become increasingly difficult to practice a 
transparent, balanced and watchdog journalism under the Chávez administration, there 
have been clear signs of a growing awareness among many editors, journalists and 
some media owners about the need to effectively promote democratic debate while 
embracing professional norms. This, many argue, has become evident during the 
second half of the 2000s, when certain reporters in the private media shifted from 
partisan practices to those underpinned by traditional, professional tenets.  
 
To conclude this theme, it is important to highlight that among both pro-government and 
 
 
213 
 
pro-opposition media workers there are some nuanced postures in relation to 
professionalism and about the mechanisms by which journalists should develop their 
ethical standings and contributions to a democratic society. An important group of 
journalists and editors presage that a trend towards more professional norms and 
practices should develop further, and contribute to, liberal democratic principles, even 
though it is expected to be strongly challenged by the forces of Chavismo. Some pro-
government reporters and editors disregard liberal notions of objectivity and apparent 
neutrality in news production and seem hopeful in continuing to promote and in being 
part of a predominantly partisan journalism, framed in the Chavista ideals of a 
participative and revolutionary media practice.   
 
6.11. Conclusion 
 
The foregoing section offers an extensive description of this research’s core findings. 
Having undertaken a process of qualitative interviewing with a representative sample of 
Venezuelan reporters, editors and media-related professionals, their perceptions and 
opinions have been presented within ten inter-linked themes which address this study’s 
organising questions.  
 
A very evident aspect of the new Venezuelan mediascape, according to journalists 
interviewed, is that during the Chávez era the national media have been highly-active 
elements in the construction of what has become the most socially and politically-
polarised environment in Venezuela’s democratic history. Even though a majority of 
interviewees agree that this is not beneficial for ethical journalistic practice and overall 
normative democracy, others believe that it represents a desirable stage of a 
revolutionary process. The clash of two different political projects – one led by Chávez, 
the other promoted by a predominantly liberal-leaning opposition – has significantly 
permeated journalists’ everyday agency. A key shift the Venezuelan ‘ideological war’ 
has brought to the foreground in relation to the media has been the increasing 
harassment and physical threat towards reporters, media workers and owners. Another 
notable shift has been the gradual disappearance of accessibility to official, state 
sources for most private news outlets. A further limitation for independent and watchdog 
reporting in the private media in general – particularly within the broadcast spectrum – 
has been the official establishment of a legal framework for the media, which is backed 
by pro-government journalists who defend what they believe to be its enhancement of 
popular, participative democracy.   
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The media landscape has also been significantly transformed with the overwhelming 
growth of state-owned media and the transformative character of communitarian media. 
Views among interviewees are divergent regarding the role of communitarian media, for 
some are of the opinion that these outlets have democratised communication while 
others emphasise that they essentially operate as propaganda tools for Chávez. 
Partisanship and non-liberal practices within these and the news media at large have 
clearly challenged professional journalistic tenets as modelled in western theories.  
 
While news-gathering has been negatively affected by the hostile environment towards 
the media, news agendas have been dramatically shaped by the logic of political 
polarisation and by the pervasive presence of Chávez in the media. His weekly 
broadcast Aló Presidente, and the systematic transmittal of official blanket messages, 
have redefined political communications in the country as well as the role of news 
media in social mobilisation and the shaping of public opinion. Again, Chávez’s hyper-
mediatic persona and his use of state and communitarian media to spur his political 
project have underlined a strong binary divide among journalists. Those of a critical 
viewpoint argue that Chávez’s personalist use of the media is irreconcilable with 
balanced, ethical, professional practice, whereas those that support him find that it 
contributes to defining a desirable radical democracy. 
 
Overall, there is evidence that the ideas of freedom of the press, of censorship and self-
censorship, and of the media’s role in enhancing democratic debate are manifestly 
different between most pro-government and pro-opposition media practitioners. This 
arguably underlines many other pressing aspects of journalistic understanding of 
democracy highlighted in this chapter. In the following section, these empirical findings 
are analysed critically by linking them to theoretical, historical, and normative 
perspectives which were discussed in the initial chapters. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Discussion and analysis of findings 
 
 
The preceding section of this study selectively presented opinions and data – grouped 
into ten thematic constructions – derived from in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
carried out among Venezuelan journalists, editors, media workers, media 
commentators and scholars. This chapter discusses and analyses their responses with 
reference to the theoretical, narrative, and historical formulations discussed in the first 
four chapters of this research.  
 
The ten themes developed and discussed in the previous chapter have been 
condensed in this section into four inclusive analytical strands, in order to enhance 
focus and direction in critically addressing key issues related to journalistic practice and 
the democratic role of the news media in Venezuela. The four analytical strands are:    
 
 Ideas of democracy, the democratic role of the media and polarisation; 
 The populist paradigm, state media and communitarian media; 
 Private ownership, media regulations, censorship and the ideological imperative;  
 Accessibility, watchdog role, journalistic autonomy and dilemmas in 
professionalism. 
 
7.1. Ideas of democracy, the democratic role of the media and polarisation 
 
There is evidence that the idea of democracy as the dominant standard of political 
legitimacy is prevalent among Venezuelan journalists and media workers. It could be 
argued that Carrera Damas’ formulation of Venezuela’s “third step in the road towards 
democracy” (2007: 164), when the nation’s last dictator was overthrown in 1958, 
continues to provide a landmark within journalists’ narratives of political representation, 
participation and deliberation. Prevalence and deepening of democracy continues to be 
a desired political and social aim for all interviewees.  
 
However, democratic discourses and aspirations – just like the very concept of 
democracy – vary considerably among media practitioners and observers. Moreover, 
during the Chávez era the differences in understanding and promoting democracy 
have become further distinct, and media workers – like the majority of the population – 
much more vocal in promoting the models of democracy they stand by.  Even though 
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there are evident nuances within the political spectrum, the majority of interviewees 
position themselves in colliding interpretations of democracy. These can arguably be 
located – at least nominally – in Corcoran’s (1983) guiding formulation of a radical 
tradition, on the one hand, and a liberal one, on the other.  
 
As gathered from what was expressed by the majority of interviewees, there are two 
dominant camps of thought installed among Venezuelan’s discourses on democracy, 
each requiring various qualifiers. One is essentially aligned with Marxist-inspired 
paradigms of radical, direct, participatory, communitarian democracy (Macpherson 
1972, Bobbio 1987, Callinicos 1991, Held 2006). The other belongs to the liberal 
current, circumscribing the ideas of representative, institutional, electoral, pluralist 
democracy (Dahl 1956 and 1999, Bobbio 1987, Held 2006, Sartori 2007b). Thus, in the 
context of Venezuela, the narratives of democracy are strongly installed – arguably like 
never before – within the Left-Right axis, as formulated by Bobbio (1987 and 1997). 
However, it was claimed by a non-Chavista sector of left-wing leaning media workers 
and commentators that Chávez’s discourse and its echoing by his government and 
supporters have “co-opted” and “kidnapped” – to use the expressions of two 
interviewees109 – elements and concepts of the Left, while allegedly not representing 
the theoretical and practical tenets of a progressive, reformist and inclusive Left, as 
defined by Petkoff (2005 and 2007), Castañeda (2006) and Mangabeira-Unger (2006). 
So, even though the democratic debate within society, and as shown among 
interviewees, is essentially encompassed within a highly dichotomous scheme of Left-
Right standings, both political concepts – particularly the Left – remain broadly 
contested, albeit Chávez’s emphasis on defining his political project as socialist, 
revolutionary and anti-imperialist.  
 
It is important to highlight that the Left-Right divide was found to be strongly permeated 
by the populist paradigm, whereby, as defined by Arditi (2004) and Laclau (2005), a 
leading figure – Chávez in this case – subverts the pre-established socio-political order 
while creating a direct emotional and political linkage with ‘the people’, the subordinate 
classes. Interestingly, pro-Chávez interviewees did not define his rupturist political 
project as populist. In fact, only two of them used the term, whereas, among opposition 
journalists such characterisation – generally of pejorative connotations – was 
prevalent.  
 
                                                          
109 Teodoro Petkoff, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 6th April and 4th June 2012; and 
Cristina Marcano, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 7th June 2012. 
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Just as the understanding and valuation of models of democracy are contested so, too, 
are the ideas of journalistic practice and news-media production in relation to 
democracy-building. Most advocates of Chávez interviewed do not adhere to the 
principal liberal, western values as expressed by theorists of freedom of the press and 
defenders of commercial media, exemplified by Siebert (1963). They claim that, in the 
liberal context, media have been ultimately utilised as instruments of control by the 
dominant social class, the oligarchy, rather than as emancipatory and participatory 
tools for democratic enhancement. This group, openly pro-government, echo 
Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony, as explicated by Artz et al (2006), when claiming 
that the media should be used by its practitioners to challenge and modify pre-existing 
forms of class domination and elitist representations of reality. Among this pro-Chávez 
group it was found that a revolutionary role of the media in terms of its emancipatory, 
participative and inclusive potential is the predominant form of understanding the 
democratic contribution of their journalistic work to the wider society.     
 
Although many pro-government interviewees claim that such a revolutionary role within 
the state-owned and the communitarian media has been attained to a significant 
degree, others from the same pro-Chávez camp argue that authentic revolutionary, 
communitarian, grassroots media in Venezuela are very much in embryonic stages, 
and that these still entail many aspects “inherited” from liberal, capitalist models. There 
is, however, a minority of left-wing and pro-government reporters and editors who 
maintain that, for journalistic practice to contribute to democratic debate and civic 
dialogue, it is paramount that news media systematically check on the power elites – 
particularly the government. But, carrying out a watchdog role on the Chávez 
administration and on the public sector becomes a problematic area for the vast 
majority of pro-government reporters and editors, and has lost relevance as part of 
their ideals of journalistic contribution to democracy.  
 
On the other hand, most media workers and commentators who are critical of the 
government are convinced that the media, as a democratic institution, should operate 
ideally in a non-partisan and autonomous manner, so as to elaborate information that 
is balanced and of public interest, while keeping the government and the powerful in 
check. In this sense, it can be argued that the majority of the pro-opposition group find 
desirable Habermas’s notion that the press – and the news media at large – ought to 
be the public sphere’s main institution for “fostering democratic politics” (Schudson 
2003: 212). Yet, pro-opposition journalists – with few exceptions – by no means fully 
advocate for an Anglo-American media model in its most normative character, as 
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defined by Siebert (1963) or Hallin and Mancini (2004). The ideas of alleged balance, 
transparency, accuracy, and objectivity – all of which are prominent in the U.S. liberal 
narrative of the media – among the majority of these journalists tend to merge with 
certain licences to comment in news or reportages, and to use literary devices that 
mainly belong to fiction writing – aspects which have been part of the Latin American 
journalistic tradition (García Ponce 2001, Díaz Rangel 2007). 
 
The different and often-colliding perspectives of the democratic role of the news media 
among practitioners have intensified during the Chávez era. Moreover, the dominant 
form of journalism that had been developing since 1958, during Venezuela’s 
democratic period and underlined by the party-politics of puntofijismo (Díaz Rangel 
2007, Caballero 2010), entered a time of crisis. Most of the news media in Venezuela 
had operated during the puntofijista period within a liberal-inspired framework – albeit 
with occasional limitations to freedom and patent clientelist traits –, and loosely 
influenced by its ideals. These have been strongly challenged by a social environment 
defined by overt political confrontation and ideological struggle between Chavismo and 
oppositional forces. According to most sources, Venezuela had not experienced such 
profound levels of political polarisation during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
The partisanship which has emerged among media practitioners and in news media 
content – an all-important component of a highly-polarised social sphere – maintains 
close similarities with the overtly militant and pugnacious type of journalism practiced in 
Venezuela throughout the nineteenth century (Grases 1967, Febres Cordero 1983, 
García Ponce 2001). Political polarisation, as reflected in the news media during the 
2000s, most resemble that which existed in the press during and after Venezuela’s 
Federal War (1859-1863) through to Guzmán Blanco’s presidencies110 (Febres 
Cordero 1983, Salcedo Bastardo 1996). 
 
The profound polarisation in Venezuela’s media landscape also responds to the legacy 
of a “long history of incomplete democracy”, as expressed by one interviewee111. There 
is consensus among most of the study’s interviewees that the republic’s democratic 
period generated a political-party system that gradually became discredited in most 
social narratives because of its increasing corruption and administrative 
mismanagement, lack of participative political and social policies, and a general 
negligence towards the needs of the popular sectors. A majority of interviewees echo 
                                                          
110 President Antonio Guzmán Blanco ruled Venezuela intermittently between 1870 and 1887, 
during three terms.  
111 Clodovaldo Hernández, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 6th June 2012. 
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Lander’s idea that, under the ongoing polarised environment in the Chávez era, “a 
discussion around the interpretation of meaning of events is no longer possible, since 
agreement on the very events themselves is impossible” (2008: 83).   
 
Although polarisation in the news media increased overwhelmingly, its escalation has 
not been linear. Rather, it has developed through peak periods, alternating its intensity 
depending on how journalists, editors and owners react to specific events in the 
unravelling political collision between Chavismo and the opposition. Elections and 
referenda have proved to be markedly polarised spells, with media outlets redoubling 
their militancy and political sectarianism on both sides of the spectrum. However, the 
2002-2003 period, during which both an anti-Chávez coup d’état and a general strike 
took place, proved to be the most critical point of polarisation, with most of the private 
media playing active oppositional roles and assuming, to varying degrees, the 
functions of political parties; and the state-owned and the pro-Chávez communitarian 
media reacting as instruments of state communications and support (Ibid, Botía 2007, 
Villegas 2009). It is arguably at this point that public service broadcasters – which had 
always been aligned with the government – became patent instruments of state 
messages and propaganda, serving to mobilise Chávez’s supporters, and have since 
maintained such a role.  
 
As explained by Lozada, polarisation has indeed “favoured the naturalisation and 
legitimisation of violence” in Venezuela (2011: 27). Some journalists and commentators 
in the news media have evoked and promoted forms of violent language. Hence, 
political content in the news media has become strongly charged with an emotional 
pitch, and it is not rare to find the use of words like “fascists”, “coup plotters”, “lackeys”, 
“anti-patriots” in the pro-government media to label the opposition; or “assassins”, 
“thugs”, “dictator”, “tropical Hitler” to describe Chávez’s persona and/or his political 
project in the pro-opposition media. Over time, the dissident news outlets have shown 
more moderation in their journalistic language compared to the pro-government media, 
which echo the President’s confrontational rhetoric. Furthermore, the pro-Chávez news 
outlets have reflected the hegemonic struggle between two rival political stances in a 
language of dichotomy: the Left versus the Right, “the popular” versus “the rich”, 
“revolutionaries” versus “neo-liberals”, etc. This was found to be less apparent in the 
private media, particularly during the second half of the 2000s – by then these news 
organisations reduced the polarising role they had adopted during the first five years of 
the Chávez administration. So, while the rhetoric of polarisation was used strategically 
by Chávez and the pro-government news outlets throughout the 2000s, some of the 
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private media, particularly the press, sought normative alternatives of journalism. It 
should be noted, however, that certain private news outlets maintained a polarising 
stance throughout the decade.    
 
Journalists were found to be fully aware of the existence of intense polarisation in 
Venezuela and most have a clear idea about its mechanisms and socio-political 
consequences. Again, there is division of opinion in the evaluation of the 
consequences of polarisation in news-production, journalism practice, and the all-
permeating effects these have on society. Within this division, a majority are critical in 
relation to polarisation, arguing that it constructs distorted representations of others in 
the media, thus impoverishing public discourse and political debate. Also, as argued by 
them, polarisation intrinsically imposes a Manichaean reading of socio-political reality, 
and tends to legitimise violence as a means of political domination, while obstructing 
democratic and peaceful solutions to conflicts, as also argued by Bisbal (2008a and 
2009), Lozada (2011) and Waisbord (2011 and 2012).  
 
It can be inferred from these interviews that the pro-government media, in aligning 
themselves with Chávez’s political rhetoric, have been strategically using a polarising 
narrative in news coverage and production, seeking to neutralise pro-opposition voices 
and critical media. An important sector of journalists and editors in the state-owned and 
communitarian news outlets affirms that polarisation in the media is not negative, for it 
is a mechanism by which ‘the people’ can become politically aware (Laclau 2005, 
Garretón 2006) and are able to attain mass mobilisation against oppressive agents – 
namely, the traditional, liberal, capitalist elite. Some argue that journalistic neutrality is 
not only a bourgeois or neo-liberal idea, but that it is anti-political and frivolous.  
 
The justification and intensification for militant and polarised forms of journalism has 
meant that moderate voices in the media have been gradually losing ground and 
audiences/readers. Journalists and commentators with a radical, biased, militant 
stance have been amassing a large media following and have displaced, to an 
important degree, reporters and analysts that defend mainstream, professional, 
normative forms of journalism. The latter, critical of the use of news media as tools of 
overt ideological confrontation, argue that polarisation – if intensified further in 
Venezuela’s media and journalistic environment – could lead to sustained forms of 
direct violence or even to a civil war.   
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7.2. The populist paradigm, state and communitarian media 
 
Polarisation in Venezuelan media and society reflects many aspects of the logic of 
populism as partly defined by Canovan (1981), Ansaldi (2007), Merino (2007) and 
Keane (2009). Under Chávez’s government, Venezuela represents that ‘grey area’ that 
is populism in democracy dynamics. Within the nation’s society and media a 
Manichean discourse – in which political standings are defined to an important degree 
by the symbolic construction of an enemy, and through the rhetoric of systematic 
confrontation – has become prevalent. Authors of different political perspectives like 
Diamond (2002), Laclau (2005) and Ansaldi (2007) coincide in their view that, in Latin 
America’s political tradition, populism has been identified with non-liberal, authoritarian 
and charismatic leaderships.  
 
Not since Argentina’s Juan Domingo Perón had the Latin American region experienced 
such as an overwhelming populist phenomenon as the one brought about by President 
Chávez. According to many interviewees and analysts, Chávez epitomises the twenty-
first-century version of Venezuelan nineteenth-century caudillos, most of who had 
military backgrounds, developed strong personalistic leaderships, and showed very 
limited concern for liberal ideas of institutionalism.  
 
Chávez’s hyper-leadership has relied heavily on the use of media. Some 
commentators in this study have gone as far as suggesting that his rise to power and 
successive popularity are mainly the product of his media exposure and his strategic 
use of broadcasts. However, what is most evident is that Chávez has been able to 
establish a relentless media presence for himself in Venezuela. With such media 
ubiquitousness he has strategically propagated his political messages, mobilised his 
followers, verbally attacked his enemies, and set the national news agenda – and the 
regional one, to an important degree. Under his government, it was found that news 
media in Venezuela have become more President-centred than ever before. This trait 
of the nation’s new political and media landscape has, again, divided opinions and 
revealed to be problematic. 
 
Hardly any neutral opinions were found in relation to Chávez’s use of his weekly 
broadcast Aló Presidente and his recurring blanket messages that are compulsory for 
all national broadcasting outlets. His followers and sympathisers that work in the media 
maintain that the President’s intense on-screen and radio presence is positive and 
necessary for the deepening of a socialist, revolutionary process. In this sense, it can 
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be argued that Chávez’s personal use of media is partially guided by a political ideal 
that seeks to enhance participatory democracy while also channelling the popular 
disenchantment towards pre-existing neo-liberal policies and promoting alternative 
ones, as explained by Barret et al (2008) and some interviewees. Chávez’s personal 
broadcasts and some of his cadenas simulate a direct connection between the people 
and the President, and some consider them to boost a radical, indispensable 
relationship between leader and revolutionaries. Also, within the political tug-of-war 
between Chavismo and opposition forces, Aló Presidente and cadenas proved to have 
been strategically successful in mitigating the advocacy journalism of some pro-
opposition and anti-Chávez private media.    
 
However, the pervasive manner in which Chávez utilises the media clashes with 
fundamental liberal values, and arguably undermines democratic practice, as many 
journalists and commentators explained. His discourse in the media – highly-
politicised, militant and divisive – has not stimulated a constructive debate within 
Venezuela’s society, which ought to be a role of the media in democracy, as explained 
by Keane (1991), Schudson (1995 and 2003), McQuail (2005), and Bisbal (2008a and 
2009). Moreover, it has spurred a narrative that is both belligerent and divisive – often 
resorting to militarist allusions – through much of the media that is state-owned or pro-
government, against the political opposition and the critical media.   
 
Among interviewees of liberal and critical bent it became evident that dealing with the 
tone and content of most of Chávez’s messages has been a challenge, particularly 
when the President accuses some of them of being “servants” of a “media oligarchy” or 
“pawns” of the “U.S. empire” – characterisation which can be associated with political-
economic and neo-Marxist critiques of media ownership and corporatism, as 
formulated by McChesney (2000), Mosco (2006), and Parra (2010). As an important 
consequence of such deprecations, much of the population came to regard dissident 
journalists as declared enemies of the Bolivarian political project, and as unethical 
practitioners, who were allegedly subordinated – as argued by authors of the Marxist 
tradition – to the private interests of the dominant elite.   
 
Similarly, Chávez’s mediatic ubiquity represents a dilemma for journalists of liberal 
normative ideals, namely the majority of those working in the private media. It has 
become very difficult for most media outlets to maintain coverage of all the traditionally-
established news sections in a professional manner. There are two main reasons for 
this. One is the personalistic disposition of Chávez’s use of the media and his 
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broadcasted hyper-leadership. The other is the reactive nature of most of the critical 
reporters and editors to whatever the President affirms in his speeches and 
broadcasts. The news agenda has been increasingly determined on the basis of 
Chávez’s actions and statements. As a result, the impoverishment of diversity in news 
coverage has become evident, as have the mechanisms by which critical journalists 
could withstand the logic of polarisation.       
 
As a key component of his hyper-leadership and populist communicational strategy, 
Chávez increasingly created new state media outlets while also buying private ones for 
his revolutionary project. State-funded broadcast stations that had previously worked 
under a scheme which mainly privileged educational and public service – albeit always 
entailing a pro-government standing – have been turned into active disseminators of 
pro-Chávez messages and content. Never in Venezuela’s democratic history had the 
state owned so many media outlets, principally in the broadcast spectrum. Very 
importantly, never had news material been so prominent in state-funded media and, by 
the same token, so politicised.  
 
Defined as a new, disproportionate media hegemony by most critics of Chávez and his 
government, the ever-growing state ownership has been gradually asphyxiating the 
private sector and the political opposition. In its antagonism towards the pro-opposition 
media, one of its main aims appears to consist in minimising the power of oppositional 
voices in the private media and the potential re-emergence of a strong anti-Chávez 
force.  
 
Evidently, the coup d’état against the President in April 2002 and its aftermath – which 
most of the private, pro-oppositional media covered in a highly-biased and unethical 
way – indicated to Chavismo that a more robust and larger state media structure was 
necessary in order to counter potential future attacks from sectors of the opposition. As 
Chávez’s government increased considerably its ownership of media outlets and these, 
in turn, adopted a stronger advocate role, it can be argued that a majority of journalists 
within the private media began exercising a more moderate and less biased tone. 
 
Pro-Chávez interviewees indicated welcoming the exponential growth of the state-
owned media. Its expansion can be theoretically supported by the anti-imperialist and 
developmentalist narratives of Frank (1969), Mattelart and Mattelart (2005) and Bolaño 
(1999). These authors, echoed by some interviewees, have drawn criticisms towards 
the cultural and economic subordination of Latin American media to the United States. 
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Hence, a radical shift in media ownership – in which Chávez’s self-defined socialist and 
anti-imperialist media gains ground in terms of quantity – represents, under these 
views, a plausible way to curb the nation’s dependency on and influence of U.S. media 
models and information flow.  
 
Some interviewees provided evidence that the Chávez administration has promoted 
and assisted the growth of communitarian media as a means to stimulate popular 
participation and representation in the media. This was also part of the President’s 
strategy for expansive mediatic dominance. Crucially, the vast majority of the more 
than 300 existing communitarian media – often referred to as ‘alternative media’ by 
pro-government commentators – not only reflect increasing political agency for the 
working-class and poorer minorities but have been operating to a significant degree as 
journalistic support for Chávez. The advocacy role of communitarian media workers, 
together with the non-professional background of most of its staff members, has 
resulted in trenchant criticisms from professional media workers of the private sector, 
and has also led to tensions with some pro-government professional journalists 
working in traditional media. The frequently colliding visions regarding journalistic 
practice between the predominantly-amateur workers of communitarian media and the 
professionals of state and mainstream state media proves that normative elements of 
liberal journalistic practice – as described by Gurevitch and Blumler (1990), Aguirre 
(1998), Curran (2002), and Schudson (2003) – are present among some 
‘revolutionary’, pro-Chávez and non-liberal practitioners.  
 
Indeed, it was argued by many interviewees that most community news outlets tend to 
reproduce or re-broadcast pro-government information elaborated by state and official 
media; they resonate as instruments that have been partly elaborated to echo 
Chávez’s messages and the government party’s indications. The significant 
dependence on the state, and the systematic assistance to the government’s actions in 
Venezuela’s newer community media, are traits that Siebert and Schramm (1963) 
would include in their formulations of ‘authoritarian’ and ‘Soviet’ theories of the press. 
Yet, their context, character and operating mechanisms are not as formulaic as that. 
Community media in the 2000s can be considered an integral element of Chávez’s 
socio-political policies to empower Venezuela’s popular and poorer sectors of society, 
which had been broadly misrepresented or under-represented – and even disqualified 
to some degree – in most of the news media prior to Chávez’s arrival to power.  
 
Communitarian media have enabled the popular sectors in Venezuela to gain a socio-
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cultural space from where to negotiate with national institutions and society at large, 
while also allowing them to attain an important presence in the news media and in 
public debate. The communitarian media arguably represent like few other recent 
phenomena in Venezuela a socio-political transformation whereby individuals of the 
poor majority recognise themselves as “subjects of political and organisational action” 
(Lander 2008: 81). These are voices that had been marginalised before, and through 
reporters and members of the increasingly numerous community media have found the 
informative access and means of self-representation that are desirable in a 
participative and deliberative democracy, as argued by authors Benhabib (1996 and 
2005), Mosco (1996) and Sampedro (2000).  
 
While views from various non-liberal theoretical camps uphold the idea that 
Venezuela’s communitarian media have represented an emancipatory challenge to the 
ideological supremacy of a pre-existing social order, a pervasive liberal and anti-
populist critique among some interviewees contends that these are subordinated to the 
power of the state, to the figure of Chávez, and that most have assumed a 
propagandist role. Yet, an alternative view from the above-mentioned dichotomous 
understanding of communitarian media, and the tensions the latter have brought to the 
foreground among journalists, can be elucidated from Latin American cultural 
theoretical perspectives. Authors Martín-Barbero (1993 and 2000b) and García 
Canclini (1995 and 2008) have stressed that communitarian cultural and media 
products entail a hybrid, subversive and nuanced character; and that popular sectors in 
Latin America tend to maintain a non-passive and highly-fluid relation with the powerful 
through the media. Yet, theorists such as Pasquali (1980 and 2007), Reyes Matta 
(1983) and Beltrán (1999 and 2005), who proposed national media policies based in 
highly-participatory and multi-directional models of communication, would contend that 
the Venezuelan communitarian media model is too reliant on the state and its political 
guidelines, allowing scant space for autonomous communitarian decision-making and 
direct civic interaction. Even so, these communitarian outlets represent examples of 
emerging informative and communicational instruments by which the people can 
potentially mediate, to some degree, political and social aspects that affect them, while 
configuring their hegemonic struggle through their use.  
 
The abundance of communitarian media, together with the Presidential rhetoric and the 
government policies that uphold them, have contributed markedly towards the newly-
acquired relevance of community and popular themes across practically all the media 
spectrum. Evidence suggests that journalists of both state-owned and private news 
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organisations have been drawn to voicing in their news coverage and informative 
production the realities of sectors of society that had been marginalised and 
misrepresented. This labour of recognition and agency is particularly strong in the state 
and pro-government news media. Non-elite and popular sources have become more 
visible and tangible in journalistic production, and spaces in media programming 
dedicated to people’s issues have increased. With the exception of radically capitalist 
theorists and advocates, this is desirable for adherents of varying democratic 
standings. 
 
7.3. Private ownership, media regulations, censorship and the ideological 
imperative  
 
While state-owned news outlets and communitarian media have increased in numbers 
significantly under Chávez, private news organisations have been gradually 
decreasing. Importantly, those private outlets that seek to maintain a critical and 
dissident editorial profile have faced increased pressure and hardships from the 
government and media regulating bodies. The governmental media hegemony 
strategies have reduced not only the numbers of private news outlets but, more 
importantly, the power these had traditionally exerted. As highlighted by scholars in 
Chapter 4, the majority of the private media had been traditionally used by its owners 
for economic and political gains, maintaining traits of political clientelism while 
sustaining episodes of tension with the state (Capriles 1976, Díaz Rangel 2007). The 
Chávez administration, the media it funds, and its followers have challenged the 
traditionally-held domination of the private media. 
 
Chávez’s selectively radical policies defied the existing media system, which has 
traditionally relied on market and commercial dynamics, predominantly promoting 
liberal-inspired values, and possessing significant political agency. Since the fall of the 
nation’s last dictatorship, in 1958, news media had ceased to function as direct 
extensions of political parties but had, since the 1989 social upheaval – El Caracazo – 
adopted a much more active political role, echoing general social discontent, and 
strongly criticising the successive ruling parties and government leaders (Hawkins 
2003, Botía 2007, Caballero 2010). However, it was found that by 2000 many media 
outlets, reporters and columnists had begun taking an overtly partisan position, at 
times superseding political parties – during the early 2000s, this was particularly 
evident within oppositional news organisations. Hence, the validity of the argument 
which indicates that in the Chávez era most journalists became not only very political, 
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but significantly partisan. This, seemingly, poses a problem for some journalists who 
seek to elaborate news under the banners of autonomy, balance and fairness. Within 
the journalistic culture in Venezuela there is a desideratum among most professional 
media workers for normative standards, yet there seems to be scant regard for their 
sustained every-day practice in general terms – as is the case in many non-western 
media systems (McQuail 2005). Alternatively, it can also be argued that intense 
advocate and partisan forms of journalism have emerged among some professional 
reporters and editors as a result of the “exceptional times” – to use the expression of 
some interviewees – that Venezuelan society has gone through during the 2000s 
under a framework of broad politicisation and acute polarisation.   
 
In the prevailing polarised scheme, the confrontational divide that has emerged 
between pro-government and pro-oppositional standings within the media and its 
workers has led to the configuration of ideologically-homogenous newsrooms. Since 
the April 2002 coup d’état, politically and ideologically-motivated migration of media 
workers to news outlets of similar political stances became evident.  
 
Ideological and political homogeneousness within newsrooms was found to be a 
novelty in Venezuela’s history during the democratic era, and has become a 
determinant factor in news decision-making (gatekeeping) and agenda-setting. These 
have changed to less hierarchical dynamics within most news organisations. Reporters 
in both private and state-owned media arguably have more active engagement in the 
type of material that is gathered for news, as well as in the production of information, 
which indicates that gains have been achieved in terms of broader journalistic 
participation and inclusiveness. However, this new form of homogeneousness has also 
presented some qualitative dilemmas. Firstly, there is scarce tolerance within 
newsrooms towards potential political and ideological diversity of its members. 
Secondly, under these conditions overall balanced, fair, accurate, scrutinous reporting 
tends to be supplanted by the organised political-ideological interests of the 
newsrooms. Hence, even though many editors and journalists claim that construction 
and provision of news has become more participative within media outlets it seems 
that, under the emerging rationale for newsroom ideologically-driven configuration, 
reporters relinquish political independence and conventions of balance and 
transparency, all of which undermines public constructive discussion and the media’s 
potential contribution to democracy, as expressed by authors Schudson (1995 and 
2003), Dahl (1999), McQuail (2005), Sartori (2007b) and Waisbord (2007 and 2013).  
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Many interviewees provided evidence that liberal, non-partisan ideals of journalism 
practice, particularly in the private media, have also suffered the effects of new 
regulatory and economic measures established by the Chávez administration. 
Spearheaded by the Organic Law of Telecommunications and the Law of Social 
Responsability for Radio and Television (Resorte), the legal framework that took shape 
after 2002 seeks to democratise the media spectrum, thus incorporating actively 
different groups of Venezuelan society, particularly the popular and poorer sector, in 
inclusive debate.  
 
Under a Marxist-leaning and within a populist logic – as derived from assessments by 
Bolaño (1999), McChesney (2000 and 2008), Waisbord (2011 and 2012) and 
Kitzberger (2012) –, Chávez’s new judicial framework for the media offers a platform 
for non-corporate and popular information outlets and their workers to curb the 
communication power of the market-driven media, the traditional elite, and journalists 
who allegedly reproduce neo-liberal and capitalists values in their news production. 
Yet, a most evident effect of the official regulations – emanating from various liberal 
critiques, an array of freedom of expression organisations, and many journalists 
interviewed – has been the weakening of freedom in reporting, and the imposition of 
hurdles for checking on the public sector and exercising critical news reporting. 
Broadcast journalism is monitored and controlled by regulatory bodies more intensely 
than the press, and their news production has been more affected by the new 
communications legislation. Albeit experiencing increasing pressure from the 
discretionary application of these laws, there are indications that print media editors 
and journalists still have some margins by which to negotiate certain critical content 
with public functionaries.  
 
The government’s implementation of media regulations which allow the Executive to 
suspend any news that it considers unfavourable to national interests, and the 
manner in which it closely regulates the inflow of non-nationally produced media 
content (Hernández Díaz 2009), highlights the centrality of a nation state’s policies 
under apparent globalising tensions. Contrary to central ideas of globalisation 
enthusiasts and technological determinists which stress the prevalence of media 
deregulation and international corporatism during the last decades of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty-first, this study finds in Venezuela’s newly-
established set of laws an important example of media sovereignty and cultural 
resistance from ‘peripheral’ state nations towards the dictates of ‘global’ policies, as 
formulated in Latin American reform and dependency paradigms. Furthermore, the 
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implemented media and communications regulations under the Chávez 
administration indirectly brought to the fore in Venezuela a particular reordering of the 
developmentalist, non-western proposals that dominated the New World Information 
and Communication Order (NWICO) debates during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
focused on combating cultural and economic dependency, and on promoting national 
media production and inclusive access and minorities’ representation in the media. 
Significantly, it was found that many theorists, intellectuals, and journalists who 
backed reform-minded proposals during the NWICO discussions of the 1970s and 
1980s (Pasquali 2007), have become very critical about the negative consequences 
of media regulations set forth by the Venezuelan government during the 2000s. 
 
Both judicial manoeuvres and financial penalisation brought about by Chávez’s 
reformist policies – together with the volatile economic conditions for the private sector 
during the second half of the 2000s – have partly paved the way for censoring critical 
newsrooms. Albeit having the enthusiastic approval of pro-government editors and 
reporters, the new national media legislations have been threatening freedom of 
expression in the private news organisations and imposing varying levels of censorship 
and prior-censorship. The overriding argument among Chavista journalists for the 
escalation of censorship and relative restriction to freedom of expression in the media 
tend to gravitate around two central reasons: the defence of the Chávez-led 
revolutionary process; and the use of ‘revolutionary’ laws and media to counter what 
they consider “right-wing”, “neo-liberal”, “counter-revolutionary” threats from the pro-
opposition media and the rivalling political camp.  
 
Prior-censorship and government-censorship are not new in Venezuelan history 
(Febres Cordero 1983, Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008). Journalistic standards 
underpinned by theories of freedom of the press and in western, libertarian, normative 
media imperatives have been deficient or have fallen into crisis cyclically throughout 
the nation’s republican history (García Ponce 2001, Bisbal 2009, Waisbord 2011). 
However, as expressed for this study by some interviewees, to find such levels of state 
censorship one would have to draw analogies from twentieth-century periods of 
dictatorship and from those of nineteenth-century caudillismo.    
 
Another pivotal element which has induced censorship and self-censorship in 
newsrooms has been the general environment of hostility, threat and physical assault 
boosted by the radical factions of opposing political groups, as experienced by most 
journalists. In the view of many media practitioners, news reporting has shifted from 
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being considered one of the most respected and credible professions to one of the 
country’s most visible targets of collective aggression. President Chávez’s belligerent 
rhetoric towards critical media has permeated most sectors of society, and journalism 
has become – as expressed by one interviewee112 – a “high-risk occupation”. And 
although most reporters wish to work normatively they have had to become mainly 
preoccupied in preserving their lives in a context of increasing harassment, threat, 
physical aggression, and possible detention and imprisonment.  
 
It is evident that high levels of politicisation have resulted in violent reactions by 
Chávez’s supporters towards journalists who seek to practice under liberal models and 
perform a watchdog role. Within the same binary logic, albeit to a lesser degree, radical 
followers of the opposition have harassed officialist media workers, reactively and in an 
attempt to nullify the flow of governmental information. Reporters of most beats or 
news sections had never feared the street as much as during the 2000s. The tension 
between the risks of being harassed while reporting and producing critical, scrutinising 
news material has become very problematic.    
 
Many news reporters, editors, media owners and freedom of the press organisations 
find that violence towards journalists is a form of intimidation and coercion which has 
the tacit approval of the Venezuelan state. As demonstrated through the interview 
process, many journalists in Venezuela wish news media could function both as organs 
of self-expression and as tools of socially-responsible communication. Such desired 
freedom and responsibility, as argues O’Neill (1990), are key aspects for the 
democratic role of the media. However, they remain only aspirational tenets among 
Venezuelan news workers because, in day-to-day practice, interests in self-expression 
and group ideological imperatives seem to prevail among most journalists over the 
need to produce balanced, inclusive and socially-responsible news.    
 
The violence towards private-media reporters also underlines the relative negation of 
dissidence in populism. Chávez’s anti-corporatist, anti-imperialistic, and anti-dissident 
populist designs have arguably placed at least two external forces that have partly led 
to censorship, prior-censorship and curbing of freedoms among private-media 
journalists: a new legal framework but also, and seemingly more so, the emerging 
violent clashes from radical groups against critical media outlets and their workers.  
 
                                                          
112 Laura Weffer, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th May and 4th June 2012. 
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There is, in addition, concern among those professionals interviewed about internal 
forces leading to censorship and self-censorship. Across most media platforms, 
regardless of their political-ideological leanings, important areas of ‘internal’ censorship 
have been perpetuated to varying degrees. In the private, commercial media most 
censorship within the newsrooms is exercised by owners or editors, and is related 
mainly to information of financial and an economic nature, especially if the information 
alludes negatively to a commercial client or advertiser of the news organisation. Even 
though there is no evidence to suggest these measures have increased during the 
2000s compared to previous decades, they have created tensions between reporters 
and private-media owners. Within official, state-owned media this type of censorship is 
rarer. These outlets, relying entirely on governmental funding and siding with Chávez’s 
political project, are not critical of state policies and actions, nor do they produce 
watchdog pieces that check on the government. The claim that there is apparently less 
‘internal’ censorship from editors to reporters in official media can also suggest that 
there are less demands for journalistic autonomy from the reporters and/or that they 
overtly align themselves within the traditions of advocacy journalism. Hence, the 
“professional devotion” to freedom of expression and to freedom from any ideological 
constraint, which Schudson (2003: 200) underpins as the aspiration of all journalists, 
does not seem to be constitutive in many pro-Chávez reporters and editors.    
 
Even though some forms of ‘internal’ censorship are patent in the country‘s media, it is 
coercion and censorship from the state which was found to have augmented 
exponentially; and in doing so these have challenged the development of forms of 
journalism that relate to the ideals of “objective reporting”, as promoted in the U.S. 
liberal tradition (Siebert 1963: 60). A narrative of censorial culture which is set from the 
state has become very prevalent among most of the critical media practitioners. An 
alternative view, as formulated by a group of interviewees, is that advocates of 
normative, liberal journalism abused their freedoms in order to help undermine the 
political process led by Chávez, and ultimately collaborated in his ousting during the 
events of April 2002. It can be argued that even though freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press are values that are – at least nominally – esteemed and desired 
by the majority of Venezuelan journalists, some maintain – in the vein of Marxist-
oriented and critical political economy thinkers (Mosco 1996 and 2006, Bolaño 1999, 
McChesney 2000, Sparks 2006) – that state-imposed media restrictions are necessary 
in order to curb the power of private media organisations, and that journalists in the 
context of a radical process of social change should not expect the maximisation of 
liberal freedoms.  
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7.4. Accessibility, watchdog role, journalistic autonomy and dilemmas in 
professionalism 
 
One of the most negative effects of extreme politicisation during the 2000s for 
Venezuelan journalism, as this study’s findings indicate, has been the diminishing 
possibility to, or rights to, access official information that is newsworthy and of social 
interest. For most media workers and observers interviewed, this new characteristic in 
the country’s mediasphere is alarming – it undermines significantly what is for most 
journalists the desirable prospect of elaborating news with a sense of accuracy, 
utilisation and portrayal of varied voices, and broad representation of diversity of views. 
Moreover, for most critical media professionals, inaccessibility also imposes the non-
viability to exercise critical, watchdog and investigative forms of journalism. These are 
forms of journalistic practice primarily defended by editors and reporters who stress 
linkages to principles embedded in liberal theories such as freedom of the press and 
social responsibility.  
 
The wider the quality and range of sources represented in news content, the closer 
journalists allegedly become “to achieving an accurate account of what is happening”, 
bearing in mind that maintaining high standards of accuracy “are important to 
democratic media” (Street 2011: 318). As argued by most western promoters of liberal 
and social-responsability media theories, for journalistic practice to serve effectively as 
an instrument which democratically enhances dissemination of information and 
stimulation of plural and constructive debate within society, adequate access to data 
and sources of information is a requirement (Keane 1991 and 2009, Schudson 1995 
and 2003, Hallin and Mancini 2004).  
 
Even though some pro-government journalists and editors argue that no access to 
official or state data is justified in the context of an hegemonic battle within the media, 
or as a necessary consequence of non-liberal journalistic ideals clashing with liberal 
ones, most news workers do not consider inaccessibility to relevant official data and 
public information a part of a revolutionary phase. Instead, they see this as a 
component of state media strategies which are framed, on the one hand, under a 
scheme of polarisation and, on the other, as a result of a dualistic view of journalism 
which has been elaborated counter to “‘professional’ reporting’’, which pro-Chávez 
news practitioners interpret as “representative of oligarchic, imperialistic, corporate 
interests” (Waisbord 2012: 511).  
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This study found that developing ‘resourceful’ ad hoc techniques to access official 
information by some reporters has contributed to destabilising wishful normative 
journalistic practice among many practitioners. Private-media journalists resorting to 
negotiating with state-owned and militantly pro-Chávez outlets in order to obtain basic 
official information, which should be readily available, has been damaging the sense of 
autonomy in news-construction and the quality of political and social discourses in 
Venezuela, as have argued many interviewees and scholars Hawkins (2003), Bisbal 
(2008b) and Cañizalez (2011). Importantly, it was found that demands by the private 
media for rights of access to information tend to be denied by public institutions. 
Seemingly, media access to timely and accurate public information of social interest is 
not guaranteed by the state, but determined by whether or not a news organisation 
backs the government and its revolutionary project. The state strategies of non-
accessibility again underline rupturist, divisive, non-liberal characteristics that are 
prevalent in markedly populist governments in Latin America (Diamond 2002, Ansaldi 
2007, Waisbord 2012).  
 
The crisis in accessibility to official data and to certain types of information was found 
to be further compounded by the new configuration of a binary scheme of 
understanding ‘balance’ among journalists and editors. The binary idea of news 
balance that has become prevalent is one that renders invalid any news piece that 
does not offer opposed and confronted views. Sources are sought among 
spokespersons of politico-ideological rivalling camps, pro-government and opposition, 
leaving scant space for nuanced, moderate, non-polarised and non-cartelised voices. 
Before the mid-2000s, most journalists tended to pursue the use of sources that 
reflected certain diversity and could enhance rational debate through more ample 
representativeness; this, however, has been evaporating in Venezuela’s media 
landscape. 
 
Another relevant consequence of non-accessibility to government sources, 
underpinned by the polarising logic within news-production, has been the gradual 
waning of the journalistic scoop, particularly in the state and official media. As 
expressed by an interviewee113: “Venezuelan media is witnessing the death of the 
scoop”. The notion of scoop is inherent to a competitive market-driven framework of 
news-media functioning, as stressed in liberal, normative narratives of journalism. 
                                                          
113 Xabier Coscojuela, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 30th May 2012. 
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Partisan loyalty has eclipsed competition among news outlets for breaking-news 
stories, all of which evidences the increasing ideological and political bias among most 
reporters, editors, and media owners.  
 
Political and ideological bias, lack of transparency and neglect for accuracy in news 
production were found to have incremented further during election or referenda 
processes. In liberal thought and in many radical political variants, elections represent 
one of the central instruments for political legitimisation and broad democratic 
arrangement within society (Dahl 1956 and 1999, Schumpeter 1976, Fishkin 1991, 
Schmitter and Terry 1991, Held 2006), and within a functional democracy the media 
are expected to play a prominent role in informing the public about the various aspects 
of electoral processes, candidates, and results in an ethical, transparent and 
independent manner (Dahl 1999, Keane 1991, Curran 2002, Sartori 2007b).  
 
Although in Venezuela’s history news media’s treatment of electoral processes has 
traditionally never been even-handed and entirely transparent (Botía 2007, Díaz 
Rangel 2007, Cañizalez 2009b), during the Chávez era attitudes among journalists and 
editors towards balance, accuracy, fairness, accountability, and overall professional 
quality of coverage has suffered significantly during referenda and elections. In fact, 
agenda setting and gatekeeping have become predominantly manipulative when 
elections have taken place, and much of the language used in news has become 
aggressive and bellicose.  
 
There is the perception among journalists – particularly among those working in the 
private sector – that throughout the 2000s there has been an unprecedented loss of 
credibility towards their work and profession. This impression among some reporters 
and editors can arguably be guided by a part of the public that tends to endorse non-
partisan ideals of news production. Another sector of Venezuelans, arguably a larger 
one, seemed to equate journalistic credibility with high-levels of polarisation or overt 
partisanship. It is indeed quite symptomatic, as argued by commentators interviewed, 
that for the majority of the audience, outlets such as Globovisión and VTV – which 
represent the extremes of the polarised spectrum in news media – are identified as the 
most credible by much of the audience/readers and also by some journalists.   
 
It is evident that in most of the interviewees’ opinions, audiences and readers have 
been influencing more strongly than before the ideological bias in news production. 
Some professional journalists were found to resent this, while stressing that it is the 
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journalists’ responsibility to counter external polarising influences and to strive to 
elaborate and present news as tools for social and political scrutiny, particularly in a 
political environment in which the government and its leader are not inclined to accept 
criticism and have been attempting to nullify efforts by the critical, private media in 
denouncing state abuse and corruption.  
 
News outlets favouring watchdog roles find that the impediments for accessing public 
data, the restrictive aspects of the new media regulations, and direct government 
pressures have all imposed forms of censorship and self-censorship – the latter being 
more prevalent – on the production of watchdog, investigative journalism. Historically, 
there has always existed in Venezuela political tensions between media owners and 
government officials (Díaz Rangel 2007, Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008), and forms 
of hybrid, incomplete watchdog journalism have been deficient in ethical grounding; 
while “denouncement” journalism or denuncismo114 has had a stronger presence. Yet, 
the execution of both denuncismo and a normative watchdog role in Venezuela has 
become complicated, particularly for the private broadcast media.  
 
While some reporters and editors seek to surpass denuncismo, and even though 
Venezuela’s journalistic culture lacks any tradition or consistency in investigative 
journalism (Febres Cordero 1983, Botía 2007), it was found that a small group of 
professionals has been promoting investigative journalism since the second half of the 
2000s. This has also proven to be difficult, due principally to economic limitations, the 
threat of censorship, and the strenuous and risky conditions for many reporters when 
undertaking this journalistic approach.  
 
There is evidence that in four print news organisations investigative journalism’s tenets, 
such as revealing to the public an issue that has been actively kept secret by the 
government or other power elites, carrying out original and often risky research, using 
techniques of investigation and of writing that are not part of common news story 
production, have been systematically integrated into informative agendas and 
production.  
 
However, the fact that investigative reporting has grown – albeit very timidly – since 
2007 in Venezuela does not necessarily mean that a more balanced, accurate and 
                                                          
114 Michael Schudson also defines denuncismo as a journalistic “practice whereby one insider uses 
the press to spread a scandal about another insider… from the reporter’s perspective, this is simply 
quick-and-dirty journalism” (2003: 140-141). 
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transparent form of journalism is being practiced overall. But such an investigative 
trend demonstrates that some journalists wish to work in an independent manner within 
the private media, while championing the practice to check on the government and on 
public institutions – practices and attitudes which are enshrined in the liberal, western 
traditions of normative journalism (Keane 1991, Waisbord 2000a and 2013, Curran 
2002, McQuail 2005).  
 
This is echoed by Aguirre (1998: 251) when arguing that freedom to scrutinise “political 
abuse by the powerful, and the defence of freedom of the press in general, is one of 
the strongest nucleus of the ideology of professionalism”. In this sense, this study 
found that a majority of journalists – including almost all of those working in critical, 
private media – wished to embrace normative standards of professional journalism. 
Another group, however, tend to view professional conventions “as an ideological 
construct, a discursive strategy mobilised by publishers and journalists to gain social 
prestige” (Waisbord 2013: 4), while underpinning elitist, commercial, market-defined 
models of news production. The concept of professionalism in Venezuelan media was 
found to have antithetical interpretations. Journalists and commentators defending 
liberal narratives argued in favour of a professional model of journalism; whereas some 
radical, Marxist-inspired, and communitarian views formulated critiques to media 
professionalism in the sense that it allegedly derives from a capitalist and elitist 
conception, while stressing that such notion of professionalism does not necessarily 
enhance democracy, as argued by Miège (2000), Gans (2003) and Artz (2006).  
 
Tensions among journalists regarding normative and professional ideals became 
evident in Venezuelan news media during the Chávez era. It was found that the 
majority of interviewees generally affirm the relevance and the need for normative and 
traditional journalistic values such as fairness, accuracy, balance, transparency, 
reliability and accountability to be maintained in their own work and in that of their 
colleagues. Very importantly, they aspire to instrumentalise such values in an 
environment of autonomy and independence. Yet, their support for normative values 
and professional tenets in news gathering and news production are nuanced and tend 
to vary somewhat. For example, a minority of journalists and editors, identified with 
Chávez’s project, have reservations with the normative ideals that have been 
traditionally promoted by liberal narratives and practices.  
 
Similarly, opinions of some pro-opposition journalists proved that, although they 
endorsed professional and normative ideals, they also expressed being aware that 
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often their reporting and news-production did not demonstrate an assimilation of such 
tenets. It was also found that their ideals and levels of endorsement of normative 
journalism are less related to their levels of formal education, the time they have been 
working as media professionals, and the technical characteristics of the media they 
have worked in, than to their political and ideological leanings. News media in 
Venezuela under Chávez has become more politicised than in any democratic stage of 
the country‘s history – partisanship and politico-ideological bias were found to be the 
most influential factors in journalists bypassing and evading the alleged professional 
standards which they had informed they stood by.    
 
Politicisation in the newsrooms poses a problem for autonomous, independent 
practice. In order to “contribute to democratic life”, media organisations and journalists 
require autonomy (Waisbord 2013: 43); yet such an ideal, defended by liberal theories 
as “a question of individual morality and freedom” (Ibid: 50), has been threatened in 
twenty-first-century Venezuela. Some of that menace has derived from market 
pressures within the private media and economic hardships within the news 
organisations; but more determining factors have been censorship, ‘internal’ or self-
censorship, harassment and physical violence towards media practitioners, new media 
laws and regulations and some of their effects, and the over-arching advocacy 
imposed by the logic of intense polarisation.   
 
Interestingly, as autonomy has become problematic and partisan journalism advanced, 
some journalists have been turning to social media – particularly the Twitter micro-
blogging service – to disseminate news-related opinions, political comments and 
rumours which they would not broadcast or print in mainstream media, mainly due to 
censorship or because of the speculative nature of the texts. Thus, for some 
Venezuelan media professionals who have arguably adhered to normative standards 
and have defended accurate watchdog and investigative news production, social 
media platforms such as Twitter – and Facebook to a lesser degree – have become 
the newly-defined normative space where they ‘allocate’ comments, political rumours, 
potential news briefs, and ‘micro-denunciation’. Content in Twitter among journalists is 
predominantly political. And speculative. As explained by an interviewee, these types 
of online social networking platforms have come to be “highly purgative political spaces 
for comment among media people”115. Some interviewees detected a risk that such 
opinionated, conjectural, and polarised content could be considered news by most 
                                                          
115 Hugo Prieto, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 6th June 2012.  
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users, and even by fellow journalists. It is, nonetheless, a trend that has been growing 
markedly in Venezuela, and is seemingly configuring an alternative communication 
platform for polarised comment among media workers and society at large.  
 
7.5. Conclusion  
 
This section of the study has critically analysed the empirical data obtained through the 
qualitative technique of in-depth, semi-structured interviewing of journalists, editors, 
media workers, scholars, public functionaries and commentators regarding journalistic 
practice, media and democracy in Venezuela (2000-2010). The findings were grouped 
into four different analytical strands to provide a framework for effective qualitative 
evaluation of the data.    
 
It is evident that the understanding of democracy and of the democratic role of the 
media varied significantly among interviewees; and that such differences are 
essentially determined by ideological positioning in relation to the Chávez-led 
revolutionary process. Although news media – particularly the pro-government and 
state-owned – have echoed Chávez’s rhetorical divide between the Left and the Right, 
journalists and media organisations tend to establish their political footing and ideals of 
democratic institution on the basis of their standings vis-à-vis Chávez’s persona and 
mandate.  
 
During the 2000s, Chávez’s ‘hyper-presidency’, his populist, nationalist, anti-imperialist 
and non-liberal leadership has marked the news agenda in a most divisive, tumultuous, 
and polarised manner. His administration’s utilisation of state-owned media outlets – 
which increased consistently in number – has been a most effective political tool for its 
re-founding national project and for curbing the power of the oppositional forces. This 
has led in part to a surge of pro-Chávez communitarian media and to a qualitative 
augmentation in the representation of disenfranchised social sectors in the media. Yet, 
the effects of such official strategies of radical traits in the private media and on 
independent, critical journalists have been negative.  
 
Private media and dissident editors and reporters were found to be working in a most 
hostile environment. Under a prevailing Manichean political discourse and a highly-
polarised social landscape, some journalists have been targets of aggression, physical 
attacks and financial penalisation. Moreover, censorship, self-censorship, and general 
curbing of freedoms have risen patently. Very importantly, a set of newly-established 
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media regulations has challenged normative and autonomous forms of journalistic 
practices, as underpinned by various liberal theories and narratives. This legal 
framework, according to an alternative view, has represented a revolutionary shift in 
media practice and the relative empowerment of ‘the people’ – the working class and 
poor sectors – while strengthening participatory, popular democracy.   
 
Advocacy and partisan journalism have advanced significantly during the Chávez era 
while balanced, fair, transparent, accurate and comment-free news reporting has been 
generally weakening. This has represented a test for most journalists of a liberal, 
normative bent. Some have circumvented their alleged journalism tenets; others have 
been, under adverse circumstances, seeking to strengthen professional values and 
ethical practice. Hence, it was found that some journalists – although only in the press 
– began since the mid-2000s endorsing and producing investigative and watchdog 
news pieces, in what is a new trend in Venezuelan journalism, and which has been 
growing marginally.  
 
These important differences in journalistic ideals and practice highlight existing 
tensions within reporters’ notions of professionalism. The all-permeating logic of 
polarisation in Venezuela and the hyper-politicisation of news production have placed 
the desirability of professional journalism under a binary debate, and its potential 
contribution to democracy is questioned by many pro-Chávez media practitioners, 
while being supported by most of those working in the private media.   
 
This chapter has presented substantive analysis on the empirical findings of this 
research, and has also proceeded to formulate some conclusive thoughts on the topic 
examined. The following chapter, as a form of general conclusion, brings together the 
most relevant aspects of this study and establishes further interconnections between 
the empirical data and the theoretical framework outlined in the opening chapters.  
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Chapter 8    
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The previous chapter presented an analysis of the empirical data acquired through 
interviewing techniques, supported by critical discussion of theories and narratives on 
democracy, media, news production, and journalistic practice in the West, Latin 
America and Venezuela. This chapter draws together the main findings and seeks to 
elaborate on some final considerations while, in a critical note, raising questions for 
potential future studies.  
 
Firstly, news media practice in Venezuela during the 2000s needs to be understood 
within the context of an intense politico-ideological national clash that began almost as 
soon as Hugo Chávez was elected President in 1998. His political project, which grew 
increasingly statist, nationalist and populist, has been defined as leftist and Marxist-
inspired by followers and by various scholars; but as authoritarian, militarist, pseudo-
democratic, and as fitting the tradition of Latin American caudillos by critical observers. 
Its foundational characteristics have generated ample debate among media 
practitioners and in the public sphere about its democratic nature.  
 
Chávez’s political project reinserts the tensions – both nationally and regionally – of a 
nominally participatory democracy and a communal state presented as an alternative 
to a pre-existing and liberally-prescribed representative democracy. In many ways, it 
negates the notion – supported by Fukuyama (1992) and neo-liberal advocates – that 
the fall of the Berlin Wall epitomised at a global level the end of the conflict of ideology 
and corroborated the dominance of liberalism. Rather, the Venezuelan socio-political 
experiment – and those that followed in other Latin American nations – stresses the 
need to re-evaluate the relevance of the Left-Right ideological axis, as formulated by 
Bobbio (1987 and 1997) and, in a more radical tone, by Laclau and Mouffe (2001). 
However, this study suggests that the ‘leftist shift’ set forward by Chávez can be best 
contextualised within the theories of populism emerging from Latin American scholars 
such as Arditi (2004), Laclau (2005), and Ansaldi (2007).  
 
The set of ideas that formulate populism as a ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey’ area in democracy, in 
which a leader monopolises the political arena, promotes a Manichean rhetoric, 
disjoints democratic institutionalism, and calls for mass mobilisation to challenge the 
political establishment are instrumental in guiding the evaluation of the nation’s media 
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and, indeed, of most social and political phenomena in Venezuela during the Chávez 
era.   
 
Political polarisation is a crucial aspect that Chávez’s populism and its adversaries 
have brought forth and which has shaped, possibly irreversibly, the national media 
landscape. Extreme polarisation was found to be both reflected in and promoted by the 
news media. It is in this context that the majority of journalists, editors, and media 
owners have developed an overtly partisan role, while news production has acquired a 
markedly political bias. In assessing the strains of such politicisation in media and 
journalistic practice, freedom of the press theory, the four theories of the press – as 
formulated by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1963) –, and social responsibility 
theory have served as pertinent theoretical frames by which to address normative 
ideals, belonging to liberal traditions, that defend freedom of expression, scrutiny of 
authorities, accuracy, balance, transparency in news elaboration, among other tenets.   
 
Similarly, the revolutionary rupture sought by the Chávez administration in the media, 
and its complex rearrangement of the relationship between democracy and the media, 
find a theoretical grounding in both Marxist-derived and populism theories. This is 
echoed in the rhetoric of pro-government journalists and commentators when stressing 
that mainstream, private media of liberal leaning represent political tools that replicate 
the dominant, market-driven, bourgeoisie discourse, in detriment of the claims for 
egalitarianism and emancipation by the subordinate social classes.  
 
The new media laws and regulations established by the government have enhanced 
popular participation in the media, but it was found that their discretionary use by 
authorities has undermined and restricted oppositional voices. This legal framework for 
the media arguably reinserts aspects of the policies promoted by development 
theorists and Latin American participants in the New World Information and 
Communications Order (NWICO) debates during the 1970s, explicated in this study’s 
theoretical chapters. However, the increasing implementation of regulations for media 
and journalists should be primarily understood in the context of the hegemonic struggle 
of populism and, very importantly, guided by theories of nationalism, anti-imperialism, 
and anti-globalisation.  
 
It is these policies which arguably best emphasise the relevance of national 
sovereignty and ideals of nationhood vis-à-vis the forces of globalisation in the field of 
journalism and news media production. If, as Mattelart points out, globalisation “walks 
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hand in hand with deregulation” and is driven by the logic of the market (2010: 322), 
the media regulatory strategy set forth by Chávez represents one of the most evident 
ways in which the globalisation and cultural imperialism paradigms have been 
challenged. Like globalisation theories, the regional trend of cultural theories in this 
research proved not to be the most suitable for assessing such a politically-charged 
national media environment. As Bisbal and Nicodemo (2010) and Szurmuk and 
Waisbord (2011) argue, the ideas of ‘mediation’ and ‘negotiation’ – pivotal concepts of 
the Latin American cultural critique – do not seem sufficiently adequate in theoretical 
terms to structurally explicate power struggles in the media between the government 
and oppositional forces, or the politicisation of news production under a highly-
polarised environment, or the hegemonic peculiarities of media regulations and their 
impact on media practice.   
 
While the neo-liberal thesis of market-led media and globalisation have arguably 
gained terrain internationally during the last three decades – as argue different 
authors reviewed in this research –, Venezuela under Chávez offers evidence that 
nation-centred radical and non-liberal media policies have been, since 2000, curbing 
the power of private media corporations, while challenging normative imperatives in 
journalistic practice. Moreover, the ideological centrality and the nationalist traits that 
Chávez’s media strategies entail represent a challenge for some media theorists, for 
the character of these laws appears to be democratically participative on the one 
hand, but highly restrictive on the other. For local journalists, editors, and 
commentators, however, they are far from nuanced and, instead, framed quite 
dichotomously – Chavista media workers believe that the governmental media 
strategy is revolutionary, counter-elite, and empowers the masses; their pro-
opposition counterparts interpret it as aggressive, tendentious, censoring, and 
unconstitutional.   
 
Paradoxically, as biased and partisan journalism was found to have increased 
significantly in Venezuela, many reporters and news workers affirmed situating 
themselves as professionals driven by normative standards of balance, fairness, 
transparency, accuracy, accountability, independence and ethical considerations 
emerging from liberal models and theories. A nominal advocacy for normative, liberal-
based, U.S.-modelled reporting was more prevalent among the journalists who are 
employees of private, critical or pro-opposition news outlets; yet others who work for 
state-owned or pro-government media – albeit criticising certain aspects of western-
inspired normative journalism – support core ideals of professionalism in news media 
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practice. A different minority among pro-Chávez reporters regards as desirable an 
‘implosion’ of these values in favour of the emergence of radical and communitarian 
models of media, and of direct and participatory democracy.  
 
The variations of views and attitudes towards professional journalism and its core 
values are aligned with clashing theoretical arguments reviewed in this study. The 
relation between professional journalism, autonomy and democracy is clearly defined 
in the ‘fourth estate’ paradigm and throughout traditional liberal theories of the media 
(Ungar 1990, McQuail 2005, Waisbord 2013); whereas critiques to liberal ideals of 
professional journalism are formulated in part by political economy theorists and 
advocates of populism, and more radically by classical Marxism scholars in their 
critical claim that such professional parametres reproduce elitist discourses and are 
ideologically constructed so as to preserve the capitalist status quo (Mosco 1996, 
McChesney 2000 and 2008, McQuail 2005, Waisbord 2013). It is noteworthy that a 
majority of those media workers who claimed to embrace professional standards and 
their ethical delineations, were found to have had difficulties in mirroring those tenets 
in their reporting – this indicates that such tensions within defenders of journalistic 
professionalism arguably need to be weighed further in liberal theories.  
 
The advocacy and militant shift that journalism has undergone represents a crisis in 
journalistic professionalism in Venezuela. As newsrooms become ideologically 
homogenous and framed within the binary discourse of polarisation, journalists and 
media owners – especially those of the private, critical and pro-opposition media – 
have increasingly suffered threats, intimidation and physical attacks from radical 
cadres. It is indeed difficult to work normatively in such a tense socio-political climate, 
particularly during electoral and referenda processes. In this sense, further challenges 
have been compounded on journalists of professional values by the government’s 
discretionary instrumentalisation of media regulations, the financial penalisations 
executed by authorities on dissident news media and reporters, the overuse of 
blanket official messages, and the overall weakening of institutional autonomy in the 
country. It is not surprising that the concatenation of the above-mentioned factors has 
created a general ambient of restrictions, censorship, and self-censorship in the 
media, which had never been so defining in Venezuela’s democratic historical period.  
 
While evidence suggests that many reporters began resorting to social media – 
mainly to Twitter – for commentating news while bypassing limitations set by the new 
legal media framework for mainstream media, a minority have been resisting the 
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dominant partisan and unprofessional trends by focusing in the normative elaboration 
of watchdog and investigative journalism since 2007. This represents a new 
phenomenon in Venezuelan journalistic history. Arguably, the excesses of militant 
journalism – exemplified in the conduct of most private media during the April 2002 
coup d’état – found a discursive and practical counterpoint in a group of reporters and 
editors – small as it is – who have defied the government and dominant groups by 
denouncing abuses of power in the name of freedom of expression and in clear 
tension with the new political establishment and its media agendas.   
 
This emerging set of investigative reporters’ information elaboration and provision 
seem to aim at checking on the powerful, while nurturing a sense of balance, 
accuracy, transparency and social interest. Evidently, they have been influenced by 
normative – and idealised – parameters of the U.S. press and the core of liberal 
theories of freedom of the press and watchdog scrutinising. They represent an aspect 
that has been embedded – albeit in a somewhat defective manner – in Venezuelan 
journalistic culture for at least one hundred years, and which gained force once the 
nation become a relatively stable, representative democracy. Contrary to Hallin and 
Mancini’s formulation that during the nineteenth century Latin American press 
inherited and predominantly relied since on a Hispanic, Southern European media 
model (2007), empirical findings and reviewed Venezuelan historical-sociological 
analysis by Grases (1967 and 1981), García Ponce (2001) and Aguirre (1998) for this 
study indicate that both British and Anglo-American press models have been very 
influential in shaping the national media model and its journalistic culture. Moreover, 
the U.S. ‘prescriptive’ media model attained a stronger presence during the second 
half of the twentieth century.  
 
It can be argued that the model that prevailed until Chávez’s arrival to power had 
mixed elements of the U.S. and British liberal traditions, a marked Iberian tendency 
for comment and political slant, and varying local stylistic features. In brief, it had 
been constructed as a heterodox and hybrid journalistic model. Since the early 2000s, 
and under the singular political and social climate bought forth by the clash between 
Chavismo and oppositional forces, it has been partly incorporating non-professional 
reporting, communitarian representation, and markedly anti-neo-liberal comment. 
Resorting to historical perspectives from scholarly works reviewed, one model that 
has emerged, particularly among the pro-government media, holds similar traits with 
the one prevalent in Venezuela during the era of nineteenth-century caudillos, in 
which journalistic standards were determined by partisanship and news tended to be 
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framed within a politically binary scheme.  
 
This model is significantly shaped by the President’s rhetoric and his government’s 
media strategies. It has indeed placed ideological agency and political confrontation 
at the heart of journalistic practice. Taking into account Habermas’ formulation that 
commercial and global media would “eliminate the public sphere” and contribute to 
depoliticise citizens (Street 2011: 56), the case of Venezuela during the 2000s proves 
that both national commercial and state media can strongly enhance debate intra and 
extra-nationally, underpinning a public sphere of hyper-politicised confrontation. 
However, the nature of such political and social debate has been so Manichean, 
polarised and divisive that it has not contributed towards an open and inclusive 
democratic dialogue.   
 
Venezuelan news media have scarcely contributed to alleviate confrontation and 
promote democratic solutions to a national crisis that only seems to escalate. In an 
attempt to briefly formulate a prognosis, based on this study’s findings through 
qualitative research methods and on the theoretical/historical explications utilised, it 
can be argued that Venezuelan journalists and news media will face increasing 
challenges in the near future in relation to their contribution to paving the nation’s next 
steps in its strenuous road towards democracy. Additionally, President Chávez’s 
death in March 2013 – while this study was in its final stages of production – arguably 
intensifies uncertainties in any prognosis of Venezuela’s media and socio-political 
landscape.  
 
It is hoped that this research has been able to identify new avenues by which to 
further explore both new and pressing issues in the recent development of journalism 
and media in Venezuela and Latin America.  
 
A key area that requires further analysis, as found by this study, is the character of 
populism that Chávez’s national project represents, its similarities and specificities 
when compared to other regional forms of populism and to western socio-political 
contexts. Very importantly, assessing in more detail the nuances of such a political 
paradigm seems paramount as to identify the ways in which such a specific form of 
populism can potentially affect the reinvention of journalistic practice in Venezuela 
and the reshaping of the country’s media landscape.  
 
Similarly, this study detects a need to explore in more depth a unique phenomenon 
 
 
246 
 
which has emerged as part of the populist and radical process led by President 
Chávez – the unprecedented surge of communitarian media. By the time this 
research concluded, it was estimated that more than 400 community media outlets 
were operating in Venezuela, which represents by far the largest amount in any Latin 
American nation. As already stressed, the purpose of such type of media is disputed 
among highly-polarised views; yet their internal working dynamics, means to 
sustainability, and the manner in which its collaborators have been developing new 
ways to produce news and non-news content are some aspects to empirically 
evaluate further as a means to contribute in explaining the increasingly hybrid 
character of journalistic practice and media platforms in Venezuela during the Chávez 
era.  
 
Such hybridisation, which represents a challenge to normative frameworks in 
journalism, has also been intensified by the significant increase in the use of social 
media by professional journalists and media owners. Comment in social media by 
reporters and editors is evidently a growing trend in the country, particularly as of the 
last years of the 2000s and due in part to the restrictive and polarised environment 
many Venezuelan journalists find themselves working in. The recent rise in the use of 
social media by local professionals and the characterization of the comments the 
latter formulate in these platforms is also an area worth examining in future research.   
 
In closing, and in reference to a broader research framework, this study also aspires 
in contributing to stimulate further analysis related to the complex relationship 
between normative and radical ideals of journalism and democracy in Venezuela, as 
well as in similar polarised and conflicting contexts.    
 
 
247 
 
Bibliography  
 
 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. (1991) The Culture Industry. London: Routledge. 
 
Aguirre, Jesús M. (1992) El perfil ocupacional de los periodistas en Caracas. Caracas: 
Ucab. 
 
Aguirre, Jesús M. (1998) La estructuración de la identidad profesional del comunicador 
social en Venezuela. Caracas: Ucab.  
 
Aguirre, Jesús M. (2010) “Los profesionales de la comunicación social” in Aguirre, Jesús 
M. and Bisbal, Marcelino (Eds.) (2010) Prácticas y travesías de comunicación en América 
Latina. Caracas: Centro Gumilla. 
 
Aguirre, Jesús M. and Bisbal, Marcelino (Eds.) (2010) Prácticas y travesías de 
comunicación en América Latina. Caracas: Centro Gumilla. 
 
Alasuutari, Pertti et al. (Eds.) (2008) Social Research Methods (The Sage Handbook). 
London: Sage. 
 
Amnesty International (2010) “Venezuela: Amnesty International Report 2010” [online]. 
Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/venezuela/report-2010 [Accessed 19 
September 2011]. 
 
Ansaldi, Waldo (Ed.) (2007) La democracia en América Latina: Un barco a la deriva. 
Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 
Arditi, Benjamín (2004) “El populismo como periferia interna de la política democrática” 
[online], Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Vol XLVII, No.191. Available 
at: http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/421/42119105.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2011]. 
 
Arrueta, César (2010) ¿Qué realidad construyen los diarios? Buenos Aires: La Crujía.  
 
Artz, Lee and Ortega Murphy, Bren (2000) Cultural Hegemony in the United States. 
London: Sage. 
 
Artz, Lee (2006) “On the Material and the Dialectic: Toward a Class Analysis of 
Communication” in Artz, Lee et al (Eds.) (2006) Marxism and Communication Studies. New 
York: Peter Lang. 
 
Artz, Lee et al (Eds.) (2006) Marxism and Communication Studies. New York: Peter Lang.  
 
Artz, Lee and Kamalipour, Yahyar R. (Eds.) (2007) The Global Media: Trends in 
International Mass Media. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Ayala-Corao, Carlos (2005) “Prólogo” in Correa, Carlos and Cañizales, Andrés (Eds.) 
(2005) Venezuela: Situación del derecho a la liberatd de expresión e información (Informe 
2005). Caracas: Espacio Público/Ipys. 
 
Barranquero, Alejandro (2011) “Rediscovering the Latin American Roots of Participatory 
Communication for Social Change”, Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture. 
Vol. 8:1.  
 
Barrat, David (1986) Media Sociology. London: Routledge. 
 
 
248 
 
 
Barrera Tyska, Alberto and Marcano, Cristina (2006) Chávez sin uniforme: Una historia 
personal. Caracas: Debate. 
 
Barret, Patrick et al (Eds.) (2008) The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn. London: 
Pluto Press. 
 
Bell, Allan and Garrett, Peter (Eds.) (1998) Approaches to Media Discourse. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
Bell, Allan (1999) The Language of News Media. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Belsey, Andrew and Chadwick, Ruth (Eds.) (1998) Ethical Issues in Journalism and the 
Media. London: Routledge. 
 
Beltrán, Luis Ramiro (1999) “Políticas de comunicación en América Latina: ¿Una utopía 
realizable?”, Archipiélago, Vol.4, No. 24/25.  
 
Beltrán, Luis Ramiro (2005) “La Comunicación para el desarrollo en América Latina”. 
Paper presented at the III Panamerican Congress on Communication, Buenos Aires, 12-16 
July.   
 
Beltrán, Luis Ramiro (2008) “Comunicación para la democracia en Iberoamérica: Memoria 
y retos de futuro”, Perspectivas de la Comunicación, Vol.1 (1).  
 
Benhabib, Seyla (Ed.) (1996) Democracy and Differences: Contesting the Boundaries of 
the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Benhabib, Seyla (2005) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Bennett, Lance W. (2002) News: The Politics of Illusion. London: Longman. 
 
Bennett, Lance W. and Entman, Robert M. (Eds.) (2000) Mediated Politics: Communication 
in the Future of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Berger, Arthur A. (1998) Media Research Techniques. London: Sage.  
 
Berger, Arthur A. (2000) Media and Communication Research Methods: An Introduction to 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. London: Sage. 
 
Berlin, Isaiah et al (Eds.) (1968) “To Define Populism”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 3. 
 
Bertrand, Ina and Hughes, Peter (2005) Media Research Methods: Audiences, Institutions, 
Texts. London: Pelgrave.  
 
Bisbal, Marcelino (2005) “Otros lugares para pensar la política: Consecuencias en la 
política de la mediación comunicativa”, Metapolitica, No. 40. 
 
Bisbal, Marcelino (2007) “Los medios en Venezuela: ¿Dónde estamos?”, Espacios 
Abiertos, Vol. 16, No. 4.  
 
Bisbal, Marcelino (2008a) “De la nueva política comunicacional a la desmesura del poder”, 
Comunicación: Estudios Venezolanos de Comunicación, No. 141. 
 
Bisbal, Marcelino (2008b) “El observador observado, o la realidad mediada por los medios 
y los periodistas”, Mediaciones Sociales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, No.2. 
 
 
249 
 
 
 
Bisbal, Marcelino (Ed.) (2009) Hegemonía y control comunicacional. Caracas: Alfa. 
 
Bisbal, Marcelino and Nicodemo, Pasquale (2010) “Sensibilidad, medios y cultura: 
reflexiones desde el consumo cultural” in Aguirre, Jesús M. and Bisbal, Marcelino (Eds.) 
(2010) Prácticas y travesías de comunicación en América Latina. Caracas: Centro Gumilla. 
 
Bobbio, Norberto (1987) The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bobbio, Norberto (1997) Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
 
Bolaño, César (Ed.) (1999) Economía política, comunicación y conocimiento. Tucuman: La 
Crujía. 
 
Borón, Atilio A. (2008) “Promises and Challenges: The Latin American Left at the Start of 
the Twenty-first Century” in Barret, Patrick et al (Eds.) (2008) The New Latin American Left: 
Utopia Reborn. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Botía, Alejandro (2007) Auge y caída del Cuarto Poder: La prensa en la democracia. 
Caracas: Debate. 
 
Bottomore, Thomas B. (1991) A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. 
 
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver (2002) “Global News Wholesalers as Agents of Globalization” in 
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle et al (Eds.) (2002) Media in Global Context: A Reader. 
London: Arnold.  
 
Britto García, Luis (2010) “Reflexión comprometida con el debate de los medios” in 
Salazar, Robinson et al (Eds.) (2010) Poder Mediático en Venezuela: Una reflexión 
necesaria. Maracaibo: CICI.  
 
Bryman, A. (2001) Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Caballero, Manuel (1983) “De significaciones y sinonimias en una historia de la izquierda”, 
Nueva Sociedad, 65. 
 
Caballero, Manuel (2010) Historia de los venezolanos en el siglo XIX. Caracas: Alfa. 
 
Calhoun, Craig (1988) “Populist Politics, Communication Media, and Large Scale Societal 
Integration”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 6, No. 2.  
 
Calhoun, Craig (Ed.) (1992) Habermas and the Public Sphere. London: The MIT Press. 
 
Callinicos, Alex (1991) The Revenge of History: Marxism and the European Revolutions. 
London: Polity. 
 
Cammack, Paul (2000) “The Resurgence of Populism in Latin America”, Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, Vol. 19, Issue 2. 
 
Canovan, Margaret (1981) Populism. London: Junction. 
 
Cañizalez, Andrés and Lugo-Ocando, Jairo (2008) “The media in Venezuela: The 
revolution was televised, but no one was really watching” in Lugo-Ocando, Jairo (Ed.) 
(2008) The Media in Latin America. Maidenhead: Open University Press.  
 
 
250 
 
 
 
Cañizalez, Andrés (Ed.) (2009a) Tiempos de cambio: Política y comunicación en América 
Latina. Caracas: UCAB. 
 
Cañizalez, Andrés (2009b) “La era Chávez: Notas para una historia política del periodismo 
venezolano” in Bisbal, Marcelino (Ed.) (2009) Hegemonía y control comunicacional. 
Caracas: Alfa. 
 
Cañizalez, Andrés (2010) “Comunicación para la democracia: Una travesía 
latinoamericana” in Aguirre, Jesús M. and Bisbal, Marcelino (Eds.) (2010) Prácticas y 
travesías de comunicación en América Latina. Caracas: Centro Gumilla. 
 
Cañizalez, Andrés (2011) “Venezuela 1999-2009: Retrocesos para la gobernabilidad 
democrática y la libertad de prensa”, Comunicación, No.156.  
 
Capriles, Oswaldo (1976) El Estado y los medios de comunicación en Venezuela. Caracas: 
Ininco/Suma. 
 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Faletto, Enzo (1979) Dependency and Development in 
Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (1980) “On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in 
Latin America” in Collier, D. (Ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. New York: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Carlsson, Ulla (2003) “The Rise and Fall of NWICO: From a Vision of International 
Regulation to a Reality of Multilevel Governance,” Nordicom Review 24 (2). 
 
Carr, Barry and Ellner, Steve (Eds.) (1993) The Latin American Left: From the Fall of 
Allende to Perestroika. London: Latin American Bureau. 
 
Carrera Damas, Germán (2007) “Sobre democracia en las sociedades latinoamericanas’’ 
in Ansaldi, Waldo (Ed.) La democracia en América Latina: Un barco a la deriva. Mexico 
City: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 
Castañeda, Jorge G. (1993) Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Castañeda, Jorge G. (2006) “Latin America’s Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs, 85 (3). 
 
Castañeda, Jorge G. and Morales, Marco A. (Eds.) (2008) Leftovers: Tales of the Latin 
American Left. New York: Routledge. 
 
Castellanos, Laura (2009) “El gran comunicador?”, Comunicación, No.147. 
 
Castells, Manuel (1996) The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Cloud, Dana L. (2006) “Change Happens: Materialist Dialectics and Communication 
Studies” in Artz, Lee et al (Eds.) (2006) Marxism and Communication Studies. New York: 
Peter Lang.   
 
Cohen Bell, Lauren et al. (Eds.) (2007) Perspectives on Political Communications: A Case 
Approach. New Jersey: Allyn & Bacon. 
 
Cole, Richard R. (Ed.) (1996) Communication in Latin America: Journalism, Mass Media, 
and Society. Washington: Jaguar Books.  
 
 
251 
 
 
 
 
Collier, David and Adcock, Robert (1999) “Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic 
Approach to Choices about Concepts”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.2. 
 
Collier, David and Gerring, John (Eds.) (2009) Concepts and Method in Social Science: 
The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori. London: Routledge. 
 
Conatel (2008) [online], “Responsabilidad social”. Available at: 
http://www.conatel.gob.ve/#http://www.conatel.gob.ve/index.php/principal/responsabilidads
ocial [Accessed 27 October 2010]. 
 
Conatel en Red (2012) Medios comunitarios: reimpulso definitivo, No.3. [magazine]. 
 
Conboy, Martin (2010) The Language of Newspapers: Socio-historical Perspectives. 
London: Continuum. 
 
Committee to Protect Journalists (2009) “Attacks on the Press 2009: Venezuela”. Available 
at: https://cpj.org/2010/02/attacks-on-the-press-2009-venezuela.php [Accessed 17 January 
2011]. 
 
Cook, Timothy E. (1998) Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political 
Institution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Corcoran, Paul E. (1983) “The Limits of Democratic Theory”, in Duncan, Graeme (Ed.) 
Democratic Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Coronil, Fernando (1997) The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Corrales, Javier (2005) "In Search of a Theory of Polarization: Lessons from 
Venezuela,1999-2005", European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 79. 
 
Crick, Bernard (2002) Democracy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Curran, James and Park, Myung-Jin (Eds.) (2000) De-Westernizing Media Studies. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Curran, James (2002) Media and Power. London: Routledge. 
 
Curran, James (2006) “Media and Cultural Theory in the Age of Market Liberalism” in 
Curran, James and Morley, David (Eds.) (2006) Media and Cultural Theory. London: 
Routledge.  
 
Curran, James (Ed.) (2010) Media and Society. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Curran, James (2011) Media and Democracy. London: Routledge. 
 
D’Angelo, Paul and Kuypers, Jim A. (Eds.) (2009) Doing Framing Analysis: Empirical and 
Theoretical Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
 
D’Elia, Yolanda and Reyna, Feliciano (2011) “Situación de los derechos humanos y la 
democracia en Venezuela ante las recientes medidad legislativas” in Comunicación: 
Estudios Venezolanos de Comunicación, No. 153. 
 
 
 
252 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1991) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1999) On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Dahlgren, Peter and Sparks, Colin (Eds.) (1992) Journalism and Popular Culture. London: 
Sage. 
 
Dahlgren, Peter and Sparks, Colin (Eds.) (1993) Communication and Citizenship: 
Journalism and the Public Sphere. London: Routledge. 
 
Dahlgren, Peter (2000) “Media, Citizenship and Civic Culture” in Curran, James and 
Gurevitch, Michael (Eds.) (2000) Mass Media and Society. London: Arnold.  
 
Dahlgren, Peter (2009) Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication and 
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Davis, Aeron (2010) “Media and Politics” in Curran, James (Ed.) (2010) Media and Society. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Deacon, David (2007) Researching Communication: A Practical Guide to Methods in Media 
and Cultural Analysis. London: Hodder Arnold. 
 
DeGrave, Analisa et al (Eds.) (2006) Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Latin American 
Issues. New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin. 
 
De la Torre, Carlos (2010) Populist Seduction in Latin America. Columbus: Ohio University 
Press. 
 
De Leeuw, Edith (2008) “Self-Administered Questionnaires and Standardized Interviews” in 
Alasuutari, Pertti et al. (Eds.) (2008) Social Research Methods (The Sage Handbook). 
London: Sage. 
 
Denzin, Norman K. and Lincoln, Yvonna S. (Eds.) (1998) Collecting and Interpreting 
Qualitative Materials. London: Sage. 
 
Denzin, Norman K. and Lincoln, Yvonna S. (2005) The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. London: Sage. 
 
Diamond, Larry et al (Eds.) (1999) Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.  
 
Diamond, Larry (2002) “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, 
No. 2. 
 
Diamond, Larry et al (Eds.) (2008) Latin America's Struggle for Democracy. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Díaz Rangel, Eleazar (2007) La prensa venezolana en el siglo XX. Caracas: Ediciones B. 
 
Diez, Francisco (2011) “Polarización política y mediación internacional”, Temas de 
Formación Sociopolítica, No. 49. 
 
Di Tella, Torcuato S. (1997) “Populism in the Twenty-First Century”, Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 32. 
 
 
253 
 
Dorfman, Ariel and Mattelart, Armand (1978) Para leer al Pato Donald. Mexico City: Siglo 
XXI. 
 
Downing, John et al (Eds.) (1995) Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction. London: 
Sage. 
 
Duncan, Graeme (Ed.) (1983) Democratic Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Edwards, Sebastian (2010) Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Einstein, Mara (2004) Media Diversity: Economics, Ownership, and the FCC. Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Ellner, Steve (2004) “Leftist Goals in the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal Strategy in Latin 
America”, Society and Society, 68 (1).  
 
Ellner, Steve and Tinker-Salas, Miguel (Eds.) (2007) Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the 
Decline of Exceptional Democracy. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Entman, Robert M. (1989) Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American 
Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Farreras Rodríguez, Iraida (2008) “Los patrones de lectura cambian el papel electronico, el 
salto ineludible” in Delgado-Flores, Carlos (Ed.) Tendencias de la prensa y el periodismo 
del siglo XXI en Venezuela. Caracas: UCAB. 
 
Febres Cordero, Julio (1983) Historia del periodismo y de la imprenta en Venezuela. 
Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia.  
 
Ferreira, Leonardo (2006) Centuries of Silence: The Story of Latin American Journalism. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood.  
 
Ferrer, Aldo (2007) “Globalización, desarrollo y densidad: Un abordaje de la experiencia de 
América Latina” in Ansaldi, Waldo (Ed.) (2007) La democracia en América Latina: Un barco 
a la deriva. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 
Finel, Bernard I. and Lord, Kristin M. (Eds.) (2002) Power and Conflict in the Age of 
Transparency. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Fishkin, James S. (1991) Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic 
Reform. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Fishkin, James S. and Laslett, Peter (Eds.) (2003) Debating Deliberative Democracy. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Flick, Uwe (2009) An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London: Sage. 
 
Fox, Elizabeth (Ed.) (1988) Media and Politics in Latin America: The Struggle for 
Democracy. Beverly Hill, CA: Sage. 
 
Fox, Elizabeth and Waisbord, Silvio R. (Eds.) (2002) Latin Politics, Global Media. Austin: 
University of Texas Press. 
 
Frank, Andre Gunder (1969) Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution. New York: 
Monthly Review Foundation. 
 
 
254 
 
 
 
Frank, Andre Gunder (2004) “The Development of Underdevelopment” in Wheeler, 
Stephen M. and Beatley, Timothy (Eds.) (2004) The Sustainable Urban Development 
Reader. London: Routledge. 
 
Franklin, Bob et al (Eds.) (2005) Key Concepts in Journalism. London: Sage. 
 
Freedom House (2001) Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political and Civil 
Liberties, 2000-2001. New York: Freedom House. 
 
Freedom House (2010) “Freedom of the Press 2010: Country Header Data and Narrative 
Reports” [online]. Available at: http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 
Country%20Reports%202010%20final%20for%20website.pdf [Accessed 19 September 
2011]. 
 
Freire, Paulo (2000) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin. 
 
Fung, Archon and Wright, Erik Olin (Eds.) (2003) Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. London: Verso. 
 
Gagliardi, Lorena et al (Eds.) (2007) Control, medios de comunicación y calidad 
institucional. Buenos Aires: APOC.  
 
Gans, Herbert J. (2003) Democracy and the News. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
García Canclini, Nestor (1995) Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving 
Modernity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
García Canclini, Nestor (1999) La globalización imaginada. Buenos Aires. Paidós.  
 
García Canclini, Nestor (2008) Latinoamericanos buscando su lugar en este siglo. Buenos 
Aires: Paidós.  
 
García Ponce, Servando (2001) Ciento cincuenta años de periodismo en Venezuela (1808-
1958). Caracas: Melvin. 
 
Garnham, Nicholas (1990) Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the 
Economy of Information. London: Sage. 
 
Garnham, Nicholas (2000) Emancipation, the Media, and Modernity: Arguments about the 
Media and Social Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Garretón, Manuel A. (2006) “Sociedad civil y ciudadanía en la problemática 
latinoamericana actual” in Cheresky, Isidoro (Ed.) (2006) Ciudadanía, sociedad civil, y 
participación política. Buenos Aires: Mino y Davila. 
 
Garrison, Bruce and Goodsell, James N. (1996) “Professional News Organisations in Latin 
America” in Cole, Richard R. (Ed.) (1996) Communication in Latin America: Journalism, 
Mass Media, and Society. Washington: Jaguar Books.  
 
Gerring, John (2001) Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Giddens, Anthony (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.   
 
 
255 
 
 
Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third Way. Cambridge: Polity.  
 
Gill, Rosalind (2000) ‘‘Discourse Analysis’’ in Bauer, Martin W. and Gaskell, George (Eds.) 
(2000) Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound. London: Sage. 
 
Gillespie, Marie and Toynbee, Jason (Eds.) (2006) Analysing Media Texts. Maidenhead: 
Open University Press. 
 
Glasser, Theodore L. and Craft, Stephanie (1998) “Public Journalism and the Search for 
Democratic Ideals” in Liebes, Tamar and Curran, James (Eds.) (1998) Media, Ritual, 
Identity. London: Routledge. 
 
Glasser, Theodore L. (Ed.) (1999) The Idea of Public Journalism. London: Guildford Press. 
 
Gobo, Giampietro (2004) “Sampling, representativeness and generalizability” in Seale, 
Clive et al (Eds.) (2004) Qualitative Research Practice. London: Sage. 
 
Golding, Peter et al (Eds.) (1986) Communicating politics: Mass Communications and the 
Political Process. Leicester: Leicester University Press. 
 
Gorman, Lyn and McLean, David (2009) Media and Society into the 21 Century: A 
Historical Introduction. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Graber, Doris A. et al (Eds.) (2008) The Politics of News: The News of Politics. 
Washington: CQ Press. 
 
Grases, Pedro (Ed.) (1967) Materiales para la historia del periodismo en Venezuela 
durante el siglo XIX. Caracas: UVC. 
 
Grases, Pedro (1981) La imprenta en Venezuela: Estudios y monografías. Caracas: Seix 
Barral. 
 
Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James A. (Ed.) (2001) Handbook of Interview Research: 
Context & Method. London: Sage. 
 
Gumucio Dagron, Alfonso (2002) “Comunicación para el cambio social: llave de la 
participación democrática”. Paper presented at the XX AFACOM Conference, Medellin, 17-
20 September. 
 
Gurevitch, Michael et al (Eds.) (1982) Culture, Society and the Media. London: Routledge. 
 
Gurevitch, Michael and Blumler, Jay G. (1990) “Political Communications and Democratic 
Values” in Lichtenberg, Judith (Ed.) (1990) Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1986) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: The MIT Press.  
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1991) “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere” in Calhoun, Craig 
(Ed.) (1991) Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
Hall, Stuart (1986) “Popular Culture and the State” in Bennett, Tony et al (Eds.) (1986) 
Popular Culture and Social Relations. London: Open University Press. 
 
Hall, Stuart (1997) Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. 
London: Sage.    
 
 
256 
 
 
 
Hallin, Daniel C. (2000) “Commercialism and Professionalism in the American News Media” 
in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (Eds.) (2000) Mass Media and Society. London: 
Arnold. 
 
Hallin, Daniel C. and Mancini, Paolo (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of 
Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hallin, Daniel C. and Mancini, Paolo (2007) “Un estudio comparado de los medios en 
América Latina”, Tendencias 07 Medios de comunicación: El escenario iberoamericano. 
Madrid: Ariel/Telefónica.  
 
Hamelink, Cees J. (1995) “Information Imbalance Across the Globe” in Downing, John et al 
(Eds.) (1995) Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. 
 
Hannerz, Ulf (2002) “Notes on the Global Ecumene” in Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle et 
al (Eds.) (2002) Media in Global Context: A Reader. London: Arnold.  
 
Hansen, Anders et al (Eds.) (1998) Mass Communication Research Methods. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Hakim, Peter. (2003) “Dispirited Politics,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 2. 
 
Hakim, Peter (2006) “Is Washington Losing Latin America?” Foreign Affairs, 85 (1). 
 
Hardy, Jonathan (2010) “The Contribution of Critical Political Economy” in Curran, James 
(Ed.) (2010) Media and Society. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Harnecker, Marta (2001) La izquierda después de Seattle. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI. 
 
Hartley, John (2011) Communication, Cultural and Media Studies: the Key Concepts. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Hawkins, Eliza T. (2003) “Conflict and the Mass Media in Chávez’s Venezuela”: 
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/Lasa2003/TannerHawkinsEliza.pdf [accessed 27 April 
2012]. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1976) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Held, David (2006) Models of Democracy. London: Polity. 
 
Henn, Matt et al (Eds.) (2006) A Short Introduction to Social Research. London: Sage. 
 
Hepburn, Alexa and Potter, Jonathan (2004) “Discourse analytic practice” in Seale, Clive et 
al (Eds.) (2004) Qualitative Research Practice. London: Sage. 
 
Hernández Díaz, Gustavo (2008) Las tres T de la comunicación en Venezuela. Caracas: 
UCAB. 
 
Hernández Díaz, Gustavo (2009) “Comunicación gubernamental en Venezuela durante el 
periodo 1999-2008” in Bisbal, Marcelino (Ed.) (2009) Hegemonía y control comunicacional. 
Caracas: Alfa. 
 
Hidalgo, Ivette (2009) “Medios de comunicación de Venezuela en dictadura y democracia” 
in Delgado-Flores, Carlos (Ed.) (2009) Entre nosotros: prensa, democracia y 
gobernabilidad en la Venezuela actual. Caracas: UCAB. 
 
 
257 
 
 
 
Humphreys, Peter (2011) “A Political Scientist’s contribution to the comparative study of 
Media Systems in Europe: A Response to Hallin and Mancini” in Just, Natascha and 
Puppis, Manuel (Eds.) (2011) Trends in Communications Policy Research. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Hyman, Herbert H. (1972) Secondary Analysis of Survey Sampling: Principles, Procedures, 
and Potentialities. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Ipys (Instituto Prensa y Sociedad) (2010) Media en asfixia: la libertad de prensa en 
Venezuela 2008-2010. Caracas: Ipys.  
 
Iyengar, Shanto (1991) Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Jensen, K.B. (Ed.) (2002) A Handbook of Media and Communication Research: Qualitative 
and Quantitative Methodologies. London: Routledge. 
 
Johannesen, Richard L. et al (Eds.) (2002) Ethics in Human Communication. Richmond: 
Waveland Press. 
 
Jones, Alex S. (2009) Losing the News: The Future of the News That Feeds Democracy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Keane, John (1991) The Media and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Keane, John (2009) The Life and Death of Democracy. London: Simon & Schuster.  
 
Kelley, David and Donway, Roger (1990) “Liberalism and Free Speech” in Lichtenberg, 
Judith (Ed.) (1990) Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Kitzberger, Philip (2012) “The media politics of Latin America’s leftist governments”, Journal 
of Politics in Latin America, 4, 2.  
 
Kolakowski, Leszek (1978) Main Currents of Marxism. Vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Kornhauser, William (2008) The Politics of Mass Society. London: Transaction. 
 
Kraidy, Marwan M. (2005) Hybridity or the Cultural Logic of Globalization. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
 
Krouse, Richard W. (1983) “Classical images in democracy in America” in Duncan, Graeme 
(Ed.) Democratic Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kvale, Steiner (1996) InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. 
London: Sage. 
 
Kvale, Steiner and Brinkmann, Svend (2009) InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative 
Research Interviewing. London: Sage. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto (2005) On Populist Reason. London: Verso. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
 
 
 
258 
 
 
Lander, Edgardo (2008) “Populism and the Left: Alternatives to Neo-Liberalism” in Barret, 
Patrick et al (Eds.) (2008) The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn. London: Pluto. 
 
Levin, Michael (1983) “Marxism and Democratic Theory” in Duncan, Graeme (Ed.) (1983) 
Democratic Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lichtenberg, Judith (1990) “Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press” in 
Lichtenberg, Judith (Ed.) (1990) Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Littig, Beate (2007) Interviewing experts or interviewing the elite – what makes the 
difference? Conference on Interpretation in Policy Analysis, Amsterdam. 
 
Lozada, Mireya (2011) “¿Nosotros o ellos? Polarización social y el desafío de la 
convivencia en Venezuela”, Temas de Formación Sociopolítica, No. 49. 
 
Lozano, José Carlos (2007) “Latin America: Media Conglomerates” in Artz, Lee and 
Kamalipour, Yahyar R. (Eds.) (2007) The Global Media: Trends in International Mass 
Media. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Lugo-Ocando, Jairo (Ed.) (2008) The Media in Latin America. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press.  
 
Macridis, Roy C. (1986) Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes. 
Toronto: Little, Brown & Co. 
 
Macpherson, C.B. (1972) The Real World of Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Macpherson, C.B. (1977) The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Madero, Elinor (2009) “Democracia y proyecto histórico nacional en Venezuela” in 
Delgado-Flores (Ed.) (2009) Entre nosotros: prensa, democracia y gobernabilidad en la 
Venezuela actual. Caracas: UCAB. 
 
Mander, Mary S. (Ed.) (1998) Framing Friction: Media and Social Conflict. Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press. 
 
Mancini, Paolo (1993) “Between Trust and Suspicion: How Political Journalists Solve the 
Dilemma”, European Journal of Communications, No. 8. 
 
Mangabeira-Unger, Roberto (2006) What Should the Left Propose? London: Verso. 
 
Manning, Peter K. and Cullum-Swan, Betsy (1998) “Narrative, Content, and Semiotic 
Analysis” in Denzin, Norman K. and Lincoln, Yvonna S. (Eds.) (1998) Collecting and 
Interpreting Qualitative Materials. London: Sage. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert (1991) One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society. London: Routledge.  
 
Martín-Barbero, Jesús (1993) Communication, Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to 
Mediations. London: Sage.  
 
Martín-Barbero, Jesús and Silva, Armando (Eds.) (1997) Proyectar la comunicación. 
Bogota: Tercer Mundo. 
 
 
 
259 
 
Martín-Barbero, Jesús (2002a) “Communications. Decentering Modernity” in Volek, Emil 
(Ed.) (2002) Latin America Writes Back: Posmodernity in the Periphery. London: 
Routledge.  
 
Martín-Barbero, Jesús (2002b) La globalización en clave cultural: Una mirada a América 
Latina. Paper presented at the Conference on Globalism and Plurality, Montreal 24-27 
April.  
 
Martínez, Anibal R. (1971) Cronología del petróleo venezolano. Caracas: Librería Historia.  
 
Marx, Karl (1978) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1. London: Penguin.  
 
Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1998) The Communist Manifesto. London: Verso. 
 
Matos, Carolina (2011) “Media and Democracy in Brazil”, Westminster Papers in 
Communication and Culture. Vol. 8: 1.  
 
Mattelart, Armand (1999) “Prólogo” in Bolaño, César (Ed.) (1999) Economía política, 
comunicación y conocimiento. Tucuman: La Crujía. 
 
Mattelart, Armand and Mattelart, Michele (2005) Historia de las teorías de la comunicación. 
Barcelona: Paidos. 
 
Mattelart, Armand (2010) ‘An Archaeology of the Global Era: Constructing a Belief’ in 
Thussu, Daya K. (Ed.) (2010) International Communication: A Reader. London: Routledge. 
 
Mazzoleni, Gianpietro (1995) “Towards a Videocracy?”, European Journal of 
Communication, Vol. 10, No. 3. 
 
Mazzoleni, Gianpietro et al (Eds.) (2003) The Media and Neo-populism: A Contemporary 
Comparative Analysis. Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
 
McChesney, Robert W. et al (Eds.) (1998) Capitalism and the Information Age: The 
Political Economy of the Global Communication Revolution. New York: Monthly Review 
Press.  
 
McChesney, Robert W. (2000) Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in 
Dubious Times. New York: The New Press. 
 
McChesney, Robert W. (2008) The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging 
Dilemmas. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
McCombs, Maxwell and Protess, David (Eds.) (1991) Agenda Setting: Readings on Media, 
Public Opinion, and Policymaking. London: Routledge. 
 
McCombs, Maxwell et al (Eds.) (1997) Communications and Democracy. London: 
Routledge. 
 
McCoy, Jennifer et al (Eds.) (1999) Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress. New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers. 
 
McCoy, Jennifer L. and Myers, David J. (Eds.) (2004) The Unravelling of Democracy in 
Venezuela. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
 
McKee, Alan (2001) “A Beginner’s Guide to Textual Analysis” [online], Metro Magazine. 
Available at: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/41993 [Accessed 15 April 2012]. 
 
 
 
260 
 
McLuhan, Marshall (1994) Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. London: The MIT 
Press.  
 
McNair, Brian (2000) Journalism and Democracy. London: Routledge. 
 
McNair, Brian (2006) Cultural Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World. 
London: Routledge. 
 
McQuail, Denis (2003) Media Accountability and Freedom of Publication. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
 
McQuail, Denis (2005) Mass Communication Theory. London: Sage. 
 
Merino, José (2007) “No Such Thing as a Social Advantage for the Left?” in Castañeda, 
Jorge G. and Morales, Marco A. (Eds.) (2007) Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left. 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Miège, Bernard (2000) “Cultural Production and Cultural Pluralism” in Tawfik, Mohsen (Ed.) 
(2000) World Communication and Information Report 1999-2000. Paris: Unesco. 
 
Miller, David (1983) “The Competitive Model of Democracy” in Duncan, Graeme (Ed.) 
(1983) Democratic Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Morley, David and Robins, Kevin (1995) Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic 
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries. London: Routledge.  
 
Morris, Nancy and Waisbord, Silvio R. (2001) Media and Globalization: Why the State 
Matters. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Mosco, Vincent (1996) The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal. 
London: Sage. 
 
Mosco, Vincent (2006) “Revisiting the Political Economy of Communication” in Artz, Lee et 
al (Eds.) (2006) Marxism and Communication Studies. New York: Peter Lang.  
 
Murphy, Patrick D. and Rodríguez, Clemencia (2006) “Between Macondo and McWorld: 
Communication and Culture Studies in Latin America”, Global Media and Communication, 
Vol. 2, 3.   
 
Nerone, John C. (Ed.) (1995) Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press. Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press 
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo et al (Eds.) (2004) The Quality of Democracy: Theory and 
Applications. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.  
 
Ollivier, Bruno (2008) “Medios y mediaciones”. Anthropos 219.  
 
O’Neil, Patrick H. (Ed.) (1998) Communicating Democracy: The Media and Political 
Transitions. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
 
O’Neill, Onora (1990) “Practices of toleration” in Lichtenberg, Judith (Ed.) (1990) 
Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Orozco, Guillermo (Ed.) (2002) Recepción y mediaciones: Casos de investigación en 
América Latina. Buenos Aires: Norma.   
 
Orozco, Guillermo (2008) “La ‘mediación’ de Jesus Martín-Barbero”, Anthropos 219.  
 
 
261 
 
 
Ortega Ortiz, Reynaldo (2001) Caminos a la democracia. Mexico City: Centro de Estudios 
Internacionales. 
 
Páez, Tomás (2011) “Comunicación, propiedad, medios, democracia y libertad” in 
Comunicación, No.151.  
 
Palencia, Wilman (2009) “Imperio mediático en poder del gobierno venezolano” in 
Delgado-Flores, Carlos (Ed.) (2009) Entre nosotros: prensa, democracia y gobernabilidad 
en la Venezuela actual. Caracas: UCAB. 
 
Panizza, Francisco (Ed.) (2005) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. London: Verso. 
 
Panizza, Francisco (2009) Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy 
Beyond the Washington Consensus. London: Zed Books. 
 
Parra, Luz N. (2010) “Los cambios políticos y comunicacionales en revolución” in Salazar, 
Robinson et al (Eds.) (2010) Poder Mediático en Venezuela: Una reflexión necesaria. 
Maracaibo: CICI.  
 
Pasquali, Antonio (1980) Comunicación y cultura de masas. Caracas: Monte Avila. 
 
Pasquali, Antonio (1991) La comunicación cercenada: El caso Venezuela. Caracas: Monte 
Avila. 
 
Pasquali, Antonio (2007) Comprender la comunicación. Caracas: Monte Avila.  
 
Pellegrino, Francisco (2010) “La economía de la comunicación en América Latina” in 
Aguirre, Jesús M. and Bisbal, Marcelino (Eds.) (2010) Prácticas y travesías de 
comunicación en América Latina. Caracas: Centro Gumilla. 
 
Peterson, Theodore (1963) “The social responsibility theory of the press” in Siebert, Fred 
S. (Ed.) (1963) Four Theories of the Press. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Petkoff, Teodoro (2005) Las dos izquierdas. Caracas: Alfa. 
 
Petkoff, Teodoro (2007) El socialismo irreal. Caracas: Alfa. 
 
Petkoff, Teodoro (2010) El chavismo como problema. Caracas: Libros Marcados. 
 
Prevost, Gary and Vanden, Harry E. (2008) Politics of Latin America: The Power Game. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Provea (Programa Venezolano de Educación-Accion de Derechos Humanos) (2010) 
Situación de los derechos humanos en Venezuela: Informe annual 2009-2010. Caracas: 
Provea. 
 
Quiñonez, Rafael (2010) “Ley de responsabilidad social en radio y televisión: la historia de 
política estatal de comunicación” in Cañizales, Andrés (Ed.) (2010) De lo estatal a lo 
público. Caracas: UCAB. 
 
Quiñonez, Rafael (2011) “Mapa de la situación de los medios privados en la Venezuela 
actual” in Comunicación, No.156. 
 
Rajan, Nalini (Ed.) (2005) Practising Journalism: Values, Constraints, Implications. London: 
Sage.  
 
 
 
262 
 
Rapley, Tim (2004) “Interviews” in Seale, Clive et al (Eds.) (2004) Qualitative Research 
Practice. London: Sage. 
 
Reese, Stephen D. et al (Eds.) (2003) Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our 
Understanding of the Social World. London: Routledge.  
 
Reid, Michael (2009) Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.  
 
Reporters Without Borders (2009) “34 broadcast media shut down at government’s behest” 
[online]. Available at: https://en.rsf.org/venezuela-34-broadcast-media-shut-down-at-02-08-
2009,34056.html# [Accessed 03 November 2010]. 
 
Reyes Matta, Fernando (1983) Comunicación alternativa y búsquedas democráticas. 
Mexico City: ILET. 
 
Romero, Javier (2008) “Informe: Elecciones regionales 2008 en Venezuela” [online]. 
Available at: http://www.coordinadorabolivariana.org/documentos/INFORME-ER2008.pdf 
[Accessed 12 February 2011]. 
 
Roncagliolo, Rafael (1994) “Communication and Development: the Latin American 
Challenge” in Hamelink, Cees J. and Linné, Olga (Eds.) (1994) Mass Communication 
Research: On Problems and Policies. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
 
Roncagliolo, Rafael (2003) Problemas de la integración cultural: América Latina. Bogotá: 
Norma.  
 
Ruane, Janet M. (2005) Essentials of Research Methods: A Guide to Social Science 
Research. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Ryan, Alan (1983) “Mill and Rousseau: utility and rights” in Duncan, Graeme (Ed.) (1983) 
Democratic Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ryen, Anne (2004) “Ethical Issues” in Seale, Clive et al (Eds.) (2004) Qualitative Research 
Practice. London: Sage. 
 
Salcedo Bastardo, José L. (1996) Historia fundamental de Venezuela. Caracas: UCV. 
 
Salwen, Michael B. and Garrison, Bruce (1995) Latin American Journalism. New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum.  
 
Sampedro, Víctor (2000) Opinión pública y democracia deliberativa. Madrid: Itsmo. 
 
Sánchez Urribarri, Raúl (2008) “Venezuela: Turning Further Left?” in Castañeda, Jorge G. 
and Morales, Marco A. (Eds.) (2008) Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (1991) The Theory of Democracy Revisited: Part One & Part Two. 
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (2007a) “Video-Power”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 24, 1. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (2007b) ¿Qué es la democracia? Madrid: Taurus. 
 
Scannell, Paddy (1998) “Media, Language, World” in Bell, Allan and Garrett, Peter (Eds.) 
(1998) Approaches to Media Discourse. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
 
 
263 
 
Schamis, Hector E. (2006) “Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions,” Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 4. 
 
Schedler, Andreas et al (Eds.) (1999) The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability 
in New Democracies. Boulder: Lynne Riener.  
 
Schiller, Herbert I. (1991) Culture, Inc: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Schiller, Herbert I. (1996) Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America. 
London: Routledge.   
 
Schlesinger, Philip (1993) “Introduction” in Martín-Barbero, Jesús (1993) Communication, 
Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to Mediations. London: Sage.  
 
Schmitter, Philippe and Karl, Terry (1991) “What Democracy Is… And What is Not”, Journal 
of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 3. 
 
Schramm, Wilburn (1963) “The Soviet communist theory of the press” in Siebert, Fred S. 
(Ed.) (1963) Four Theories of the Press. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Schudson, Michael (1995) The Power of News. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   
 
Schudson, Michael (2003) The Sociology of News. New York City: W.W. Norton & Co.   
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1976) Democracy, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge. 
 
Seligson, Mitchell A. (2007) “The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America”, Journal 
of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 3. 
 
Seale, Clive et al (Eds.) (2004) Qualitative Research Practice. London: Sage. 
 
Servaes, Jan (Ed.) (2008) Communication for Development and Social Change. London: 
Sage/Unesco. 
 
Servaes, Jan and Malikhao, Patchanee (1994) “Concepts: The Theoretical Underpinnings 
of the Approaches to Development Communication” in Mayo, John and Servaes, Jan 
(Eds.) (1994) Approaches to Development Communication. Paris: Unesco.  
 
Servaes, Jan and Malikhao, Patchanee (2007) “Communication and Sustainable 
Development” in Communication and Sustainable Development: Selected Papers for the 
9th UN Roundtable for Communication for Development. Rome: United Nations. 
 
Shils, Edward (1982) The Constitution of Society. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Shuy, R.W. (2001) “In-Person Versus Telephone Interviewing” in Gubrium, J.F. and 
Holstein, J.A. Handbook of Interview Research: Context & Method. London: Sage.   
 
Siebert, Fred S. (Ed.) (1963) Four Theories of the Press. Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press. 
 
Silverman, David (2001) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text 
and Interaction. London: Sage. 
 
Smith, Emma (2006) Using Secondary Data in Educational and Social Research. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
 
 
 
264 
 
Somekh, Bridget and Lewin, Cathy (2004) Research Methods in the Social Sciences.  
London: Sage. 
 
Sparks, Colin (2000) “Media Theory After the Fall of European Communism” in Curran, 
James and Park, M-J. (Eds.) (2000) De-Westernizing Media Studies. London: Routledge. 
 
Sparks, Colin (2006) “Contradictions in Capitalist Media Practices” in Artz, Lee et al (Eds.) 
(2006) Marxism and Communication Studies. New York: Peter Lang.  
 
Sparks, Colin (2007) Globalization, Development and the Mass Media. London: Sage.  
 
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle et al (Eds.) (2002) Media in Global Context: A Reader. 
London: Arnold.  
 
Stalder, Felix (2006) Manuel Castells: The Theory of the Network Society. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
 
Starkey, Guy (2006) Balance and Bias in Journalism: Representation, Regulation and 
Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Straubhaar, Joseph D. (2010) “Beyond Media Imperialism: Asymmetrical Interdependence 
and Cultural Proximity” in Thussu, Daya K. (Ed.) (2010) International Communication: A 
Reader. London: Routledge. 
 
Street, John (2011) Mass Media, Politics and Democracy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Sunstein, Cass R. (2003) “The Law of Group Polarization”, in Fishkin, James S. and 
Laslett, Peter (Eds.) (2003) Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Szurmuk, Mónica and Waisbord, Silvio R.  (2011) “The Intellectual Impasse of Cultural 
Studies of the Media in Latin America”, Westminster Papers in Communication and 
Culture. Vol. 8: 1.  
 
Taggart, Paul (2000) Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Thussu, Daya K. (2000) International Communication: Continuity and Change. London: 
Arnold.  
 
Thussu, Daya K. (Ed.) (2009) Internationalizing Media Studies. London: Routledge. 
 
Thussu, Daya K. (Ed.) (2010) International Communication: A Reader. London: Routledge. 
 
Tilly, Charles (2007) Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tomlinson, John (1999) Globalization and Culture. Cambridge: Polity.  
 
Ungar, Sanford J. (1990) “The Role of the Free Press in Strengthening Democracy” in 
Lichtenberg, Judith (Ed.) (1990) Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Villegas, Ernesto (2009) Abril, golpe adentro. Caracas: Galac. 
 
Volek, Emil (Ed.) (2002) Latin America Writes Back: Posmodernity in the Periphery. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Waisbord, Silvio R. (2000a) Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, Accountability, 
and Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
 
265 
 
Waisbord, Silvio R. (2000b) “Media in South America: Between the Rock of the State and 
the Hard Place of the Market” in Curran, James and Park, M-J. (Eds.) (2000) De-
Westernizing Media Studies. London: Routledge. 
 
Waisbord, Silvio R. (2007) “In Journalism We Trust?: Credibility and Fragmented 
Journalism in Latin America”, in Voltmer, Katrin (Ed.) Mass Media and Political 
Communication in New Democracies. London: Routledge. 
 
Waisbord, Silvio R. (2011) “Between Support and Confrontation: Civil Society, Media 
reform, and Populism in Latin America”, Communication, Culture & Critique, Vol. 4.  
 
Waisbord, Silvio R. (2012) “Democracy, journalism, and Latin American Populism” [online], 
Journalism, 14: 504. Available at: http://jou.sagepub.com/content/14/4/504 [Accessed 28 
November 2012]. 
 
Waisbord, Silvio R. (2013) Reinventing Professionalism: Journalism and News in Global 
Perspective. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Wasko, Janet et al (Eds.) (2011) The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications. 
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.  
 
Weaver, David and Wilhoit, Cleveland (1986) The American Journalist in the 1990s: U.S. 
News People at the End of an Era. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Weisbrot, Mark and Ruttenberg, Tara (2010) “Television in Venezuela: Who dominates the 
media?” [online], Center for Economic and Policy Research, Issue Brief, Dec. 2010. 
Available at: http://www.cepr.net/documents/ publications/ 2010_12_venezuela_media.pdf 
[Accessed 22 March 2011]. 
 
Weiss, R.S. (1995) Learning From Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview 
Studies. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Wengraf, Tom (2002) Qualitative Research Interviewing. London: Sage. 
 
Weyland, Kurt (2001) “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin 
American Politics”, JSTOR Comparative Politics, Vol. 32.  
 
White, Robert A. (1989) “La teoría de la comunicación en América Latina: Una visión 
europea de sus contribuciones”, Telos 19. 
 
White, Robert A. (2004) “Is ‘Empowerment’ the Answer?”, Gazette: The International 
Journal for Communication Studies, Vol. 66, 1. 
 
Williams, Kevin (2003) Understanding Media Theory. London: Hodder Education. 
 
Williamson, Edwin (2009) The Penguin History of Latin America. London: Penguin.  
 
Willis, Jim (1991) The Shadow World: Life Between the News Media and Reality. New 
York: Praeger. 
 
Wimmer, Roger D. and Dominick, Joseph R. (2006) Mass Media Research: An 
Introduction. London: Thomson. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
266 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
Narratives of the history of media 
 
In order to evaluate the relation between democracy, media and journalism, in terms of 
how it has been developed and presented as historical narratives, it is worth exploring 
their characterisation as elaborated by James Curran (2002). Although Curran’s 
formulations relate primarily to the British context, these can help shed light in other 
national and cultural contexts. He evaluates seven narratives, but amplifies a critique 
mainly towards three of them – the ‘liberal’, the ‘populist’, and the ‘radical’. For the 
purpose of this study, and due to its focus of research, these three are reviewed in 
more detail than the others.  
 
Curran (Ibid) argues that the ‘anthropological’ narrative has essentially focused on the 
configuration of a national identity through media and in the ideological variables that 
make up nationalism. Therefore, this strand of narrative observes and evaluates the 
relation between media and the specific nature of nation-states. A key exponent of this 
line of thought is Benedict Anderson, whose work contends that all nations are 
‘imagined communities’ in the sense that they “exist in people’s minds as objects of 
orientation and affiliation” (Schudson 2003: 67). In this view, the media would play a 
principal role in helping create the sense of national community and national 
consciousness.   
 
The ‘libertarian’ narrative, which acquired relevance during the 1960s, tends to 
describe a very different issue, which is the confrontation in the media between liberals 
and traditionalists, particularly on issues of public morals. A different focus is that of the 
‘feminist’ narrative, which studies the media through history as an incomplete process 
in which women have been misrepresented to a significant degree, but which has been 
gradually utilised by them to gain participation and liberation (Young 2000, Curran 
2002).  
 
All three of the narratives above mentioned are affirmative in their nature – they 
emphasise from varying perspectives a positive view of the media in terms of 
enhancing distinctively social diversity and tolerance, people’s empowerment, 
freedom of expression, liberation and inclusion of interest/minority groups, and civic 
nation-building (Curran 2002, McQuail 2005). The ‘technological determinist’ narrative 
is arguably the most affirmative of all. It pays attention to the supposed transformative 
influence of the media. Also, it tends to interpret communication technology as an 
independent force that is likely to shape democratic practices and social change 
(McQuail 2005). Various elements of the technological determinist narrative arguably 
emanate from the populist narrative.  
 
The populist narrative focuses on the alleged collective fascination with the emergence 
and use of various media technologies. Its dominant theoretical trait is to defend the 
market as a key means of democratisation and to celebrate the media as one of its 
derivations. Also, its focus of study is fundamentally the audience, its behavioural and 
consumerist patterns. Curran (2002) argues that this narrative has been enriched 
mainly by both authors of neo-liberal and neo-Marxist trends. Such theorists, he 
explains, have maintained the following common features in their speeches: an 
understanding of the media essentially as a source of meaningful mass pleasure; a 
defence of the relevance of the democratic culture; and a distrust of state power and 
the professional protagonism. The ‘populist’ narrative’s emphasis on comprehending 
egalitarianism as recognition seems to fail to grasp aspects such as distribution, while 
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employing the United States media ‘model’ as exemplary. In this respect, Curran 
formulates the following:  
 
It is about equality of esteem, as reflected in respect for mass 
audiences, ‘ordinary’ people and popular taste. It has little to do with 
other dimensions of equality: about the distribution of wealth, income, 
power, public spending, life opportunities or space… This [populist] 
tradition views the United States as a land of equality since it scores 
high in terms of the civil respect accorded to its citizens… [but] the 
United States also has a greater inequality of wealth and income than 
any other major western country… This accounts for a puzzling feature 
[of this narrative]: its lack of interest in the link between democratic 
social recognition and redistributive politics (Ibid: 43).  
 
In the ‘liberal’ narrative the media is principally understood as a tool by which the 
democratic process has been greatly strengthened (Curran 2002, McQuail 2005). One 
of the determining factors argued by this narrative about the role of the media in a 
democracy relates to the historical struggle these have sustained – especially the 
press (as has been the case of Great Britain) since the seventeenth century (Ibid). 
Another of its arguments has been the ways in which the media have been encouraged 
by the pursuit of individual rights, of freedom of expression, and of mass empowerment 
(Keane 1991, Ibid).  
 
The fundamental liberal argument for free media lies in the core of this type of historical 
narrative. It formulates that the media would become free when it is not subject to a 
centralised power, when it is able to operate without the control of the state, and when 
the various information and communication outlets have the possibility to compete 
freely between each other (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990, Street 2011). The idea of the 
media as a ‘fourth estate’ was based on these ideas and can be appreciated as a 
derivation of this narrative (Curran 2002). 
 
The liberal history of the media has been questioned mainly by authors of the radical, 
neo-Marxist, and critical political economy traditions (Hardy 2010). They contend that 
the media has not been capable of operating in a genuine independent manner, as 
they are an inherent part of the power structure of societies (Curran 2002, Artz et al 
2006) and tend to operate as ideological tools for its owners or controllers (Hall 1986, 
Mattelart and Mattelart 2005). In this sense, Colin Sparks argues that the media are 
principal mechanisms “through which powerful groups in society –capitalists, 
politicians, and even trade union bureaucrats – are able to reach the mass of the 
population” (2006: 111).  
 
The only non-affirmative narrative of media history is the one maintained by the radical 
trend –a general sense of pessimism towards the role of media in liberal or capitalist 
democracy permeates most of its arguments. A prominent feature of this strand of 
thought is to question the way in which liberal democracy has not been able to 
‘equalize’ political power and empower the people in an egalitarian way (Hall 1986 and 
1997, McChesney 2000 and 2008, Artz et al 2006).  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Main media groups and conglomerates in Venezuela (2010) 
 
 
State/Government: President Hugo Chávez’s government/the state own seven 
television stations of nationwide signals: Venezolana de Televisión (VTV), Vive TV, 
Asamblea Nacional TV, Avila TV, TeleSur, Televisora Nacional Social (TVES), and 
Alba TV. In the radio sector it owns three stations of the Radio Nacional de Venezuela 
(RNV) network, plus Radio Sur network and YVKE Mundial network. There have been 
three state-owned newspapers during the 2000s: Correo del Presidente, Correo del 
Orinoco, and Ciudad Caracas. Many studies include as “para-state” outlets 
approximately 230 communitarian radio stations, 36 communitarian television stations, 
and 120 communitarian newspapers, most of which are in part funded by the state and 
affiliated to the government party.  
 
Cisneros Group: Owners of terrestrial and cable television network Venevisión – one 
of the two largest in Venezuela –, DirectTV satellite network, and Radio FM Center 
network. The group owns shares in broadcast networks Chilevisión (Chile), Caracol 
(Colombia), Caribbean Communication Network (in eight Caribbean nations), Univisión 
(U.S.A.), and Galavisión (U.S.A).  
 
Phelps-Bottome Group: Venezuela’s oldest commercial television station, Radio 
Caracas Televisión (RCTV), had been owned by this group until 2009, when Chávez’s 
government did not renew its licence for broadcasting. After that year, the group 
maintained radio stations 92.9 FM and Radio Caracas Radio (RCR), and U.S.-based 
film production house Coral Pictures.  
 
Capriles Group: The country’s most read daily newspaper Últimas Noticias during the 
2000s is owned by this family group, as well as financial daily newspaper El Mundo. 
Five magazines are owned by this group, including Dominical (varieties) and Líder 
(sports). It owns the regional rights of U.S. Continental Publishing Co.  
 
De Armas Group: Owners of daily tabloid newspapers 2001 and Meridiano, television 
station (of sports content) Meridiano TV, and Meridiano Radio Deportes FM. The group 
represents Hearst Group publications. During the 2000s, eight different magazines – 
mainly of entertainment, sports, and gossip – have been owned by the De Armas 
family group, including Variedades and Playboy Venezuela.   
 
Camero Group: Owners of Televén – the commercial television station, with open 
terrestrial signal, which had the country’s third highest viewers share and rating, after 
RCTV (while it was operative) and Venevisión. 
 
Otero Group: Owners of broadsheet El Nacional – one of the country’s two best-
selling quality national dailies. The group launched, since the mid-1990s, tabloid dailies 
Así es la Noticia and Hora Cero, and book publishing label Libros El Nacional. 
 
Mata Group: Venezuela’s oldest operating daily newspaper, El Universal, is owned by 
this group – it is the other best-selling quality national daily. The group also owns a 
majority share of Media Zoom Group, publishers of magazines Loft and Poder.   
 
Sources: Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando (2008), Aguirre and Bisbal (2010).   
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Reporters Without Borders’ report on 2009 government-led media 
‘shutdown’ 
 
“34 broadcast media shut down at government’s behest”  
Published on Sunday 2 August 2009. 
 
Reporters Without Borders vigorously condemns the massive closure of broadcast 
media on allegedly “administrative grounds.” The government announced yesterday 
that it was withdrawing the licenses of a total of 34 radio and TV stations, 13 of which 
already stopped broadcasting yesterday. 
 
“In any country that respects the rule of law, a broadcast media suspected of using a 
frequency in an irregular manner would have been warned in advance that 
proceedings were being initiated against it and its representatives would have been 
given a chance to defend themselves,” Reporters Without Borders said. 
 
“Is it still possible to publicly express any criticism at all of President Hugo Chávez’s 
“Bolivarian” government?” the press freedom organisation asked. “This massive 
closure of mainly opposition media is a dangerous for the future of democratic debate 
in Venezuela and is motivated by the government’s desire to silence dissent. It will just 
exacerbate social divisions.” 
 
When the authorities announced the withdrawal of 34 broadcast media licenses, they 
warned that 200 other radio and TV stations could suffer the same fate. Diosdado 
Cabello, the minister who supervises the National Telecommunications Commission 
(Conatel), said the reasons were technical and administrative inasmuch as the owners 
of these media were unable to demonstrate that they had broadcast licenses. 
 
The announcement set off a storm of protest. “This is the most import curb on freedom 
of expression ever seen in Venezuela,” said Carlos Correa, the head of Espacio 
Público, an NGO that defends free speech. “This is without precedent in a period of 
democracy,” he added. The closures came on the heels of a government 
announcement that it intended to “democratise” Venezuela’s media. Attorney general 
Luisa Ortega presented a bill to the national assembly on 30 July providing for severe 
punishments for “media crimes”. “The Venezuelan state must regulate freedom of 
expression,” Ortega said. “I demand that a limit be placed on this right.” The bill 
envisages prison sentences for those who break the 2004 Radio and TV Social 
Responsibility Law, which until now punished violators with fines and license 
suspensions. 
 
Under the new bill, broadcasting a “false”, “manipulated” or “distorted” report, or 
broadcasting reports that “harm the interests of the state” or attack “public decency” or 
“mental health” will be regarded as a media crime carrying a maximum sentence of 
four years in prison.The bill would also punish “refusal to reveal information” and 
“deliberate omission of a report,” thereby jeopardising the principle of the confidentiality 
of journalists’ sources. These offences carry a sentence of six months to four years in 
prison. 
 
Source: https://en.rsf.org/venezuela-34-broadcast-media-shut-down-at-02-08-2009,  
34056.html# [Accessed 5 March 2012].  
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
Freedom House reports on freedom of the press in Venezuela  
 
2002 Report: 
 
President Hugo Chávez and his government repeatedly attacked the news media 
through harsh speeches, a court ruling that newspapers must state their political 
leanings, and threats to pass a "law on content" and revoke the license of a respected 
television network. A 2000 law empowers the president to suspend broadcasting when 
he judges it to be in the interest of the nation. Journalists are required to be a member 
of the National College of Journalists. Criminal defamation laws are enforced against 
journalists. The constitution, redrafted under Chávez, includes a clause requiring 
"truthful information" in the press. The National Telecommunications Commission 
investigated the 24-hour news channel to determine whether it had reported "false 
news." In June, Chávez threatened to expel foreign journalists who insulted Venezuela 
or his government. 
 
 
2005 Report: 
 
A hostile political atmosphere has pitted the largely pro-opposition private media 
against the government of President Hugo Chávez and the state-controlled media. One 
result has been a steady decline in press freedom over the past several years-a trend 
that continued in 2004-reflected in the government's enactment of legislation 
prohibiting the broadcast of certain material, its intimidation of and denial of access to 
private media, and the continued harassment of journalists, directed primarily at those 
employed by private media outlets. The most worrying development occurred on 
December 7, when the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television was 
ratified, mandating large fines and possible closure if prohibited content is aired. 
Content not to be broadcast includes a series of vague prescriptions against 
"incitements to war," "disruptions of the public order," "disrespect toward legitimate 
institutions and authorities," or "threats to national security," which could have the 
effect of producing self-censorship. The law also restricts content including sex and 
violence to specific broadcast times and requires source disclosure. An 11-person 
Directorate of Social Responsibility, 7 of whose members are appointed by the 
government, is responsible for enforcing the law. The penal code was also amended in 
December to include a broader category of government officials covered by desacato 
(disrespect) provisions and to increase dramatically the criminal penalties for slander 
and libel, charges often employed by government officials to intimidate private media 
journalists. The government allegedly abuses its power to regulate media, with 
community radio stations reporting politically motivated irregularities in the allotment of 
broadcast frequencies. Freedom of expression is also restricted by a law requiring 
journalists to have a journalism degree and formal membership in the National College 
of Journalists; violations are punishable by a three-to-six-month jail term. This law was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in July (these requirements are waived for foreign 
journalists and columnists).  
 
Tensions between private media and the government of Hugo Chávez remain high. 
International organisations including the Inter American Press Association denounced 
a hostile climate toward media fostered by the government. Direct assaults against 
media declined compared with 2003, but journalists still decried authorities' efforts to 
prevent free reporting, including threats and attacks by government supporters. 
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Journalists from private media outlets complained that a lack of access impeded their 
reporting, including being denied entrance to the presidential palace and other official 
events, rights granted to journalists from state-controlled media. Journalists reported 
more than 30 complaints of harassment; the majority were committed by government 
supporters against private media, but some cases involved attacks by opposition 
leaders against state-owned media. Several cases involved the harassment of 
journalists by the National Guard and other officials. In June, government supporters 
attacked two Caracas media outlets, including a television station (Radio Caracas 
Television) and a daily newspaper (El Nacional). In both cases, attackers threw stones 
and other objects, set fires, and damaged buildings. Pro-government assailants shot 
and injured four reporters with rubber bullets and tear gas during protests. Radio 
reporter and columnist Mauro Marcano Ramos was killed in September, allegedly by 
drug traffickers as a result of his reporting.  
 
The government controls two national television stations, a national radio network, and 
a wire service; the president maintains a weekly radio show and exercises his power to 
preempt programming to ensure extensive broadcasting of governmental 
announcements in private media.  
 
 
2008 Report: 
 
A hostile political atmosphere over the past several years under the government of 
President Hugo Chávez has fostered a steady decline in press freedom that continued 
in 2007. The major event of the year was the government’s refusal to renew the 
broadcast license of the popular opposition-aligned television station Radio Caracas 
Television (RCTV). In general, state initiatives have gradually eroded the influence of 
private media and pro-opposition outlets. Among other actions, the government has 
enacted legislation prohibiting the broadcast of certain material, intimidated and denied 
access to private media, and harassed journalists and media outlets that are critical of 
the government.  
 
The legal environment for the press remains poor. While the law guarantees freedom 
of speech and of the press, the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television, 
signed in December 2004, contains vaguely worded restrictions that can be used to 
severely limit freedom of expression. For example, the law forbids graphic depictions of 
violence between 5:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. on both television and radio. In March 
2005, the penal code was revised to make insulting the president a crime punishable 
by six to 30 months in prison. Furthermore, comments that could “expose another 
person to contempt or public hatred” constitute a crime punishable by one to three 
years in prison as well as a severe fine. Inaccurate reporting that “disturbs the public 
peace” carries a prison sentence of two to five years. Dozens of legal proceedings 
against media workers and outlets remained open in 2007, and there were several 
convictions, including of the opposition daily Tal Cual, which was fined some $75,000 
for seemingly innocuous comments in a satirical piece that mentioned Chávez’s 
daughter. (…) Despite weeks of student-led protests and denunciations by numerous 
human rights and media groups, RCTV was forced off the air on May 27. Media 
watchdogs questioned the decision’s motivation, legality, and lack of transparency. In a 
survey by regional watchdog Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad (Ipys), 30 percent of 
journalists declared that the station’s closure would make them think twice about 
publishing certain information. 
 
Direct assaults on the media continued to occur regularly in 2007. Political polarisation 
remained high, and numerous journalists were injured by either supporters or 
opponents of the government during street protests, which peaked during the periods 
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preceding the May RCTV closure and the December constitutional referendum vote. 
One of the only remaining local opposition television stations, Globovisión, remained a 
primary target for physical aggression, lawsuits, the denial of access to information, 
verbal attacks, and threats to cancel its license. A survey by Ipys revealed that 56 
percent of journalists had suffered some sort of verbal or physical threat or attack 
during the previous year. The state does little to nothing to discourage such 
harassment. The same survey noted that only 9 percent of reporters were inclined to 
formally complain about threats, attacks, and harassment. In May, prominent 
government ally Eva Golinger unveiled a list of 33 journalists who had participated in 
cultural exchange programs financed by the U.S. State Department. Along with some 
congressional allies, she called for investigations into whether the reporters were 
engaged in espionage. However, even some government supporters, notably National 
Assembly president Desiree Santos and former vice president José Vicente Rangel, 
acknowledged that the accusations were extreme. In general, independent journalists 
complained that a lack of access impeded their reporting; they were often denied entry 
to military ceremonies and other official events that state media representatives were 
allowed to attend. 
 
In addition to fostering the proliferation of community-based media outlets, the 
government controls five national television stations, a national radio network, and a 
wire service, all of which have benefited from budget increases. Government-run 
stations operate alongside a shrinking number of private television and radio stations. 
The country’s leading newspapers are privately owned and most identify with the 
opposition, but they are subject to threats and violence by the government and its 
supporters, sometimes leading to self-censorship. Local and regional media are 
particularly dependent on government advertising revenue, leaving them vulnerable to 
economic retaliation for criticism. According to responses to the Ipys study, fear of 
offending the government and a reluctance to antagonize ad buyers were the two 
primary reasons for a high level of editorial-directed self-censorship. The president has 
a weekly television show and exercises his power to preempt regular programming to 
ensure extensive coverage of government cadenas (announcements) in private media 
(…).   
 
 
2010 Report: 
 
Media freedom declined in Venezuela in 2009 due to increased legal harassment. The 
authorities suppressed political opposition in the media through harsh regulation of 
privately owned broadcast channels. While freedoms of speech and the press are 
constitutionally guaranteed, the 2004 Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and 
Television contains vaguely worded restrictions that can be used to severely limit these 
freedoms. Criminal statutes assign hefty fines and long prison terms for “offending” or 
“denigrating” the authorities. Since 2005, defamation of the president has been 
punishable by 6 to 30 months in prison, while offending lower-ranking officials carries 
lighter punishments. Individuals can also sue the press for “public disdain” or “hatred.” 
 
In July 2009, the attorney general introduced a bill designed to curb “the abusive 
exercise of freedom of information and opinion” and to “prevent and punish actions or 
omissions” in the media that could constitute a crime. These included messages that 
threaten “social peace, the security and independence of the nation, the stability of 
state institutions, the peoples’ mental health or public ethics, and the justice system.” 
Following international criticism, the National Assembly shelved the bill in August. 
However, the legislature did adopt an education statute that prohibited materials 
inciting “hate,” “aggressiveness,” or “terror in children.” Journalists protested this law as 
a restriction on freedom of expression. 
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Regulatory harassment of the press continued unabated in 2009. After President Hugo 
Chávez succeeding in lifting term limits for elected officials in a February referendum, 
authorities again resorted to revoking broadcast licenses and taking legal action 
against critical media organisations. In July, the National Telecommunications 
Commission (Conatel) launched a sweeping review of 240 broadcast licenses, pulling 
32 private radio and 2 private television stations off the air. While Conatel called the 
move an effort to “democratize the airwaves,” it was widely seen as an attempt to 
suppress dissent. 
 
Throughout 2009, the private, opposition-oriented television station Globovisión 
remained a key target of official harassment. Beginning in May, Globovisión faced a 
growing number of state inquiries, such as accusations of “inciting panic and anxiety in 
the population” after it aired reports of an earthquake in Caracas. By mid-June, Conatel 
and the Attorney General’s Office had opened a formal review on possible violations of 
the 2000 Law on Telecommunications, including lack of a proper network registration. 
The commission launched another probe in July, this time into claims that the station 
had created a general state of “anguish, anxiety, and fear.” In an additional 
administrative proceeding launched in September, Globovisión was accused of using 
on-air text messages to incite a rebellion. 
 
Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), a popular television station whose free-to-air 
broadcast license had been revoked in May 2007 and which had since operated a 
cable subsidiary called RCTV International (RCTVI) and an internet-based service, 
also faced renewed pressures in 2009. Conatel extended the Law of Social 
Responsibility in Radio and Television to the cable industry, requiring domestic network 
operators to clear time for presidential addresses (cadenas) and state advertising, free 
of charge. On December 22, Conatel announced that “international” stations would be 
defined as any cable or satellite channel on which foreign programming accounts for at 
least 70 percent of the content. Consequently, RCTVI could not qualify. 
 
Journalists—largely but not exclusively from private media—continued to be 
intimidated, beaten, threatened, and detained, or have their equipment destroyed or 
confiscated. In January 2009, gunmen shot and injured political editor Rafael Finol of 
the pro-Chávez daily El Regional in Acarigua. In February, the progovernment group 
La Piedrita claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on independent journalists 
and threatened Globovisión and the director of RCTV. Individuals believed to be 
employed or supported by the state assaulted Grupo Capriles newspaper reporters 
during a street protest in Caracas in July, criticizing them as “oligarchs” and “enemies 
of the people.” (…) In August, a group of at least 30 pro-government activists with the 
Venezuelan Patriotic Union (UPV) attacked the Globovisión offices with tear gas, 
injuring a police officer. Past cases of harassment of opposition media have not been 
investigated sufficiently. Top officials also frequently engage in negative verbal rhetoric 
against journalists and media outlets that are perceived to be anti-government, while 
opposition-aligned media owners respond in a similar fashion. 
 
Although murders of journalists are relatively rare, with six reporters killed in the past 
decade, two Venezuelan journalists were murdered in separate incidents in January 
2009. Jacinto Lopez of El Impulso was kidnapped and shot to death, and Orel 
Sambrano, director of the political weekly ABC de la Semana and Radio America, was 
shot and killed by gunmen on motorcycles. Two suspects were arrested in connection 
with Sambrano’s killing in February and July, but the alleged mastermind of the murder 
remained at large, and no trial date had been set by year’s end. Before his death, 
Sambrano had been publishing stories about the drug trade in the Valencia area. 
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While a large portion of the print sector and a number of opposition broadcast outlets 
remain hostile toward the government, their share of the market has declined in recent 
years, as the government has cancelled or taken over private outlets’ licenses. Mass 
media investment and usage remain a top priority for the Venezuelan government, 
which relies on some 238 radio stations, 28 television channels, 340 publications, and 
125 websites to disseminate its political platform. Venezuela’s leading newspapers are 
privately owned, though dependence on government advertising encourages the 
papers to avoid critical coverage or politically sensitive topics. Self-censorship is also 
practiced regularly due to harassment and threats of fines or closure (…). 
 
The government maintains control over most of the free-to-air broadcast media. For a 
number of years, prominent private networks have decidedly avoided confrontation 
with the government, minimizing if not eliminating their criticism of the Chávez 
administration. After toning down its anti-Chávez line, Venevisión had its license 
renewed for another five years in 2007, as did Televén in 2008. During a March 2009 
broadcast of his weekly television show, Chávez ordered the government leadership at 
all levels to investigate radio stations and newspapers, determining their content and 
owners. This declared “media war” with the opposition also extends to material on the 
Internet. 
 
Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela [Accessed 14 May 2012] 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Violations to freedom of the press in Venezuela (2003, 2005, 2008) 
 
 
Types and quantities of violations to freedom of the press in Venezuela  
 
Types of violations  2003  2005 2008  
Aggressions  28 15 18 
Physical attacks 32 10 16 
Threats 25 16 12 
Official censorship 28 13 18 
Legal restrictions 4 2 3 
Verbal harassment  7 16 11 
State intimidation  47 31 24 
Judicial harassment  3 28 17 
Administrative restrictions 12 13 13 
TOTAL 186 164 123 
 
Source: Non-government organisations Provea, Espacio Público, Instituto Prensa y Sociedad 
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Victims of violations to freedom of the press by (media) occupation 
 
Occupation in media 2003 2005 2008 
Reporters 45 47 31 
Camera-operators 16 5 14 
Columnists 4 8 15 
Programme hosts 2 4 11 
Directors/Editors 7 10 8 
Supportive citizens  0 2 4 
Photographers  18 9 11 
Broadcast narrators  2 2 7 
Investigative reporters 2 9 5 
News media outlets  7 53 42 
Institutional journalists 1 3 3 
Drivers/Other 11 4 9 
Media owners 1 1 2 
TOTAL  114 164 162 (*) 
 
Source: Non-government organisations Provea, Espacio Público, Instituto Prensa y Sociedad 
 
(*) According to data from Provea and Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (Ipys), 16% of the 
victims of violations to freedom of the press worked for state-funded and official media, 
74% worked for the private media, 4% worked in communitarian media, while 6% could not 
be identified.  
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
Amnesty International Reports: Venezuela*  
 
 
2007 Report: 
 
Most human rights violations committed by members of the security forces remained 
unpunished. Human rights defenders and journalists were threatened, intimidated and 
attacked. 
 
Background:  
 
Hugo Chávez was elected President in December for a third six-year term. In April 
Venezuela abandoned the Andean Community of Nations trading block, after Colombia 
and Peru signed free trade agreements with the USA, and joined the South American 
trade group Mercosur. The government continued to establish social programmes 
aimed at the most vulnerable, including programmes to improve access to education, 
health and housing. The independence and impartiality of the judiciary continued to be 
questioned. There were serious concerns that the proliferation of small arms was 
fuelling an increase in violence. 
 
Impunity, intimidation and harassment: Human rights violations, including torture, 
extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances perpetrated by members of the 
security forces remained unpunished. 
 
In July the bodies of eight people, including two children, were found on a ranch in the 
villages of La Victoria and El Nula in Alto Apure region, on the border with Colombia. 
Their hands were tied and they had been shot and their bodies burned. Witness 
accounts and initial evidence obtained by the police indicated that several members of 
the military had been involved in the killings. Despite this, only one member of the 
military was charged and tried for this crime. Human rights organisations alleged that 
this was part of a wider pattern of human rights violations by the same military unit 
against rural communities in Apure state. 
Melquiades Villaroel was threatened in February after a judge sentenced five police 
officers to 25 years' imprisonment for the killing of her son Rafael Moreno Villaroel and 
two others, including a child, in El Tigre, Anzoátegui state, in March 2001. 
 
There were concerns for the safety of the Mendoza family in Araure, Portuguesa state, 
following a shooting at their house in March. The Mendoza family had taken part in the 
trial of 11 police officers accused of the killing of seven people, including three 
members of their family. 
 
Human rights defenders:  
 
Human rights defenders continued to be threatened and intimidated. In May the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights reiterated its concern at threats and other 
open hostility towards human rights defenders by government officials who publicly 
referred to human rights defenders as "coup plotters" and agents of instability. 
 
In April, María del Rosario Guerrero and her husband, Adolfo Martínez Barrios, were 
victims of an attempted assassination in Guárico state. They had been the subject of a 
campaign of defamation and intimidation since 2001, apparently linked to María del 
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Rosario Guerrero's allegations of human rights violations by the police in Guárico state. 
By the end of the year, María del Rosario Guerrero was receiving protection, following 
a ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 
In September, the Public Ministry recommended the dismissal of the case and closure 
of the investigation into the threats and acts of intimidation against members of the 
human rights organisation COFAVIC (Comité de Familiares de Víctimas de los 
sucesos de Febrero-Marzo de 1989). A court ruling on the recommendation was 
pending at the end of the year. Staff from COFAVIC feared for their safety as the 
dismissal of this case might mean the withdrawal of police protection. 
 
There were concerns that a draft law on international co-operation which would allow 
government officials to decide which non-governmental organisations could access 
international funds, could be used to restrict the work of human rights defenders (…). 
 
Attacks against journalists:  
 
Threats and attacks against journalists continued.  
 
The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Organisation of American 
States expressed concern about the killing in April of Jorge Aguirre, a photographer for 
the newspaper El Mundo. He was reportedly shot dead at a demonstration in Caracas 
protesting against high levels of crime and insecurity, following the kidnapping and 
killing of three students. A former police officer was charged with the shooting. At the 
end of the year he was awaiting trial. 
 
In August, Jesús Flores Rojas, Co-ordinator of the newspaper Región in El Tigre, 
Anzoátegui state, who had exposed corruption by local civil servants, was shot eight 
times in the head while he was parking his car in front of his house. The men allegedly 
responsible for the shooting were reportedly shot and killed by police. Three police 
officers were reportedly detained, accused of involvement in the killing of Jesús Flores 
Rojas. At the end of the year it was not known whether the Public Ministry had pressed 
charges. 
 
 
2008 Report: 
 
Thousands of government and anti-government supporters took to the streets on 
several occasions. A number of demonstrations ended in violent clashes between 
different groups of protesters and between protesters and the police. A new law on the 
right of women to live without fear of violence gave hope to thousands of women who 
experience violence in the home, community or workplace. 
 
Background:  
 
President Hugo Chávez Frías took office for a third term in January and Congress 
granted him powers to pass legislation by decree for 18 months on a wide range of 
issues including public security and institutional reform. In December, Venezuelans 
rejected controversial constitutional changes in a referendum. Concerns had been 
expressed, including by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and 
expression, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights 
Defenders and the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, 
that some of the constitutional changes proposed would have curtailed fundamental 
human rights. 
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Political violence:  
 
The authorities did not take effective action to stop an escalation of violence in the 
context of demonstrations by supporters and opponents of government policies. There 
were reports of violent clashes between civilians, and between civilians and police 
officers throughout the year which resulted in scores of injuries and at least two deaths. 
 
Scores of demonstrators, mainly students, including several who were under 18 were 
injured or arrested in the context of protests over the authorities’ decision not to renew 
the licence of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV) in May. Several police officers were 
also injured in the clashes. 
 
Confrontations between both law enforcement officials and demonstrators, and 
between demonstrators and armed civilians, also took place in the context of tensions 
over the proposed constitutional reforms. 
 
 
2009 Report: 
 
Attacks on journalists were widespread. Human rights defenders continued to suffer 
harassment. Prison conditions provoked hunger strikes in facilities across the country. 
Some significant steps were taken to implement the 2007 law on violence against 
women but there was a lack of commitment from many of the authorities responsible. 
Lack of arms control contributed to high levels of violence and public insecurity.  
 
Background:  
On 31 July the enabling law that empowered President Hugo Chávez Frías to pass 
legislation by decree on a wide range of issues including public security and 
institutional reform came to an end with legislative power returning in its entirety to the 
National Assembly. During the 18 months the law was in force, President Chávez 
issued a total of 66 decrees covering a wide range of issues.  
 
A law on national intelligence and security passed by presidential decree in May was 
withdrawn the following month following protests against several aspects of the law, 
including a provision that would have obliged people to inform on each other or face 
prosecution.  
 
There were reports of physical attacks on journalists, by both security forces and by 
civilians. Public insecurity remained an issue, with high numbers of small arms in 
circulation, including within the prison system. (…) 
 
Local elections for mayors and governors took place in November. Implementation of 
anti-corruption orders against a number of public officials effectively prevented them 
from standing for election. The Supreme Court of Justice upheld the constitutionality of 
these orders in August.  
 
In December, the Supreme Court ruled that a decision by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights that three judges should be reinstated and compensated for their 
removal from their posts, was “unforceable”. The judges had been dismissed in 2003. 
There was concern that the Supreme Court decision could undermine provisions in the 
Constitution guaranteeing the implementation of rulings by international bodies. (…) 
 
Human Right Defenders: 
 
Government officials attempted to undermine legitimate human rights work by making 
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unfounded accusations against human rights organisations.  
 
Local human rights activists supporting the Yukpa Indigenous community who were 
involved in a dispute with local landowners over land rights in the State of Zulia were 
harassed and detained in August. An official investigation was initiated following the 
death in July of the elderly father of Sabino Romero Izarra, one of the community 
leaders; he was allegedly beaten to death by armed men.  
 
In September, two senior officials of the international NGO Human Rights Watch were 
expelled from the country following the launch of a report criticizing the government’s 
human rights record. 
 
Human rights defender José Luis Urbano was repeatedly threatened because of his 
work as President of the Foundation for the Defence of the Right to Education 
(Fundación Pro-Defensa del Derecho a la Educación). In May, the director of a school 
where he had exposed irregularities threatened him and called for him to be attacked. 
Also in May he received anonymous death threats by telephone. (…)  
 
 
2010 Report: 
 
Attacks, harassment and intimidation of those critical of government policies, including 
journalists and human rights defenders, were widespread. Unfounded charges were 
brought against those who opposed government policies. More special courts and 
prosecutor’s offices specializing in gender-based violence were established. However, 
the implementation of the 2007 law to eradicate violence against women remained 
slow.  
 
Background: 
 
In February, the limit on presidential terms was removed, following a referendum. 
Social unrest increased; there were nearly twice as many protests between January 
and August as in the whole of 2008. The protests were sparked by issues such as 
discontent over labour rights and basic services, including a new education law 
opposed by the private education sector and the political opposition.  
 
The National Assembly debated the possibility of legal reforms to regulate the use and 
possession of small arms, including harsher sentences for possession of weapons. 
According to the National Assembly’s Security and Defence Commission, there were 
between nine and 15 million illegal firearms in circulation.  
 
Reforms to the armed forces in October included provisions allowing the creation of 
militias. Ten police officers charged with criminal offences in the context of the 2002 
attempted coup against President Chávez were sentenced to up to 30 years’ 
imprisonment in April. They were convicted of homicide and grievous bodily harm 
against anti-coup protesters amid concerns that not all of those who committed acts of 
violence in the context of the attempted coup had been brought to justice.  
 
Human rights defenders:  
 
Human rights defenders and victims of human rights violations and their relatives 
seeking justice and redress continued to be attacked, threatened and harassed by the 
security forces.  
 
In August, two men shot at José Luis Urbano, President of the Foundation for the 
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Defence of the Right to Education, an NGO working to promote and defend the 
constitutional right to free education for all. He and other members of the Foundation 
had been the targets of a series of attacks and threats. By the end of the year, nobody 
had been brought to justice for this attack or for the shooting in 2007 which left José 
Luis Urbano seriously injured. No protection measures had been put in place for him, 
his family or other members of the Foundation by the end of 2009.  
 
In October, Oscar Barrios was shot dead in the town of Guanayén, Aragua State, by 
two armed men dressed in similar clothing to that worn by police officers. The shooting 
followed a six-year campaign of harassment and intimidation against the Barrios family 
which began after they reported the killing of Narciso Barrios by police officers in 2003. 
Further killings of family members took place: Luis Barrios was killed in 2004 and 
Rigoberto Barrios in 2005. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called on 
Venezuela to take the necessary measures to guarantee the right to life and security of 
the Barrios family and to bring those responsible for the killings to justice.  
 
In November, human rights defender Mijail Martínez was shot dead in Lara state. He 
had been working with the Committee of Victims Against Impunity in Lara on a 
documentary film featuring the stories of people who had suffered human rights 
violations at the hands of police officers. By the end of the year nobody had been 
brought to justice for the killing and no protection had been provided for the family.  
 
Freedom of expression:  
 
Journalists were harassed, intimidated and threatened. At least 34 radio stations had 
their licences revoked for non-compliance with statutory telecommunications 
regulations. However, as noted in August by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the authorities’ public 
statement that these stations “play[ed] at destabilizing Venezuela” indicated that their 
editorial stance could have been the actual reason behind the closure.  
 
There was concern that a draft law which would criminalize the dissemination of 
information in media outlets which was “false” and could “harm the interest of the state” 
could undermine freedom of information and expression. The law remained before the 
National Assembly at the end of the year.  
 
In August, staff at the Caracas offices of the television channel Globovisión were 
attacked by armed men. Teargas grenades were thrown and one of the security guards 
was beaten. Globovisión was widely regarded as opposing government policies. In 
January, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a ruling ordering the 
authorities to investigate reports of intimidation and physical and verbal attacks against 
Globovisión staff. No investigation had been initiated by the end of the year. 
 
(*) Reports by Amnesty International on Venezuela for the years between 2000 and 2007 
were sought, but not found on the organisation’s local and international websites. 
 
Source: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/venezuela/ [Accessed 2 March 2012]. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
List of interviewees, their job roles, and dates/periods of interviews 
 
 
List of Interviewees, and their occupations and employers (2000-2010) 
 
Name of interviewee  Occupation and organisation/media outlet(s) 
where interviewee worked (2000-2010) 
Juan Francisco ALONSO News reporter at El Universal daily  
Víctor AMAYA  News producer at FM Center Radio / former 
Political reporter at TalCual daily  
Marcelino BISBAL  Media Professor at Andres Bello University / Co-
Director at Centro Gumilla Communications Think 
tank 
Douglas BOLÍVAR News reporter at TeleSur TV / former News 
reporter at Correo del Orinoco daily  
Lisseth BOON  Investigative reporter at Últimas Noticias daily and 
El Mundo daily 
Isnardo BRAVO  News reporter at RCTV 
Michel CABALLERO  Political reporter at Radio Nacional de Venezuela 
(RNV) and VTV / former News reporter at state 
news agency Agencia Venezolana de Noticias 
(AVN) 
Hernán CANOREA Reporter at Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV)  
Rafael CARABALLO  Coordinator of Programming at Tiuna Community 
radio 
Mercedes CHACÍN  Deputy Editor at Ciudad Caracas daily / former 
News reporter at Últimas Noticias daily 
Alexis COLINA Content Coordinator at Voces Libertarias 
Community radio 
Xabier COSCOJUELA  Information (Deputy) Editor at TalCual daily 
Eleazar DÍAZ RANGEL Editor-in-Chief at Últimas Noticias daily 
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Víctor Hugo FEBRES  Co-Director of Los del Medio journalism group/ 
former News and content producer at Televén TV 
and RCTV 
Tania de GARCÍA Editor-in-Chief and Co-owner of Vea daily 
Aliana GONZÁLEZ Director of Information at El Nacional daily / 
former News reporter at El Universal daily and at 
TalCual daily 
Moraima GUANIPA Media and Journalism Professor at Central 
University of Venezuela 
Ameliut HERNÁNDEZ News reporter at VTV 
Clodovaldo HERNÁNDEZ News reporter and columnist at Correo del 
Orinoco daily / former News reporter at El 
Universal daily 
Marco HERNÁNDEZ Director of Journalism NGO Periodistas por la 
Verdad / Content manager at Conatel 
Government Bureau / former News reporter at 
Panorama daily 
María Alejandra LÓPEZ
  
Head of Programming and former News reporter 
at Unión Radio network 
Diana LOZANO News reporter at El Nacional daily 
Hernán LUGO-GALICIA News reporter at El Nacional daily / General 
Secretary of National Journalists’ College (CNP) 
Cristina MARCANO  Politics Editor at El Nacional daily 
Américo MARTÍN  Columnist at Código Venezuela website and at 
TalCual daily / independent politician 
Javier MAYORCA News reporter at El Nacional daily 
Taisa MEDINA Director of Information at El Universal daily 
Alonso MOLEIRO  News Producer and Host at Unión Radio FM / 
News commentator at Globovisión TV / former 
News reporter  
Pedro Pablo PEÑALOZA News reporter and commentator at Globovisión 
TV / News reporter at El Universal daily  
 
 
284 
 
Argelio PÉREZ  Information Editor at Vea daily 
Teodoro PETKOFF Editor-in-Chief at TalCual daily / News 
Programme director and Host at Globovisión TV/ 
independent politician 
Hugo PRIETO  News reporter at Últimas Noticias daily / former 
News reporter at El Nacional daily 
Carlos REVETTE News reporter and programme director at ANTV/ 
News commentator at YVKE Mundial Radio 
Jordán RODRÍGUEZ  News reporter at TeleSur TV and ANTV  
Diana Carolina RUIZ  News reporter and Host at Globovisión TV 
Felipe SALDIVIA  Assistant Editor at Ciudad Caracas daily / former 
News reporter at El Universal daily 
Stephanie SARTORI  News reporter at VTV 
Ewald SCHARFENBERG  Director of Journalism NGO Instituto Sociedad y 
Prensa (Ipys)  
Rafael UZCATEGUI  General Coordinator at Human Rights NGO 
Provea / Co-Director of El Libertario newspaper 
Ernesto VILLEGAS News commentator and Host at VTV / Editor-in-
Chief at Ciudad Caracas daily / former News 
reporter at El Universal daily  
Laura WEFFER  Investigative reporter at Últimas Noticias daily/ 
News reporter and commentator at Fe y Alegría 
Radio / former News reporter at TalCual daily and 
El Nacional daily 
Fabiola ZERPA Investigative reporter at El Nacional daily 
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Periods in which interviews were carried out in situ (Caracas, Venezuela): 
 
26th March 2012 to 14th April 2012, 
 
20th May 2012 to 9th June 2012,  
 
22nd December 2013 to 5th January 2014.  
 
 
Dates of interviews:  
 
Juan Francisco Alonso, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 24th May 2012. 
  
Víctor Amaya, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th May 2012. 
  
Marcelino Bisbal, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 3rd and 4th April 2012.  
 
Douglas Bolívar, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 1st June 2012.  
  
Lisseth Boon, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 7th April 2012. 
 
Michel Caballero, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 8th June 2012. 
  
Rafael Caraballo, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 27th December 2013. 
 
Isnardo Bravo, interview by author, 6th July 2013. (Telephone interview).  
 
Hernán Canorea, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 4th June 2012. 
 
Mercedes Chacín, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 5th June 2012.  
 
Alexis Colina, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 4th January 2014. 
 
Xabier Coscojuela, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 30th May 2012. 
 
Eleazar Díaz Rangel, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th March 2012. 
  
Víctor Hugo Febres, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th May 2012.  
  
Tania de García, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 10th April 2012.  
  
Aliana González, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 27th March 2012. 
 
Moraima Guanipa, interview by author, 2nd July 2013. (Telephone interview). 
 
Ameliut Hernández, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 2th June 2012.  
  
Clodovaldo Hernández, interview by author, 11th and 12th July 2013. (Telephone 
interview). 
  
Marco Hernández, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 31st March 2012.  
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María Alejandra López, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th December 2013. 
  
Diana Lozano, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th May 2012.  
  
Hernán Lugo-Galicia, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 27th March 2012. 
  
Cristina Marcano, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 7th June 2012.  
  
Américo Martín, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 10th April 2012. 
  
Javier Mayorca, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 28th May 2012.  
  
Taisa Medina, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 26th May 2012.    
  
Alonso Moleiro, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 8th June 2012.  
  
Pedro Pablo Peñaloza, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 24th and 26th May 
2012. 
   
Argelio Pérez, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 22nd May 2012.   
   
Teodoro Petkoff, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 6th April and 4th June 2012.
  
Hugo Prieto, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 6th June 2012 and 23rd 
December 2013.  
  
Carlos Revette, interview by author, 25th May 2013. (Telephone interview).  
 
Jordán Rodríguez, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 8th June 2012. 
 
Diana Carolina Ruiz, interview by author, 4th July 2013. (Telephone interview).  
  
Felipe Saldivia, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 25th March 2012.   
 
Stephanie Sartori, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 2nd June 2012. 
 
Ewald Scharfenberg, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 11th April 2012.   
 
Rafael Uzcátegui, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th December 2013.
  
Ernesto Villegas, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 31st May 2012. 
  
Laura Weffer, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 29th May and 4th June 2012.
   
Fabiola Zerpa, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 10th and 11th April 2012. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
Interview Guide  
 
 
The interview guide (organised around the research’s main questions and related 
themes) is directed to Venezuelan news reporters, media practitioners, and editors; 
and also to news media owners, communications and media scholars, NGOs’ 
representatives, public functionaries, politicians, and “expert” commentators.  
 
 
Personal Background 
 
– What has been your main occupation during the 2000s? 
– How would you define your professional or non-professional journalistic/media 
background? 
– Which media outlets and organisations have you worked for/with in the 2000s? What 
have been the main motives behind this? 
– How would you define yourself politically/ideologically?  
 
Ideas of media’s contribution to democracy 
 
– Do you hold specific ideas and tenets about democracy? Is there a specific model of 
democracy you support? 
– Has the Left-Right political debate been defining your own political standing, and 
influencing your views on media and society in Venezuela? 
– Historically speaking, would you define Venezuela as a democratic society?  
– How do you understand the contribution of media to democratic enhancement? Has 
there been democratic enhancement in the country under the Chávez administration? 
– What type of democracy does President Chávez’s political project represent? How 
would you define, broadly, the political process he leads? 
– Is it pertinent to define Venezuelan society (2000-2010) as politically polarised? If so, 
how do you evaluate such polarisation, broadly speaking? 
 
Historical perception of the political climate in Venezuela (2000-2010) 
 
– How would you describe the political climate in Venezuela during the Chávez 
regime? What could make it different from the past national political experiences? 
– Have narratives and theories of radical thought vis-à-vis liberal political traditions 
been shaping Venezuela’s social, cultural and media context in the 2000s? 
– What might be the main reasons behind such political environment? 
– In what ways is the Chávez era similar or different to 19th century and 20th century 
political historical periods? 
– How democratic is the country (2000-2010)? How solid are institutions? How plural 
and participative is the public sphere? Have these aspects changed compared to the 
pre-Chávez era? 
– To which Venezuelan political historical figures can President Chávez relate to?  
 
Characterisation of Venezuela’s news media environment, and the democratic 
debate (2000-2010) 
 
– What have been the most significant changes in journalistic practice during that 
period of time (2000-2010), and compared to before?  
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– What have been the causes of these changes? How do these relate to political and 
ideological aspects? 
– What is your perception of the democratic role the news media have played in 
society? Has democracy been generally strengthened or not by journalists and news 
media (and how so)? 
– How have news media fitted into national institutional dynamics? Can you give 
examples? 
– To what degree have the media offered democratic participation and debate?  
– How have the President’s figure, and his use of the media, contributed to democratic 
debate? 
 
Journalistic “negotiation”, news bias, and legal aspects in Venezuelan media 
(2000-2010) 
 
– What have been the main constrains and pressures for reporters and news-media 
practitioners (please give examples)? What effects do these have? 
– How have political/ideological standings affected newsroom work and the structure of 
news media organisations? Does the internalisation of political values need to be 
consonant with the news outlets journalists work for?  
– How do you perceive the coverage of political and social issues in terms of balance, 
transparency, and accuracy?  
– Which model predominates in agenda-setting and gatekeeping: informative or 
partisan? Can you explain why? 
– How do you, as a journalist, negotiate with the news media outlet when covering 
news events? 
– How do both the journalist and the news media outlet negotiate with the state (and its 
media policies) when covering news events?   
– Have you or colleagues experienced self-censorship, based on anticipation of what is 
acceptable as news (both by the news organisation and the government)?  
– How do you evaluate the presence –or not– of censorship and previous censorship in 
the news media?   
– How would you evaluate the media policies that have been implemented (2000-
2010)? What effect have they had for journalists and media owners? 
– Has your “ideal” form of journalistic practice, according to your own professional 
norms, been constrained or compromised? If so, how, why, and by whom?  
 
Access to data, coverage of elections, and coup d’état (2000-2010) 
 
– How do you evaluate the way journalists have been accessing official and non-official 
data/information? 
– What are the main challenges and advantages when covering sensitive issues in 
terms of access and sources? 
– Is jouranlistic reporting a safe job in Venezuela? Has safety increased/decreased 
while reporting?  
– How have news media contributed to the democratic elections that have taken place 
between 1998 and 2010?  
– How do you perceive the way the national news media acted during the April 2002 
coup d’etat that momentarily ousted President Chávez? What was your reaction as a 
journalist / media owner / media scholar? 
– What has election news coverage shown about the political hegemony in the 
country? 
– Have some news media outlets and professionals changed political direction before 
or during elections? What might be the causes for this and implications media-wise and 
politically? 
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Community participation/representation, media ownership and professionalism 
(2000-2010)  
 
– How have journalists and news media been “constructing” the new Venezuelan 
communities?  
– How has the representation of community and its issues shifted –if at all– under the 
Chávez administration and through state, pro-government media? 
– What are the editorial policies for covering all political parties and communitarian 
movements? Do all sides have equal access? Is each faction represented without 
bias? Can you give examples? 
– Have news media outlets or specific journalists been used as ‘bridges’ or mediators 
between different political groups? If so, what is your view on this?  
– Is there a professional logic to news-making in your experience? 
– Can you describe what are the differences between state, communitarian and private 
media; and how do the three interrelate? What are their different communicational, 
political and economic priorities? 
– Have media ownership structures changed during the Chávez era? How 
significantly? And how has possible change of ownership affected journalistic output?  
– To what extent have you felt editorial or proprietorial influences when covering and 
delivering news? 
 
Autonomy, ethics and journalistic values in Venezuela (2000-2010) 
 
– What are the editorial priorities in the news media outlet that you work for? Can you 
give examples? 
– How autonomous do you feel when reporting/editing? 
– How committed are you and fellow journalists to independent journalism? 
– What have been the main constraints when trying to carry out investigative reporting, 
when covering the street for information? 
– Which notion of journalistic ethics do you cultivate? Do these differ from the 
predominant news environment, or not? 
– How do journalistic ethics relate to market pressures, legal challenges and notions of 
social responsibility in your practice? 
– Have the news media played a watchdog role? If so, how accurate and factual-based 
are the checks on government and on the powerful?   
– How committed are you and fellow journalists to independent journalism? 
– Have the national media and journalists played a role as mediators between state 
power, non-government power and the public sphere?    
 
Journalistic culture and models in Venezuela (2000-2010) 
 
– What are the similarities and differences of the Venezuelan media case when 
compared to other Latin American media (2000-2010)? 
– How influential are global, western models (particularly the U.S.) to journalistic 
practice and ideals in the country?  
– Do you consider the media and political landscape in Venezuela unique in any way, 
exceptional in its characteristics? 
– What could be the impact, nationally, of online news media, social media, blogs, 
Twitter? 
– Where do you sense journalism practice is heading in Venezuela? Will it become 
more democratic, more participative? 
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